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Abstract
State accommodation of new religious and cultural diversity is typically understood
in terms of national models. Authors argue, for instance, that French laïcité, Dutch
pillarization, and Norwegian establishment best explain how these countries react
to newcomers. This book compares state responses to Muslims burial needs in
France,TheNetherlands, and Norway, as well as humanists’ burial needs in Norway,
providing a strikingly different image of societal accommodation.
Van den Breemer shows that policy responses follow distinctive types of logic
between the various levels of governance, and that material solution matter as well.
While national models do turn up in the discourse of public agents, suggesting
large differences between states, in everyday practice these burial agents do much
the same.
In a departure from this major finding, van den Breemer argues for a ‘two-
pronged strategy’ in the study of state responses to diversity, one that oscillates
between theory development and everyday empirical analysis. On the model and
conceptual level, her account deals with the discussion of reified state-church
models in the ‘religious governance’ literature and with the concept of secularism in
the research agenda of ‘multiple secularisms and secularities.’ On the empirical level,
she carefully maps out the previously uncharted institutional domain of cemeteries.
Thus, the volume outlines a methodologically more coherent research agenda for
the comparative study of religion, secularism, society, and state.
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Introduction: The Cemetery as a Site for Studying
(New) Diversity
1.1 Meta-Analytic Concerns and a Two-Pronged Approach
How do states respond to situations of new cultural and religious diversity? That
question stands high on the public agenda because of the polarization surrounding
Muslims, terrorism, and international migration. But scholarly developments as
well have added to its relevance. With the demise of the secularization thesis – the
idea that religion would simply fade away with the onset of modernity – numerous
new and more empirically attuned analytic frameworks have been proposed for
the global study of religion and state.
Today, scholars are battling it out over the appropriate concepts for conducting
such an analysis in light of the nature of terms like ‘religion’ and ‘secularism’ tainted
by the history of Western Christianity and colonialism. And, in particular, within
a postcolonial and religious studies agenda, scholars have raised concerns about
the potentially reifying effects of applying these concepts to societies both within
and outside of the ‘West.’ Behind the attempt to define certain practices as ‘religion’
or ‘secularism’ often lie colonial or state-interventionist motives to classify and
control.
In this book, I argue that the new, more empirically attuned scholarly approaches
to the governance of minorities are often still too abstract; and that the construction
of valid theoretical frameworks needs the viewpoint of a concrete fieldwork study.
More specifically, I argue that the empirical investigation of ‘how states respond
to situations of new diversity’ should be conducted alongside a discussion of the
best theoretical frameworks and concepts for such comparisons. In other words, I
propose connecting theory and concept development with everyday analysis.
This argument builds in part on the latest developments in the integration and
religious governance literature, where it is similarly suggested that scholarly models
of state responses make for poor analytic approaches, unless they take “account of
the ways in which government and other public actors view their social worlds (…)”
(Bowen: 2012, 354). It is increasingly being recognized that the meaning-giving
processes of public actors themselves is central to explaining or describing their
actions toward new minorities. Rather than trying to explain such governance
through the lens of a national model or a descriptive concept, such as laïcité, we
must examine how public actors reason and frame their decisions.
Of course, scholars still need scholarlymodels and concepts to reduce complexity,
but they risk reification into stereotypes by adopting overly one-dimensional ones.
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16 The Cemetery as a Site for Studying (New) Diversity
This applies to the work of the individual scholar as well as to metalevel discussions
over appropriate concepts for the global study of religion and state.
This attempt to link public actors’ reasoning to scholarly modelmaking has made
some advances in the literature. However, it still deserves a firmer standing. Fur-
thermore, it requires a broader focus: The discussion over Muslims and minorities
is typically addressed in terms of legal regimes or of public reasoning at the official
policy-making level: Few studies look at the level of application and everyday mu-
nicipal practice.1 Even fewer complement public justification with an investigation
into actual material provisions.
And this is where this book makes its most original contribution. As I show
in the pages to come, how states respond to new cultural and religious diversity
in their public domain depends largely on framing: how public agents frame and
see the issue at hand. But I expressively add the need for looking at the material
dimension as well.
On a more general level, these scholarly developments and existing lacunas
necessitate what I would like to label a ‘two-pronged strategy’ in the study of state
responses to diversity: That is (1) theory and concept development simultaneously
with (2) an analysis of empirical domain. Such a strategy entails a back-and-forth
movement between scholarly concepts and models, on the one hand, and public
actors’ everyday language and actions, on the other hand.
A strategy such as the one pursued here obliges scholars to provide nuanced
accounts of state responses that are not reified one-dimensional models. This re-
quires knowing what actually happens. Furthermore, in order to meet the need
for developing concepts, such a factual investigation should be amenable to being
translated into good scholarly concepts that capture complexity beyond the grand
narratives of, for example, ‘multiple secularisms’ or ‘postsecularity’ (cf. Bader: 2012a,
5). And, in particular for research interested in ‘lived experiences’ (e.g., Hurd: 2015;
Casanova: 2009), scholarly concepts should be informed by everyday language and
practices and not obstruct comparative analysis.
What does this mean concretely? In line with this two-pronged strategy, this
book is concerned with the following: (1) On the model and concept level, it deals
with the discussion over reified state-church models in the ‘religious governance’
literature (e.g., Bader: 2007b) andwith the concept of secularismwithin the research
agenda of the ‘multiple secularisms’ (e.g., Asad: 2003, 2018).2 These are both new
and promising, yet conceptually different frameworks for the study of governance
1 Exceptions are Galembert: 2005; Mathieu: 2000; Goodwin/Jasper 2011; Lipsky: 1980.
2 The debate over ‘multiple secularizations, secularisms, and secularities’ is a rapidly expanding research
agenda in the social sciences and humanities, linking a broad range of scholarship through the concept
of the secular/secularism/secularities. It is not a coherent framework but rather a research canon.
We narrow our discussion of that framework by analyzing one of its main theoretical proponents –
https://doi.org/10.13109/9783666567322 | CC BY-NC-ND 4.0
© 2021, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Theaterstraße 13, D-37073 Göttingen
Meta-Analytic Concerns and a Two-Pronged Approach 17
of religious minorities. (2) On the empirical level, the book carefully maps a thus-
far uncharted institutional domain. I compare how burial professionals in The
Netherlands, Norway, and France respond to the new challenge of providing for
Islamic sections in their cemeteries.
There are several significant outcomes of this two-pronged strategy. One is empir-
ical and methodological in nature, suggesting what such an analysis should investi-
gate. In this book, I show how the standard models for understanding state-church
relations – laïcité, pillarization, and establishment – from these three countries and
their inferred way of dealing with new minorities describe more legal differences
than material practice. At times, this can be hard to see, and the reason why lies in
these national models still having relevance as discursive narratives. These legacies
are active in how local burial agents interpret the issue.
So, indeed, we need to adopt a scholarly turn to the public actor’s discourse in
order to understand how states govern new minorities. But if scholars look only
at discourse, as is the new trend, they risk reproducing these standard models as
explanations of solutions provided. What investigating everyday accommodation
in the graveyards shows is that we need to look at the material dimension as well.
This empirical finding has implications for how we configure the methodological
and theoretical level.
Another outcome of the two-pronged strategy is methodological and metathe-
oretical in nature. By interrogating the usage of secularism in the public actor’s
discourse, this book finds that secularism is not a substantive and action-guiding
value for burial agents in The Netherlands and Norway; nor is it a framework of
reference or a sensibility to which burial agents relate in their governance of minori-
ties’ needs. Yet, in the French context it is all of that. Connecting these empirical
findings to T. Asad’s influential research framework within the multiple secularism
agenda, I show how his framework cannot account for these findings because it
lacks a coherent methodology for comparison.
In that example, the two-pronged strategy connecting theory/concept develop-
ment with an analysis of everyday accommodations results in a methodological
discovery. From that discovery, I further develop a metalevel argument about the
nonviability of ‘secularism’ as a structuring term for comparative analysis. This
partially supports calls to abandon this term as a basis for an international research
agenda, most forcefully argued by the philosopher and sociologist V. Bader (2007a,
2009b).
the work of Asad – and by shortly discussing the related analytic frameworks of ‘religion-making’
(Mandair/Dressler: 2011) and ‘moving beyond religion’ (Hurd: 2015); see Section 2.3.4.
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18 The Cemetery as a Site for Studying (New) Diversity
Let us now turn to the book’s more precise questions, structure, and layout. A broad
thematic like that of state responses to diversity must necessarily be narrowed down.
I limit it, as mentioned, to a study of cemeteries. The book looks at responses to
two groups of burial challengers whose needs can disrupt the symbolic or material
dimensions of existing regulations. This involves Muslims in all three countries
as well as humanists in Norway. These groups provide new claims of cultural and
religious diversity by their demands for special burial accommodations.
The newness of Muslim demands comes from a change in migratory patterns as
they increasingly wish to be buried in the land of residence instead of repatriation.
The newness of humanist burial needs in Norway occurs because of internal societal
changes. In light of an increasingly secularized and pluralized Norwegian popu-
lation, today there is a demand for a neutral institution governing the cemeteries
instead the Church of Norway, which until recently was a state church and now is a
‘folk‘ church.
Thus, I ask the following: (1) What are the institutional and discursive policy
responses to Muslim and humanist burial needs, across countries and over time?
Which national similarities and differences do we observe? By ‘institutional’ I mean
the material/legal provisions in place,3 and by ‘discursive’ I ask why burial agents
accommodate and how they, or relevant public documents, justify and explain the
solutions provided. How do these national or local agents reason and make their
decisions?
In an even further specification, the book investigates the role of ideas about
secularism or the historical experiences of a particular country in dealing with
minorities in the responses of contemporary agents. Thus, I also ask: (2) What role
does a state-organized religion legacy or national repertoire play in determining
burial outcomes? (3) How is secularism used and argued for?
These research questions form a common thread in the book and are further
specified under Section 1.2. Both the Muslim and humanist cases are appropriate
for addressing these research questions because existing templates for dealing with
religion or cultural diversity are being upended in the face of new challenges. In
light of contestation, legal formal frameworks (e.g., state-church relations, burial
regimes) or ideas about secularism have to be reinterpreted to ‘make sense.’
1.1.1 Cemeteries and the Islamic and Humanist Burial Challenge
By orienting our approach to state responses to diversity along a first theme, I
note that, for most readers, cemeteries probably bring to mind primarily death
3 Material solutions include the physical form: Is there a separate entrance? Do bushes surround the
section? Is it visible as a separate section?
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and sadness. As archaic remnants of the past, they may be of great interest to the
historian, the archaeologist, and perhaps the undertaker; yet for most people, they
contain hardly any relevance to the living, or indeed politics, today. This could
not be further from the truth! Graveyards are relevant to manifold contemporary
questions concerning religious and cultural diversity as regulatory domains where
the relationship between state and religion is negotiated (sometimes violently).
Furthermore, they highlight the fascinating tensions between ideology and praxis
because their concrete materiality reflects the mores and conditions of times past.
A prime historical example is the battle over cemeteries waged between the
French state and the Catholic Church. Under the Ancien Régime (14th–18th cen-
tury), cemeteries were church territory. Burial was characterized by great differences
in rank and class: Mass graves served the poor, and burial in the church was re-
served for the affluent. Jewish and Protestant minorities were prohibited from being
buried in the churches’ sacred ground and instead relegated to a separate corner
outside the churchyard.
With the French Revolution, all this changed. As part of a larger battle between
the Catholic Church and French Republicans over the identity and future of the
country, the Revolutionaries called for the abandonment of all class and religious
privileges in the graveyard. Birth, marriage, and death, too, they argued, from now
on were to be arranged by the State. As one central politician at the time formulated
it:
This democratization of death, as I propose it, should complement political democracy,
… (Boissy d’Anglas: 1793, 105, quoted in Van Helsdingen:1997, 35).4
Catholics and the counterrevolutionaries, on the other hand, demanded the reli-
gious freedom to arrange cemeteries and funerals to their own standards. Cemeter-
ies, in other words, provide sharp lenses through which we can study larger battles
over societal power and change. And they impinge on state-organized religion
relations because of their historical location in, or overlap with, the realm of the
churches.5
Even today, state authorities and minorities have overlapping or conflicting
interests in matters pertaining to death. The state wants to provide for a decent
burial for its citizens, independent of their religious or life orientation. Cultural
or religious communities are keen on providing their members a dignified burial.
4 “Cette démocratie de la mort, telle que je la propose, doit être le complément nécessaire de la
démocratie politique (…),” my translation.
5 In most countries, processes of secularization and welfare-state expansion brought cemeteries under
the tutelage of the state. Yet, we see remnants of this heritage, for example, in the terms ‘churchyard,’
‘kirkegård’ (Norwegian), ‘kerkhof ’ (Dutch), or ‘cimetière’ (French).
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Death is the moment in which a religious or secular meaning to life is most urgently
felt.
Let us look at our first set of challengers: Muslims bring a new facet to this
tension between state interest and religious groups. Scholarship on Islam in Europe
reveals that, since the 1980’s, this increasing and continuing growth of the Muslim
population has led to the need for respective provisions in hospitals, prayerrooms,
houses of worship, etc.6 Relatively new – yet scarcely addressed7 – in this line of
institutional demands is the need for proper burial facilities.8 Until recently, most
Muslims opted for repatriation of the body to the country of origin or their ancestral
origin. Repatriation rates in The Netherlands, for example, are estimated to lie at
around 90%, for France the rate is 80%, and for Norway 40–50%.9
Yet, the numbers are changing. With a shift in perception from Muslims being
temporal sojourners to permanent residents, European countries are increasingly
witnessing ‘a last stage’ of a migratory pattern. Muslim citizens from a diverse
range of backgrounds not only live, work, and die in the ‘new land,’ but also are
increasingly choosing to be buried there. Muslim burial customs can conflict with
national or local regulations as Islam requires burial within 24 hours, facing Mecca
and without a coffin. This requires a set of public goods like Muslim cemeteries, or
Muslim parcels within municipal cemeteries, speedy procedures as well as washing
facilities.
As to the second challenger, only in Norway is the topic of humanistic burial
relevant. Humanists here represent a substantially sized minority, equal in numbers
to Muslims. Their burial needs are largely formulated negatively, by articulating
what they do not want. Politically, they object to the fact that the Church of Norway
owns – and since 1996 has administered – all public graveyards. Furthermore, there
is a clear lack of neutral ceremonial rooms for use by nonaffiliated citizens for their
burial ceremonies.
Compared to Muslims in the other countries, the annual number of humanistic
burials is very small. Yet, this selection is analytically justified because, across
national contexts, both groups challenge aspects of the symbolic burial order. In the
6 For a comprehensive overview of studies on the institutionalization of Islam in Western Europe, see
Rath/Buijs: 2002; Maussen: 2007.
7 Exceptions may be found within the integration literature. See Shadid/Van Koningsveld: 1991; Er-
sanilli/Koopmans: 2009; Klaussen: 2005; Bowen: 2007; Koopmans/Statham/Giugni/Passy: 2005;
Warner: 2009; Pfaff-Czarnecka: 2004.
8 This demand is relatively new. Both The Netherlands and France have had Muslim parcels on public
cemeteries since the 1970s. However, since 2000 the demand has increased in all settings.
9 These estimates are very provisional. Exact numbers are difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. I rely
on information from interviews with burial agents and public reports. Furthermore, the numbers are
different for different populations. For example, Dutch Surinamese Muslims choose burial in The
Netherlands, whereas Turkish and Moroccan Muslims almost all repatriate (cf. Dessing: 2001).
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Norwegian case, it serves the additional analytic purpose of comparing responses
to different minorities within the same state.10 The ‘newness’ of humanist demands
stems from their relatively recent arrival on the scene of religious and secular
groups.11 The salience of their demands lies not in external events (like migration),
but arises from larger societal transformations within Norwegian society.
In order tomap how these countries respond to these situations of (new) religious
and cultural diversity, this book takes amultilevel discursive governance approach. I
focus on how governments at all levels actually, and not just legally, treat minorities.
Furthermore, I study the everyday governance of religious and cultural diversity in
the graveyards.
The latter entails three aspects: In terms of policy, I look at the application and the
consequences rather than the mere formulation. This has the benefit of probing be-
low the surface of formal and elite policy-making.12 Second, in order to understand
what solutions burial agents propose toward Muslims and humanist burial needs –
and why – I focus on the discursive quality of their answers. I look at the arguments
they offer, the framework in which they understand the issue at stake, their use of
terminology, and their application of (legal) regulations. Third, I situate my inves-
tigation in the context of the everyday world13 of the responsible administrators.
That means describing as exactly as possible how the burial agents experience their
decision-making process in the day-to-day situation. I thereby pay special attention
to the more implicit ideas or sensibilities (the self-evident presumptions) that guide
their choice of institutional solutions. This involves charting possible emotions (like
hesitations), material circumstances, or – for example – existing power relations
(e.g., the administrators place in an existing hierarchy) that bear on the agents’
reasoning. “Epistemologically, … we should not invent the viewpoint of the actor,
and should only attribute to actors ideas about the world they actually hold, if we
want to understand their actions, reasons and motives” (Becker: 1996, 60).
10 Initially, I had planned to compare the position of the humanists in the burial regulations and
practices of the other two countries, but this proved to be moot.
11 The foundation of the humanist organization (HEF) dates to 1956.
12 For studies that make a similar point, see Lipsky: 1980; Mathieu: 2000; Goodwin/Jasper: 2011;
Bertossi/Duyvendak: 2012.
13 By the term ‘everyday world,’ I refer to the social praxis, circumstances, and experiences of burial
agents in the local contexts. Because relevant decision-makers vary among national contexts, such
a description does not pertain to that of one type of professional. Rather, I chart the different
considerations, experiences, and material situations. I omit the everyday world of legislators.
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1.2 Research Questions and Their Operationalization in The Field
To illustrate the relevance of the latter epistemological point – and as an upshot to a
further specification of the main research questions – I would like to recount a short
anecdote thatmay alsomake tangible for the reader how the two registers of analysis
in this study – the (1) theoretical/meta-analytic and the (2) concrete/everyday world
investigation – became so inherently connected.
In my first round of field research in France in 2009, I worked with a research
question formulated in the spirit of Asad. I asked: “How is secularism applied and
argued for?” For readers unfamiliar with Asad, this famous anthropologist influ-
enced a broad range of scholars with his Genealogy of Religions (1993), Formations
of the Secular (2003), and his latest book Secular Translations (2018).
The key feature of Asad’s work is that he applies a genealogical analysis of power
to categories like ‘religion’ and ‘secularism.’ Aligning himself with studies in the
tradition of Michel Foucault and Edward Said, secularism for him designates a
discourse: a hegemonic narrative ofWesternmodernity. And rather than investigate
what religion or secularism is, these authors investigate the category usage inherent
to nation-state practices. What and whom we call ‘religious’ in the West is related
to history and power structures. Furthermore, studying the application of these
categories requires looking not only at ideologies, but also at modern ways of living
and practices. Asad refers to ‘secular’ sensibilities, for example, regarding pain and
agency, which already foreclose certain possibilities of citizen actions and state
practices.14
What binds Asad’s work to a larger postcolonial agenda and an agenda of crit-
ical religious studies is the shared suspicion of the idea of religion as a univer-
sal category.15 In these rapidly growing fields, scholars highlight the process of
reification that occurs, for example, when states use these categories to demar-
cate ‘good religion’ from ‘bad religion’ (cf. Hurd: 2015). Alternatively, they show
how these archetypical Western concepts derive their normative force and self-
evident status from a history of colonialism. Scholars chart how “religion-making”
(Dressler/Mandair: 2011) is used in colonial projects to assess and govern its sub-
jects (Van der Veer: 2001). They show how the discourse of world religions served
to carve out a European identity vis-à-vis colonial others (Masuzawa: 2005).
14 For example, the reason why religious arguments in the public debate hold no sway cannot be
explained by content but needs ‘secular’ sensibilities. Certain arguments can be ‘made, but not heard.’
15 There is a vast literature available addressing this. W. Smith’s 1962 essay ‘The Meaning and End
of Religion’ was one of the first. Further, see J. Smith: 1982; Asad: 1993, 2003; Cavanaugh: 2009;
Fitzgerald: 2000, 2007;McCutcheon: 1997; King: 2011;Masuzawa: 2005; Tweed: 2005. For skepticism
to religious freedom as a category, see Sullivan: 2005; Hurd: 2015.
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Their common scholarly presumption is that categories like secularism or religion
are always political and discursive constructions, used to further particular interests.
This makes them hesitant to provide clear definitions and conceptual boundaries
(which would imply taking a firm stance). Rather than investigate what secularism
is, this strand of scholarship thus aims to leave the category open and to look at the
usage that accompanies practice, that is, “how secularism is used and argued for.”
This approach made initial sense for the project on which this book is based. In
the European public debate I am involved in, Muslims are often juxtaposed as ‘the
other’ of secularism. For example, in conflicts concerning head scarves, mosque
building, and halal slaughtering, the ‘religiosity’ of Muslims was often constructed
as incommensurable with Western secular identity and institutions. The initial
thought was thus: Might different national/cultural forms or usages of secularism
play a role in the responses of burial agents?
This thought worked well for France: To the question “How do you use and argue
for secularism?” followed a rich and diverse answer concerning how burial agents
perceived laïcité16 to determine their decisions about Islamic burial solutions.
InNorway andTheNetherlands, on the other hand, the answer faltered: Decision-
makers in these countries and municipalities did not talk about secularism or
secularity when justifying the solutions chosen. They were, in fact, at a loss when I
asked about the relevance of secularism in their decision-making process. In other
words, I had no “usage of secularism” to hold my investigation in place. Rather, I
had to frame all that I observed being done or argued toward Muslims or humanists
as part of secularism. That made both groups the equivalent of religion – and
it obscured the multiplicity of reasons that decision-makers had for choosing a
particular solution, which were often rather pragmatic or had nothing to do with
religion at all. Alternatively, by leaving my intended inductive approach, I had to
pick a (normative) yardstick and declare what parts of reasoning fell within or
outside of the category. Yet, this approach contrasted with the Asadian predicament
of avoiding definitions and avoiding taking a normative stance (“leave the category
open”).
Thus, the following dilemma arose: How to resolve the tension between the
declared instability of the category of religion or secularism and, yet, the need
for stable scholarly categories in order to compare (or inductively study) my sub-
ject matter? How to compare contingent contexts when the subject matter of the
categories of religion and secular is also contingent?
In short, I ended up broadening the question of secularism to one about different
responses to diversity (both religious and cultural) within a religious governance
framework. The key feature of a (religious) governance approach (see Section 2.3)
16 The French translation of ‘secularity.’
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is that it asks: “What happens?” – in our case concerning the burial needs of these
groups. This general approach to asking questions leaves open the possibility that
the group’s demands are not framed or perceived as religion, but rather that of,
say, ‘consumers,’ or ‘immigrants.’ Furthermore, this does not mean looking only
at discursive governance, but also includes focussing on “regulation or steering,
guidance by a variety of means, not only by rules” (Bader: 2007b, 873).
Yet, I retained the Asadian question for three reasons: first, in order to address the
discursive reality of the French case studies; second, Asad’s focus on ‘sensibilities’
(2003 and 2018) provides a potential element in the story of why some institutional
solutions automatically make sense to these burial agents; third, finding a lack of
secularism usage serves as the basis for a constructive engagement with Asad and
parts of a postcolonial and religious studies agenda.
This fieldwork anecdote illustrates how this book’s two-pronged strategy emerged:
entailing oscillation between (1) theoretical/conceptual frameworks and (2) ev-
eryday institutional analysis, further reflected in the hierarchy of project- and
research-questions.
At the most general level (Level A, see Appendix I), the book engages the project
questions: How do states respond to the new religious and cultural diversity? And
what scholarly frameworks or concepts are best suitable for international compar-
isons? This theoretical and metatheoretical discussion draws out broader conclu-
sions regarding international research agendas that go beyond the narrow scope of
this study. Yet, such conclusions are strongly informed by the previous fieldwork
experience and by the book’s everyday analysis as specified below.
The book’s second analytic layer consists of three research questions17 that ad-
dress the study as a whole (level B). This layer contains an extensive discussion of
empirical findings. It is empirical in nature but involves a simultaneous theoretical
and conceptual engagement with state-church variables and secularism. I recall
and further specify the following:
1) What are the institutional and discursive policy responses to Muslim and hu-
manist burial needs, compared among countries and over time?18 What are the
(national) similarities and differences?
2) What role does a state-organized religion legacy or national repertoire play in
determining burial outcomes?
3) How is secularism employed and argued for?
17 These are further operationalized at three levels of analysis (level C, D, E). See Section 2.4.1.
18 For France and The Netherlands, the timeframe is 1800 to the present, for Norway 1840 to the
present.
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I define policy outcomes/responses as all intentional actions that engage public
authorities, including decisions not to act, in view of the accommodation of Islam
or humanists (cf. Breemer/Maussen: 2012, 280). And I finetune this dependent
variable as to how and why they are accommodated. That means distinguishing
between legal prescriptions, national policies/practice, and municipal practices
within each national context. At the municipal level, I furthermore distinguish
between an institutional and discursive dimension: What material/legal provisions
are in place? Discursively, how do burial agents, or relevant public documents,
reason?19 This is summarized in Table 1.1, which functions as an important data
collection device.
Table 1.1 Policy outcomes specified at three levels across countries






















Concerning the independent variable, I also propose fine-tuning (cf. Breemer/Maussen:
2012, 280). I define a state-organized religion legacy as a set of ideas, governing
repertoires and the underlying principles that work together to create a distinctive
national approach to church-state relations (cf. Monsma/Soper: 1997, 156). And
I make use of Bowen’s idea of schemas, “sets of representations that process
information and guide action” (2012, 357). For a more elaborate discussion of this
independent variable, see Section 2.4.3.
I relate, first of all, to the standard pictures of religious government found in the
literature. Do the solutions encountered fit expectations that follow from the stan-
dard conceptions of the French laïcité, the Dutch pillarization, and the Norwegian
establishment? If so, we would expect to find important differences between these
19 We also take note of the discursive dimension at the legal level and the national policy level.
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three countries which are stable over time. This leads to the following hypothesis
(drawing on Breemer/Maussen: 2012, 282):
(H1): Relying on an understanding of the national state-organized religion model as
‘strictly secular’ for France, as ‘pillarized’ for The Netherlands, and as ‘established’ for
Norway, we would expect France to have an unwillingness to accommodate Islam in any
way that compromises the neutrality of the public sphere. For The Netherlands, we would
expect to find some form of pillarized Islamic set of institutions: group rights for all, a
large number of Islamic cemeteries, Islamic sections in public graveyards. For Norway, we
would expect to find the continuing relevance of the Lutheran Church as the privileged
denomination and an extension of rights and facilitative services to other confessional
and secular groups in light hereof.
Furthermore, I test a more nuanced version of the model:
(H2): Relying on a conception of national models as heterogeneous, we would expect to
find different ideological traditions within a country’s repertoire. These come into play on
different issues and vary over time. Yet, we should still be able to identify policy responses
in one country that are absent in another (i.e., there would be truly ‘national’ differences),
and these differences can be plausibly linked to state-organized religion regimes. We
conceptualize French relations as a combination of Gallican, associational, and strictly
secular scripts (cf. Bowen: 2007, 2012), The Netherlands as a combination of ‘principled
pluralism’ (cf. Monsma/Soper: 1997) and a secular tradition (cf. Maussen: 2009, 2012),
and for Norway, we propose a conceptualization of its state-organized religion legacy as
entailing ‘establishment’ (remaining Lutheran hegemony), ‘compensatory evenhanded-
ness’ (compensating toward other minorities), and (municipal) disestablishment schemes
(cf. Breemer: 2014, 2019).
What often bedevils such discussions is thatmodels can have different functions: For
example, they can be intended descriptively, as a succinct summary or abstraction
of a complex reality. So, when scholars talk of the Dutch state-church relations as
‘pillarized,’ they aim to reduce the wild complexity of historical solutions toward a
range of minorities at different institutional spheres and different time periods to a
single institutional ‘logic.’20
Yet, agents in the field (or scholars for thatmatter) can also usemodels or concepts
discursively, meaning they then often have an explicitly normative intent. After
Bowen (2007, 1005), we can refer to these two usages as a ‘model of’ and a ‘model
for.’ The first describes or summarizes a given reality; the second intends to change
social reality, not to merely describe it.21 Engaging with these discursive models
20 ‘Pillarization’ refers to a societal process of differentiation occurring in Dutch society from
1900–1950s. Separate societal spheres were organized around confessional and cultural affiliations.
21 A ‘model for’ is an ideological distortion of the social processes it purports to describe.
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(how agents use them and for what reason) can then be a way of providing a better
empirical description.
Finally, models can have explanatory functions, that is, they are used as an
independent variable or explanans to describe policy outcomes. This occurs most
often in combination with other variables. This is the most challenging claim,
because one has to answer how the model and its elements lead to action.22
In this book, I address the role of a state-organized religion model for burial
outcomes in all three ways. By means of the above-formulated hypotheses, H1
and H2, I first ask descriptively whether policy outcomes agree with expectations
based on the standard or heterogeneous state-church model; this is discussed and
summarized in Chapter 6. I then inquire discursively how agents appropriate (or not)
elements of these state-organized religion legacies in their public reasoning, asking:
How is secularism “used and argued for”? This is subject of discussion in Chapter
7. As to their explanatory power, I inquire throughout Chapters 3, 4, and 5 about
the extent to which lawmakers or burial agents mention these national traditions
as the reasoning behind their actions: ‘reasons mentioned’ being a possible cause.23
Keeping these functions of the model separate in such a scholarly analysis helps
us to resist the temptation to reify country-specific regimes into stereotypes. For
example, it avoids explaining everything the French do with laïcité even if the public
actors do this themselves.
1.3 Wider Research Context and Main Contributions
These questions and theoretical concerns are relevant to a broad interdisciplinary
discussion of religion, immigration, and Islam. Criticism of the classical secular-
ization thesis – the idea that modernity inevitably leads to a decline of religion –
has been around for decades. Yet, until recently, some of its core presumptions still
held a stronghold on the social sciences and humanities. In normative political
theory, the debate over multiculturalism and the politics of recognition of the 1990s
still bore its marks. This involved discussions about the appropriate normative
responses to ethnic and cultural diversity, while dodging a discussion of religion
(e.g., Kymlicka: 1995).24 In the field of immigration, influential scholars like Castles
22 For a discussion, see Bader: 2007b, 877. Models can also themselves be the object of explanation
and investigation. They become the ‘dependent variable’ (explananda).
23 We have no way of assessing whether a ‘reason mentioned’ is truly a causal factor. The best we can
do is to include a wide range of interviews and use multiple sources of evidence.
24 Kymlicka (1995) argues for the impossible and undesired norm of strict separation and state neu-
trality in the case of ethnic and cultural diversity, all while maintaining a norm of strict separation
and privatization in the case of religious difference. His later work is more nuanced.
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(1995) made no mention of religion as something relevant to the empirical question
in his essay “How Nation States Respond to Immigration and Ethnic Diversity”.25
With the onset of the third millennium, all has changed: Political theorists now
emphasize the range of morally permissible state-church arrangements and the
inherent balance of principles involved.26 Studies in sociology and migration now
investigate the different cultural roles of religious identity for the integration pro-
cess of migrants in the United States versus Europe (Foner/Alba: 2008) or the role
of religion for the integration of Muslims across the Atlantic (specifically, Cesari:
2004).27 Even within the scholarship on secularization itself we find a desecular-
ization and contextual turn. In his influential 1994 work, Casanova still defended
societal differentiation as the core component of the secularization thesis. Recently,
however, he charted the variety of secularizations or secularisms, mapping all forms
of differentiation that have occurred historically and in different local contexts
(Casanova: 2006).28
In other words, the demise of the secularization thesis has opened up new re-
search agendas. As mentioned, I address two new promising, yet conceptually
different, academic frameworks: ‘religious governance’ (see Section 2.3.1) and ‘the
research agenda of multiple secularisms and secularities.’ I briefly discuss the latest
developments in these literatures and highlight the turn to discourse as central to
both.
In the literature on immigration, citizenship, and religious governance, scholars
present a broad range of factors that affect the state response to religious and cultural
diversity (further discussed in Section 2.2). More specifically, scholars point to
two relevant institutional regimes regarding Muslims: state-church relations and
integration policies (cf. Maussen: 2009). Although the relevance of state-church
relations has gained in prominence in the literature (e.g., Fetzer/Soper: 2005),
whether or not other factors are more important is still contested.29
One central question in this literature is whether national path-dependent struc-
tures are still relevant – or in fact have they lost relevance, for example, because
of a European process of policy convergence. Alternatively, scholars warn of the
danger of reification and too simplistic institutional accounts. We must recon-
ceptualize these national models as heterogeneous and recognize their historical
idiosyncrasies.
25 He distinguishes between regimes of differential exclusion, assimilation, and pluralism.
26 See Bhargava: 2011; Taylor: 2011; Bader: 2007.
27 See also Zolberg/Woon: 1999; Casanova: 2007; Warner: 2007.
28 See also Gorski: 2000, 2003.
29 For a discussion, see, e.g., Koenig: 2007; Minkenberg: 2008.
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Furthermore, as part of a discursive turn, scholars have begun to show how state
responses depend on public reason and framing (cf. Bowen: 2006; Maussen: 2009).
The combination of an internally pluralistic conception of state-church models and
a focus on public framing provides better explanations.
To illustrate, in a study on Islamic governance, M. Maussen looked at policy
responses tomosque-building efforts in France andTheNetherlands. In his analysis,
policy outcomes follow from the combined influence of institutionalized regimes
of governance and public policy discussion.30 As long as mosque-building was
seen as being about creating a “French Islam,” that is, a topic closely identified
with the state identity, the principle of strict neutrality in the state-church regime
remained valid, also implying a strict policy of nonfinancing. Yet, when the issuewas
framed in the public discourse as being about creating more equal conditions for a
“neighbourhood Islam,” this framing appealed to the more pragmatic elements in
the French state-church regime, resulting in the adaptation ofmore accommodating
policies. This suggests that the institutional response of a state depends on how the
public discourse frames a group’s demands.
Changes in the public framing can also cause other institutions to come into
play (instead of other elements in the same institution). For example, the issue
of ritual slaughtering31 can give rise to contestation. Some groups defend their
understanding of this issue based on animal rights and human cruelty, whereas
other treat it solely as a matter of meat production and hygiene. Western European
societies, however, may respond to the demand analogous to previous experiences
with kosher slaughtering. Previous institutional state-church arrangements toward
Jews can make new challenges feel familiar. Depending on who wins the discursive
battle, different institutionsmay come into play, and different institutional responses
may then be considered appropriate. Initially, this social order is open, but over
time the dominant discourses (linked to specific institutions) come to be taken for
granted and in fact become part of social practice: “This is how we do things.”
One reason for going into such detail is that these acquired insights (the relevance
of institutions, public reasoning, and actual practice) provide the steppingstone for
my own research design. Studying (religious) governance requires looking not only
at relevant laws and national policies, it also requires looking at social praxis and
how public actors frame things: What institutions matter and how do they matter?
Which elements do everyday actors appropriate from national traditions?
This ultimately leads us back to a constructivist turn in the literature on new
institutionalism (Section 2.3.3) and a discussion about how institutions influence
30 He distinguishes three levels of structuration: (1) internally pluralistic institutional regimes; (2)
strategies of governance and policy frames; (3) a policy process (2009, 260).
31 I borrow here from Maussen (2009, 30).
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agents. “Institutions influence behaviour not simply by specifying what one should
do but also by specifying what one can imagine oneself doing in a given context”
(Hall/Taylor: 1996, 948). Accordingly, institutional action is tightly bound to a
public actor’s interpretation.
The turn to discourse (analysis) in the study of religion and state is also central
to a second influential body of literature: scholarship on multiple secularisms and
secularities.32 To be sure, this research agenda contains a broad range of disci-
plines.33 But the work of genealogically orientated scholars, in particular Asad, has
32 Secularism is high on the scholarly agenda; spearheaded by works like Connolly’s (1999) Why I Am
Not a Secularist, Asad’s (2003) Formations of the Secular, Taylor’s (2007) Secular Age, Casanova’s
articles on the “multiple secularisms and secularities” (2006b, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2014), and some of
Habermas’ writings on religion and postsecularity (2006, 2008a, 2008b). Since the turn of the third
millennium, a broad range of anthologies have been published on the topic, and a number of insti-
tutional initiatives have been undertaken in its name: the establishment of the Institute for the Study
of Secularism in Society and Culture, Trinity College, in 2005; the formation of the Nonreligion and
Secularity Research Network at the University of Cambridge in 2008; and a Department of Secular
Studies at Pitzer College since the Fall of 2011. The Immanent Frame, a scholarly blog of the Social
Science Research Council published several anthologies on the topic. See Jakobsen/Pelligrini: 2008;
Warner/VanAntwerpen/Calhoun: 2010; Cady/Hurd: 2010; Gorski/Kim/Torpey/VanAntwerpen:
2012; Calhoun/Juergensmeyer/VanAntwerpen: 2011.
33 We can distinguish here between the explicitly normative and the descriptive/explanatory. (We
could also distinguish a third, deconstructive purpose, which, however, is omitted here for reasons of
space.) These distinctions are artificial insofar as scholars can use the term for several purposes (e.g.,
Habermas’ term ‘post-secularism’ (2008a) has both explicit empirical and normative ambitions).
But as a rough indication, for political philosophers secularism often designates (a) the alleged role
of the religious argument in the public sphere, e.g., Habermas: 2008a, 2008b; Connolly: 1999; (b) a
discussion of better or worse forms of secular states, e.g., An-Na’im: 2008; Bhargava: 2009a; or (c)
that of competing normative doctrines by which to regulate the relationship between state, religion,
and society. The latter can be demarcated into (1) forms of secularism differentiated on the basis of
the values that secularism is supposed to defend, leading to distinctions like pragmatic vs radical
secularism (Modood: 2005), political vs ethical (Bhargava: 1998), political vs doctrinal secularism
(Bielefeldt: 2001). Or it leads to (2) a differentiation based on different foundational grounds. This
leads to distinctions like hypersubstantive vs hyperprocedural vs contextual secularism (Bhargava:
2005); common ground vs independent ethic vs overlapping consensus (Taylor: 1998). Social and
political scientists typify different forms of secularism, for descriptive and explanatory purposes.This
leads to distinctions like passive vs assertive secularism (Kuru: 2008); weak vs strong (Hashemi: 2009);
negative vs positive (McClay: 2003); Laicism vs Judeo-Christian (Hurd: 2008); religious vs irreligious
vs areligious secularism (Gilpin: 2007). In this literature, secularism can designate anything from
an institutional configuration, an ideology, a worldview, or the lived experience of being secular
(Casanova: 2009, 1052). And then there is an outpour of anthologies with a global or non-Western
focus: Berg-Sørensen: 2013; Cady/Hurd: 2010; Rectenwald/Almeida/Levine: 2015. For an explicit
non-Western approach, see Burchardt/Wohlrab-Sahr/Middell: 2015. For Indian secularism, see
Bhargava: 2011, 2012, 2016. For Asian secularism, see Bubandt/van Beek: 2012. And there is a
Special issue on Japanese secularism in the Japan Review 30 (2017). For work on Scandinavian
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gathered a large following and platform.34 In my previous fieldwork anecdote, I
already noted Asad’s discursive turn toward secularism as a hegemonic narrative of
Western modernity. Rather than investigate what religion or secularism is, he and
likeminded authors investigate the category usage internal to nation-state practices.
This wider research agenda produced some important insights. It has now be-
come commonplace that addressing the contemporary politics of religious diversity
requires discarding any grand narrative of modernization. Rather than thinking
in terms of linear, one-dimensional developments, scholars now emphasize the
plurality of forms of secularizations. And rather than think in standard pictures
of what secularism is or should be, they point to a multiplicity of secularisms or
secularities.
Second, construing religion and secularism as mutually exclusive essences is
now widely seen as erroneous and associated with a modernist European secularist
agenda. Developments in religious studies and postcolonial theory now emphasize
an understanding of religion and the secular, first, as interconnected and, second,
as contingent upon the particular context. Exemplary in this sense is Ch. Taylor’s
(2007) book Secular Age, in which he connects the different meanings of the secular
to different historical contexts. In Taylor’s opinion, the idea of the secular as the
opposite of religion – which is for us the natural way to understand the term – is
the latest stage in a development within Western Christianity.
Third, in particular Asad’s way of looking at the secular as a means of interro-
gating secularism inspired scholars in political theory and sociology to investigate
secularism at the level of lived experience. It has become fashionable within secular
studies to proclaim a phenomenological turn toward the ‘lived experience’ of the
secular,35 to approach secularism from ‘the bottom up,’ ‘on the ground’ (cf. Asad:
2003; Cady/Hurd: 2010, 6; Knott: 2005; Rectenwald/Almeida/Levine: 2015, 11), or
as ‘a way of inhabiting the world’ (Brown: 2007).
Asad as well as Casanova and Taylor deserve credit for these important insights. I
sympathize with such a shift toward sensibilities insofar as it highlights the implicit
presumptions that people hold for justifying arrangements and ideas regarding reli-
gious or secular minorities. People’s ideas about religion are often unexamined and
taken for granted. Yet, the attempt to apply Asad’s framework in a fieldwork context
proves difficult. Asad’s predicament to “leave the category open” stands opposed
secularism, see Breemer/Casanova/Wyller: 2014. On Norwegian secularism, see Bangstad: 2009b;
Bangstad/Leirvik/Plesner: 2012.
34 For example, see the work of Mahmood: 2003, 2005, 2006; Hurd: 2008, 2015; Dressler: 2013;
Dressler/Mandair: 2011. See also Scott/Hirschkind’s (2006) discussion of Asad’s breadth and influ-
ence.
35 See Taylor’s ‘secularity three’ (2007, 2–3), Casanova’s ‘phenomenological secularism’ (2009, 1052),
also Rectenwald/Almeida/Levine: 2015, 7.
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to the need for bounded concepts for the purpose of empirical and comparative
analysis.
1.3.1 Empirical Findings and Theoretical Implications
This book makes two contributions against the backdrop of this discursive turn
within these scholarly literatures. In the following, I discuss the outcomes of the
two-pronged strategy mentioned earlier, but this time spelled out in relation to the
research questions and an overarching concern with scholarly reification.
In response to research question 1, this book finds that the differences between
these states and the way they give institutional form to religion in the burial do-
main in general, and toward Muslims in particular, is astonishing at the legislative
level: Confessional sections are illegal in France, a legal right for groups in The
Netherlands, and absent altogether in Norwegian law. Yet, in practice, nearly all
municipalities provide for confessional sections in public graveyards.
In response to research question 2, the role of state-organized religion legacies,
this book finds that, legally, the historical formation of the relationship between state
and church in these countries impacted the rules regarding confessional sections
and cemeteries. And, discursively, these legacies return in the discourse – in how
local burial agents make sense of the issue. Yet, these legacies seemed to matter
little for our de facto understanding of material practice.
If we connect these empirical findings to the discussion on national models in
the religious governance and integration literature, the first outcome of the book’s
proposed two-pronged strategy becomes both empirical and methodological in
nature: This study shows that the standard models for understanding state-church
relations – laïcité, pillarization, establishment – better describe legal differences
than actual practice. Indeed, we need a scholarly turn to a public actor’s discourse,
as suggested in the aforementioned literature. However, investigating everyday
accommodation in the graveyards reveals the need for a multilevel approach and a
look at the material dimension as well.
The book’s second contribution relates to research question 3 about ‘secularism
usage’. This study finds that only in France is there an explicit concern with secular-
ism and being secular. Such explicit concern with secularism as a guiding idea or
issue is lacking in The Netherlands and Norway. And at the level of the more im-
plicit ideas (‘sensibilities’), I found that Dutch and Norwegian burial agents are not
driven by any concern about solutions being secular versus religious; rather, their
central tacit motive for action was a concern with wholeness versus fragmentation:
How whole or divided should the cemetery be?
Connecting these empirical findings to the discussion of themultiple secularisms
results in a second outcome of the proposed two-pronged strategy, that is conceptual
and metatheoretical in nature, leading to recommendations for a more coherent
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comparative methodology: Asadians investigate the deployment of a category like
secularism internal to practices, asking “How is it used and argued for?” Yet there is
no analytic room in their approach for addressing the situation where respondents
do not use or argue for secularism. In other words, they reify that reality as being
about secularism.
I repair some of these shortcomings (Section 2.3.4) by distinguishing between
‘the strategy of actual deployment’ and ‘perceived deployment.’ Still, I think that,
on a metalevel, structuring one’s analysis in terms of the secular or comparative
secularism – as is very fashionable today – risks reifying the reasoning of the
everyday world.
Both these main contributions (the need for a multileveled, material focus and
abandoning secularism as a structuring term) are connected through an overarching
concern with reification. Reification connotes “to make something abstract more
concrete or real” (Oxford Dictionary).36 Yet, it is sometimes also understood as
a form of overgeneralization.37 I limit my definition to that of an ‘inadequate
reduction of complexity’ and of making national models or concepts into real
entities.
Avoiding reification is of central concern to Asadian scholars who seek to de-
construct the reification process that occurs, for example, when states use these
categories to demarcate ‘good religion’ from ‘bad religion’ (cf. Hurd: 2015). Social
scientists in the governance literature question reified one-dimensional national
models in order to develop better comparative tools. Here, reification occurs, for
example, because scholars mistake the discursive salience of national models for a
sufficient explanatory factor. Respondents explain their actions in terms of ‘pillar-
ization,’ which is then taken as a proof of the model. Not only does this confuse dis-
cursive salience with explanatory salience, it presumes pillarization to be this–one
thing – that somehow drives people’s actions.
In both scholarly agendas, a deconstructive and discursive approach is used to
avoid reification and ameliorate comparative understanding. Yet, paradoxically, as I
will show, in both scholarly agenda’s scholars run such risk (in particular Asadians).
Ultimately, I do not propose a one-size-fits-all solution. The line between descrip-
tive, normative, or explanatory purposes is only analytically sharp. But it would help
if scholars were more upfront about their own implicit normative presuppositions
(see Bader: 2007b, 877). Scholars need not always adopt the discursive framing of
the lifeworld. Nor do I propose that we can avoid all normative connotations. Yet,
there can still there be better and worse terms.
36 The standard example is Marx’s claim that money is a reification of what is in fact a social production
process (labor) in which value is attributed to a thing.
37 “When we reify, we do not see the details, because they are overshadowed by the whole”, see
http://www.anthrobase.com/Dic/eng/def/reification.htm [accessed 25 May 2020].
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My general point is that scholarly naming does matter, thus requiring explicit
reflection. Scholars need concepts and models that help reduce complexity in an
appropriate way and not stand in the way of descriptive or explanatory analysis.
1.4 Chapter Outline
Chapter 2 discusses the leading theoretical approaches, outlining the contours of a
multileveled discursive (religious) governance approach. This chapter incorporates
elements from two strands of actor institutionalism into Bader’s religious gover-
nance framework. And it incorporates a more methodologically “fit” version of
Asad’s anthropology of secularism.
In Chapter 3 we look at the legal burial regimes and state-organized religion
regimes and their historical genealogies. There are large differences between coun-
tries in how they give institutional form to religious diversity in the cemetery and
the nature of their legal social imaginary of a cemetery.
Chapter 4 investigates the relevant national policies and their historical idiosyn-
crasies. What do these different legal burial regimes – and state-church regimes
described in Chapter 3 – amount to in the face of a common challenge today?
How do they translate into national policies regarding the burial needs of Muslims
and humanists? There are clear differences regarding the national policy responses
to the demand for confessional sections and cemeteries for Muslims. Yet, these
national differences become less clear when we include existing material provisions.
Chapter 5 describes what those burial agents do and think who actually deal
with these issues on a day-to-day basis. It provides in-depth descriptions of local
municipal responses and related processes.
Chapters 6 and 7 then arranges all of these empirical finding across levels of
governance and countries into patterns. Chapter 6 describes and explains the
municipal institutional pattern; Chapter 7 describes and explains the burial agent’s
public reasoning. If our legacies (standard and heterogeneous) do not well reflect
themselves in material outcomes, as seen in Chapter 6, might they have relevance
for the agent’s discursive responses? Lastly, how is secularism used and argued for?
Stretching the argument as far as possible toward Asad, I inquire about possible
evidence for secular sensibilities.
Coming full circle with that latter argument (opening and closing with Asad),
let us return to the question of minorities and Islam in Europe. Are countries
increasingly becoming similar in their policies toward newcomers? Or do national
and path-dependent differences exist? This book provides an in-depth answer
to this question. Moreover, I very clearly show why studies on state responses
to new diversity need a two-pronged approach: connecting theory and concept
development with everyday analysis. In their empirical focus, scholars need to
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move from legal inventories of regulations to a multileveled analysis of rules and
concrete material solutions provided for. Conceptually and metatheoretically, a
debate on the secular benefits from this book’s empirical findings, namely, that
scholarly terms can be out of sync with – or at worse misrepresent – the language
and concerns of the everyday professionals under study.
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Frameworks of Religious
Governance and Discursive Institutionalism
2.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the book’s main theoretical approaches. As an introduction
to the research design, it discusses the scholarly approach to institutional regimes
and discourse in the literature on the institutionalization of religious and cultural
diversity (Section 2.2). It then outlines the contours of a multileveled discursive
(religious) governance approach (Section 2.3).
This approach, used throughout the book, is based on the work of the sociologist
and philosopher V. Bader. His metaframework of religious governance – for my
purpose specified as ‘(religious) governance’1 – includes all levels and all modes
of governance that have a possible bearing on policy outcomes, for example, actor
constellations, relevant institutions, or cultural factors (Section 2.3.1).
I supplement Bader’s framework with insights from two strands of actor-centered
institutionalism (ACI): In line with Bader, F. Scharpf’s ACI emphasizes the relevance
of a multiple actor- and process-orientated approach to institutional action (Section
2.3.2). V.A. Schmidt’s discursive institutionalism (DI) addresses the relationship
between institutions and discourse/ideas for explaining institutional action and
change (Section 2.3.3). Schmidt’s understanding of institutions as not simply struc-
tures (i.e., contexts of meaning) but also ideational constructions allows for a better
understanding of a range of discursive similarities and differences encountered in
this study.
Furthermore, as part of that discursive discussion and as a means of addressing
cultural factors, I integrate a debate over the cultural construction of the secular
(Section 2.3.4). Relying on the theoretical work of Asad, in the embedded case
studies I explore how ideas about secularism or secular sensibilities are relevant
to the actions of a burial agent. This has initial appeal because of the discursive
importance of laïcité for French burial agents. However, as previously mentioned
(Section 1.2), Asad’s framework proves hard to apply in a fieldwork setting. Thus,
in preparation of the empirical analysis, I amend Asad’s theoretical proposal and
discuss the multiple embedded-case design and additional qualitative methods as
suitable means of exploring the theoretical issues (Section 2.4), before concluding
(Section 2.5).
1 This is intended to highlight our study of the governance of these group needs, which sometimes, but
not always, is seen as the governance of the needs of a religious community.
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2.2 State of the Art: State Accommodation of Diversity
The question of religious and cultural diversity and how states ‘handle it’ has gained
importance across many disciplines. In this complex dynamic, three sets of factors
are typically discerned: the role of (1) actor constellations, (2) cultural context, and
(3) structural, institutional factors (cf. Koenig: 2009, 305).
Scholarship that centers around the various actors involved asks, for example,
whether the most religiously diverse countries also have the most open cultural
policy (cf. Koenig: 2009, 306). Alternatively, the socioeconomic, educational, and
religious status of the actors (e.g., migrants) plays a role. Scholars investigate the
internal organizational structure of, say, Muslims as affecting the provision of
services for new migrants (cf. Kniss/Rumerich: 2007; Davis/Robinson: 2001).2 Or
they show that the transnational mode of religious belonging among migrants
bear on how they organize, make claims, and ultimately settle (cf. Beyer: 2006;
Ebaugh/Chafetz: 2002).
Other scholars hypothesize the denominational effect on integration policies.
Do specific confessional and cultural legacies – such as the fact that Norway is
predominantly Lutheran as opposed to themixed Catholic-Protestant population of
The Netherlands – affect how public authorities integrate newcomers? A large-scale
comparative study by Minkenberg (2008) suggests this. Predominantly Protestant
countries, he argues, exhibit moderate-to-high levels of recognition of cultural
group rights, whereas Catholic countries fall in the range of low-to-moderate levels.
Political scientists, however, have been much concerned with structural and
institutional factors (e.g., Koopmans/Statham: 2000). When this is transposed to
the study of Islam in Western Europe, we observe a shift from research looking at
the internal organizational structure of Muslims and their religiosity to research
that focuses on the external opportunity structure (cf. Bader: 2007b, 872).This work
shows how “societies create opportunities for the development of Islam, or oppose
them” (Buijs/Rath: 2002, 9).3 A certain political climate, a set of laws, or social con-
ditions affect how minorities frame their demands and whether they, for example,
emphasize equal or exceptional treatment (cf. Rath/Penninx/Groenendijk/Meijer:
2001).
More particularly, scholars emphasize country-specific institutional arrange-
ments (or regimes) as crucial factors. Regarding Islam in Europe, two types are
particularly relevant: that of citizen and immigrant integration and of state-church
relations (cf. Maussen: 2009, 19). Because the presence of Islam in Europe results
2 This can involve ethnic composition, financial resources, or ideological characteristics of different
Muslim communities.
3 See Koopmans/Statham/Giugni/Passy: 2005; Fetzer/Soper: 2005, 2007; Koenig: 2005; Maussen: 2007a,
2007b, 2009.
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largely from migratory processes, the integration of Muslims is often conceived of
as both a matter of immigrant integration as well as religious diversity.
A landmark study is that of Fetzer/Soper (2005), which seeks to account for
the disparate political responses to the religious concerns of Muslims in Britain,
France, and Germany in the areas of education and houses of worship. The authors
argue that the national state-church legacies shape (rather than determine) the
outcome of negotiations over accommodation.4 And this factor can better account
for variation than the political resources of the Muslim communities, the general
political opportunity structures, or the political (ideology) of the respective states
on citizenship and nationality. In a similar vein, a range of studies investigates the
role of a given state-church pattern for the treatment of Muslims in prisons.5
Fetzer/Soper’s argument led to considerable debate.6 Critique, or complementary
analysis, is levelled at it in two ways: First, are other factors not more relevant for
explaining variation in accommodation policies?7 Second, should we revise the
conception of national models themselves?
Along the first line of critique scholars typically ask about convergence or remain-
ing differences. Are national models still consequential – or do they lose relevance,
for example, because of a European process of policy convergence?
In this regard, Minkenberg (2008) explores the relationship between religious
legacies and cultural group rights for 19 countries.8 Relying on a tripartite typol-
ogy of state-church regimes into ‘established,’ ‘partially established,’ and ‘separate,’
he finds Fetzer/Soper’s conclusion about the nonaccommodating effects of sep-
arationist church-state regimes to hold for France. But it cannot be generalized.
Denominational factors, instead, he considers more consequential.
Koenig (2007) interrogates the national model of religious government from a
transnational perspective. To what extent does a postnational ormulticultural social
4 They refer to the Anglican establishment, French Laïcité, and the German Staatskirchenrecht.
5 Beckford (2005) investigates this role in France and Britain, Beckford/Gilliat: 1998 for Britain. Furseth
(2003) investigates the role of the Norwegian state church in the military and prison system, inquiring
about the formal administrative functions of the church.
6 See Koenig: 2007; Bader: 2007b; Maussen: 2007b; Bowen: 2007; Minkenberg: 2008.
7 See Minkenberg: 2007; Breemer/Maussen: 2012; Soysal: 1994; Jacobsen: 1996; Joppke: 2007; Koop-
mans/Statham/Giugni/Passy: 2005.
8 Religious legacies are specified as the combination of three markers: a historic-cultural dimension,
i.e., the role of confessional patterns (relying on Martin: 1987); second, a sociocultural dimension
of religiosity, as measured in church-going rates; and finally, the institutional dimension of patterns
of church-state relations (relying on Chaves/Cann: 1992). The latter is measured by the degree of
deregulation of churches in financial, political, and legal regards. He categorizes the latter pattern
in terms of a threefold typology: full establishment (Scandinavian countries), partial establishment
(Germany, Italy, and Great Britain), and full separation (France, US, Ireland). For an index of cultural
group rights, he relies on Koopmans/Statham/Giugni/Passy: 2005.
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order affect religious government today? Are transnational and subnational actors
increasinglymore able tomake claims for religious recognition against the sovereign
nation-state? His study of Muslims’ claim-making finds that both path-dependent
state-church repertoires as well as multileveled transnational institutionalism play
a role.9
A second line of critique targets the idea of the national state-church model as a
totalizing factor itself. Here, scholars point to the danger of reification and over-
simplistic institutional accounts. One reason why, in the study above, Minkenberg
finds little effect of state-church regimes might be that his typology is too simplistic
(established, partially established, and separate). So, along this line of argument,
scholars seek to revise and nuance their conception of the national model.
As a further specification of this second line of critique I highlight three insights
from this literature that inform my own approach.10
One important problem with the fixation on national models lies in a determin-
istic conception of how these models lead to action. How is it that policy scripts in
these models are activated to address situations of new diversity (cf. Koenig: 2009,
312)? Perceiving models as “dense, coherent, stable and homogeneous structures”
(Bertossi/Duyvendak: 2012, 240) can falsely suggest that the ideology of pillariza-
tion or establishment directly drives action – which mistakes the model for this
homogeneous ‘thing’ driving individual and collective behaviours; it confuses de-
scriptive, stylized models with explanatory factors. And how to explain institutional
change (Finotelli/Michalowski: 2012, 234)?11
As a response, scholars have pointed to the internal complexity and historical
contingency of models. National models should be seen as historical products
containing “within them multiple lines of reasoning and emotion, developed in
counterpoint to each other, and in tension if not in contradiction with one another”
(Bowen: 2007, 1005). And these different elements of themodel can apply at different
moments in time, regarding different policy domains, as Maussen argues (2009,
253). Whereas ‘evenhandedness’ is the guiding principle in the Dutch approach to
spiritual care and the wearing of headscarves, reliance on ‘separation of state and
church’ and ‘no financing of religion’ determine the financing of houses of worship.
9 Koenig uses transnational institutionalism “to designate social practices and institutional spheres
cross-cutting or encompassing the boundaries of nation-states” (2007, 915). This set of transnational
institutions and practices has normative (law), regulative (political institutional actors), and cognitive
dimensions (imagined community of the European Union).
10 Special issues on the national model are an issue of Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (2007),
vol. 33, no. 6; ‘TheHeuristic Potential of Models of Citizenship and Immigrant Integration Reviewed,’
Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies (2012) vol. 10, no 3; issue of Journal of Comparative
European Politics (2012) 10.
11 How can one explain changes in public policies in reference to the same model?
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Furthermore, the elements of the model can apply differently to Islam than to other
religious minorities.12
Second, in the country overview studies of the French or the Dutch approach
to Islam, scholars focus mainly on legal regulations and formal policies. “Social
contexts, concrete interactions and institutional settings are curiously never the
place where ‘model scholars’ do any research” (Bertossi/Duyvendak: 2012, 241).
Yet, Bader (2007b, 880) too predicts it:
The gap between predominant normative models of appropriate institutions and policies
and ‘what is going on, on the ground,’ the actual institutions and policies, is expectably
huge in all countries but particularly in countries like France or the US, where ideal
models of ‘strict separation of state and religions’ are paramount.
Institutional approaches thus stand to gain from a multileveled analysis as well as a
study of actual accommodation and policy application.
Third, the latest development in the literature suggests that, instead of relying on
national models, scholars should take note of “the ways in which government and
other public actors view their social world and act in them” (Bowen: 2012, 354).
Such a proposal links the effort to devise better descriptive models (or categories)
of what happens to religion or Islam to a constructivist turn. The meaning-giving
processes of the agent themselves become central for explaining (or describing)
their actions. By looking closely at public actors’ discourse, we might discover new
elements in the French/Dutch/Norwegian way of governing religion. In particular,
when combined with historical analysis, as Bowen has done for France,13 we might
be in a position to enrich our descriptive analytic models. Or we can observe how
an existing state-church element is interpreted in practice in new ways.
In this latest conception of state-church legacies, the model is thus seen not only
as internally plural. It is also conceptualized as an ideational frame of reference
that can be appropriated in different ways (it is ‘multi-interpretable’). See Jensen
(2019, 6) for a similar ideational approach to the national model, namely, that of an
immigrant integration model.
This discursive turn highlights the need for a scholarly distinction between
different usages of the model. As discussed in Section 1.2, Bowen distinguishes
between a state-church model as a ‘model of and ‘model for.’ The former describes
12 Maussen (2009, 253) shows how, in the French governance of Muslims, Islam obtains a status aparte
compared to other religious minorities as a result of particular colonial legacies. The Gallican and
Concorditarian traditions were crucial for the governance of Islam in Algerian and West Africa,
sidelining a stricter separation tradition. The Dutch, however, did not draw upon their colonial
policies.
13 He adds the ‘associational’ and ‘Gallican’ element to the French model. See Section 3.3.1.
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a given reality, i.e., it is a descriptive analytic tool; the latter is a discursive resource
used for specific purposes.
In summary, I use the above-mentioned insights as steppingstones for my own
approach. In my conceptualization of what happens to Muslim and humanist burial
needs, I pay attention to (1) internal complexities and possible historical changes
in adapted policies toward these groups burial needs; (2) forms of regulation at
different societal levels (not only law); (3) actual practice and application as opposed
to normative policy models; (4) the discourse actors employ to make sense of
the issue. These insights form the input for a ‘multileveled, discursive (religious)
governance approach’ developed in the next section. Further, they inform the
working conception of a heterogeneous state-church regime discussed in Section
2.4.3.
2.3 A Multileveled, Discursive (Religious) Governance Approach
2.3.1 Explaining the Metalevel Framework of Religious Governance
In response to the range of potentially relevant factors discussed above, the sociolo-
gist and philosopher Veit Bader proposes a metaframework of religious governance.
His intent is to bridge the various forms of scholarship and to incorporate a scholarly
focus on relevant internal factors of governance (a group’s own rules and structures)
with a focus on external factors of governance (general opportunity structures).
The term ‘governance’ is popular in a range of disciplines,14 though definitions
differ widely in the literature. Nevertheless, they do share a focus on mechanisms
of regulation that lie somewhere on the nexus between the state and society (cf.
Treib/Bähr/Falkner: 2005, 4). Bader was the first to apply the concept of governance
to the study of religion and Islam.15 He refers to religious governance as a pretheo-
retical framework aiming at providing for an adequate conceptual mapping of the
research field of religion, Islam, or migrants. Further, it provides guidelines for the
development of theoretically guided, explanatory, and comparative research.
In juxtaposition to a government approach, religious governance includes “reg-
ulation or steering, guidance by a variety of means, not only by rules” (Bader:
2007b, 873). Religious governance is thus more comprehensive than government.
14 This includes political science, economics, law, EU research, and studies analyzing the role of the
state in network societies. For a good overview and interdisciplinary discussion of this literature, see
Kersbergen/van Waarden: 2004; Treib/Bähr/Falkner: 2005; Pierre: 2000a, 2000b; Kooiman: 2003.
15 See Bader: 2007a, 2007b, 2009a; Maussen: 2007, 2009. Bader (2012c) also applies it to the study of
transnational migration and post-colonial governance of Islam, also Maussen/Bader/Moors: 2011.
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Studies of government tend to focus on the action of one actor (the state) and on ac-
tion(s) coordinated by means of formal rules (law or public regulations). Focussing
on governance means including more actors and other forms or regulation, like
soft pressures, condoning, incentives, etc.16 Yet, religious governance is narrower
because it includes only intentional capacities to regulate; markets as a relevant
mechanism for action coordination are not part of its focus. These operate accord-
ing to an invisible hand. Furthermore, only coordination by policies in a broad
sense matters. But, for example, the personal opinion of public or private agents
falls outside its scope.
To include the role of religion, humanism, or Islam in affecting policy outcomes,
Bader distinguishes two axes of regulation: internal versus external governance. He
also distinguishes democratic (bottom-up) from hierarchical (top-down) gover-
nance. Muslims own claims and actions are seen as shaping institutional arrange-
ments. Yet institutions also shape their actions and claims-making. Bader thus relies
on an actor-centered institutionalism. (We return to this theme later on.)
External factors can include a wide set of regulations as discussed: laws or law-
like rules as well as more informal forms of regulation. Internal issues of governance
involve self-regulation by religious laws and customs (e.g., canon law, sharia law)
or, for example, fatwas on specific topics. Here, the focus is broad and includes
rules that are enforced top-down by formal church elites, sharia councils, etc. Or,
reversely, it includes bottom-up steering mechanisms by local congregations or
imams. It could also include the destabilization of rules or norms by dissenters
or less formally organized groups of believers. In this respect, it is important to
note the differences between religions in their internal organization: Catholicism
approaches the autocratic pole; Protestantism is more democratic; Islam entails a
less organized form of internal governance (cf. Maussen/Bader/Moors: 2011, 16).
Differences in the internal structure of religious or secular minorities might help
to explain why new minorities are organized and institutionalized differently, even
in the same state. Differences in the external governance (both institutions as well
as cultural factors) might explain why a similar religious minority organizes and is
institutionalized differently in different states (cf. Bader: 2014, 3).
The governance perspective is multiactor-centered as opposed to state-centered.
It focuses on processes and potential shifts in policy paradigms, which avoids
historically static models or fixed normative templates for the regulation of reli-
16 For example, Treib/Bähr/Falkner (2005) distinguish between conceptions of governance encom-
passing institutional features (the polity), actor constellations (politics), and policy instruments
(policy). They distinguish four modes of governance in the policy dimension: coercion, voluntarism,
targeting, and framework, which derive from two dimensions: the type of instrument applied (legally
binding/soft law) and the quality of implementation (rigid/flexible).
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gious diversity. Finally, it leaves room for a wide range of factors (the state and its
institutions) to come into the analytic gaze of what happens to religion or Islam.
For my purposes, the perspective is attractive: By considering the pitfalls of national
modelling, Bader’s framework provides the parameters for more ‘sensitive’ mod-
elling that aligns itself with a multilevel perspective and shifts in governance as they
apply to society at large.17 This is particularly relevant to the study of Islam, the gov-
ernance of which is affected by a set of transnational institutions (Koenig: 2007b) as
well as by subnational and local institutions. Furthermore, the religious governance
perspective is attractive in light of the methodological concerns I raise toward
Asadian scholars. The analytic openness of this perspective allows researchers to
approach its subject matter openly. It asks, rather than assumes, what issue is at
hand.
2.3.2 Integrating Elements of an Actor-Centered Institutionalism
A few elements in Bader’s framework invite further investigation. Bader empha-
sizes the dynamic interaction between the claim-making of actors and existing
institutions. A similar idea is central to the actor-centered institutionalism (ACI)
developed by F. Scharpf and R. Mayntz, where social phenomena are explained
as the outcome of the interaction of intentional actors. Yet, these interactions are
structured such that the outcomes are shaped by the characteristics of the institu-
tional setting in which they take place (Scharpf: 1997, 1). The institutional context
does not determine what actors do, but it does influence them.
For my analysis of policy application (rather than formulation), I do not need
to know the details of their account. Yet, in line with ACI, I do adapt a similar
backward-oriented reasoning approach. The central unit of analysis for their ap-
proach lies in the interactions that eventually lead to a policy outcome. In the next
instance, this allows for the identification of the relevant actors “whose choices ulti-
mately will determine the outcome” (Scharpf: 1997, 43). Within actor- institution-
alism, the observable behaviour by actors counts as the ‘proximate’ cause, whereas
the institutional context is seen as constituting a ‘remote’ cause (Mayntz/Scharpf:
1995, 46–47).
In line with ACI, I start from an observed policy outcome and reason backwards
to discover the causes for that particular policy outcome. Like Scharpf, I give
analytic emphasis to the potential multiplicity of actors involved. Yet, in most of the
17 This involves a vertically upward change in governance from nation-states to international public
institutions; and a vertically downward shift from the influence of national and supranational realms
to that of subnational or regional/local agencies (cf. Kersbergen/Waarden: 2004).
https://doi.org/10.13109/9783666567322 | CC BY-NC-ND 4.0
© 2021, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Theaterstraße 13, D-37073 Göttingen
A Multileveled, Discursive (Religious) Governance Approach 45
municipal case studies, there were just one or two relevant agents. Furthermore,
Scharpf has a different institutional orientation.18 Ideas and discourse do not play
an explicit role in Scharpf’s account. For this, I turn to V. A. Schmidt’s so-called
discursive institutionalism.
2.3.3 Discursive Institutionalism: How Ideas and Discourse Matter
To explain the understanding of institutions in Schmidt’s framework and its rele-
vance to my book, I need to say a little bit about the other forms of institutionalism
juxtaposed to discursive institutionalism (DI).
DI is an umbrella term for works in political science that “take account of the
substantive content of ideas and the interactive process by which these ideas are
conveyed and exchanged in discourse” (Schmidt: 2010, 3). Schmidt claims DI to
be the fourth new institutionalism.19 In the three older schools, rational-choice
institutionalism (RI), sociological institutionalism (SI), and historical institutional-
ism (HI), institutions are seen as external to the actors. Furthermore, they function
largely as constraints to the agent’s functioning. Institutional action on a rational-
choice perspective is seen as the product of rational agents calculating in light of a
set of external incentive structures. Historical institutional accounts see actions as
the result of path-dependent rule following macrohistorical structures and regular-
ities. Sociological institutional accounts see action as the product of a social agent
that thinks and acts according to a norm of appropriateness in light of external
prevailing cultural norms and frameworks.20
According to Schmidt (2008, 313), these schools rightly brought institution back
into political analysis. But they “may have tipped it too far.” These perspectives leave
little room for explaining change:
Action in institutions in the three older new institutionalisms conforms to a rule-following
logic, whether an interest-based logic of calculation, a norm-based logic of appropriate-
ness, or a history-based logic of path dependence. But if everyone follows rules, once
established, how do we explain institutional change? (Schmidt: 2008, 314).
18 Scharpf’s framework is a mixture of rational-choice institutionalism (RI) and historical institution-
alism (HI). His work has earned him credit for sensitizing the understanding of a rational actor’s
actions and preferences toward an understanding of “the games real actors play.”
19 See Schmidt: 2008, 2010. “New institutionalism” refers to scholarly works that brought back in
institutions in the explanation of social and political phenomena.These developed largely in response
to the influence of behaviourism in the 1960s and 1970s (cf. Hall/Taylor: 1996). The latter explained
political phenomenon as the outcome of the behaviour of (rational) individuals or explain politics
merely as the outcome of group conflict (the sum aggregate of individual behaviour).
20 I rely in this discussion on the succinct summary of Schmidt (2010, 2).
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In other words, Schmidt criticizes these schools for having an imperfect account of
agency. “RI, HI and SI effectively leave us with ‘unthinking’ agents who are in an
important sense not actors at all” (2008, 314).
My interest in this framework is not to explain institutional change. But Schmidt
offers a useful way of conceptualizing institutional action that, like Scharpf and
Bader maintain, takes agency and institutional embeddedness seriously. Yet,
Schmidt accords more explicitly a role for ideas and discourse by emphasizing the
discursive dimension of institutions.
Such a conception of institutions allows me to take the ideas and discourse of
burial professionals in the field as an entry point for the causes (or at least for
the reasons mentioned as causes). The burial discourse tells us something about
the mechanisms of action, for example, how a state-organized religion legacy is
de facto appropriated. Furthermore, a comparative look at the discursive framing
also reveals national differences regarding relevant institutions or broader cultural
meaning structures.21
Schmidt sees institutions as both given meaning structures and contingent con-
structs. Institutions feed into the background abilities in which and through which
the agent thinks, acts, and speaks. Schmidt’s notion of ‘background ability’ empha-
sizes knowhow and predispositions rather than a conscious engagement with these
constitutive rules or norms.
Background abilities underpin an agent’s ability to make sense in a given meaning context,
that is, to get it right, in terms of the ideational rules, or ‘rationality’ of a given discursive
institutional setting (Schmidt: 2010, 14).
Schmidt refers to what Searle (1995) defines as ‘background abilities,’ which accord-
ing to Schmidt encompass “human capacities, dispositions, and knowhow related
to how the world works and how to cope with it” (Schmidt: 2010, 14). Or, referring
to Bourdieu, the habitus in which human beings act, “following the intuitions of
a ‘logic of practice’” (Schmidt: 2010, 14, quoting Bourdieu: 1990, 11). Likewise,
Schmidt refers to the psychology of cognitive dissonance that shows that people act
without thinking until they run into a contradiction; only then do they consciously
experience the rule that applies.
In other words, institutions enter the reasoning and actions of the actors, not
(only) as cultural norms or scripts of appropriateness (as a sociological institutional
account would have it, SI). Rather, they enter as the very means by which meaning
21 Why do they juggle with words in France, talk about money in The Netherlands and about conse-
cration in Norway?
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is attributed to the situation22 – something I call the ‘issue framework.’ For Schmidt,
institutions are also ideational constructs and thereby contingent outcomes of the
agent’s thoughts. The reinterpretation of an institutional element by public agents
can also alter the legitimacy of a previous way of ruling or way of seeing things.
Relating back to the opening paragraph of section 2.3.3, institutional action in
DI is a process in which ‘sentient’ agents make sense of a given issue in light of the
reigning “ideational rules or rationality of that setting” (Schmidt: 2008, 314). That
means that Schmidt sees a dialectic relationship between institutions, discourse,
and social praxis. Institutions enter social praxis and discourse by providing the
means through which agentsmake sense of a situation. Over time these institutional
frameworks come to be taken for granted: They become part of the background:
“This is how we do things.” And with this praxis comes a way of talking.
Yet, institutions are also dependent on discourse for their legitimization. Changes
in the public discourse, or the popularity of new ideas, might mean that other
institutional factors emerge, or that existing elements are reinterpreted. As ex-
plicit ideational constructs, institutions are also contingent outcomes of the agent’s
thoughts and interpretation.
In order to explain institutional change, Schmidt’s basic concern, she emphasizes
a second component: an agent’s ‘foreground discursive ability.’ This involves the
capacity of agents to speak, think, and act outside their internalized institutions
(rules, preferences, norms). This discursive ability allows them to change their
own ideas and communicate them to others. They can thereby collectively alter an
institution.
Schmidt’s distinction between ideas and meaning context is useful for the purpose
of this book. The latter refers to the (institutional/structural/cultural) frame in
which ideas are giving meaning. This distinction allows me, in a more fine-grained
manner, to separate how differently and how similarly these countries respond
to similar burial demands.23 Furthermore, my analysis confirms the idea that
institutional action is (at least) initially practice driven: This is how we do things –
rather than explicitly following rules. Third, because Schmidt’s understanding of
meaning context is broad, including institutional legacies as well as other discursive
settings or cultural legacies, it aligns well with Bader’s governance approach. Fourth,
22 There is a close affinity between SI and DI.
23 Policy outcomes between countries and municipalities are rather similar in a material sense and in
some of the normative ideas that are agents claim to be guiding their decision (e.g., equity, respect,
religious freedom). Yet, they are crucially different in the frames (institution or discourses) in which
agents embedded these normative ideas and thus the meaning that they attribute to these principles.
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regardless of the specific ontological position on the relationship between ideas,
agent, and institution24, we take agents ideas seriously (yet not too seriously!).
A few differences should be noted. Schmidt’s work concerns policy-making and
explaining institutional change (for example, at the level of the European Union).
On the other hand, I am concerned with institutional action rather than change
and with application of policy rather than the making of policy.25 Furthermore,
in Schmidt’s analysis, discourse comes in two forms: the coordinative discourse
among policy actors and the communicative discourse between political actors and
the public (2008, 303). However, on the issue of Muslim burial, there is little public
debate, not even in France.26
For this study, the relevant discourse is the day-to-day decisions of the public
burial executives. I conceive of (policy) discourse as the “ensemble of ideas, concepts,
and categorizations that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular
set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities”
(Hajer: 1995, 44). I analyze this day-to-day discourse borrowing loosely from
Schmidt’s distinction between levels of ideas.27 I distinguish between (1) explicit
ideas mentioned for guiding action, (2) issue frameworks, (3) a level of cultural
confessional narratives/sensibilities.
The first level refers to ideas that agents mention for their actions taken, or the
reason for which they think current solutions are as they are. That can be explicitly
normative (moral-political) reasons (‘be equal between citizens,’ ‘respect religious
freedom of practice’) or realistic and prudential oughts.28 Here, I follow closely the
language used by the respondents.
‘Issue frameworks’ refer to the larger meaning context in which agents situate
these ideas; these can be relevant institutions, relevant public discourses, or other
24 Schmidt has been accused of reducing institutions to mere ideas in the mind of the actor. They
become “residual” according to Bell (2012). Bell is right that institutions are not only ideas (that
would imply that they have no ontological existence outside the mind of the agent). But I disagree
that Schmidt accords institutions only a status as ideas. She allows them to enter her analysis as
“constitutive rules.” They enter the agents understanding of how to do things, their capacities,
dispositions, and knowhow. Yet, she differs in thinking that agents initially and normally do not
reflect on these constitutive rules. I omit a further ontological account of institutions here.
25 This is similar to Lipsky (1980), whose study looks at how public policy is ‘made’ in everyday life by
street-level bureaucrats. Yet, I do not focus on one group of professionals.
26 There is thus no pile of public statements out of which we can distill different groups that battle it
out over the definition of a problem. Hajer (1995, 44) tries to explain why a certain understanding
of the environmental problem is authoritative.
27 Schmidt (2008, 305) distinguishes three levels of ideas “policy,” “program,” and “public philosophy.”
28 E.g., Not shock!, weight of history, “please” (the customer), “it is logical,” “for a mayor what is the
problem?,” “niche in the market,” “we are a practical people.”
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sources of authority. What do the respondents see as the main issue? Here, (as a
scholar) I interpret what I think is the main issue.
Lastly, we demarcate cultural and confessional narratives, a level of ideas on par
with Schmidt’s distinction of public philosophy (2008, 306). I understand these
as wider background narratives: loosely articulated stories that inform the choice
but that cannot be fully explained. Actors might not be able to define these ideas
clearly. “These ideas serve as guides to public actors what to do, as well as being the
source of justification and legitimization for what such actors do” (Schmidt: 2008,
306). At this level, I give examples in which respondents could not really explain
why they did what they did. But at the same time they were deeply committed to
avoiding a certain institutional solution.
Based on these fine-grained distinctions, I have the tools for a nuanced discourse
analysis. I can compare literal language used: “I do this because of laïcité,” as well
as narrative structures. Maybe the agent does not use the word laïcité, but they do
provide a similar institutional argument (‘issue framework’) or expresses similar
cultural ‘sensibilities’ another agent would call ‘laic.’ Yet, as I argue, this then requires
an explicit justification and strategy of ‘perceived deployment’ on the part of the
scholar.
Before making the transition to the next section on Asad, first a few words on
the distinction between explicit and tacit factors. Schmidt’s conceptualization of
institutions is throughout one of implicit meaning structure (feeding into agents
‘background abilities’) as well as an explicit ideational construct (part of agents
‘discursive foreground abilities’). So, what is the difference between the implicit
relevance of an institution as ‘an issue framework’ and that of a ‘sensibility’?
I cannot provide hard-drawn lines here. But with sensibilities I try to get at even
more implicit incentives for action. They come through in the discourse because
of the usage of certain words (‘whole,’ ‘fragmentation,’ ‘patchwork,’ ‘ghetto’), or
underlying metaphors (‘lying in the bed,’ ‘coming home’). But respondents are not
conscious about this. In the two examples I discuss (Section 7.6.1), these sensibili-
ties are expressed through cultural/confessional narratives about the exclusion by
Catholics and the role of the French state toward its citizens. In the Norwegian
context, the recurring theme of consecration (‘issue framework’) suggests the rele-
vance of Christian or Lutheran sensibilities (although admittedly, I have not been
able to fully sense this).
I propose these sensibilities are even more tacit guides of action. To give an
example from Chapter 7, that private cemeteries are inconceivable for the chef du
cimetière he explains as stemming from a concern about equity (‘action-guiding
idea’): All citizens deserve equal treatment. This norm is given explicit meaning in
his discourse regarding a commitment to laïcité bien comprise (the ‘issue frame-
work’). Yet, as I point out to him, in laïc Switzerland private cemeteries are in fact
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allowed. Why then see private cemeteries as incompatible with laïcité? I conclude
that the reason why he avoids this institutional solution cannot be explained by his
argument; rather, we need to understand the underlying sensibility – a deep distrust
of religious communities. Moreover, he does not like visible group distinctions in
public.
2.3.4 The Role of Cultural Sensibilities: Talal Asad’s Anthropology of
Secularism
One possible interpretation of the example above is that the chef du cimetière relies
on a culturally French understanding of secularity (by which I then mean ‘religion
as something to be distrusted’). And this sensibility plays a role for understand-
ing why he is automatically against the idea of private confessional cemeteries.
Thus conceived, Asad’s work on the secular and secularism speaks directly to our
discussion by addressing a potentially relevant cultural factor.
Indeed, in France, secularism (laïcité) has a discursive relevance. And at the level
of sensibilities, distrust toward religion, is, indeed, one ingredient in this French
respondent’s reasoning. Asad’s focus on secular sensibilities can thus – also for
this study – productively highlight the implicit presumptions that people hold
for justifying arrangements. Yet, upon closer scrutiny, Asad’s approach lacks the
methodological tools necessary to provide for coherent cross-national comparisons.
In the following, I explain why this is so, while also looking at two alternative
Asad-inspired frameworks that solve some of Asad’s problems. Yet, despite being
more empirically sensitive, these too fail to address the question of their own
theoretical presuppositions. So, constructively, I make a suggestion for a more
coherent comparative framework.
In Asad’s leading work on secularism and the secular (2003), his interest in secular-
ism is genealogically based (see also Asad: 2018). Because secularism is a central
category of modernity, Asad is keen on tracing how: “… it [secularism] presupposes
new concepts of ‘religion,’ ‘ethics’ and ‘politics,’ and new imperatives associated
with them” (2003, 2–3). Consequently, he studies the deployment and the political
salience of the concept in the (colonial) structures of the nation-state.
Asad declares himself uninterested in providing a normative or ideological cri-
tique toward the vices of secularism, although he most certainly does so in a variety
of publications (see 2006b, 2007). Nor is his interest descriptive, in the sense of
stipulating a definition and then investigating what falls under that category (al-
though he certainly works with an implicit definition). However, Asad’s interest is
comparative:
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What is distinctive about modern anthropology is the comparison of embedded concepts
(representations) between societies differently located in time or space. The important
thing in this comparative analysis is not their origin (Western or non-Western), but the
forms of life that articulate them, the powers they release or disable. Secularism – like
religion – is such a concept (Asad: 2003, 17).
This passage is important since it shows that failure to provide for a coherent
comparative research methodology is not part of an external critique but stems
from within Asad’s own theoretical premises. Asad aims to compare, between
contexts, the deployment of the concept. To use his own words: “How, when and by
whom are the categories of religion and the secular defined? What assumptions are
presupposed in the acts that define them?” (2003, 201). Of interest to Asad is the
force the concept of secularism has and the powers its releases or disables within the
social context in which it is used. Furthermore, he inquires into its conditions:What
forms of life, practices, and sensibilities feed into its understanding and articulation?
And it is Asad’s shift to the input side of the concept – the category of the secular
– that has made him so influential. Asad worked out his ideas on religion and the
secular through a range of influential publications.29 And he provides inspiration
for a range of ethnographic studies that seek to critique notions of agency derived
from liberalism, by looking at Muslims’ ethical formation.30
Yet scholars have noted a range of problems with Asad’s approach.31 What I want
to highlight here is the following tension: Asad wants to avoid definitions and leave
the category open. He states: “It is precisely my concern to stress that the elements
making up the secular and secularism are in each case contingent” (2006a, 228). Yet,
he provides for descriptions of agency, pain, and torture in relation to embodiment
as “explorations of the secular” (2003, 16). That means that Asad must hold on
to something secular, as otherwise he could not be talking about any particular
secular sensibilities.
Relatedly, it is unclear how his approach to secularism can form the basis for a
comparative analysis, if his subject matter is “in each case contingent”? Along the
basic logic of comparative analysis, we obtain comparability only “when two or
more items appear ‘similar enough,’ that is neither identical nor utterly different”
(Sartori: 2009a, 15). For this to work, Asad needs a placeholder. The question of who
argues for and deploys secularism – and that there even is a deployer – becomes
29 See Asad: 1993, 2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2007, 2008, 2018.
30 E.g., Mahmood: 2003, 2005, 2006.
31 This not only reinforces the dichotomies between secular-religious, modern versus unmodern and
West vs non-West. This form of situated inquiry is at the same remarkably insensitive to context. It
posits enormously broad contexts, ‘the West,’ ‘the modern world,’ ‘Euro-American societies,’ etc., as
large analytic containers without any attention to real people living actual lives (cf. Bangstad: 2009a).
Further see Jansen: 2011; Dressler/Mandair: 2011.
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crucial. Yet, in the entire Secular Formations there is no answer to the question of
who exactly argues or deploys secularism. Asad simply states this to be a master
narrative and a series of inquiries about what “we have come to call the secular”
(Asad: 2003, 25, my italics).32 Framed differently, there is no secular subject.
Read as a pure counternarrative (and not an empirical description of the world)
and an ideological one at that, Asad’s account is useful, precisely because he keeps
his audience (“us”?) unspecified, his contexts general, and his explored categories
(‘the liberal,’ ‘the modern,’ ‘the secular’) undefined and vague. But what if we try to
work with his approach for the purpose of an empirical comparative investigation?
Let me suggest one defensible reading: Asad’s strategy could work when people
in the particular context actually use the term secularism or the secular (or some
emic proxy), although they mean very different things by it. In this case, the scholar
can avoid an explicit definition and make an inventory of the different usages of
the term and their connection to power structures. I call this the strategy of actual
deployment. But, what to do in contexts in which agents do not use these terms
(or close proxies)? In that case, what one is comparing is variations of the same
idea that the scholar perceives as being about the secular: the strategy of perceived
deployment.
Jumping ahead to the discussion in Chapter 7: In France, public agents indeed ac-
tively deploy terms like laïcité over others to argue for certain institutional solutions.
Yet, these arguments are absent in Norway, where the state-church has a monopoly
over the public graveyards because the local parish owns as well as administrates
them. In this context, if we ask burial agents why they chose certain institutional
accommodations for Muslims, they justify their choices, for example, in terms of
‘respect for the others,’ ‘not wanting to provoke,’ and that ‘they (Muslims) should
feel equally at home.’33 The public agents involved do not understand this matter
as being anything about secularism. In fact, some of them see their solutions and
underlying reasoning as “actually not secular thinking at all.”34
So, how do we decide whether a set of action practices or discourses count as an
instance of secularism? To apply Asad’s own question: “What makes a discourse
and an action ‘religious’ or ‘secular’?” (2003, 8).
One response could be to say that I am confusing here the usage of a termwith that
of the concept. These agents do not actually use the word, but if I as a scholar decide
that the solutions chosen and the arguments made surrounding Muslim’s burial
needs count as arguments about ‘religion’ (and everything concerning religion is a
form of secularism), then they nevertheless refer to the concept of secularism.
32 He says that he draws on material from West European history.
33 See the Discursive Chart, Table 7.1, Section 7.3.5 under ’central ideas mentioned,’ Støren case.
34 Interview with the churchwarden in Støren, 18 October 2013.
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But that presupposes, first, a theory of religion on my part (equating Islamic
burial practices with religion). Second, to avoid finding what I am looking for,
I need a precise definition of what I think counts as secularism – or not. Third,
even if I, the scholar, want to avoid a normative discussion of what secularism
should be, this can hardly be avoided. Insofar as the Norwegian burial agents (or
other relevant interest groups like humanists) in my study themselves attribute
normative meanings to the term that conflicts with my scholarly ones, I have to at
least acknowledge and specify that normative stance. If we frame the Norwegian
burial regulations (in which the Norwegian state-church has a monopoly) as a type
of ‘Norwegian secularism,’ my use of terminology thus takes sides in a controversy
over the legitimacy of these burial legal regulations.
In other words, we are confronted with the question about the normative un-
derpinnings of (comparative) scholars claiming to study secularity. How can Asad
study “formations of the secular” while avoiding any operational definition of the
phenomenon under study? What is not a case?
Asad’s strategy has another unfortunate outcome: Hiding behind a generalized
“we” to avoid the need for a definition obscures any possible distinction between
(1) the framing of the researcher, (2) the meaning of the category for the reading
audience (“we”), (3) the (different) meaning(s) of the category for the different
agents in the situation explored. This is problematic insofar as the meaning of
‘secularism’ as an etic concept can conflict with the meaning of ‘secularism’ or
‘secular’ for the agents in the situation explored. It is problematic insofar as Asad
himself claims that “one must work through the concepts the people concerned
actually use” (2007, 44). Lastly, it reifies: Asad makes it about the secular without
explicitly justifying why that is (and whose secular definition it is).
No doubt, Asad’s Secular Formation is a landmark study. It deserves huge credit
for being one of the first to interrogate a dominant narrative of modernity through
the category of the secular. Furthermore, the shift toward sensibilities has inspired a
wide range of scholars to investigate the lived experience of being secular.35 Still, as
a postmodern anthropologist, I think that he wants his framework to have empirical
relevance. As he tells us as much in a 1996 interview with S. Mahmood:
Once we get out of the habit of seeing everything in relation to the universal path to the
future which the West has supposedly discovered, then it may be possible to describe
things in their own terms. (…)The anthropologistmust describe ways of life in appropriate
terms. (…) These ”intrinsic terms” are not the only ones that can be used – of course
35 In the essay ‘Secularism and the Secular,’ like Asad, Casanova explores the connection between
secularism as an epistemic knowledge regime (‘the secular’ in Asad’s parlance) and secularism as
a political ideology. Casanova (2009, 1052) asks this question as a sociologist: How do “ordinary
people” experience being secular?
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not. But the concepts of people themselves must be taken as central in any adequate
understanding of their life.
At this point, the more constructive question may be: How to make this agenda
more empirically sensitive? I address two interesting proposals that partly achieve
this, though ultimately they do not resolve Asad’s main methodological problem.
M. Mandair and S. Dressler propose ‘religion-making’ as a key concept or critical
term. Inspired by Asad’s genealogical approach, this heuristic device “allows us to
bring into conversation a wide range of perspectives on practices and discourses
that reify religion (…)” (2011, 21). Much in the spirit of this book, they “aim to
avoid the impasse between theory and empiricism that continues to be the hallmark
of many books with a focus on the politics of religion and secularism” (p. 21).
To this end, they distinguish between three levels and modes: ‘religion-making
from above,’ where religion becomes an instrument of power from above; ‘religion-
making from below,’ where particular social groups in a subordinate position draw
on a religionist discourse to establish (or re-establish) their identities; and finally,
‘religion-making from (a pretended) outside,’ which refers to scholarly discourses
that help sustain the first two processes of religion-making by legitimizing and nor-
malizing the religious/secular binary (p. 21). ‘Religion-making from a (pretended)
outside’ is often linked to ‘religion making from above’: “the academic study of
religion in particular has been implicated in imperialist projects and Eurocentric
discourses more generally” (p. 23).
The second proposal by E. Hurd – to move “beyond religion” – introduces three
similar yet slightly different heuristics: ‘governed religion,’ ‘expert religion,’ and ‘lived
religion.’ Expert religion is “religion as construed by those who generate ‘policy-
relevant’ knowledge” (2015, 8); lived religion is “practiced by everyday individuals
and groups as they interact with a variety of religious authorities, rituals, texts
and institutions” (p. 8); and she sees ‘governed religion’ as “construed by those in
positions of political and religious power” (p. 8).
ForHurd, “the category of lived religion ismeant to draw attention to the practices
that fall outside the confines of religion as construed for purposes of law and
governance” (p.13). But, as she notes, “(…) to distinguish between official and lived
religion in this way is to risk reifying and romanticizing lived religious practice”
(p. 13). The challenge, as Hurd herself diagnoses it, is to “constantly problematize
a clear juxtaposition between everyday and official religion even while relying on
these distinctions as heuristics devices (…)” (p. 13).
For Hurd, this is “a productive paradox” that draws attention to forms of religious
lifeworlds that otherwise tend to fall between the cracks, “because when scholars
and practitioners look for religion they seek out religious leaders and institutions,
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recognizable texts and defined orthodoxies, and religious authorities in fancy robes
and impressive hats” (p. 13f.).
Hurd’s interest is not the governance of religion, “how that which is identified as
religion becomes subject to particular forms of governance” (p. 11). Rather, it lies
in how these forms of law and governance, “once established,” relate to the broader
political, social, and religious lifeworlds with which they interact (p. 11).
In other words, she focuses on the prior process of categorization, namely, deci-
sions about what falls within or outside the categories of religion in law and politics,
and the effect of that exclusion on the lifeworld under investigation.
A few features make this an attractive approach. It can do better justice than
Asad’s largely Western secular, when applied to the different groups in society doing
the deployment. By distinguishing between experts, the official organs governing
religion (politics, law, official religious authorities) and the lived experience of those
in the everyday world, it becomes obvious that all engage in their own way in
constructions (although, remarkably, she does not call the ‘lived religion’ of her
everyday world a construction).
Second, it shows that those constructions have real-life consequences and affect
each other. How official representatives and public agents represent religion and
what gets done to it affect how experts theorize about it and vice versa. (In our
discussion, this resembles the link between ‘categories or models of ’ and ‘categories
or models for’; see Section 1.2) This plays back into the self-understanding of the
everyday world of participants who either align themselves with such an official
position or oppose themselves.
Third, there is an underlying (normative) commitment to take the everyday
world seriously. Crucially, it conveys that these constructions are always political.
To call something religion is a political statement. But exactly for those reasons,
the same question as with Asad remains.
If we look at Hurd’s heuristic of lived religion, according to what and whose
standards are these described lived forms of life in fact religious? Is the scholar
presenting us with an answer to that question, as the participants of that everyday
world define it (strategy of actual deployment)? Or is it the researcher who has
singled them out to be religious (strategy of perceived deployment)?
In the latter case, what are the criteria for including or excluding certain practices
as religious? Does the demarcation line fall with the status of the respondents: Is this
a study of thosewho are not in power? So, if the religious leader is speaking, we count
it as governed religion, but when it is the Muslim burial agent, it is lived religion.
Is it lived religion because the burial agent is Muslim? Is everything Muslims say
just instances of lived religion – or only when they identify themselves as religious?
And what does that even mean? When they claim identity basing themselves on an
official sacred text, do they then speak as religious subjects? But when they claim
identity based on a cookbook, does it disqualify them?
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The basic point remains, as with Asad. Out of purview are reflections on the
heuristics’ own presuppositions: the scholars’ own intervention in presenting us
that picture of the lifeworld. They pretend that they can stand (neutrally?) on the
sidelines, just ‘charting deployment.’ But this fails if there is no explicit term in usage.
In other words, how to decide (and, of course, who decides?) on the boundaries
of the discourse? “What makes a discourse and an action ‘religious’ or ‘secular?’”
(Asad: 2003, 8). Hurd raises critical questions toward any possibility of knowing
what religion is – it is always a construction, by some groups, for certain purposes.
Yet, there is remarkably little doubt what the secular is. She remarks the following:
To the extent that religion has assumed importance as a legal and policy category in inter-
national law and politics, […] governments, courts and other authorities are compelled
to define it, […]. This dilemma, […] is a – if not the – distinguishing feature of modern
secular power (Hurd: 2015, 11).
And here both Hurd’s as well as Mandair/Dressler’s heuristics share a common
presupposition: Secularism is unproblematically presumed to lie prior to religion. It
is not theorized as such, but that is the point of departure. They suggest presenting
a metanarrative by looking only at how the defining of religion takes place. Yet,
their approaches nevertheless align with a particular intervention in the debate on
the genealogy of the secular.
One issue at stake in the debate over the secular is a deeply epistemological
disagreement over the relationship between the secular and religion. Are they
opposites, in the sense of what Taylor (2007, 22) labelled as ‘subtraction stories’?
This approach understands the secular from within an immanent framework as
the decline of or overcoming of religion (a process of progressive emancipation).
Or are they inherently connected? If so, does the category of religion emerge
from the secular, in the sense of coming to fruition in the Enlightenment and as
nation-state tool, like it does in part for Asad? Or does the secular emerge from
developments internal to Christianity? Then, should we evaluate this negatively
(Casanova: 2010, 267)? Or is this a positive process of internal Christian seculariza-
tion (Witte: 2014, 57ff.)? Different academic disciplines rely on different genealogies
of the secular.
Both Hurd’s and Mandair/Dressler’s heuristics presupposes three things: It takes
the discursive position for granted, suspicious of anything claiming essences. This
is useful, for example, for dismantling an essentialist US political discourse of ‘good’
versus ‘bad’ religion (e.g., Hurd: 2015). Yet, it should not be generalized as the
comparative methodology for secularism or religion. There may be good scholarly
reasons to work with well-delineated categories.
Likewise, there is an underlying normative presupposition that categorization by
a category like ‘religion’ is always suspicious. It is absolutely necessary to study cases
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in which the law unfairly excludes something because of an implicit Christian bias.
Yet, this does not imply that all legal categorization by means of religious freedom
is unfair. In other words, theirs is a total critique.
Third, in both conceptual universes (i.e., Mandair/Dressler’s and Hurd’s), sec-
ularism is always implied. As soon as something is construed as religion, we au-
tomatically have an instance of secularism or secular power. “In bringing to light
the often hidden function of secularism as a religion making machine, this notion
of the postsecular helps to release the space of the political from the grasp of the
secularization doctrine“ (Mandair/Dressler: 2011, 18).
As with Asad36, this suggests that there is an underlying genealogy in which
secularism comes first and then gives rise to the category of religion: “secularism as
a religion making machine.” While from a theoretical perspective this looks like a
benign matter, it matters greatly in a fieldwork context.
To be clear, my engagement with these two analytic frameworks is not a critique
of the specific terms of ‘lived religion’ or ‘religion-making’ as such. I do not intend to
discredit or even engage with the range of studies on ‘lived religion.’ My point rather
is a pure methodological and epistemological one. The scholarly presupposition
of an implied secularism or secularity can stand in the way of interpreting burial
agents’ own vernacular understandings of their actions taken. I illustrate this in
Sections 7.6.1–7.6.3.
2.4 Additional Methods
Let us now turn to the book’s methodology. In my previous discussion of Schmidt’s
discursive institutionalism (DI), I developed the methodological tools for a nu-
anced discourse analysis. Furthermore, through my discussion of Asad, I suggested
a methodological strategy for conducting discourse analysis in a comparative field-
work situation where emic and etic understandings of the actions of respondents’
conflict: distinguishing between ‘actual’ and ‘perceived deployment.’ Apart from
these discourse methodological concerns, to which I return throughout the book,
the study uses various other methods as well.
36 As Casanova (2006c, 21) similarly remarks: “Asad seems to assign to the secular the power to
constitute not only its near-absolute modern hegemony but also the very category of the religious
and its circumscribed space within a secular regime.”
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2.4.1 Comparative Method, Multiple Embedded Case Study, and
Ethnography
The study is designed according to a comparative method and multiple-case em-
bedded design. Selection for the countries is based on grounds of a most similar
systems design within comparative politics, applying a method of difference. The
three countries have many characteristics in common, but they differ enough in
terms of the explanatory variable to make a comparison meaningful. France, The
Netherlands, and Norway are all Western democracies. Yet they differ in their
constitutional reality and their legal relations toward religious organizations, each
representing an ideal-type in a standard tripartite typology37: France is ‘separatist’;
Norway had an ‘established national church’ (until 2012); The Netherlands is a
‘selective cooperation country’ (cf. Robbers: 1996; Ferrari: 2002).
The central unit of analysis for this study is the interactions (processes and
decisions) that lead to a concrete burial policy. I study this outcome and the related
process in three national contexts and nine embedded cases studies (three in each
country).
Three conditions satisfy the choice for a case-study method and design (cf. Yin:
2014, 9). First, this study poses a ‘how-and-why’ type of research question. I aim to
describe as well as to partly explain differences in burial policy outcomes. Second,
the focus of this study is contemporary as well as historical. Both a historical
method and a laboratory experiment also ask ‘how-and-why’ questions, yet a
mere historical method would not be sufficient. Furthermore, i.e., third, I aim to
understand complex social phenomena from a holistic and real-world perspective.
That means that there are important differences and similarities with a laboratory
experiment: unlike in a laboratory experiment, I have no control over behavioural
events. However, I can study the phenomenon in different contexts with analytically
relevant different features that might influence the phenomenon. Furthermore,
what differentiates the case-study method from a laboratory experiment is that,
in the latter case, the context is typically ignored because it is ‘controlled’ by the
laboratory experiment (cf. Yin: 2014, 16). Case studies, however, are empirical
inquiries that investigate contemporary phenomenon “in depth and within its real-
world context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context
may not be clearly evident” (Yin: 2014, 16).
Nevertheless, there are also important similarities between the case-studymethod
and the experiment, namely, both types of studies strive for analytic generalization.
37 Established legal typologies distinguish between established and nonestablished states, and within
the latter between separationist and selective cooperation countries. France is separationist, and The
Netherlands selectively cooperates with selected religious bodies.
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The goal is not to extrapolate probabilities (statistical generalizations) and to gener-
alize them to populations, as is, for example, the case in a survey. Unlike a sampling
logic, the embedded cases do not indicate the prevalence of a phenomenon, which
would require many more cases studies – an impossible task for one book. Rather,
the aim is theory development. Case studies are generalizable to theoretical propo-
sitions, in our case about the role of state-organized religion legacies in affecting
processes/decisions (cf. Yin: 2014, 21 and 57).
Both the case study and the experiment first isolate and describe a phenomenon,
after which they replicate the phenomenon under similar circumstances to see
whether similar findings can be discovered. Or they repeat the study of the same
phenomenon under different circumstances. In the case of the experiment, such
replicationmight involve altering one or two experimental conditions to seewhether
the original findings can be discovered.
In our study, we look at the phenomenon of the processes leading to burial
outcomes in three different national contexts with different national state-church
legacies. Andwe replicate – or rather re-study – this phenomenon in nine embedded
cases chosen, similar to an experiment, on a ‘replication logic.’ The embedded cases
are picked with the expectation that they produce (a) similar results, called a ‘literal
replication logic,’ or that they produce (b) contrasting results, but for anticipated
reasons, called a ‘theoretical replication’ (see Yin: 2014, 57).
For each national context I selected two cities38 (the capital and a nearby city)
with a significant and growing Muslim population. I inquire about any similarity
between the two cities and compare the national legal prescription. If indeed a
national state-church legacy was relevant for the solutions chosen, I would expect
both cities to provide similar solutions in line with the national prescriptions – but
different from the cities in the other two countries. The two cities are thus chosen
with the expectation that they provide similar results (‘literal replication logic’).
This includes Amsterdam and The Hague, Montreuil and Paris, Oslo and originally
Lørenskog.39
38 To be clear, my unit of analysis is not a municipality. Yet, the demarcation line between municipal
context and the embedded case becomes blurred. In all embedded cases, the main sets of regulations
and processes are largely municipal in nature. This holds true with the exception of the case study of
the Muslims in Lyon (who operate at an intermunicipal level of le Courly) and The Netherlands,
where individual cemetery owners and private actors set regulations to a much larger degree. To
capture this, I investigated all processes leading up to the outcomes, not just those of themunicipality.
Yet, I prefer to refer to “the Amsterdam case study” instead of “the reasoning and actions of all
relevant agents leading to outcomes in the embedded case study in Amsterdam.”
39 I carried out a first round of interviews in Lørenskog but omitted that city for lack of sufficiently
qualified data and, as I explain later on, because of personal circumstances that stood in the way for
completing the fieldwork here.
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The third embedded case in each national context is chosen to engage a rival
explanation for variation, predicting contrasting results but for anticipated reasons
(‘theoretical replication’). These include the role and mobilization of Muslims them-
selves and, in the Norwegian context, the degree of rurality affecting the solutions
chosen.
In The Netherlands, the city of Almere serves to investigate the observed discrep-
ancy between the legal possibility of confessional cemeteries and the near absence
of Islamic cemeteries. By investigating this ‘unusual case,’ we learn something about
the conditions of its success. Furthermore, it engages one rival explanation for
variation: the role of Muslims themselves.
InNorway, the first pilot study of Oslo indicated that largely Joint Parish Councils
are the initiators, and the role of Muslims themselves is small. Thus, the case studies
of Elverum and Støren serve to investigate another possible reason for variation,
that is, the size of the municipality/degree of rurality. Oslo, Elverum, and Støren
are equal in the sense that a liberal folk church is influential,40 yet they differ in
degree of rurality. The expectation in that case was to find contrasting results but
for the anticipated reasons. Elverum is a rural, middle-sized town, Støren an even
smaller town.41
The choice for the third case in France, Lyon, is that it is a city known for its
large Muslim population and a very active Islamic political environment (including
tense ethnic relations).42 This can shed light on the role of Muslims themselves.
Four criteria serve to test the quality of the empirical social research designs: external
validity, internal validity, construct validity, and reliability. Following Yin’s (2011;
2014) tactics for dealing with these tests when doing case-study research, I secure
external validity (Can the findings can be generalized?) by relying on a replication
logic in the choice for the multiple embedded case studies, as described above.
To secure internal validity (How can we be sure that other factors are not caus-
ing the outcomes?), some of my embedded cases studies were chosen according
to a theoretical replication logic. This allows me to investigate the role of rival
explanations, albeit with some notable limitations.43
40 I thank Prof. D. Thorkildsen for pointing out this common ‘liberal folkekirkelighet’ and thinking
through the rationale of choosing the Støren case study.
41 The degree of rurality is of course not so easy to determine. Elverum lies on the Eastern inlands
of Norway, and, although it is considered ‘rural’ by its leadership, it is still relatively large and one
of the centers in the Mjøsa area (Norway’s largest inland lake). Støren is a very small town on the
northern coast of Norway about half an hour away from Trondheim by train.
42 I thank Prof. J. Klaussen for bringing this city to my attention as a relevant case (private conversation,
Stanford, June 2008, SIAS Summer Institute).
43 One limitation of this study lies in the lack of a historical discussion of integration policies for all
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The construct validity of a research design involves identifying the correct op-
erational measures for the concepts being studied (in our case, those of ‘burial
policy outcomes,’ ‘secularism,’ and a ‘state-church legacy’). How can readers be
sure that the researcher is not falsely interpreting the empirical outcomes as being
about a state-church legacy or secularism? This required demarcating ‘burial so-
lutions/policy outcomes’ as precisely as possible. (See Table 1.1 for a fine-grained
operationalization.) Second, it required specifying a state-church legacy as an in-
stitutional factor (operationalized as a descriptive model or a discursive trope). I
investigated the relevance of secularism at a discursive level: Was it relevant as a
narrative, a term, or a sensibility?
This book is an in-depth investigation of this meeting point between scholarly
interpretation and concepts, on the one hand, and the respondents’ own meaning-
making process, on the other hand. To make transparent how I interpret my respon-
dents’ discourse, see the detailed discussion in Chapter 7. Furthermore, to secure
construct validity, I relied on multiple sources of evidence (elaborated below), and,
where possible, I let key informants review the draft of the case study.44
Reliability (Can the findings be reproduced?) is secured by means of a case-study
database. For each national context and embedded case, I made folders that system-
atized the raw material. They contained the original interviews, transcriptions, and
all other materials collected for each municipal case. I also kept written fieldnotes
or other physical materials in separate folders. However, reproducing the results
was partly compromised by formal ethical regulations. Upon finalizing this project,
I was required to remove all audio recordings and any possible keys for identifying
persons within the transcribed interviews to ensure anonymity in accordance with
the guidelines of NSD (Norsk Senter for Forskningsdata).
Alternatively, project reliability is secured by providing a detailed overview of all
project and research questions at the five analytic levels of analysis (Appendix I).
This reveals the overall structure of the project and allows for a distinction between
questions asked of specific interviewees (level E), those at the level of the case study
(level D), patterns across multiple cases (level C), questions asked of the entire
study (level B), and broader conclusions regarding international research agenda’s
going beyond the narrow scope of the study (level A).
I discuss the data-collection procedures in detail below. Table 1.1 in the Intro-
duction provides an important data-collection device; data-collection questions for
the interviews are specified in Appendix II.
countries. Such a discussion was omitted for two reasons: (1) feasibility (2) integration regulations
do not typically address the topic of cemeteries (exceptions being Amsterdam and Elverum).
44 Regarding The Netherlands, I thank Mr. Schippers for his feedback. For the Lyon case study, I thank
Mr. Elouefi. For Norway, I thank Mrs. Skrøvset for providing feedback on my 2014 article.
https://doi.org/10.13109/9783666567322 | CC BY-NC-ND 4.0
© 2021, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Theaterstraße 13, D-37073 Göttingen
62 Theoretical Frameworks of Religious Governance and Discursive Institutionalism
My study follows a multiple case-study design and comparative method, but it can
also be called “ethnographic” along the five dimensions outlined by Hammersley/
Atkinson (2007, 3). First, it involves a study of people’s actions and accounts in the
field. Second, it combines a range of sources (further specified below). Third, cate-
gories for interpretation are not set a priori through questionnaires or observation
schedules but follow the process of data analysis. Fourth, there is an in-depth look
at a few cases. Fifth and finally, the analysis of the data concerns interpretations
of the meanings and functions of human actions and institutional practices. This
results in detailed descriptions and suggestions for explanations.
The data comprise 35 interviews, both recorded and unrecorded.45 These are
qualitative, semistructured interviews with open-ended questions. The data were
collected during two rounds of fieldwork visits,46 via email correspondence or
phone conversations. Further sources of evidence include public documentation,
archival records, participant observation as well as observation of physical artifacts
during on-site visits.
Public documentation included, among other things, legal and/or public (mu-
nicipal or state) documents (court cases, law texts), newspaper articles, municipal
brochures, graveyard brochures, published surveys, or documents from the internet.
I screened these documents for any information on general concerns with religious
diversity in the cemetery or that of burial concerns of certain groups specifically
(Jews, Muslims, Humanists). I looked at discussions over possible solutions chosen
and the motivations underlying those solutions.
Archival records were consulted at Les Archives de Paris in Paris, the Archives
Municipales in Montreuil, the Nasjonalbilblioteket in Oslo, and the Koninklijke
Bibliotheek in The Hague. I used these archives primarily to find old burial laws
or public documents about those laws in order to study motivations for former
decisions.
Participant observation occurred in several ways. For nearly every embedded
case study, I visited the cemetery and the office of the respective administrator. This
led to my discovering that the physical artifacts provided for are very similar across
countries. Furthermore, observing people work in their physical surroundings
45 Unrecorded interviews include telephone conversations, walks over the graveyards, or other situa-
tions where recording was inappropriate or failed. I made detailed field notes in these cases.
46 The first round of fieldwork took place under the heading of the New School University and with
the permission of the Institutional Review Board-Human Subjects Committee at the New School.
Dates of fieldwork: 2008 Oslo; 2009 Paris/Lyon (hosted by Science Po), and 2009 Amsterdam
(hosted by IMES). The fieldwork carried out in 2012 and 2013 occurred with permission of the
Personvernombudet for forskning, Norsk samfunnsvitenskapelig datatjeneste AS (hosted in Paris by
Science Po, IMES in Amsterdam). Grants came from the Theological Faculty, University of Oslo,
Fondation de Maison des Science de l’Homme (FMSH) and the Norwegian Research Council (NFR).
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occasionally brought out subtle power dynamics. One example that I address further
on is that of a French administrator in her office. It captures the entire French social
context in a nutshell. I joined a French Islamic undertaker one day on the job. And
I was grateful to take part in an Islamic funeral in Lyon. These visits helped me
form an idea of the everyday context of Islamic burial undertakers or other burial
professionals.
Comparing the physical dimension of solutions occurred by taking notes during
on-site visits. I took pictures on some occasions, but I was not always allowed to
take photos. In The Hague case, I provided instead for an institutional typography
of the cemetery of Kerkhoflaan (Scheme 5.1).
By collecting information from multiple sources, I could triangulate specific case-
study findings. Did other sources of evidence support the same case finding? For
example, did public documents, interviews, and the on-site visit converge in the
finding that the Islamic section was provided for because there was already a Jewish
section? In some contexts, there was no official documentation, whereas in others
the contexts produced a rich set of data.
While the lack of information in some contexts initially worried me, this varied
outcome proved ultimately telling in and of itself. For example, the lack of written
agreements in The Hague were indicative of the governing style: few formalities
and mostly oral agreements occurring on an ad-hoc cooperative basis. The Paris
case study, on the other hand, could be worked out in great detail because of an
abundance of historical and contemporary sources. The material for Oslo did not
lend itself to a discourse-analytic approach.47 For corroboration, I combined sources
of evidence and met with the same respondent several times, where relevant (Yin:
2011, 81).
Contact with informants was established through email or a phone call. Selection
of new contacts occurred in two ways: either because a former informant had
referred me, and a newspaper article brought the Elverum case to my attention.
Alternatively, respondents fell in the category of persons designated for an interview.
This includes (1) relevant lawmakers/jurists or public officials engaged in the law-
making process; (2) decision-makers at the national or municipal level; (3) Islamic
or humanistic representatives involved. (4) I also talked with a set of nonstate
actors involved in the work directly related to the graveyard: burial undertakers,
ceremonial leaders, or, where relevant, knowledgeable burial amateurs.
Each interview follows a rough protocol (see Appendix II). A set of general
themes is discussed, but their order and form are open and adapted to the partici-
47 I relied primarily on a dissertation by Døving (2005), so the material was not suitable for a similar
analysis as in the case of Støren and Elverum.
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pant’s knowledge. I adjusted to the circumstances and person I am talking with, as
these varied greatly. I followed as much as possible the conversational style of the
respondent. This served a nondirective and two-way interaction (cf. Yin: 2011, 134;
Brenner: 2006). Below I say more on this, as well as about my experiences with a
limited access to certain informants in France.
The narrative data from the recorded interviews were partly transcribed, but
including only the relevant passages. This entailed passages where respondents
explained their actions, motivations, hesitations, or ideas about possible solutions
provided for (or avoided). I omitted transcribing discussions about legal burial
procedures, historical political developments, or technical details about the burial
process, unless these mattered for the respondent’s own solution chosen.
That general information mattered, instead, to develop a broad institutional
understanding (used for Chapters 3 and 4). The respondents exact wording served
to show the usage of certain terms or how respondents framed the matter at stake.
Alternatively, it showed that respondents relied on a similar narrative structure
in their answer to humanist and Muslim burial needs, for example, in Norway.
Regarding the question of secularism, I transcribed all passages where respondents
explicitly used those terms, or where they were asked by me about its relevance.
For reasons of space, I omitted the quotations in the original language, with some
exceptions.
2.4.2 Fieldwork Challenges
Data collection can be messy. You can have a fully worked-out interview guide and
all the required permissions, yet respondents fail to show up, they get angry, or
they reveal all their interesting information exactly at the moment when the record-
ing device is turned off! Doing research as a woman in a rather male-dominated
institutional domain also led to occasionally hilarious, and sometimes rather un-
comfortable, situations. For example, one respondent called me at 3 am to visit a
grave in the city’s torture museum! Another respondent invited me after 30 minutes
of interview for a romantic ‘stayover’ during a visit to his residence.
Three sets of circumstances deserve more detailed mention because they directly
affectedmy approach to collecting data andmy access to certain types of informants
– or they set limits to my attempt to collect information more generally. All three
relate to my position as a beginning researcher and mother (Haraway: 1998).48
The fact that I was a beginning researcher sometimes impacted the interaction
with, and access to, certain respondents. My personal circumstances and being the
48 Haraway’s (1988) emphasis on positioning demands reflection on the part of the researcher over the
ways in which power relations affect the research interaction with the informants.
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mother of a sick child affected the process of data collection in the last phase of the
project on which the book is based.
The first example of what went presumably wrong relates to the general research
question of secularism. Upon starting my fieldwork, I was unsure what variables
such as a state-church legacy or secularism would look like in the field. I presumed
that respondents usually do not ask themselves: “What would the institutional
legacy of state-church relations want me to do?” But I found out that, occasionally,
they did reference the history of state and church relations. It thus made sense to
maintain my research question on the relevance of state-church legacies. Otherwise,
they referred to normative principles like ‘treating Jews and Muslims equally,’ or
they relied on logics/scripts like ‘we want them to feel at home,’ or simply the idea
that ‘religion should be private.’ Therefore, it became useful to draw on Bowen’s
definition of schemas, which captures this: “sets of representations that process
information and guide action” (2012, 357).
The absence of any reference to secularism in the Dutch and Norwegian context
was more bothersome. Initially, I did not deem this an important finding. In my
very first round of interviews in 2008 and 2009, I still mentioned the title of my
project in formal correspondence with the respondents: “Secularism Revisited: A
Comparative Study of Secularism as a Practice in The Netherlands, Norway, and
France.” But, later on, I began to understand that crucial comparative differences
between countries were to be found in how respondents talked and framed the
matter at hand. And that I, as a researcher, should avoid influencingmy respondent’s
approach. As the project evolved, I thus becamemore careful withmy own choice of
wording and avoided further reference to terms like ‘secularism’ in correspondence
and interviews.
Furthermore, I also began to ask (often at the end of the conversation) what
respondents actually thought about secularism in relation to the cemetery regula-
tions. Or, put differently, why they did not consider a certain solution appropriate.
With this change in interview strategy, I did not intend to prove my own superiority,
but rather I wanted to tap into the applied wisdom of institutional agents and to
tease out their counterarguments and objections. Furthermore, it allowed me to
register possible emotions, hesitations, or assumptions in relation to secularism.
This way of asking questions influenced the research interaction, although it is
not easy to say how. Some respondents became insecure and uncomfortable; maybe
they were intimidated by an unfamiliar vocabulary. Others became annoyed and
critical (often expressing this once the recordings had ended). In both instances, it
made for an uncomfortable and unnatural situation, which is why I tended to pose
these questions late in the conversation.
These general fieldwork experiences (i.e., the lack of secularism talk) affected
the way I approached my respondents and data. They highlight the need to remain
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open to the everyday language of my respondents and to be aware of the possible
colonizing effect of scholarly terms. Asking explicitly about secularism made clear
that the interview context is an unnatural situation where the researcher is in a
position of epistemic power.
A second set of experiences emerged from my fieldwork in the French context. One
of my very first interviews in 2009 with a French respondent was every beginning
researcher’s nightmare. I met with this respondent, who wants to remain strictly
anonymous, in a Parisian café. Prior to the conversation, I had sent this person,
whom I knew through a former informant, a range of questions by email. In my
best French I had explained my interest for laïcité and its presumed incompatibility
with Islamic sections. And yet, as I had pointed out to this person, these sections
exist. So why not change the laws? Or how am I to understand this contradiction?
Wemet in the early morning. My respondents first sentence was something along
the following lines49: “Please know that I am only here because of my loyalty to my
friend …! From your email correspondence I have gathered that you understand
nothing about French laïcité! These sections are mistakes! Who is your supervisor?
If you had been working with some of the leading persons on this topic, Pascal
Trompette, for example, I would have been willing to help you. But this person that
you mention [I had given a reference in my email], I have no idea who this is. You
are not a serious researcher [Vous n’êtes pas sérieux!]. And as I said, the only reason
I am sitting here is because of my friendship with …”
This person further asked me about my interview schedule. Upon answering
that I planned to visit two Islamic undertakers in a nearby region of Paris, more
accusations followed. “Did I understand correctly that these were illegals? Why
would I talk to them? Why not do it the proper way and gain access though the
organization that this person worked for? You probably found these people online,
right?” Clearly, this person saw no point in talking to me …
I learned three important things from this very unpleasant conversation: First,
laïcité is sacred to some and cannot be interrogated without having displayed the
appropriate embedded knowledge of French culture. Second, Islamic demarcations,
in whatever form, whether sections or in the form of Islamic undertakers, are
offensive to some version of the Republican spirit. Third, proper status and the
proper credentials are a necessary condition for gaining access to French public
officials.
49 In the heat of themoment I did not dare ask whether I could record the conversation.These wordings
are an approximation based on my memory and fieldnotes.
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This latter feature of French society also cropped up in my second fieldtrip.
Taking these lessons to heart, I had refreshed my relations with a professor of
political science at Science PO prior to my second fieldtrip. Yet, despite her help,
I was still unable to establish contact with both lawmakers and decision-makers
at the national level. The first problem was finding working email addresses or
phone numbers. I did internet searches, screened formal texts for any contact
information, but to no avail. Second, those persons I did find failed to respond, or
were uninterested. Even worse, I had trouble gaining access even to local municipal
administrators. I wrote emails, made phone calls but was, again and again, told
that I needed official appointments and an authoritative person to get access to
the main burial institutions. And spontaneous visits, people told me, were out of
the question. The result was that, on this second field trip to Paris, after 3 weeks of
what was supposed to be a 4-week fieldwork travel, I still had not obtained a single
interview.
Two actions saved the situation: In the first week of my stay, the professor at
Science Po had written a letter on my behalf to the Le Service des cimetières, which
opened doors.50 I finally got an interview with the highest administrator of the
cemeteries on one of the last days. Second, when, only a week before my scheduled
departure, the respondent of my then only scheduled interview declined, I decided
to risk humiliation. I took a bus to the cemetery of Thiais, which is one of the
largest in Europe, covering a total of 103 hectares with 130 divisions – you can
drive a car through its avenues. It is surrounded by large walls and has an imposing
gated entrance with guards! By a stroke of luck, I made it through the gates without
having a formal appointment and was guided to the conservatory building.
I asked for a conversation with the residing conservator and was guided to a
small office: The interview did not go very smoothly. But then my luck turned:
Toward the end of the conversation, my eye fell on a large map of the cemetery of
Thiais hanging above her desk where she had marked in color the different sections
and scribbled the name of the particular group in its margins. It read ‘Buddhist,’
‘Asian,’ ‘Islamic,’ ‘Iranian Muslim,’ ‘Albanian Muslim,’ ‘stillborn.’ “Oops?” I remarked
pointing to the map. She blushed. She needed a way of keeping track of all these
divisions, she said. “As long as it hangs here and I do not show this in public, I think
I am fine.”
The upcoming chapters will make clear to the reader why this is French public
reasoning in a nutshell (see Section 8.4.1.1) – and why this blushing and reasoning
stands opposed to, for example, that of the Dutch burial agents. When I asked how
the cemetery director in The Hague had dealt with the Muslim Shia and Sunni
differences, he said, “Oh, that was easy”: He had just put a high hedge in between.
50 I thank Professor R. Kastoryano for her help.
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“Then they do not need to be bothered by who lies on the other side of the hedge.”
He also had no problem respecting the Islamic wish to have only one body in each
grave. “But in that case, they have to pay for two bodies,” he said, as the lease on
each grave spot is given out for two persons.
The interview at Thiais was a turning point for my French fieldwork. It snowballed
into a range of other interviews, all in the last days of my stay. It also turned my
focus toward the local administrator’s everyday material circumstances (e.g., the
map hanging above her desk), away from formal regulations.
As can be seen above, the position of a beginning researcher can limit one’s access
to certain types of respondents. Yet, in retrospect, this positionmight also have been
conducive to some of the project’s primary findings: the importance of a material
reality and an existing logique du terrain. If I had been able to schedule a range of
interviews with French lawmakers, I wouldn’t have had the time to navigate the
cemeteries of Père-Lachaise, Thiais, and Pantin, and to visit local decision-makers
in their office. Furthermore, my near failure to gain access to public officials, even at
the local level, might also illustrate how much more politically sensitive cemeteries
are in Paris as opposed to Amsterdam or Oslo.
Finally, I would like to explain some of the personal context in which this book
developed and which has affected in particular the validity of my Norwegian mate-
rial. Since the project’s beginning, I have given birth to three children. My first two
children each took their share of time in the form of pregnancy troubles, births, and
the usual Norwegian state-sponsored parental leaves. I did fieldwork interviews
with a baby at my breast and a 5-year-old playing in the cemetery. I edited an
anthology (2012) late at night during my second parental leave, with the children
(finally!) asleep. Highly pregnant, I presented an anthology (November 2013) at
the book launch at the American Academy of Religion. What I thought was hard
work at the time proved to be peanuts in hindsight.
With the birth of my third child in early 2014, any sense of normal everyday
life vanished. My son was a gorgeous tiny baby. But over the course of time we
learned that he was not only deaf and blind, but also would not be able to sit, stand,
or walk. I relate this fact to explain the project’s very slow progress, actually near
standstill, from early 2014 until August 2018. In the first two years of my son’s life,
I still pushed for as many work moments as I could muster. As a Dutch doctoral
fellow living in Norway, I had finished the fieldwork in TheNetherlands and France,
but had plans to carry out a final round of interviews in Oslo and Lørenskog. This
all changed when, in June 2016, we heard that even more was wrong with my
son than presumed. I abandoned all further fieldwork, although that would have
indeed improved the validity of my Norwegian cases. And I stopped all further data
collection.These circumstances delayed the project for several years andmade some
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of the material more dated than desired. On the positive side, the circumstances
also allowed the project to mature. My son died in December 2017.
2.4.3 Clarification of Terms
I would like to end this chapter with a few notes on terminology. In the book, I
refrain from calling actions or ways of reasoning ‘secularism’ or ‘secular’ unless my
respondents (or the formal texts) specifically do so themselves. An exception to
this rule is the translation of Norwegian humanists (livssynssamfunn) into ‘secular
community’ (used to juxtapose Islam as a ‘religious community’). This is a better
English translation than that of a ‘life-stance community,’ the common Norwegian
translation.51 In the French context, I translate laïcité as ‘secularism’ or simply used
the emic term.
As a way of providing some analytic structure to an otherwise confusing con-
ceptual realm, I follow Casanova (2007) in distinguishing between ‘secularization’
as a historical and sociological process of societal differentiation, ‘secularism’ as
a normative, political doctrine or worldview, and ‘secular’ as either an adjective
describing ‘nonreligious’ practices or as an epistemic category (a way of under-
standing the world). In this book, I am primarily interested in the institutional and
normative reasoning of agents, what could (but maybe should not) be called secu-
larism. Furthermore, like Taylor and Asad, I touch upon the notion of ‘sensibilities,’
what could (but maybe should not) be called secular sensibilities.
By ‘organized religion’ I mean an organized and institutionalized community
or group. The decision whether the group under study qualifies as religious or
not depends on the meaning that the group, or the members thereof, attribute to
themselves. Alternatively, it depends on the way they are viewed and constructed
by the decision-makers and/or representatives of the relevant institutions involved.
(I thus apply a strategy of actual deployment.)
This study did not encounter conflicts between the laws52 or a group’s self-
definition as ‘religious’ or that of other relevant decision-makers/agents. This stands
51 I thank Mr. Smith for bringing this to my attention.
52 In The Netherlands, the right to confessional cemeteries or a confessional section within a public
cemetery is secured by law for each ‘church community’ (kerkgenootschap). There is no legal defi-
nition. Yet, Muslim and Jewish official representative organizations are unproblematically seen as
falling under this banner. In Norway, the possibility to have private cemeteries is secured for each
registered religious community (trossamfun). This has relevance in distinction with an unregis-
tered religious community (uregisterte trossamfunn) or what Norwegians translate as ‘life-stance
community’ (livsynssamfunn). Muslims fall in the first category, humanists in the third. In France,
le culte (‘organized religion’) stands opposed to ‘croyance’ (belief, faith). A religious association
(cultuelle) obtains legal status when it complies with the requirements of the 1905 law. A cultural
group (culturelle) must comply with the requirements under the 1901 law. State-guaranteed freedom
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opposite to, for example, Sullivan’s study (2005).53 Yet, where prevalent, I register
disagreement over naming.54 In my general discussion of other scholarly works
or legal regulations (thus not the fieldwork), I take more liberty in calling groups
‘secular’ or ‘religious.’ I do this inasmuch as it clarifies the intention of the laws or
authors (who use these terms themselves); or when it is simply better English.55
By institutionalization or ‘institutional accommodation,’ I refer to a two-way
process: that of claim-making by the minorities and that of institutional adaptation
on the part of the (local) institutions. I avoid the term ‘integration’ except when
referring to a public debate in which these terms are used.56 ‘Institutional regimes’
refer to “configurations of public policy institutions that are organized in a distin-
guishable way and that function according to an institutional logic” (Bader: 2007b,
872). One can analyze institutional arrangements in distinctive societal spheres like
education, health, religion, or urban planning.
Consideration should be given to the term ‘cemetery’ and ‘graveyard.’ The most
neutral term in English is ‘cemetery’ as opposed to ‘graveyard’ or ‘churchyard.’57
Although ‘graveyard’ is a good approximation of the more neutral terms in Dutch
and Norwegian (begraafplaats and gravlund as opposed to kerkhof and kirkegård,
respectively, in English it has the connotation of a burial ground lying next to a
church. I thus use ‘cemetery’ as the general term. In the Norwegian discussion, I
refer to ‘graveyard’ (gravplass) or ‘churchyard’ (kirkegård) if this corresponds to the
words chosen by the respondents or present in national documents – or when I
think it better conveys the fundamental link to the church in the discussion.58
of organized religion (les cultes) is limited to the domains of celebration (the mass), its buildings,
and its teachings (cf. Bowen: 2007, 17). Confessional cemeteries/sections are beyond its purview.
53 This study looks at the legal conflict over banning memorials from a multiconfessional nondenomi-
national cemetery in Florida, where legal definitions of religious freedom stood opposed to a group’s
self-understanding and attempts to preserve the practice of placing religious artifacts on the graves
of the city-owned burial ground.
54 In the case study of Amsterdam, there was disagreement over who is considered Muslim. The main
Norwegian Islamic burial agent (Al-Khidmat) does not cater to Ahmadiyya, who are not considered
Muslims.
55 In Dutch, humanists are referred to as a levensbeschouwelijke groupering (group with an ethical
worldview) as opposed to kerkelijke gezindte (churchly community). In Norwegian, they are a
livssynsamfunn (life-stance community) as opposed to a trossamfunn (faith community). In French,
the relevant legal criteria run between that of le culte (organized religion) as opposed to religion or
croyance (belief, faith), a matter of individual observance. With regard to state recognition, it runs
between les groups cultuel (organized religions) and les groups culturelle (cultural groups).
56 For a valid criticism of ‘integration’ as an etic terminology, see McPherson: 2010.
57 I thank Mr. Smith for making me aware of this connotation in English.
58 For Norway we could say that the term ‘graveyard’ is exactly a perfect translation of even its most
updated term of gravplass. Thus, the Norwegian cemetery is still really a graveyard.
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Aiming for neutral scholarly language is a laudable regulative idea, but it is not
always an easy task. This becomes clear when applying the generic term of cemetery
to the French material. Christian connotations are nevertheless implicit in the
French proxy for cemetery: cimetière. Ligou (1975, 63) traces its genealogy back
to the words ‘coemeterium’ and ‘atrium,’ two Greek words that indicate “the place
where the Christians await their resurrection.”
I prefer to speak of ‘state-organized religion relations,’ rather than ‘state-church
relations.’ The former captures a broader realm of interaction and avoids an all-too
Christian-tainted terminology and approach. Yet, sometimes the reference ‘state
church’ better enables readable sentences.
Here a fewmore details on this variable for which I rely in the following paragraph
on Breemer/Maussen (2012, 280). A range of typologies concern state-organized
religion models: (1) In comparative legal studies, scholars typically distinguish be-
tween systems of separation (United States and France), systems with an established
church (Britain, Denmark, and Norway), and corporatist and Concordatarian sys-
tems (The Netherlands, Germany, Italy) (cf. Ferrari: 2002). Here the focus lies on
the constitutional relations. In separation countries, no recognized state church
exists, nor does the state fully finance religion.
More common in comparative political science, scholars focus on (2) country
models as sets of underlying principles (cf. Monsma/Soper: 1997, 156). In this view,
themodel extends to encompass ideas, governing traditions, and policy legacies (see
Fetzer/Soper: 2005). There are also more reified and one-dimensional typologies,
such as the idea that France corresponds to a ‘laic model,’ The Netherlands to
a ‘pillarized model’ (cf. Koopmans/Statham/Giugni/Passy: 2005), or Norway is
‘established.’
Other typologies (3) proceed from a similar idea of underlying principles or
schemes. But here, the national model is seen as internally heterogeneous. Because
state-organized religion regimes developed over time and contain a range of policy
legacies, the model is likewise internally plural. Religious policies or normative ap-
proaches to religious minorities can vary between institutional domains or between
different minorities in question (Maussen: 2009). Furthermore, national models
are historical products containing “within them multiple lines of reasoning and
emotion” (Bowen: 2012, 1005). Lines of reasoning can be equivocal and stand
opposed to or even contradict one another.
The sum result of all this is the state-organized religion regime, which includes
laws and regulations specifically designed to regulate the relationship between
religion and state (e.g., the French law of 1905). But it also includes policy legacies
that have been applied to religious minorities (or majorities) in concrete domains
(e.g., education, prisons), informing the larger political culture.
Doing full justice to the development of state-organized religion relations in
three countries lies beyond the reach of this book. To limit the discussion, I rely
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on the typologies of Maussen and Bowen for France and The Netherlands. Only
for Norway do I actively add an element to the existing typology of ‘establishment,’
that of (municipal) des-establishment schemes (Breemer: 2014; 2019). This means
that my conceptualization of state-organized religion regime here becomes both
that of an independent and a dependent variable.59
In this book I use normative principles, scripts, or schemes interchangeably.
Bowen defines schemes as “categories, images, propositions often deeply psycho-
logically embedded in actor’s minds, that may coexist without necessarily being
consistent and that may be weighed differently from onemoment to another” (2012,
354).60 In Chapter 3, I return to a discussion of these scripts in the heterogeneous
model, placing them within a historical context.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter outlined the contours of a multileveled discursive (religious) gover-
nance approach that serves as the theoretical framework of this book. Building
on Bader, I supplemented his framework of religious governance with insights
of two types of actor institutionalism: that of Scharpf (ACI) and of Schmidt (DI).
This served to develop a more precise account of the relationship between actors,
institutions, and ideas/discourse.
In line with Scharpf, I adapt a similar back-reasoning approach to burial out-
comes. The basic unit of analysis of this project may be found in the processes that
lead to burial outcomes, after which we localize the relevant agents and institutions
in each local case. (The study design involves nine embedded cases in three national
contexts.) Interactions between multiple actors are structured, so that the outcomes
are shaped by the characteristics of the institutional setting in which they take place.
Scharpf and Bader both take agency and institutional embeddedness seriously.
Yet, these accounts do not further specify the mechanism of action and discursive
processes by which agents appropriate these institutional scripts.
Discursive institutionalism is useful for this purpose. In Schmidt’s understanding,
institutions are both (implicit and given) meaning structures as well as contingent
ideational constructs. This conception of institutions better explains institutional
change.
59 As an independent variable, the question is: Do its elements have discursive or explanatory value for
burial solutions chosen? As a dependent variable, we ask: Do we see other ways of public reasoning
that could be added to our conception of the Norwegian model?
60 Changes in policy are explained by the fact that public agents draw on several relatively stable
working schemes, while weighing these schemes differently from time to time or from issue to issue.
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For our purposes, Schmidt’s conception allows looking at the ideas of burial
professionals as an entry point into causes. And this burial discourse might reveal
the mechanisms of action: How is a state-organized religion legacy de facto appro-
priated? Furthermore, in line with Schmidt, I adapt a distinction between different
levels of ideas (1) explicit ideas mentioned for guiding action, (2) issue frameworks,
(3) a level of cultural confessional narratives and implicit sensibilities. This gives
me the methodological tools for a nuanced discourse analysis.
My discussion of the work of Asad, in the second part of the chapter, extended
the discourse analytic focus of the book. Furthermore, it investigated how to mean-
ingfully pose the question of the relevance of secularism or secular sensibilities.
Asad’s work speaks directly to our discussion as addressing a potential relevant
cultural factor. Yet, integrating Asad’s genealogical approach into Bader’s broader
governance framework proved more challenging. This exercise entailed combin-
ing two analytic traditions that are not necessarily in agreement: that of the more
standard comparative historical social sciences and a genealogical approach in the
tradition of M. Foucault.
Nevertheless, I suggest one way in which the Asadian proposal and that of some
of his followers can be made more methodologically “fitting” within the larger
framework of (religious) governance. A distinction between ‘actual’ and ‘perceived
deployment’ (Section 2.3.4) can make Asad’s question “How is secularism used and
argued or?” more suitable for empirical and comparative research.
With this proposal, I suggest that the more standard comparative sciences can
make use of the laudable insights coming from this genealogical tradition. But they
do not have to buy into the totalitarian critique implied by the Asadians. Nor do we
have to do away with all Western and liberal concepts. Recognizing the inevitable
cultural and political embeddedness of language and the inevitable normative load
of terms should not prevent scholars fromdeveloping (better or worse) transcultural
concepts and translations. History is not destiny.61
However, so I suggest, taking the deconstructive point to heart (maybe evenmore
seriously than Asad), requires that scholars relate their etic framing to discursive
61 The fact that terms arise from one cultural context does not mean that, when minimally defined,
they cannot capture relevant similarities and differences elsewhere as well. Bader relies on a form of
minimal universalism. We might not know what ‘freedom,’ differing from context to context, means,
but we could all agree that it excludes practices of slavery. Specified for the purpose of normative
political theory, he proclaims himself to be ‘moderately contextual.’ Moderate contextualists allow
for context-transcending principles but insist on relating these principles to different contexts and
cases to explain and develop their meaning (cf. Bader/Sawaharto: 2004, 110).
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everyday understandings.62 And they need to be open to the possibility of choosing
other scholarly terms in case emic and etic meanings conflict.
My brief discussion of the analytic frameworks of Mandair/Dressler and Hurd
served to show how these analytic frameworks have successfully addressed some of
Asad’s empirical blind spots. Yet, at the end of the day, like Asad, they fail to address
the question of their own methodological and epistemological presuppositions.
I closed the chapter outlining the rationale of a comparativemethod, ethnography
and multiembedded case-study design as additional methods for addressing these
theoretical issues above.
62 This holds, of course, insofar as engaging the everyday world or experience of ordinary citizens is
part of their research objective.
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Chapter 3: Legal Burial Regimes, State-Organized Religion
Regimes, and Their Historical Genealogy
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter provided the outline of a broad analytic framework for ana-
lyzing state responses to diversity and the role of, among other things, institutional
regimes. In this chapter, I investigate two such institutional regimes: the burial
regime and that of state-organized religion relations. This investigation lays the
groundwork for the analysis of contemporary responses to ‘new’ diversity in Chap-
ters 4 and 5.
It is well known that cemeteries are governed by a variety of institutional regimes.
Among other things, they are the object of urban planning, public hygiene, and
general public order. But environmental issues also play a role, for example, in
determining the suitability of the soil, the preservation of nature, or water-level
concerns. For our purposes we want to know what laws regulate the forms of
ownership and the rules of access in general, and the role of religious diversity in
the cemetery in particular. In most states, cemeteries are regulated by national or
regional law.
Three sets of questions are important for each country: (A) What are the char-
acteristics of cemeteries in terms of institutional governance? Are they part of the
public domain or are they privately owned?Who owns, pays for, and determines the
rules of the respective cemetery? (B) What (normative) considerations do lawgivers
have when choosing these institutional formats?1 (Both A and B are discussed in
Section 3.1.2) (C) How did these different institutional formats come into being?
This latter historical question concerns how a common set of domain-specific
factors, such as concerns with hygiene and public health, affected the countries’
burial laws. In addition, I consider the extent to which specific state-organized
religion dynamics were at work. For this second institutional regime, I look at how
this factor explicitly entered the historical discussions surrounding the first burial
laws (Section 3.2).
The chapter ends with a general history of each country’s state-church relation-
ship (Section 3.3). The latter serves to provide the reader with an even broader
understanding of the historically formative moments of these countries for the
1 I base my reading of these legal texts on interviews, public documents, and secondary literature.
2 For (A), I rely in part on Breemer/Maussen (2012, 283) in describing the French and Dutch situation.
For the Norwegian situation, I reference parts of Breemer (2014, 177–178).
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discussion of burial practices in the later chapters. And, as a continuation of the
discussion of terminology in Section 2.4.3, it allows me to substantiate the choice
of the schemas for the heterogeneous state-church model as formulated in Section
1.2. The chapter concludes with a summary of the legal burial outcomes in each
country (Section 3.4).
3.1.1 The French Cemetery
France regulates its burial concerns in a collection of articles in the so-calledGeneral
Code of Autonomous Regions (hereinafter GCGT),3 which is applied at the munici-
pal, intermunicipal, departmental, and regional levels.4 I refer in the following text
to the articles in the GCGT, unless otherwise specified.
The cemetery is considered an ouvrage public, a ‘public work,’ which is “public,
mandatory, and laic” (Seur/Lecerf: 2006, 19). Because of the public status, only
the municipality can maintain, create, or offer cemeteries. The Napoleonic Decree
(1804) abolished confessional cemeteries. Yet, in municipalities in which there
was a plurality of confessional groups, the municipality could maintain parts of
a municipal cemetery for them (Article 15).5 The Napoleonic Decree thus ‘mu-
nicipalized’ but did not completely ‘deconfessionalize’ cemeteries (cf. Ligou: 1975,
72–74). Confessional sections in fact were prohibited only in 1881.6
Today, municipal cemeteries fall under the authority and the supervision of the
mayor, and their upkeep falls within the municipal budget (Article L.2213–10).
Exceptionsmay be found in a handful of old confessional cemeteries dating from the
period before the Napoleonic Decree (1804) which exist under private ownership
or have been made part of a communal or intercommunal cemetery.7 However,
these confessional cemeteries cannot be enlarged. Furthermore, three departments
in the region of Alsace-Moselle (Haut-Rhin, Bas Rhin, and Moselle) still operate
under regulations of the Concordat. For historical reasons, the dispositions of the
Napoleonic Decree still apply here. That means that, in municipalities where there
3 Code Général des Collectivités Territoriales (CGCT). In particular, Section 2: Police des funérailles
et des lieux de sépulture (Articles L2213-7 à L2213-15), https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/sec-
tion_lc/LEGITEXT000006070633/LEGISCTA000006180978/#LEGISCTA000006180978 [accessed
10 February 2021].
4 Articles in the Code Civil and the Code Pénal also apply to this domain, in addition to nationally
ordained laws: Loi n° 2008–1350 du 19 décembre 2008 relative à la législation funéraire.
5 The full name is ‘The Decree of 23 Prairial an XII’ (12 June 1804): Le Décret du 23 Prairial an XII.
6 The 1881 law is ‘The Law on the Neutrality of the Cemeteries’: loi sur la neutralité des cimetières.
7 A decree from February 10, 1806, allowed Jewish communities to maintain their confessional ceme-
teries. Likewise, some Protestant cemeteries exist under a private construction.
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is a plurality of confessional groups, each can have its own cemetery or reserve
parts of a municipal cemetery (Article L.2542–12).
Themunicipal cemetery ismandatory in the sense that everyone should be buried
there. Each municipality or intermunicipal collective is obliged to reserve a certain
amount of space for burial and cremation, relative to the number of its inhabitants
(Article L. 2223–1). Municipalities can offer concessions of 15, 30, or 50 years – or
even ‘infinites’ (perpétuelles).8 Everyone has the right to burial, with municipalities
providing a free grave for 5 years.
The French cemetery is considered laic because a 1905 law9 prohibits the display
of any religious symbols on public monuments or in the public domain. The display
of religious signs on individual graves, funeral monuments, museums, or exposi-
tions is exempted from this rule (Article 28). Second, a law from 1884 stipulates
that, in the exercise of their function, third parties, in the wordings of the current
CGCT, should “make no distinctions or recommendations based on the belief
or religion of the deceased, or the circumstances that accompany his/her death”
(Article L.2213–9).10 A law from November 15, 188711, further adds that adults
or ’emancipated minors’ can arrange the circumstances of their own funeral, “in
particular all that concerns its religious or secular nature” (Article 3).12 Violations
of the will of the deceased or the deceased person’s family are sanctioned by the
Penal Code (Articles 433–21–1 and 433–22). This in turn is unknown in Dutch
and Norwegian burial regulations.
In terms of the main (normative) considerations13, in French law the will of the
deceased is of highest importance, securing individual freedom of conscience
(Article L.2213–13). Second, the local mayor is supposed to remain entirely neutral
(Article L.2213–9). The motivation for these articles has its roots in a 19th-century
idea of protecting the will of the deceased against any unwanted intervention by
religious authorities. Vice versa, the articles also ensure that, if the deceased has
expressed the will to be buried in a confessional grave, the mayor is not entitled to
refuse this. “The public cemetery must respect the right to believe, as it respects the
right to dis-believe” (Machelon: 2006, 61, my translation).
8 The latter option has been abolished in most municipalities (Article L2223–14).
9 Loi du 9 décembre 1905 concernant la séparation des Eglises et de l’Etat.
10 The 1884 law is applicable to the organizational structures of the municipality: Loi du 5 avril 1884
relative à l’organisation municipal.
11 Loi du 15 novembre 1887 sur la liberté des funérailles.
12 The freedom to arrange one’s own burial is further supported by the freedom of families to ar-
range the funeral according to their wishes, financial means, and capacities (Article L2213–11). No
prescriptions can be made, “whether of a civil or religious nature” (Article L2213–13).
13 There are obviously various normative (and practical) concerns that differ depending on the context.
https://doi.org/10.13109/9783666567322 | CC BY-NC-ND 4.0
© 2021, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Theaterstraße 13, D-37073 Göttingen
78 Legal Burial Regimes, State-Organized Religion Regimes, and Their Historical Genealogy
3.1.2 The Dutch Cemetery
In contrast to France, The Netherlands enable a wide variety of cemeteries. This
is primarily regulated by a national burial law, the “Bill on the Disposal of the
Dead” (Wet op de lijkbezorging from 1991, hereinafter Wlb), which stipulates that
cemeteries can be public or private. In the following text I refer to the articles in
the Wlb as they apply January 2021 unless otherwise specified.
Since 1827, each municipality has had to provide for a municipal graveyard, or
to share one with a neighboring municipality (Article 33). Yet, only one-third of the
approximately 4,000 cemeteries in The Netherlands are owned, administered, and
paid for by municipalities; two-thirds fall under the category of so-called ‘special
cemeteries’ (bijzondere begraafplaatsen), meaning they are owned by different
confessional groups or by private legal entities (foundations or even ‘for-profit’
companies) (Article 37.1).14 Family graves on private property used to be possible,
but this option has since been legally abolished.15
The mayor and city council determine the rules that govern the municipal ceme-
teries through what are called beheersverordeningen. But as we will see, there are also
some mixed forms. The owners of special cemeteries retain the decision-making
power, through graveyard regulations (begraafplaats-regelement). That means that,
in contrast to the French situation, the mayor has a much less formal role to play.16
‘Special’ cemeteries operate independently of municipal interference and set their
own graveyard regulations concerning daily operations and right of access. Never-
theless, they are constrained by national legislation (Wlb) andmunicipal regulations,
for example, regarding a minimal burial period of 10 years and the extension or
creation of special graveyards (Article 40.1).17
Also, quite unlike the French situation, religious communities (kerkgenootschap)
enjoy a broad set of rights. They are entitled to operate one or more graveyards
relative to the total amount of space available for this purpose in the municipality
14 Informal estimates speak of 1,487 municipal and 2,733 confessional cemeteries, 267 of which are
Jewish. I thank Mr. Bok for sharing his list with me. Examples of for-profit companies are Yarden,
de Facultatieve, or Monuta, which are insurance companies that operate transnationally. They own
crematoria and cemeteries and sell various products and technological expertise.
15 It is still possible to construct a special cemetery on one’s own property with permission from the
municipal board and the regional inspector of Public Health and Environmental Hygiene.
16 The mayor, however, remains, among others, responsible for providing the possibility of autopsy
(Article 4), decisions regarding the request to bury or cremate before 36 hours of death (the legally
required period) (Article 17.1), take care of the deceased when no family or other relatives exist to
take care of the autopsy or burial (Article 21).
17 The mayor and city council determine the measures for making the soil suitable for cemetery
construction (Article 40.2).
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(Article 38). The confessional group buys the land18 and manages the cemetery
according to its own standards of membership. Furthermore, the municipality can
allow them to have more or larger churchyards, “within the limits of the rights of
other church communities to a similar provision (…)” (Article 38, lid 2).
The Dutch cemetery can thus be both a public and a private domain when reli-
gious communities, companies, or private individuals are the owner. In addition,
there are a variety of mixed forms of ownership and management. For example,
a municipal cemetery is always the property and legal responsibility of the mu-
nicipality, though it can be (a) managed by the municipality itself, (b) a part of
the municipality, which has to arrange for its own finances and run it like a com-
pany, though not for profit (gemeentelijk verzelfstandigd), or (c) a private ‘for profit’
company (gemeentelijk uitbesteed).19
Municipalitiesmay also reserve a section in a confessional cemetery, inwhich case
the confessional group still owns the cemetery, although the municipality manages
and administers its part.20 This way of fulfilling the legal obligation for municipal
burial space is not currently prescribed in the Wlb. Yet, as we discuss further below,
its form emerged from a historical context in which there was resistance to the 1827
obligation to provide for municipal graveyards.
Furthermore, out of this historical context the obligation arose to assign a con-
fessional section within a municipal cemetery to each church community, if the
church community itself did not possess a cemetery of its own (cf. Hoog: 1870,
xxvii).21 This legal right is currently expressed in Wlb Article 39.1, in which case the
municipality remains in charge of managing, maintaining, and administering that
confessional part. Yet decisions about the design, the material form, or its usage are
made in deliberation with the confessional community (Article 39.2). Confessional
sections in Dutch cemeteries can thus differ considerably from the French carré.
Finally, there is a range of options concerning types of graves. A grave with an
‘exclusive right’ (uitsluitend recht) is bought for a minimum of 10 years, though
this limit can be extended and allows for family regroupings since the holders of
the grave rights may choose the location (Article 28). ‘Common graves’ (algemeen
18 Municipalities are encouraged to transfer the ownership of the land to that of the church community
“under reasonable conditions” (Article 40.3), though this is not always possible.
19 In the case of (a), municipal regulations apply. The municipality takes care of the maintenance. In the
case of (b), the cemetery owner regulates and maintains. In the case of (c), “municipally delegated”
maintenance and management are further delegated to a private company. Interview funeral expert,
25 March 2009, and legal burial advisor, 10 August 2012.
20 The municipality sometimes buys that parcel from the church community.
21 See also Article 19 in the Dutch 1869 burial law.
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graf ) have a grave-rest time of 10 years; family groupings are not possible.22 Yet,
these graves are cheap. Free graves do not exist as such, though mayors have the
obligation to bury citizens without relatives or financial means.
In the Dutch burial regulations, we find two central normative concerns: respect
for the will of the deceased and the individual freedom to choose the burial ritual.23
The Wlb formulates this very generally: “The corpse’s disposal should take place in
conformity with the wish, or the presumedwish, of the deceased (…)” (Article 18.1).
A variety of institutional options allows this in a real sense. Second, concerns with
collective religious freedom and collective equality play a central role. All religious
communities can own, construct, and manage their own cemeteries, though this
freedom is not coupled to any financial state support.24 And it is constrained by
equal treatment among groups (Article 38, lid 2).
3.1.3 The Norwegian Cemetery
A look at Norway reveals two primary laws governing the burial domain. There
is the 1996 Funeral Act and the 1996 Church of Norway Act.25 An important
difference to France and The Netherlands becomes obvious, where church laws
(or canon laws) have lost their relevance. Both Norwegian laws have been updated
since January 2012.
Norwegian cemeteries come in two forms, public and private. Burial can take
place in a public cemetery (offentlig gravplass) or in a cemetery as constructed by
a “registered community of believers” (Funeral Act, Para. 1).26 It is also possible
to construct a family grave plot in a private cemetery with permission from the
“county official” (Fylkesmann) (Funeral Act, Para. 20).27
Until January 2012, the first form, the public cemetery, was called a ‘public
churchyard’ (offentlig kirkegård), which well illustrates the Norwegian situation:
22 When the period is over, the remains go to a collective grave or are buried at an even deeper level.
Families can ask for the remains to be buried in a family grave in a second instance.
23 ForDutch professionals, securing a dignified burial entails “respecting the life convictions or religious
affiliation of the deceased” (Harmsen: 2007, 13).
24 The state does not provide direct support for church communities, but the Wlb encourages transfer
of land to church communities (kerkgenootschappen) “under reasonable conditions” (Article 40.3).
25 These are the ‘Gravplassloven’: Lov om gravplasser, kremasjon og gravferd) and the ‘kirkeloven’: Lov
om Den norske kirke, respectively. For all Norwegian legal documents, the translations are taken
from: http://www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulov/ [accessed 25 May 2020].
26 I refer in the following to ‘paragraph’ instead of ‘article’ because this is line with the laws’ own coding.
27 This legal option dates from a time in which rich families had their own cemeteries, though that
hardly occurs anymore. In Norway, there are today no private commercial cemeteries as in The
Netherlands.
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It makes no distinction between public and church plots, but rather equates the
two. 99% of the 2,000 cemeteries in Norway fall into this category. The Norwegian
cemetery is public in the sense that everyone has the right – and indeed the obli-
gation – to be buried there, regardless of their religious affiliation or membership.
Furthermore, the economic responsibility for the costs of cemeteries lies with the
municipalities (Church Act, Para. 15; Funeral Act, Para. 3). Yet, it remains church
oriented because the Lutheran parishes legally still own the graveyards (Funeral
Act, Para. 1). In addition, the management of the cemetery lies in the hand of a
confessional organ: the Joint Parish Council (kirkelig fellesråd).28 Cemeteries had
been an administrative municipal responsibility since 1837, which was reconfirmed
in the first burial law of 189729 but then abandoned in 1996.
In terms of decision-making power, the Joint Parish Council is in control of the
churchyards. But, given the mixed composition of this organ, the various parish
representatives are always in touch with the municipality. On the national level, the
CultureDepartment issues the rules for the form, size, and depth of the graves aswell
as all regulations regarding soil quality (Funeral Act, Para. 2). For the construction,
destruction, or extension of cemeteries, one needs approval from the municipality
as well as permission from the Council of Bishops (Funeral Act, Para. 4).
The second form of cemetery ownership is private and entails those cemeteries
constructed by a registered belief community (Gravplass av registrert trossamfunn).
Of the total of about 2,000 cemeteries, there are only three Jewish cemeteries and
about 10 other confessional cemeteries (St. meld. No. 17 2007–2008, p. 105). Only
a registered belief community can have its own cemetery (Funeral Act, Para. 1),
which excludes unregistered belief communities or nonreligious communities.30
28 The Joint Parish Council (kirkelig fellesråd) is a religious organ that assumes the economic and
administrative tasks on behalf of the different parishes (sokn/soknets) in the respective municipality.
It plans all church activities in that municipality, furthers cooperation between the different parish
councils (menighetsrådene), and represents the interest of the parish toward the municipality. It
consists of two representatives from each parish (though there can be several parishes in one
municipality), one priest (prest) or parish priest (sogneprest, a representative of the Bishop), and one
municipality representative (Church Act Para. 12, Para. 14). In the managerial process, the Joint
Parish Council makes use of the church warden (kirkeverge), which is basically its administrative and
practical arm. Whereas historically the term church warden referred to a person, today this is the
institution. A parish council is an elected board of an individual parishwhich has the responsibility for
church education, church music, and diaconal work (diakonalt) within the parish. In municipalities
with more than one parish, the Joint Parish Council is responsible for cemetery administration and
management; in an individual parish, this befalls the parish council.
29 This is the 1897 Law about Churches and Churchyards (Lov om Kirker og Kirkegårder).
30 This is further specified in The Act Relating to Religious Communities, etc., 1969 (Lov om tru-
domssamfunn og ymist anna [‘trossamfunnsloven’]), Para. 18.
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The Norwegian burial practices ensure the most egalitarian form of burial, finan-
cially speaking: All municipal inhabitants as well as those who pass away within
its territory have the right to a free grave for the first 20 years (Funeral Act, Para.
6). However, this does not eliminate all economic distinctions. For example, it
is possible to lease the rights to a grave for period longer than 20 years – for a
small sum. Norwegians are therefore unfamiliar with buying funeral insurance, a
common (and needed) practice in The Netherlands.31
Crematoria, and a handful of private cemeteries, then form the only exception
to an otherwise churchly administered and owned burial domain. Crematoria in
turn fall under municipal responsibility and are owned by the municipalities.32
In terms of the guiding normative commitments, the Funeral Act provides for
individual equality for all because it does not discriminate on the basis of religious
affiliation, providing a free grave for all – at least for the first 20 years. Norwegian
regulations are by far themost egalitarian of the three countries when it comes to the
financial aspects involved in procuring a grave. The legal right for registered belief
communities to have their own cemetery attests to a concern with collective equality
that, however, is not extended to nonreligious communities like the humanists.
3.1.4 Summary
A look at the legislative frameworks reveals large institutional variety. I summarize
the most common forms of institutional governance in Table 3.1.33
31 This is not to suggest that burial cannot be costly. I refer here solely to the cost of a grave, not the
ceremony. In Norway, families can apply for a one-time sum of financial support (gravferdsstønad).
32 Around 40,000 people each year die in Norway, and around 44% of them are subsequently cremated.
The percentages in urban and rural areas vary, see https://gravplasskultur.no/wp-content/uploads/
2020/05/kremasjonsstatistikk-2019.pdf [accessed 25 May 2020].
33 In all three countries there is some variation between capitals, cities, towns, and small villages.
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3.2 Historical Contextualization of Burial Laws
How did institutional burial formats of these three countries arise? To what ex-
tent did a larger state-organized religious dynamic alter the relationship between
churches and graveyards? For France and The Netherlands, we need to examine
the societal context of the first burial laws, in which cemeteries became municipal
responsibility and a strategy was drawn up for reducing conflicts related to religious
minorities. For Norway, the defining transitional moments with regard to religious
plurality aremuchmore recent. In preparation for the humanist complaints (Section
4.2.3), I want to show how the strong link between church and cemetery developed
over time, while basically remaining in place to this day.
3.2.1 France: From Municipalization to Laicification
In France, under the Ancien Régime (14th–18th century) cemeteries were church
territory. Jewish and Protestant burials posed a problem for themonarchies, because
the Catholic Church prohibited the burial of nonmembers on their sacred ground.
They also refused to bury certain people, “including suicides, duelists, actors and
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actresses, non-Catholics and excommunicated Catholics” (Kselman: 1988, 319).
Even worse, the Catholic Church occasionally ordered exhumations. Burial at the
time was characterized by large differentiations according to rank and class. Mass
graves were reserved for the poor; burial in the churches was solely for the nobility,
aristocracy, and clerics.
The relationship between the church and cemeteries changed significantly in the
years between 1750 and the French revolution (1789) (cf. Ligou: 1975, 68ff). Before
1750, the cemetery was the sole domain of the church; it lay at the center of the city,
open for all, and was often more a place of leisure. Burial within church premises
was frequent. Following the French Revolution (and the rise of Napoleon), without
exception cemeteries became municipal matters: Now everyone had the right to be
buried there. But cemeteries also became more hidden and were located outside of
the city; burial within churches was abolished altogether (Ligou: 1975, 68).
Some of these changes were inspired by concerns with the hygienic conditions of
burial in the church. Yet, according to Ligou, we can also observe an increasing civil
influence over the cemeteries. Circumstances like epidemic illnesses and ‘infection
of the air’ led to civil interference. Furthermore, the parliament tended to overrule
more often church decisions and refuse burial, appealing to what is called ‘appeal
as from an abuse.’34
During the Revolutionary Period (1789–1799), the ideals of social inequality,
freedom, and the dissolution of the societal order led to numerous proposals to
rearrange burial practices. Yet, there was a set of competing groups with rivalling
ideas.35 Revolutionaries called for the abandonment of all class and religious privi-
leges in the graveyard, saying that, from now on, birth, marriage, and death need to
be arranged solely by the State. Catholics, counterrevolutionaries, and some mod-
erate Republicans, on the other hand, emphasized freedom, demanding exemption
from the Republican concerns with unity and equality and the ability to arrange
cemeteries and funerals to their own standards.
Furthermore, one of the big questionswaswhat should replace theChurch, once it
had been removed from the burial domain?36 According to Kselman, the legislators
34 [l’appel comme d’abus] This legal procedure (a term originating from the canon law of the Roman
Catholic Church) provided the possibility for State and Church to safeguard their respective rights
against one another. An abuse could involve an unauthorized act on either side, which would go
beyond the limits of each power’s jurisdiction. In France, the repeated usage of this legal procedure
eventually undermined the power of church courts.
35 Helsdingen (1997) discusses rivalry over different commitments, omitted here for reasons of space.
36 Fouché and revolutionaries like Chaumette sought to de-Christianize the cemeteries (cf. Kselman:
1993, 126 and 166; Van Helsdingen: 1997, 11; Etlin: 1984, 236–238). They suggested removing all
religious elements from the cemeteries and putting a sign up at each cemetery entrance stating;
“Death is an eternal Sleep.” But while their reformist ideas emphasized decency and simplicity, some
revolutionary abuses provoked a wave of criticism of their management of the cemeteries.
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held different views on death and the afterlife. Their concern with prudence and
social utility led them to create cemeteries that would still allow people to express
their hopeful illusions about death. The role of the legislator was to strike at those
institutions that encouraged tyranny but not to “triumph over the invincible power
of the imagination, to tear from the heart illusions that are sweet consolation and
never pernicious” (Kselman:1993, 169, quoting Bontoux: 1796, 3).
Napoleon and his legislators took this to heart in the formulation of the
Napoleonic Decree. This very influential piece of legislation, both in France and
in large parts of Europe as well, incorporated many of the concerns with public
health. It reinforced the prohibition of burial within the cities and within churches.
It abandoned the notion of common graves. Cemeteries became the responsibility
and property of the respective municipality. Protestant and Jewish cemeteries,
however, were not included in this decision.37
This municipalization was thus not coupled with a ‘de-confessionalization.’ Arti-
cle 15 clearly states that every municipality with a plurality of communities should
have its own respective burial area. Or, if there is only one cemetery, the mayor
should divide up the cemetery into separate sections, demarcated by bushes, each
with its own entrance. Furthermore, Article 19 confers to the mayor the responsi-
bility to have the body “carried, presented, deposed, and buried,” if the minister
of a sect had refused a religious service. As Kselman (1998, 314) notes, Article 19
demonstrates the existing ambiguity between municipal power and ecclesiastical
authorities of the time. On the one hand, the clergy could refuse the burial of a
deceased person and even refuse a service. In fact, the clergy used Article 15 to
argue for burials taking place on a separate part for those it deemed “unfit” to be
buried in sacred soil.38 At the same time, the mayor could claim the power to have
somebody interred in consecrated ground.39
There was thus an unresolved tension between church and municipal powers,
which played itself out in the years following Napoleon’s defeat. With the reintro-
duction of the monarchy under the house of the Bourbons (1815), the Catholic
Church regained much lost territory. Unlike in The Netherlands, Article 15 re-
mained in place, leaving cemeteries in the hands of the municipalities, although
a strong Catholic influence still remained. Furthermore, previous revolutionary
concerns were caught up by existing distinctions in French society. As a central
socialist mentioned in 1844:
37 This is why currently some remaining old Protestant cemeteries exist in Bordeaux as well as some
Jewish cemeteries in Carpentras, Paris-Montrouge, Marseille, Mulhouse, Lyon, and Strasbourg.
38 The so-called ‘coin des réprouvés.’
39 In reality, Kselman claims, this ambivalence did not lead to great conflict, partially because of a set
of ministerial circulars that encouraged the municipal authorities not to challenge clerical authority.
The clergy were also urged to take a tolerant attitude (Kselman: 1988, 315).
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I still see an image of the inequalities of rank and birth governing society. The degrees of
fortune are marked by levels: the people in the common grave; the middle class in tempo-
rary concessions, and the aristocracy of finance in the perpetual concessions (Esquiros:
1884, 252, quoted in Kselman: 1993, 184).
Debates over the abrogation of Article 15 ensued to resolve this tension between
the church and municipal powers. The segregation and occasional exhumation
of unbaptized children from consecrated ground played a role in the anticlerical
legislation of the Third Republic.40 In this battle, both Catholics and Republicans
“appropriate the language of freedom in making their cases” (Kselman: 1993, 197).
Those supporting the neutrality of the cemetery argued that allowing for sections
violates freedom of conscience and forces families to publicly declare their religious
(non-)affiliation. The Catholic Church interpreted freedom as a collective right: We
have a right to bury our members in separate sacred soil.
In the end, Republicans won, and Article 15 was abandoned with the law of 14
November 1881. Further laws completed the ‘laicification’ of this matter in 1884,
1887, and 1905.
3.2.2 The Netherlands: From Reformed Status Quo to Pluralization
In The Netherlands at the start of the 19th century we observe similarities with
French burial developments. Here, too, the concerns with public hygiene led to
an increasingly medical approach to death and the involvement of the state to
“formulate a secularized version on life and death” (Cappers: 1987, 99). Moreover,
from 1795–1813, because of the French occupation, The Netherlands fell under
French regulations. Yet, despite these similarities, The Netherlands developed a
different institutional format for solving cemetery conflicts.41
The Napoleonic Decree became operative in The Netherlands in 1811 but was
then abandoned upon Napoleon’s defeat in 1813. There was resistance to the prohi-
bition in the Decree of burying in the churches and the requirement for cemeteries
to have a minimal distance of 35 to 40 meters from villages. Financial objections
were also raised, particularly in Amsterdam: In The Netherlands, ‘wet soil’ required
large sums of money for putting cemeteries outside of the city.
40 Insistence on the Catholic dogma that an unbaptized child is corrupted by sin and, like suicides,
must be buried in a separate section fed anticlerical sentiments (cf. Kselman:1993, 193; 1998, 318).
41 A pressing question becomes ‘why?’ which partially has to do with the successful lobby of a variety of
confessional minorities in The Netherlands. It also points to an unresolved theological puzzle about
the significance of burial consecration for the different faiths (Catholicism or Calvinist doctrine).
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The Decree was consequently abolished, yet under pressure from medical com-
missions partially reinstalled in an amended form in 1827.42 Article 15 of the
Napoleonic Decree was replaced in 1827 by a municipal obligation to provide for
municipal cemeteries43, which was then formalized in the first burial law of 1869
and demanded a municipal graveyard in every municipality – or at least a munici-
pal cemetery shared by two or more municipalities (Article 13). Furthermore, the
municipal cemetery had to provide for a separate section for their citizens, should
the community not have its own graveyard (Article 19). And it should lie outside
the village borders (Article 16).
The first burial law with the title ‘Act on the Disposal of the Dead, Cemeteries
and Funeral Rights’44 was the outcome of lobbying among several parties: the gov-
ernment, municipalities, religious communities, and medical scientists/doctors.
Dutch medical scientists investigated and concluded that burial in close proximity
to residential areas was damaging to public health. They convinced the govern-
ment that burial should thus take place outside of the urban areas and away from
churches.45
Resistance on the part of the municipalities was strong against the municipal
obligation to provide for a municipal graveyard outside cities. Municipal budgets at
the time were small, and the cost of constructing graveyards was high. They argued
that there were already many Dutch Reformed (Nederlands Hervormd) cemeteries
where everybody could be buried. Furthermore, therewere ample special cemeteries
available.
The government nevertheless insisted. The legislature above all wanted to assure
that no corpse remained unburied, and that, on the part of the government, there
was always an option everywhere for burial, “a confessional churchyard could, for
whatever reason, refuse to accept the corpse” (Hoog: 1870, xii).46
Yet the government provided for some exceptions, emphasizing that, if there
were several existing confessional graveyards in a municipality and if the need for
42 In Amsterdam, burial within the churches continued until 1865 (cf. Cappers: 1987, 105)!
43 The municipal monopoly prescribed by the Napoleonic Decree was never enforced in The Nether-
lands. One reason must have been the short time period. Second, there was resistance toward the
Decree mostly with regard to the prohibition of burial in the churches. See Hoog: 1870, xii and xxvii.
44 Wet tot vaststelling van bepalingen betrekkelijk het begraven van lijken, de begraafplaatsen en de
begrafenisregten.
45 Earlier attempts at prohibiting burial in the churches had been rejected in 1795 and 1808 for mostly
financial reasons. Likewise, proposals were made by medical scientists emphasizing a “concern
for fresh air” (Cappers: 1987, 102). A prohibition of burial in the churches was articulated but not
taken seriously at the time of the Kingdom of Holland in 1808. As early as 1667 the City Council of
Amsterdam had tried to encourage its citizens to be buried in the graveyard instead of in the church,
by promising them a tax cut (Lievaart: 1982, 53).
46 This a legal commentary by a central administrator, my translation.
https://doi.org/10.13109/9783666567322 | CC BY-NC-ND 4.0
© 2021, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Theaterstraße 13, D-37073 Göttingen
88 Legal Burial Regimes, State-Organized Religion Regimes, and Their Historical Genealogy
municipal space was small, the municipality would have to provide just a small
area. Or it could use the option to request a municipal area within a confessional
cemetery.47 This way “its costs could not be large” (Hoog: 1870, xxviii).
Catholics and Jews48 actively sought to construct (and maintain) their own
cemeteries, probably for theological reasons and as minority faiths to oppose the
reigning Dutch Reformed Church. In addition, they secured the right to use part
of a municipal cemetery if they could not afford the former.
In hindsight, this looks like a natural outcome of the burial developments; con-
fessional sections had already been allowed under the Napoleonic Decree. But in
France these rights had been stripped from church communities in 1881. So, the
question becomes rather why this did not happen in The Netherlands.
A prominent liberal politician, J.R. Thorbecke (1798–1872), had in fact proposed
abolishing the legal basis for confessional graveyards. This influential man, who
engineered the constitution of 1848 and was Minister of Internal Affairs, drew
up a new burial law in 1852 that prioritized public health and order over confes-
sional considerations. It allowed church communities to maintain already existing
cemeteries while abandoning future confessional cemeteries.
In the course of the 1860s, Thorbecke’s proposal failed when the power of the
confessionals increased. Orthodox Reformed and Catholic political movements
developed during this period in response to the educational reforms that liberals
had pushed through parliament (Monsma/Soper 1997: 56). The position of the
enlightened liberals and their increasing anticlericalism had strengthened during
the 19th century through their school reform policies and their dominance in
parliament. Yet, theDutch religious communities objected to earlier drafts of the law,
which did not sufficiently take their religious sensitivities and understandings into
consideration. Parliament determined that, although some of these ‘understandings’
could be regarded as prejudices, “particularly in a country like ours, where taking
them [the understandings] into consideration is a duty, as long as they do not
violate concerns of general interest” (Hoog: 1870, xx, xxi). Religious interests were
thus given equal consideration to those of health and public order (cf. Cappers:
1987, 106).
This rise in the importance of confessional interests can be seen as a prelude to
the wider societal emancipation of Catholics and other minorities to follow at the
onset of the 1900s (Cappers: 2012, 276). The result is a solid set of religious rights in
this first burial law, which has carried much of its historical baggage to the present
day.
47 This option still exists but is not prescribed by contemporary law.
48 A Jewish community had been present since the 16th century and had bought their first cemetery
in 1602. Judaism requires permanent grave rest and burial outside of cities (Lievaart: 1982). Many
Catholic cemeteries still exist in the southern part of The Netherlands.
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3.2.3 Norway: From Municipal Administration to Churchly Administration
InNorway, we observe a very different burial history.The previous contexts revealed
that the changing relationship between the church and cemeteries was propelled
by medical developments, which increasingly turned death into a matter of state
regulation. In many areas of Europe, “Public health was concomitant with progress
and civilization” (La Berge: 1992, 12). Yet, for Norway, we find little material con-
cerning matters of burial hygiene and public health. Fæhn (1994, 282) mentions
the 1805 prohibition of burial in churches because of bad odours in the summer.49
Yet, other hygiene concerns remain unexplored. Nor was it easy to find institutional
studies that address the broader political context of the first burial law.50 Instead,
the question of cemeteries is treated historically as an aspect of church governance.
Only since 1996 does Norway have a specific Funeral Act.
I therefore took an indirect approach: For the historical analysis, I looked at
the function of the church warden and changes to the identity of this person (and
later institution). Indirectly, this provides insight into the historically interwoven,
yet changing, relationship between graveyards and local communities, church and
(later) municipalities.51 Furthermore, I looked at the more recent 2012 changes to
the 1996 Funeral Act. The further discussion in this Section 3.2.3 draws on Breemer
(2014, 183–185).
Ever since Norway ‘s conversion to Christianity (around 1000 AD), the church has
been involved in burials and the maintenance of graveyards, albeit in different roles
49 There are some references to the need for inquiring the “helseraaet” Para. 33 in the construction of a
new churchyard (1896 Church and Graveyard Act). The second part of Para. 34 mentions the need
for churchyards outside “kjøbstæder.” Otherwise every parish “shall have a churchyard next to or in
close proximity to the church” (Para. 34). Given that churches were often positioned at the center of
villages, this would imply burial in the vicinity of the population. Maybe debates over hygiene were
less prevalent because Norway urbanized so much later, making the challenge of burial in densely
populated areas less acute. Or perhaps enlightenment ideology did not resonate as strongly it did
in The Netherlands and France. Arguments for health reasons were deliberately used to counter
confessional power.
50 A handful of available studies/projects focuses on the ritual aspects of death (e.g., Aagedal: 1994; Nee-
gard: 1993; Hansen: 1977). Alternatively, there was a focus on ideas of death internal to confessional
groups (e.g., Aukrust: 1985). For a broad study of the Early Protestant Tradition, see Rasmussen:
2017. Fæhn discusses the period from the Reformation to now, though in the sections on burial
(Fæhn: 1994, 146–153; 278–282; 398–403), this again refers only to rituals, liturgy, and consecration
through jordpåkastelse. Only one section shortly addresses the issue of religious plurality. In 1604,
Church ritual demanded that foreign faiths (i.e., other Christians) be buried in the churchyard, even
executed persons, suicides, and banned people! However, duellanter (i.e., those who died in a duel)
should not be buried in the churchyard (Fæhn: 1994, 153).
51 I rely on the excellent study by Alsvik: 1995.
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and to different degrees. Typically, the local community took care of the church
building and graveyard, and the burial process was left to the family and the local
community (Lappegård: 1994, 90).52 This means only a small role for the minister,
who did the final consecration (sometimes 6 months after the burial).
The ‘Act Relating to Churches and Churchyards’53 of 1896/1897 marked the
first legal formalization of these roles. As the name indicates, the regulation of
churchyards was part of the attempt to regulate the financial and administrative
concerns with regard to churches, their buildings, and employees.54 Unlike the
Dutch context, where a wide range of parties (and their respective concerns) were
involved in this first burial law, Norwegian churchyards were treated as an integral
part of the Church law (1896).
This Act of 1896 gave the Lutheran parishes ownership of the churchyard, al-
though their financial management formally became a municipal responsibility.
Maintenance responsibilities for the cemeteries changed over time but were pri-
marily left in the hands of a ‘confessional’ body, although these bodies were in
fact always mixed in nature and interwoven with the local community, at least
up until 1837, and thereafter with the municipal administration.55 For reasons of
space we cannot go deeper into this matter. Central to our discussion here are the
administration of cemeteries and employer responsibility. In one reading of history,
this has been a municipal responsibility since 1896 (cf. NOU 2006: 2, 133). Yet, in
fact, as history shows, reality was more complex.
The position of church warden dates back to the second half of the 12th century.
As a man of status in the local farming community, he was charged with securing
income for the church and for maintaining the church building and graveyard. The
institution was firmly rooted in the local community as well as being part of the
international institution of the Catholic Church (Alsvik: 1995, 31).
With the Reformation (1536–1537), church governance became integrated into
state governance (cf. Thorkildsen: 2012, 1). The then Danish-Norwegian king
confiscated all church property and used this wealth to create an integrated State.
The introduction of absolutism in 1660 increased the material and spiritual
power of the state. Materially, the king subjected the church warden to the control
of the minister, who inspected the financial accounts every third year and forced
the church warden to hand over any accumulated savings (tvanglån) (Alsvik: 1995,
40). However, the state also increased its spiritual and moral influence over the
local community. Now the church warden was given a moral supervisory function
52 This included functions such as the bellringer, the church warden, and the sexton.
53 This is the LOV-1897-08-03 no. 1: Lov om Kirker og Kirkegaarde.
54 Of the six chapters in the law, only the fourth is dedicated to churchyards.
55 For example, the Act of 1897 introduced a church supervisory body (kirkens tilsyn) to appoint church
wardens. It included representatives of the parish, the municipality, and council (formannskap).
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and, as a state representative, became part of the state’s moral objectives (Alsvik:
1995, 53). Basically speaking, at this point Church and State were still the same.
From 1680 onwards, the pressure for income increased, because the Danish king
kept losing wars. The locals were then pressed for more money, and the king began
selling the churches to private individuals.
During the 1800s, the churches were gradually returned to the public. The cre-
ation of municipalities in the Alderman Act of 1837 put organizational structures
in place to enable buying the churches back (cf. Hovland: 1987). This law made
the church warden a municipal employee who, in large cities like Oslo and Bergen
held a full-time position. Yet, despite the process of municipalization, in most other
smaller cities and towns, the position remained voluntary, part-time, and closely
connected to the church.
The Act of 1896 reflected this situation by transferring the financial responsibility
for a variety of church functions to the municipalities. Yet, it also reflected some
ambiguity by mentioning (in Section 45) that the municipalities or the Parish
Council may appoint the church warden.
In the period from 1900 until 1950, the function of church warden continued to
be situated at a borderline between different administrative identities. The Church
of Norway Act of 195356 did not change this much: It allowed the Parish Council
to appoint a church warden, inasmuch as this involved an unpaid position; if it
involved a paid position, the municipality was responsible.
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, many municipalities were merged into one.
The need arose for a church warden to attend to the tasks of the different parishes
and, often, to lead the Joint Parish Council (if it already existed). Furthermore,
the position became important enough to be transformed from an unpaid, volun-
tary church function to a full-time, paid position. Paradoxically, these municipal
processes led to more religious involvement, as the church warden became an im-
portant link between the Parish Council and themunicipality. However, because his
formal position was that of a municipal servant, the church warden continued to be
Janus-faced. In the early 1980s, in the report submitted by the Sivertsen Committee,
this confusion gave rise to the question: Should this remain so?
[…] the municipalities should have full responsibility for building and maintaining ap-
propriate graveyards in the municipality. This ought to be a municipal responsibility, and
it is important that each local community has the responsibility for ensuring that their
dead are given a dignified burial. Since the graveyards are for everyone, regardless of
religion or worldview, it is in principle proper that the municipalities and not the church
56 This is the Lov om Den norske kirkes ordening, 1953, my translation.
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communities bear the responsibility for building and maintaining the graveyards (passage
from NOU 1975: 30 quoted in St. Meld. No. 2007: 17, p. 106).57
In 1982, the Norwegian parliament appointed a Church Act Committee (Kirkelovut-
valget) to prepare a recommendation. The majority advice of the committee was
that the administration and maintenance of the graveyards should be a municipal
responsibility, but that the church should maintain a supervisory role. A minority
suggested that the Church should take care of both the administration and the
supervision.
Thus, both subscribed to maintaining the link between graveyard and church,
though they differed onwhat this entailed.Theminority argued that the cultural and
religious distinctiveness of the graveyards should also be expressed in their practi-
cal administration.58 The majority, however, considered graveyards a nonchurch
administrative domain.59 Ultimately, in the Funeral Act in 1996, the department
decided in favour of leaving the administrative responsibility to the church.
The latest formative phase concerns a broadly shared political commitment to
“take religious and secular minorities’ needs in regards burial better into considera-
tion” (Innst. 393 L 2010–2011, p. 2). This results in the reformulation of the Burial
Law of 2012. The former 1996 Funeral Act, Para. 2, well revealed the mixture of
public and church-oriented function: “Churchyards shall as a rule be constructed in
each parish and in close proximity to a church.” Norwegian public cemeteries thus
explicitly emphasized their cultural and confessional heritage. The most recent legal
amendments removed this part, also replacing everywhere the term kirkegård with
the term gravplass.60 Importantly, the updated law opens with the words: “Burial
shall occur with respect toward the deceased’s religion or belief ” (Para. 1).61
These legal changes reveal the concern with the changing character of Norwegian
society and the need for more inclusive public institutions. However, the law was
not changed regarding the large principal question of who is administratively
responsible for (or physically owns) the graveyards.
57 There is no precise page number given from NOU 1975: 30, my translation.
58 This was argued by the member Skurtveit, see NOU 1989: 7, p. 230.
59 This advice was presented to a wide range of institutions and individuals to be voted on. A thin
majority (55%) of the parish councils voted for church administration, versus 39% for municipal
responsibility. The response rate of the municipalities, however, was too low to draw any clear
conclusion (cf. Raustøl: 1993).
60 Also, the term consecration (vigsling) was replaced by ceremony (seremoni).
61 The revised Para. 6 mentions that minorities are entitled to financial help by the Joint Parish Council
in case extra costs arise to bury someone in a special grave, for example, when the home municipality
does not have Islamic graves available. In Para. 23 a requirement was added for an annual meeting
in each municipality with all religious and secular communities.
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3.2.4 Summary
In conclusion, state-organized religion relations played a major role in the forma-
tion of these first burial laws parallel to concerns for hygiene and public health.
French burial regulations arose in a sequence of historical moments, motivated by
anticlerical sentiments and political attempts to reduce the power of the Catholic
Church over the cemeteries. Dutch burial regulations were shaped by the context
of manifold religious minorities who wished to maintain, or safeguard, their ceme-
teries against a Dutch Reformed status quo. Dutch religious communities were able
to significantly influence the process leading to the formation of the first burial
law (1869). In Norway, the burial and church laws were shaped by the context
of a Lutheran monopoly and relatively homogeneous population. Until recently,
Norway’s burial law revealed few signs of religious diversity. Norwegian cemeteries
remain largely church territory.
3.3 A Wider Understanding of State-Organized Religion Relations
Inwhat follows I provide the reader with one last layer of historical contextualization
by looking at the wider dynamic between organized religion and the state. This
allows for an even broader understanding of these countries’ historical formative
moments, in order to assess not only legal but also national policy as well as people’s
everyday responses in the chapters to come.
Contemporary discussions of suitable burial solutions might draw on state-
organized religion schemes that perhaps were not visible in the legal debate of the
first burial laws but which today nevertheless affect professional decision-making
about burial policy. Furthermore, as a continuation of Section 2.4.3, such a broad
state-organized religion discussion allows me to substantiate the choice of the
schemas for the heterogeneous state-church model as formulated in Section 1.2.62
Let us shortly recall: I conceptualize French state-organized religion relations as
a combination of Gallican, associational, and strictly secular schemes (cf. Bowen:
2007, 2012). The Netherlands use a combination of principled pluralism (cf. Mon-
sma/Soper: 1997) and a separation tradition (cf. Maussen: 2009, 2012). For Norway,
I propose a conceptualization as entailing establishment (i.e., remaining Lutheran
hegemony), compensatory evenhandedness (i.e., compensating toward other mi-
62 For my discussion of France, I rely on Bowen: 2006, 2007, 2010, 2012; Maussen: 2009; Baubérot:
2000, 2004; Fetzer/Soper: 2005, 2007. For The Netherlands: Monsma/Soper: 1997; Maussen: 2009,
2012; Van Rooden: 1996, 2010; Van Bijsterveld: 1987, 2006. For Norway: Thorkildsen: 1998, 2012;
Furre: 1991; Molland: 1979; Elstad/Halse: 2002; Leirvik: 2007.
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norities) and that of (municipal) dis-establishment schemes (cf. Breemer: 2014,
2019).
3.3.1 France: Gallican, Associational, and Strict Neutrality Schemes
The French relationship between organized religion and the State is typically de-
scribed by referring to laïcité, often portrayed as a teleological process.63 After the
French revolution robbed the Catholic Church of its power, the principles of the
Republic were laid down. Struggles during the Third Republic removed the church
from the schools. The Law of 1905 allowed the idea of laïcité to come to fruition,
and separation of state and church was given a legal form.64
According to Bowen, such a historical and normative account of secularity dis-
guises a more complicated and long-term policy that is better understood as a
combination of scripts. The ‘Gallican scheme’ focuses on the role of the State as the
protector as well as the controller of religious institutions. Bowen traces its origins
to Phillipe le Bel (1268–1314), who wanted to maintain an independent French or
Gallican church vis-à-vis Rome. He sees its continuation in Napoleon’s Concordat
and in certain versions of Republican philosophy.65
The ‘associational scheme’ is a variation of Republican thought66 that crucially
entails focusing on citizen associations and civil society. State-centered French
Republicanism is suspicious of intermediate corporate bodies, as they obstruct the
direct relationship between the State and the individual. Yet, the associational line
of thinking sees associations, for example, religious associations as well as private
religious schools, as the best vehicles for that role.
Maussen (2009) adds a “strict neutrality script”67 that involves a solely secularist
interpretation of principles like neutrality, equality, separation, and the conviction
that religion belongs in the private domain.
In a short historical reconstruction, I show how these strands of reasoning can
capture an equivocal French approach to organized religion and state.68
63 I rely on Bowen (2007, 1006) with reference to leading historians on the subject, like Baubérot.
64 Yet, the word does not have a legal definition. It appears first only as an adjective in the Constitution
of 1946, Article 1: “La France est une République indivisible, laïque, démocratique et sociale” (“France
is an indivisible, secular, democratic and social republic,” my translation).
65 Any definition of Republicanism is as contested as that of laïcité. Its central idea is that living together
in a society requires an agreement on basic values, and the state must ensure that all citizens and all
newcomers learn those values, see Bowen: 2012, 359. Civil liberties are secured through state power
and a public space that is neutral with respect to religion (cf. Bowen: 2006,14).
66 This also has roots in the philosophy of Rousseau, who advocated free association among citizens.
67 I distinguish this strand in agreement with Maussen (2009, 44), yet as distinct from laïcité. In my
approach laïcité can mean many things, sometimes overlapping with a ‘strict neutrality script.’
68 My approach is here heavily indebted to Maussen (2009, 43).
https://doi.org/10.13109/9783666567322 | CC BY-NC-ND 4.0
© 2021, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Theaterstraße 13, D-37073 Göttingen
A Wider Understanding of State-Organized Religion Relations 95
We can trace the struggle between French monarchs and the Catholic Church –
which eventually led to the formation of a Gallican church – as far back as Phillipe le
Bel (1268–1314).TheKing inaugurated the tradition of controlling this church from
the palace, where in France rulings of the Pope required royal consent (Maussen:
2009, 44ff). There was also an array of other early formative moments: the religious
wars (1562–1598) and the failure of a successful Reformation in France; the edict of
Nantes (1598), which allowed for the practice of Protestantism; and its revocation
in 1685.
The Gallican approach dominated French politics until the late 19th century
(Bowen: 2006, 22). Tolerance in this respect was a matter of royal regulation of a
recognized religion. It did not (yet) means recognizing freedom of conscience. As
Maussen (2009, 44) remarks, in the period leading up to the Revolution of 1789,
France had no experience with the peaceful accommodation of religious pluralism.
A suppressive Catholic Church and the reign of Louis XIV led to new violence
against Protestants and the edict of Fontainebleau (1658).
During the Revolution (1789–), the Catholic Church was ‘unestablished,‘ robbed
of its properties, and thousands of Catholic priests were murdered or deported (cf.
Baubérot 2000: 11–17).
Baubérot distinguishes two modes of thinking about religion that subsequently
developed: the wish to maintain a national public religion and the withdrawal of
the State from all things religious.69
Initially, the Constituent Assembly wanted to install the Catholic Church as the
national religion, as part of the public order. Yet, the civil constitution of the clergy
from 1790 required Catholics to take an oath to uphold the constitution. Those
refusing were persecuted, and a wave of terror followed, answered with a wave of
counterterror. Revolutionaries institutionalized a ‘religion of the Republic’ with a
festival for “the Goddes of Reason.”70
The second mode of thinking that eventually dominated was the commitment
to individual freedom of conscience, embodied in the 1789 Declaration of the
Rights of Man and of the Citizen. After Robespierre’s fall in 1795, the government
abstained from supporting any religion. The State no longer paid the salaries of the
clergy. Liberty of conscience was guaranteed to all, yet the State forbade exterior
clothing or rituals of any religion, including funeral processions and bell-ringing
(Bowen: 2006, 22).
The Revolution thus resulted in changes in the State-Church relationship by
focusing on individual freedom of conscience, by seeing the outward expression
of religion as a potential threat to political stability, and by forwarding a generally
69 I rely here on Baubérot: 2000; Bowen: 2006, 22.
70 For a discussion, see Baubérot: 2000, 15–17; Fetzer/Soper: 2005, 69.
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Republican philosophy that urges its citizens to abstain from all communal loyalties
other than those to the French nation (cf. Maussen: 2009, 44).
This strict separationist attitude was again abolished in 1801 when Bonaparte
signed a Concordat with the Pope. Catholicism then became the religion of the
French people, albeit not as an established religion. Bowen sees this arrangement
as an extension of the Gallican scheme, in that the state recognized and financed
four religions (Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist, and later the Jewish faith). It paid all
clergies’ salaries, but it also demanded their explicit subordination.71
The Napoleonic regulations retained the tension between supporters of the
Catholic Church and monarchy and anticlerical Republic factions. This is reflected
in the shifts between monarchical and Republican regimes following Napoleon’s
later defeat.72
The conflict between ‘the two Frances’ culminated at the beginning of the Third
Republic (1871–1940) over schools. Once anticlericals had gained parliamentary
power, they passed the “Ferry Law” (1882),73 which stripped the clergy of their
right to inspect schools or to fire teachers who displeased them (Fetzer/Soper: 2005,
70).
A range of laws between 1882 and 1886 then further secularized the classroom,
allowing only laypersons to teach and adopting a secular curriculum aimed to form
“peasants into Frenchmen” (Bowen: 2006, 24f).This phasewas very formative for the
contemporary imagery of French state-church relations: Laïcité became an object of
struggle and an actual word.Militant secularism (laïcité du combat) pits itself against
those favouring a return to the era of Catholic morality. A previous willingness to
tolerate religious morality hardened into an even firmer anticlericalism that was
further ignited by the Dreyfus Affair (1898–1899).74
In the ‘hot years’75 between this affair and the laws of 1907/1908 regarding church
property, the battle between proclerical and anticlerical factions culminated in two
phases of public policy and law-making. Changing power constellations shifted
the strongly antichurch current in the years 1901–1905 over to a more liberal
associational approach in the years 1905–1908.
71 In 1908, this involved the creation of a Jewish consistory: Jewish practices and institutions were
aggregated into a legal corporation, rather than being recognized as the rights of a community
striving for self-determination. Jews were given rights as individual citizens but not as a community.
72 From the July Monarchy (1830–1848) France transitions to the Second Republic (1848–1851) to the
second Empire (1851–1871) to the Third Republic (1871–1940).
73 Jules Ferry, Minister of Education, enacted this.
74 This involved the false accusation of high treason toward a Jewish artillery Captain. The affair deeply
divided France between the anti-Dreyfusards, comprised of the Catholic Church, the military, and
the right wing, who clung to the original verdict and exploited anti-Semitism. The Dreyfusards were
an alliance of moderate Republicans, radicals, and socialists who claimed his innocence.
75 Bowen relies on Baubérot: 2004 for this account.
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This last phase led Bowen to highlight an associational scheme76 that results
in the right to create a legal association in 1901 (i.e., cultural associations with
a religious flavor) (association culturelle) and the legal right to create an explicit
religious association (association cultuelle) as stipulated in the 1905 law.
The 1901 law allowed citizen to establish voluntary associations, but the law also
aimed to weaken Catholic institutions, as congregations now needed authorization
from parliament. The anticlerical Emile Combes used it in 1903 to close down
10,000 Catholic schools on the grounds that they had been created by religious
orders. A 1904 law forbade religious teachers.
The 1905 Law of Separation of Churches and State was more liberal. It traded in
the Concordatarian system of officially recognized public religion for a privatized
notion of le culte.77 Its first article “guarantees the freedom of conscience and the
free exercise of organized religions …” Article 2 stipulated that “the Republic shall
not recognize, pay, or subsidize, any organized religion.”
However, the State of Council does recognize religion as such.78 Second, the Re-
public does pay the costs of chaplaincies in schools, hospices, asylums, and prisons
(1905 law, Article 2.) And a range of indirect subsidies were created for building
prayer houses (Breemer/Maussen: 2012, 288),79 which by 1950 also included sub-
sidies for religious private schools, on the condition that they teach the national
curricula (Bowen: 2012, 360).
To the present day, the 1905 law has remained the primary legal framework.
Yet, discussions endure as to how to interpret its contradictory strands: Defenders
of a more ‘millitant’ (laïcité du combat), ‘strict,’ or ‘closed’ laïcité read the law as
proof of strict separation and nonsupport; proponents of a more ‘moderate’ (laïcité
modérée), ‘open,’ ‘plural,’ or ‘soft’ laïcité emphasized the law’s defense of effective
religious freedom, the right to establish autonomous private religious associations
and other forms of state support (cf. Fetzer/Soper: 2005, 73; Maussen: 2009, 46).
76 Bowen (2006) and Rosanvallon (2004) see this as an internal Republicanism struggle, pitting a
centralizing Jacobinian political philosophy toward one emphasizing the importance of associations
and civil society.
77 Le culte, organized religion, has no legal definition but refers to the protection and freedom of a
religious organization regarding the mass, its buildings, and its teaching (cf. Bowen: 2006, 18).
78 This confers legal recognition on the condition that the group comes together in formal ceremonies,
that the beliefs contain universal religious principles, that the group has had a long existence and
does not threaten public order (Bowen: 2006, 18).
79 Moreover, the state or municipality assumes the costs for Catholic churches built before 1905.
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3.3.2 The Netherlands: Principled Pluralism and Separation Tradition
The Dutch approach to organized religion and state is often characterized by the
idea of ‘pillarization,’ which refers to a period in Dutch history (1900–1960) in
which society was structured by confessional and socialist divisions (Reformed,
Catholic, Socialist, Liberal) and entailed a type of governance that combined group
autonomy with elite cooperation and compromise (Lijphart: 1975). In both the
Dutch public and scholarly debate of the last decade, pillarization has increasingly
come to be used as a trope by those critical of Dutch immigration policies.80
By evoking this mythical understanding of Dutch integration and state-church
regimes (and its transition into “the multicultural model”), scholars or politicians
can lend support for their plans for alternate models or policies. In response, other
scholars show how the label of pillarization and its transition into multiculturalism
distorts an understanding of actual transitions in integration policies and Dutch
state-church relations.81
Dutch state-church relations are best conceptualized as a combination of ‘prin-
cipled pluralism’ and a separationist tradition. The former is a term coined by
Monsma/Soper (1997) and entails a pluralistic view of society, which deems a vari-
ety of religious and philosophical movements normal and no threat to the unity
and prosperity of society. These can develop freely on separate tracks, “neither hin-
dered nor helped by government” (1997, 60). Further, the state supports religious
freedom – whether positive, negative, individual, or collective – guided by an idea
of a principled evenhandedness between religion and nonreligion. Nonreligious
organizations are yet another orientation (richting).
Lastly, there is a strong separation tradition: Liberals have historically stressed the
need for a neutral public sphere, secular institutions, and policies of noninterference
vis-à-vis organized religion (Maussen: 2009; 2012). Below, I present these schemes
in their historical context.
The Republic of the Seven United Netherlands was formed in 1581. During the
Dutch Revolt or the so-called Eighty Years’ War (1568–1648), leading up to this
Republic, the political battle against the authority of the Habsburgs joined the
beginnings of the Reformation. The reform movements (under the lead of William
80 Pillarization and its outflow into multicultural politics led to perverse effects, so it is argued. It
allowed for ‘parallel societies,’ ‘ethnic enclaves,’ and the oppression of women. See Klausen: 2005,
145; Koopmans/Statham/Giugni/Passy: 2005, 434–435; Sniderman/Hagendoorn: 2007, 17–18, all
quoted by Maussen (2012, 338). Vink (2007, 344) looks at historical changes in integration policies
since the 1970s, showing that “there never was a pillarized Dutch integration policy to begin with.”
81 Vink: 2007; Rath/Penninx/Groenendijk/Meijer: 1999; Maussen: 2009, 2012; Dyvendak/Scholten:
2010.
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van Oranje) were directed against the rule of Spain and the Catholic Church. The
battle for a Dutch Republic was thus at the same time a Calvinist fight for religious
freedom.82
The Union of Utrecht in 1579 created the transition to a confessional state.
Article 13 laid down the principle of individual freedom of conscience, meaning the
freedom to have a religious opinion. This meant primarily a ban on the Inquisition,
though it did not yet mean that one could publicly exercise one’s religion or publicly
express dissent (Van Bijsterveld: 1987, 27). Public office still required membership
in the Reformed Church, and dissenting religious groups were looked upon with
lesser regard.
Yet, unlike Norway at the time, the Reformed Church was not a state church, but
was rather highly decentralized, with power residing in the hands of local elites
and influential families. Second, it had an antiabsolutistic character. Because the
ReformedChurch had arisen out of theDutch revolt against the Spanish Inquisition,
the new republic refused forced membership (Rooden: 1996, 20). The influx of
leading thinkers like Descartes, Locke, Spinoza, and Bayle, who had fled religious
wars elsewhere, further strengthened the commitment to religious toleration.
With the Batavian revolution (1795–1798), which marked the end of the Dutch
Republic83, the Reformed Church was robbed of some of its privileges. Membership
in another confessional community no longer carried public advantages or disad-
vantages with it. And confessional affiliations other than the Reformed Church
were seen as something positive (cf. Van Bijsterveld: 1987, 28). Furthermore, in the
short French period (1795–1814), the invasion of the French revolutionary armies
lay the legal basis for a further separation of state and church. Religious freedom
and equality for all churches was declared in 1796 and confirmed in 1815 (Sengers:
2010, 79), putting a strong bureaucracy in place.
The constitution of 1814 is the outcome of tensions between modernists, who
wished to minimize the relationship between state and church, and traditionalists,
who longed to return to the reign of the ReformedChurch. By way of compromise, it
still proclaimed that the king should be of the Reformed confession. Yet, in 1815 this
is abandoned. After the merger with the predominantly Roman Catholic Belgium,
the provision was exchanged for a promise from the Belgian authorities to secure
explicit supervision over the Catholic Church (Van Bijsterveld: 1987, 29f).
This satisfied William I’s (1815–1840) need for interventionist control over the
churches. The constitution84 installed in 1806 had allowed the government to regu-
late the organization and practice of all cults. Likewise, William I demanded that
82 My discussion is heavily indebted to Van Rooden (1996 and 2010).
83 This marks the beginning of the Batavian Republic, which lasted until 1806.
84 There were six constitutions between 1795–1816.
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all church bodies obtain his approval for their internal regulations (bestuursregle-
ment).85
This was when the state and the church became decoupled. The basic principles
of the Dutch pluralistic and liberal state were now in place and would remain so
until today (Sengers: 2010, 79). Nevertheless, the government still intervened in
church matters.
The constitution of 1848 changed everything. The legal scholar Thorbecke in-
stalled a – at its time liberal – constitution abolishing the need for state approval
for the construction of church bodies. Here, we recognize our marked third strand
of a ‘separation tradition.’ As further confirmed in the 1853 law on ecclesiastical
communities, these communities could decide themselves on the internal regula-
tion and practice of their faiths (Hirsch Ballin: 1987, 12). This allowed Catholics to
reestablish the structure of their church. Yet, this liberal loosening of control did
not imply abandoning the Protestant nation; anti-Catholic sentiments were still
prominent.
In the second half of the 19th century, the power of liberals in the Dutch gov-
ernment increased. Inspired by ideas popular in large parts of the Western world
(‘enlightenment‘), Dutch Liberals worked for a society that was marked by a con-
sensus of values, that was nonsectarian (Monsma/Soper: 1997, 55). Schools were
seen as important, and, as in France, the idea became salient that the state should
provide for common public schools, unguided by one particular denomination
(Glenn: 1987, 46–47).
Opposition to these liberal ideas came from both the Roman Catholics and
orthodox Protestants. Conflict ignited when, in 1878, four years before the 1882
French Ferry law, the liberal Kappeyne van de Coppello pushed through a new law
demanding higher standards for all schools, that is, reform for all schools, both
public and confessional. But it provided funding only for the public schools: The
confessional schools should finance themselves. Furthermore, they risked being
closed down if they did not meet the higher educational standards.86
Despite their historical animosity, Catholics and Protestants alike formed a strong
political alliance against the Liberals.87 Over a period of 40 years, this Protestant
ARP-Catholic alliance became a major political force, installing its own vision
of education. Religiously based schools and public schools espousing a “neutral
85 He also used the 1806 law to restructure all Protestant groups in the North to become nation-
building organizations (Van Rooden: 2010, 67). His attempt to do the same with the Catholic Church
ultimately led to Belgian separation in 1830.
86 This law ensured parents the freedom to establish their own schools.
87 Abraham Kuyper, an influential minister and mass politician, created the Orthodox Reformed
Church (Gereformeerde Kerken, 1892), which was a split off from the Public Reformed Church
(Hervormde kerk). And he created the ARP, the Antirevolutionary Party.
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consensual philosophy” should all share “fully and equally in public funding”
(Monsma/Soper: 1997, 57). This vision was ultimately set down in the Constitution
of 1917, Article 23, which is still in force today.
This is where Monsma and Soper’s idea of ‘principled pluralism’ comes from. It
entails the thought that both religious as well as nonreligious views have the same
right to sit at the public policy table; liberal views are no more neutral than religious
ones. And it builds on an idea of sphere sovereignty: “the right of different religious
and nonreligious perspectives to develop freely on separate tracks, neither hindered
or helped by government” (Monsma/Soper: 1997, 60).88 The social imaginary
evolves from a nation consisting of subjects to be transformed and educated to one
of individuals belonging to groups. Allegiance to the nation could be expressed
only through membership in these groups (cf. Van Rooden: 2010, 70).
Beginning in the early 1900s, this eventually led to a society in which the basic
spheres of life are structured along ‘pillars’ – there are, for instance, Catholic radio
stations, bakeries, sports clubs, political parties, etc. The combination of group-
based autonomy and an elite-level consultation and decision-making structure is
what held this system together peacefully (Lijphart: 1975). The pacification and
constitution of 1917 is the legal embodiment hereof. It secured universal male
suffrage, an electoral system of proportional representation, and the equal funding
of schools.
This pillar system, however, eroded from the 1960s on. The expansion of the
Dutch welfare state made its citizens less dependent on religious organizations. The
increasing economic prosperity in the 1950s and 1960s allowed formore educational
opportunities and higher wages. Internal changes to the Catholic pillar – the group
that had needed the protective structures most – led to its dissolution (Bryant:
1981, 63). Furthermore, the cultural revolution of the 1960s challenged the system
with its emphasis on sexuality, consumption, and freedom of choice. As Maussen
(2009) remarks, one of the effects of depillarization was an increased emphasis
on individual freedoms and protection against intrusive religious authorities. In
88 As they trace it, intellectuals like the Orthodox Protestant Abraham Kuyper, the Orthodox Protestant
Guillaume Groen van Prinsterer, as well as the Catholic Herman Schæpman were indebted to these
pluralist ideals. It was their simultaneous challenge and common alliance (later joined by the
socialists) that led to the eventual development of a pillarized society. Possibly because they all
occupied a minority position vis-à-vis the liberal and Hervormd Protestant nation, none sought to
impose their ideas on the nation as a whole (cf. Monsma/Soper: 1997, 59). Furthermore, deep anti-
Catholicism had provided strong incentives for Catholic mobilization. The split among Protestants
secured the majority of the combined Orthodox Reformed and Catholics (cf. Van Rooden: 2010,
70).
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this light, the existing financial relationship between the Dutch state and churches
increasingly became seen as inappropriate.89
TheConstitution of 1983 provides the basis for contemporary Dutch state-church
relations. There is no mention of the principle of separation of state and church, in
any law. Yet, it has long been an important value and premise that finds its expression
through a set of articles in the Constitution, Articles 1, 6, and 23. Van Bijsterveld
(2006, 248) summarizes it as the mutual freedom of churches and state to give
form to their organizational structures and confessional orientation (vrijheid van
inrichting en richting). The state does not intervene in the appointment of religious
officials. Conversely, the churches should not proclaim a formal position in public
decision-making procedures. And no merely confessional criteria can be used to
direct the actions of government.
3.3.3 Norway: Establishment, Compensatory Evenhandedness, and
Municipal Disestablishment
In international literature,Norway is typically categorized as falling into the category
of an “established church” (Ferrari: 2002; Kuru: 2009); or “establishment secularism”
(Stepan: 2011). Since May 2012, the constitutional relationship has been loosened,
though the Norwegian Church still enjoys a special foundation in the Constitution:
Article 2 no longer mentions the Evangelical-Lutheran Religion as the official
state religion but does emphasize a “Christian and humanist heritage.”90 Yet, the
Evangelical-LutheranChurch remainsNorway’s popular church (folkekirke) (Article
16). And whereas, in 1815, the Dutch constitution abolished the need for the King
to be of the Hervormd faith, the Norwegian king is still required to “at all times
profess the Evangelical-Lutheran religion” (Article 4).91
Although the term ‘establishment’ still reflects some reality, we should be careful
not to overinterpret matters through this analytic category. I suggest, as elaborated
in Breemer (2014, 2019), a more dynamic view of the Norwegian model, which
entails a tradition of ‘establishment’: (1) the continuing hegemony of the Church of
Norway and its continuing intertwinement with public institutions; (2) a growing
89 Going back to the reign of KingWilliam I, the Dutch state had provided direct subsidies for churches.
The Church Building Subsidy Act (Wet Premie Kerkbouw) was abolished in 1982 (Maussen: 2009,
54). Since 1983, no structural scheme for direct subsidies is foreseen (Breemer/Maussen: 2012, 291).
Yet, support for houses of worship can come from municipalities or as indirect support.
90 Also, in 2017 responsibility for the appointment of deans, bishops, and priests was transferred from
the state to the diocesan councils or National Council (Kirkerådet). Since January 2017, the church
is an independent legal subject, with the General Synod (kirkemøte) as its highest representative
organ.
91 Since 2012, he is no longer obliged to “uphold and protect” it, Article 4.
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emphasis on religious freedom and equality between religious and secular com-
munities, in light of the remaining Lutheran hegemony labeled as “compensatory
evenhandedness”; (3) ‘disestablishment,’ the process of increasing independence
and separation of the church from the municipality within the (Norwegian) state-
church constellation.
In one reading of history, Norwegian state-church relations did not change their
basic logic from the Reformation up to May 2012. As Thorkildsen (2012, 1) sum-
marizes it, “Ruling of the Church was an integrated part of the ruling of the State.”
With the Reformation, the Catholic bishops were removed from office, and the
Danish King Christian III confiscated the church properties to amass wealth and to
create an integrated state. Yet, he introduced Lutheranism in a “careful and peaceful
way” (Thorkildsen: 2012, 2), appointing superintendents to replace the bishops but
leaving much of the local structures of governance intact. Local representatives
– well embedded in their communities – obtained an additional state (and thus
church) – function. The local administration of the church thus became deeply
intertwined with that of the local community or, after 1837, the municipality.
With the introduction of Absolutism in 1660, the King became head of the
Church. Superintendents thus became servants to both the King and God. No
other religion was permissible for the citizens of the Danish Norwegian kingdom;
foreigners who entered the country had to sign a declaration of loyalty to the
Lutheran teaching – or leave the country within 3 days (Elstad/Halse: 2002, 102).
By the end of the 1600s, a gradual relaxation occurred vis-à-vis foreigners with
whom the Kingdom trades,92 albeit not for ordinary citizens.
The otherwise liberal constitution of 1814 continued this emphasis on religious
unity. Article 2 stated that the Evangelical-Lutheran Religion remained the official
religion of the state. And it prohibited Jews any access (abandoned in 1851). Unlike
theDutch constitution of 1814, nomentionwasmade of an explicit right to religious
freedom. Historians suggest that it had originally been included but vanished in a
later version.
Throughout the 1800s, Norway evolved from an absolutist monarchy to a democ-
racy. Industrialization and urbanization were impressed upon the relationship
between church and the nation. In 1814, Norway was no longer part of Denmark
but now existed in a loose union with Sweden (1814–1905).
In the second half of the 19th century, the idea of a Norwegian nation became
very strong. Similar to the situation in France and The Netherlands, the political
92 Ambassadors (sendmenn) were allowed to practice a foreign faith. In 1685, the Huguenots were
given the right to practice freedom of religion and given tax privileges. A range of cities allowed
Jewish and Christian foreigners to practice their faith (Elstad/Halse: 2002,102).
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formation and construction of the nation-state were expressed in the realm of
education. The basis of a common school (allmueskolen) was created in the Danish
Norwegian kingdom by the pietist movements in the 1730s. State pietism93 led to
the introduction of obligatory confirmation and a Pontoppidan catechism. The goal
of this church school was to create good Christians as well as loyal and disciplined
citizens (Thorkildsen: 1998, 250).
From 1800 until 1950, the transition occurred from a church-run educational
system to that of a modern state-governed educational system (Bakke-Lorentzen:
2007, 37). The common elementary school still had a religious background and
Christian formation as its central aim, as reflected in the first school laws of 1848
and 1860. Yet, increasingly, the power of the church and its self-evident influence
over the school system waned.94
Two features are interesting to note: Unlike France, where the common school
was supposed to be a secular school, the option of a religion-free school seemed
rather unpopular in Norway. Only in 1911 did the Labor party propose to establish
a bekjennelsesfri folkeskole (and in 1918 to withdraw the subject of Christianity
from its curriculum). Yet, by making these schools confession-free, it was feared
that private confessional schools would subsequently blossom.95 Second, unlike
in The Netherlands, the Norwegian school system historically had privileged the
public unitary schools (enhetsskolen) rather than the private schools.
Increasing religious freedom and democratization marked the early 1840s. The
fight for religious freedom entailed two forms: a fight for freedom within the
Lutheran faith, which was won with the abolishment of the Act of Conventicles in
1842 (konventikkelplakat). This entailed the prohibition of organizing for religious
purposes outside the control of the state church. The second freedom concerned
the right to belong to and organize other Christian communities, which was not
realized until 1845 with the adoption of the Law on Christian Dissenters (dissenter
lova) (Leirvik: 2007, 11). Yet, two groups were still seen as especially threatening:
the Jesuit and Monastic orders (Munkeordener). Monks were allowed in 1897, but
93 This was enforced under Frederik IV (1699–1730) and Christian VI (1730–1746). Pietism was a
reform movement internal to the church which emphasized internal revelation over formalized
ritual and dogma. It argued that subjective experiences were central to religious experience and
knowledge and thereby also allowed a larger role for laypersons (cf. Elstad/Halse: 2002, 114–115).
94 Conflicts arose during the 1870s between two upcoming parties (Venste and Høyre) of liberals and
conservatives over the identity of the common schools. The liberals wanted a less church-oriented
and more democratic and uniform schooling system (enhets skole), whereas the conservatives argued
that the responsibility for education should remain with the state and church (Bakke-Lorentzen:
2007, 37–38). After the introduction of parliamentarism in 1884, it was the liberals who emphasized
educational reform, culminating in the folkeskoleloven of 1889.
95 For a discussion, see Bakke-Lorentzen (2007, 40), who referred to the work of Eidsvåg (1996).
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the ban on Catholic Jesuits remained in place until 1956 (Leirvik: 2007, 12). Full
freedom of religious practice for all did not appear in the constitution until 1964.
Furthermore, a process of general political democratization marks the 1840s,
albeit with contradictory outcomes in terms of a separation of state and church. On
the one hand, local government and churches become more interwoven, through
decentralization and democratization. With the Alderman Act of 1837, national
decision-making power was transferred to locally elected bodies, so that the church
minister very often became leader of the new municipal board. One of the first
responsibilities of the newly created municipalities was to take care of the local
church and church affairs. On the other hand, because of a gradual internal church
democratization process (kirkelig reformbevegelse), we also see demands for more
separation of state and church from within the state-church framework. Not unlike
The Netherlands at the time, the wish for more institutional independence vis-à-vis
the state emerged.96
A consciousness arose that the Church of Norway was a spiritual community for
which forced regulations were not appropriate (Molland: 1979, 9). Jens Lauritz Arup
first articulated such a vision, consisting of a reorganization of the church by means
of, for example, the election of parish representatives, as well as changes at levels
higher up in the church hierarchy (Molland: 1979, 8). However, this movement
was only moderately successful. Absalon Taranger, a professor in law, argued that a
free popular church had to loosen its ties with the state, but not with the people
(Oftestad/Rasmussen/Schumacher: 1991, 241).97 An initial realization of Arup’s
proposals, however, did not come into effect until the 1920 Parish Councils Act.98
In the postwar period, the issue came up on the political agenda again with the
1945 Reform Commission, which proposed a church council (kirkeråd). Promises
had been made to the church during the war for a new structure of self-governance.
Yet, once again the reforms were struck down. The positive attitude of the political
elite toward the church, which characterized the war period, evaporated in the 5
years thereafter (Furre: 1991, 191 and 278). Among other things, the “battle over
hell”99 confirmed fears in the Labor Party of the possibility of conservative forces
in the church coming to power.
96 For a discussion, see Elstad (2002, 163) and Molland (1979, 8).
97 A 1908 church committee investigated the issue. A minority followed Taranger’s proposal for a
free church. The majority chose to retain the state church. When this advice was distributed for
consultation among parishes and municipalities, the outcome was a total defeat of the idea of a free
popular church.
98 This was followed by the introduction of the Council of Bishops (bispedømmeråd) in 1933 and the
formalization of the Council of Bishops (Bispemøtet) in 1934.
99 This refers to a heated debate over the centrality of a belief in hell as part of the Lutheran dogma.
Does the state have the power to decide this matter?
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Not until the early 1980s was the question of local reform of the church taken up
again. The Church Act Committee (kirkelovutvalgst 1982), which is central to the
1996 burial law, is the first public report to address this theme so prominently.
Since the 1970s, Norway has followed a more generous ‘freedom of religion’
politics. The 1969 Act Relating to Religious Communities, etc. provides registered
and unregistered religious and or secular communities with an economic budget.
Its logic is a compensating one: maintain Lutheranism as default yet compensate
other groups as well. The Council for Religious and Secular (in Norwegian ‘Life
Stance‘) Communities was established in 1996 with the aim of furthering equal
treatment between various religious and secular communities in Norway.
Since May 2012, the constitutional relationship has loosened, although the state
still maintains financial responsibility for employing bishops, deans, pastors, and
other persons employed in ecclesiastical positions of regional and central church
bodies. Also, at the local level, themunicipalities remain responsible for the finances
of the local churches, such as maintaining the offices or supplying materials related
to the educational purposes of the Church.
In sum, proposals for increasing religious freedom and more internal church
autonomy were countered throughout the second part of 19th century and the
beginning of the 20th century by opposing concerns to avoid church reform and
maintain the state-church link. Furthermore, at a local level the church remains
firmly integrated with the local government. Opposition to loosening the state-
church link came from forces within the Norwegian Church100 and moreover
resulted from a lack of political support for such decoupling in the Norwegian
Labor Party. “People were afraid that religious and Pietistic elitists would seize
power of their church” (Thorkildsen: 2012, 3). Not unlike the French Gallican
effort, the Norwegian political establishment thus seeks control, albeit by means of
a state church.
3.3.4 Comparative Reflections
The comparison of these otherwise rich and divergent histories reveals that the
period from the 1840s to the early 1900s was particularly formative for state-church
100 For reasons of space and for analytical purposes, I must omit a discussion of the various groups and
historical alliances that argued for or against the dissolution of the state-church link. Grundvigians
typically supported an open conception of the church as including a wide range of people. Pietist
groups typically defended a more circumcised idea of the church and what it means to be Christian;
freedom from state interference was more central to their concerns. Grundvigians, who shared
similar concerns about church autonomy, saw the benefits of an intervening state to keep the church
open.
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relations in all countries.101 Liberal ideologies arose in all contexts and became
part of the struggle to form a national identity. In France, this took the form of a
historical struggle between the ‘two Frances’ and the rise of a ‘militant secularity.’102
In The Netherlands, liberals had to fight against a plurality of confessional and
nonconfessional groups. The result was compromise and a legacy that views all di-
rections (richtingen) as equal (‘principled pluralism’). In Norway, the construction
of the nation-state plays itself out, among others, in the realm of education: Liberals
fought for a less church-oriented and more democratic and uniform schooling
system. Since the early 1840s, furthermore, we see processes of increasing religious
freedom and internal church reforms for more church autonomy and disestablish-
ment.
The legacies that emerge from this period support our conceptualization of these
countries’ state-organized religion regimes. This holds for both the standard as well
as the more heterogeneous models. And these legacies can be seen as capturing, to
varying degrees, the dynamic surrounding the formulations of the first burial laws.
We observed the increasing neutralization and ‘laicification’ of the French ceme-
tery under the laws of the Third Republic and the 1905 law (confirming laïcité and
our ‘strict neutrality script’) We observed an emphasis on religious plurality and the
possibility of various confessional cemeteries arguing against liberal proposals for
abandonment in the Dutch 1869 burial law (confirming ‘principled pluralism’ and
‘separation tradition’). In Norway, the influence of liberal ideology is entirely absent
in the formation of funeral regulations. Rather, we observe the completely interwo-
ven governance of the Norwegian graveyard as an aspect of church governance in
the 1896 Law on Churches and Churchyards (‘establishment’).
3.4 Conclusion
In preparation for the discussion of contemporary responses to ‘new’ diversity (see
the next chapter), this chapter investigated the legal contours of these countries’
burial domains. I treated three realms of interests: (A) Who governs the cemetery,
i.e., who pays, administers, and owns them? Who decides the rules of access? (B) I
extrapolated the leading normative commitments and social imageries expressed
in these burial laws. The rest of the chapter (C) contextualized these contemporary
101 For the sake of comparison, I simplify here. In the case of France, Bowen argues that we need to
look much further back in time, tracing the Gallican element back to Le Bel (1268–1314). For
Norway, some of the main transitions in the state-church framework happened much later, in 2012.
102 The battle between proponents of a Catholic church and monarchy and the anticlerical Republicans
gave rise to a stereotypical characterization of a militant laïcité, which I call ‘strict neutrality scripts.’
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institutional formats by providing a two-fold genealogy, first tracing the histori-
cal transitions within the burial legislation itself (looking at a range of factors at
play) and, second, providing a short historical overview of state-organized religion
relations in each country.
A look at (A) shows that the differences in the legal contours of the burial domain
are huge; for a detailed summary, see Table 3.1. The different ways these countries
provided an institutional form of diversity in the cemetery was expressed through
the legal abolishment of confessional graveyards and sections in France since 1804
and 1881/1884, respectively; the legal right to both in The Netherlands since 1804
and 1869, respectively; and the formal right for registered belief communities to
their own cemetery in Norway since 1969. The legal possibility of establishing a
confessional section is absent in the latter.
These differences manifest themselves furthermore through (B) different guiding
normative commitments and legal social imageries. We found that France consid-
ered the principles of individual freedom of conscience and neutrality of the public
space as legally relevant. The French cemetery has a strong symbolic dimension,
signifying a public domain in which all Frenchmen and Frenchwomen are united
and should be treated equally and neutrally. In the Dutch burial domain, the prin-
ciples of individual and collective religious freedom are most prominent, resulting
in a wide range of burial options. Early on, conflict management takes the form of
extending a set of legal rights to all confessional and nonconfessional groups alike,
rather than purging the public cemetery of a religious imprint, as in France.103
And there are financial considerations to be reckoned with. In Norwegian law, the
concern with collective equality is central, yet the legal right to one’s own cemetery
is not extended to nonreligious communities. As in France, individual equality
matters. Norwegian regulations are the financially most egalitarian ones.104 Quite
unlike France, public cemeteries are the explicit embodiments of a cultural and
Christian heritage, albeit downplayed in the latest legal reforms.
Lastly, (C) represents a two-fold genealogy of the burial laws and state-church
approaches, so that we conclude that state-church relations played an explicit role
in the formation of the burial legislation in tandem with concerns of hygiene and
public health (see Section 3.2.4).
The standard pictures of laïcité, ‘pillarization,’ and ‘establishment’ were good
approximations for the legal regulation of cemeteries. For France, the rise of a
militant secularism (laïcité du combat) around the time of the Third Republic
coincides with the neutralization of the cemetery (laws of 1881, 1884, and 1905).
Legally, it captures an important part of the historical dynamic. For Norway, the
103 This is the legal imagery, though many French cemeteries have retained a clear Catholic character.
104 This involves costs for a grave but not the funeral ceremony.
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designation ‘establishment’ captured the completely interwoven legal governance
of the Norwegian graveyard as an aspect of church governance, until at least 1996,
when for the first time cemeteries became regulated by their own law.
However, a more nuanced reading of these countries’ state-organized religion
regimes (Section 3.3) reveals how these standard designations are not “wrong” but
overshadow and oversimplify other historical readings.
For example, a look at The Netherlands shows that, rather than ‘pillarization,’ the
battle concerning the formulation of the first burial laws is informed by ideas of
religious plurality and the possibility of various confessional cemeteries against lib-
eral proposals for abandonment (‘principled pluralism’ and ‘separation tradition’),
predating ‘pillarization.’
For Norway, a more detailed historical analysis of the state-church regime shows
the beginning of two other strands of reasoning in the 1840s that develop into
‘compensatory evenhandedness’ and ‘disestablishment.’ In Section 5.3.4, I argue that
we see signs of the ‘disestablishment strand’ in the reasoning underlying the 1996
amendment.105 And we can recognize a focus on ‘compensatory evenhandedness’
with the latest legal burial changes in 2012.
For France, the ‘laic’ characterization of legal burial regulations overshadows
an earlier dynamic of municipalization of cemeteries that sought to support and
control publicly recognized religions under the Concordat (‘Gallican script’). The
remaining confessional cemeteries and confessional sections were allowed to exist
under the Napoleonic Decree (1804). Even today, this affects the regulation of
cemeteries in three departments in the region Alsace-Moselle (see Section 3.1.1).
Apart from these historical details, in this chapter we discovered huge legal
diversity between how these states give form to religious diversity in the cemetery.
Second, we found the legal regulation of confessional sections and the possibility (or
not) of confessional cemeteries to historically overlap with the broader regulations
concerning organized religion and state.
Based on these findings, we might expect substantial differences in how these
countries meet the contemporary challenges of new diversity in the cemetery. Is
that the case? That is what we now want to find out. Further, how do these two
institutional regimes inform national responses (Chapter 4) and everyday responses
(Chapter 5) to the burial needs of Muslims and humanists?
105 A more explicit focus on ‘compensatory evenhandedness’ can be traced back to the wider state-
church regime to the 1970s. It manifests itself in the 1969 Act Relating to Religious Communities
with the allowance for private churchyards for registered belief communities and the 2012 legal
changes.
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Chapter 4: National Policies and Regulations: Responses
to Muslims and Humanists
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter discussed the legal burial regimes and their genealogies.
Large national differences between countries exist in how they give institutional
form to religious diversity in the cemetery, and in their social imaginary of what
a cemetery is. Furthermore, the laws that regulate burial practices developed in a
particular historical context, for which a national state-organized religion dynamic
was relevant.
This chapter investigates what comprises these different legal burial regimes and
the respective state-organized religion regimes in the face of today’s common chal-
lenge. Legal frameworks necessarily must be interpreted in light of new situations
in order to ‘make sense’ of the situation.
We look at the challenge of Muslim burial in all contexts as well as that of hu-
manists in Norway. The newness of Muslim burial has resulted from changing
migratory processes. Originally, Muslims were not part of the historical context in
which modern burial and or state-church laws were formed. The novelty of human-
ist burial needs in turn arose more from endogenous changes in Norwegian society,
an increasing pluralizing population.This entailed a growth ofMuslim and Catholic
minorities in particular as well as an increasing plurality in the forms of new reli-
giosity internal to majority religions (cf. Holberg/Brottveit: 2014, 9). The position of
humanists and other atheists in Norway is special: In no other country in the world
is the Humanist Association (Human-Etisk Forbund, hereinafter HEF) so large.
How do these countries respond to these contemporary challenges on a national
level over time? Do policy responses line up with burial laws and state-organized re-
ligion relations? This chapter looks at national policy responses as well as estimates
of existing material provisions (drawing on Breemer/Maussen: 2012, 284–285 and
Breemer: 2014, 178–188). National policy responses include proposals for legal
changes, policy memoranda, guidelines, national declarations, and public recom-
mendations (such as the French Administrative Directives, Decrées or Circulaires).
But it can also include national research projects and plans like an inventory of
available institutions, national subsidy schemes, and public reports like the official
Norwegian reports (NOUs).
This chapter provides a general picture of significant national differences regard-
ing the policy responses to Muslims. But these national pictures are less evident
when we look at the actual provisions in place.
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This raises three puzzles: First, if a prohibition of special sections and confessional
cemeteries according to laïcité constrains regulations toward Muslims, then why
are there still 75 such carrés and two Muslim cemeteries? Second, why are there
not more Muslim cemeteries in The Netherlands despite the evenhanded legal
framework and pillarization legacy? And why are there no Islamic cemeteries in
Norway at all? Central to the humanist complaint, the question arises why the
Church of Norway gained administrative charge of the cemeteries in 1996 during
increasing religious and cultural diversification in Norwegian society?
This chapter serves to answer these questions. For France, I review how specific
ways of responding to Muslim burial developed over time that can explain at
least part of the puzzle. Yet, for both the French question and the legal change in
Norway in 1996, the municipal dimension is crucial. The reader must thus wait
until Chapters 5 and 6 for the final analysis.
I introduce the challenge of Muslim burial practices in a context of immigration,
followed by an estimate of the number of available provisions (Section 4.2). I then
look briefly at the national responses (or the lack hereof) of each country regarding
Muslims burial needs. And for Norway I discuss the humanist complaints regarding
burial provisions (Section 4.2.3) and one set of arguments for the 1996 law, before
summarizing the overall situation (Section 4.3).
4.2 Muslim Burial Practices in a Context of Immigration
As mentioned in the Introduction, European countries are increasingly witness-
ing a new stage in a migratory pattern. Today, Muslims from a diverse range of
backgrounds not only live, but also work and die in the ‘new land’ and are also
increasingly choosing to be buried there. Yet, research on this last aspect of the
immigrant trajectory is scarce. Only a handful of studies have investigated Islamic
burial in its ritual aspects from within a context of immigration.1 They reveal
the large variety of burial practices for the various Muslim groups coming from
different countries (Dessing: 2001). Furthermore, they show how their ‘rites de
passage’ have changed because of acculturation and settlement. Islamic burial in a
context of immigration entails negotiations between theological commitments and
pragmatic concerns (Jonker: 1996). Consequently, any talk of an ‘Islamic burial’
would misrepresent reality.
1 A discussion of changes in broader burial rituals would go beyond the scope of this project. See
Døving: 2005; Dessing: 2001; Jonker: 1996; Aggoun: 2003, 2006; Chaïb: 2002; Richner: 2006. For
works addressing the transnational aspect of death and migration, see Balkan: 2015a, 2015b, 2016;
Gardner: 2002; Nunez/Wheeler: 2012; Zirh: 2012.
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Nevertheless, the wide variety of strands of both Sunni and Shia Islam do share
some core ideas and practices. The most important prescriptions regarding death
in Sunni Islam come from the Hadiths (Practices of the Prophet) and the different
law schools (fiqh).2 The Koran itself is not very explicit regarding burial rituals,
though it does address the importance of the last judgment, the resurrection, and
the afterlife. The Koran tells us that death is not the final stage, but rather the start
of a new life. Burial should take place in the soil, at the place of death, to await
resurrection. Similar to Jewish ideas about burial, the body should be returned to
its creator, so cremation is strictly prohibited, as is exhuming the remains.3
Four sets of ritual practices are central to all strands of Islam.4 In the order of
sequence, (1) a qualified person from the community should ritually wash the body
according to precisely defined rules, (2) then the body should be wrapped in a
simple tissue called the kafan. (Here variations exist between different strands of
Islam.5) (3) After the washing procedure (often in the Mosque), a final prayer is
recited. (4) After being transported to the cemetery, the body should be buried in
the soil, in the right position, namely, with the face toward Mecca.
A proper burial testifies to a life as a good Muslim, superseding the religious
significance of, say, marriage or circumcision (Aggoun: 2006, 20). It underlines the
personal responsibility of eachMuslim toward his or her own life. But a proper burial
is not merely a matter of individual preference (as many secular persons would
presume). Rather, it obliges the community to find a collective burial area (Jews and
Muslims among one another). The community should avoid commercial exploita-
tion (all work being done voluntarily), emphasize modesty, and ensure the proper
carrying and internment. A proper Islamic burial expresses communal solidarity. In
institutional terms, this means Islamic cemeteries or Islamic sections within public
cemeteries with graves in the direction of Mecca. And it means permanent grave-
rest, burial without a coffin, burial within 24 hours, and adequate washing facilities.
Another picture indeed appears when we map the number of available Islamic
sections and cemeteries to the estimated numbers of Muslims. France has a Muslim
population of about 3.3–4.9 million, that is ca. 5.1–7.5% of the overall population.6
2 There are four legal schools within Sunni Islam: Hanafi’I, Shafi’I, Hanbali, and Malika.
3 See Koran 50; 2–15, discussed in Aggoun (2006, 19). On the aspect of exhumation, it should be
noted that some disagreement exists, see Jonker: 2004. Also, in practice, I have heard a wide range of
interpretations, ranging from never to 30 years to when only bones remain.
4 These are addressed in the Hadiths and not in the Koran, see Aggoun: 2006, 19; Døving: 2005, 59.
5 Dessing (2001, 151–152) mentions several varieties: wrapping the body in three to seven pieces of
cloth, three for Sunni Muslims and seven for Alevites, see also Jonker: 2004.
6 The numbers are controversial because formal statistics on religious affiliation are not allowed. I rely
for all estimates in the three countries on the numbers of the SMRE and American PEW Research
Center. The Swiss Metadata of religious affiliation in Europe base (SMRE) provides an overview of
surveys and estimates that consider the number of Muslims in France to range from as little as 2%
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The first recruitments of Moroccan/Berber workers goes back to as early as 1911,
with the largest wave of migration taking place after the World War II. A significant
part of France’s Muslim population comes from its former colonial territories and
protectorates (Algeria, Morocco, and ess of oc).7 Islam is commonly considered
the second most popular religion in France after Catholicism (Cesari: 2002).
By comparison, there are an estimated 4.0–6.0% Muslims in the total population
of The Netherlands. The largest wave of migration occurred in the 1960s and 1970s
because of labor migration from Turkey and Morocco. A very small number of
Muslims from former colonial areas settled in the cities of Leiden and The Hague
before World War II.8 Islam is the third most popular religion in The Netherlands.9
Muslims in Norway make up an estimated 2.5–3.7% of the total population.
Norway is religiously speaking relatively homogeneous, with membership in the
Church of Norway totaling some 70% of the total population (2018 data)10; 12.7%
of the population belong to other religious or secular communities, so that 17.3%
is unaffiliated.11 The fastest-growing groups are Muslims and Roman Catholics
(Thorkildsen: 2012, 1). Today, Muslims represent the second largest group, totaling
25.9% of all religious and secular communities outside the Church of Norway,
with 175,507 registered members (in 2019). Humanists are the third-largest group,
totaling 14.2%. They are closely followed by Muslims, with a registered membership
of 96,276 (in 2019).12 Based on these most recent numbers, 3.3% of the Norwegian
population belong to an Islamic organization, 1.8% to the HEF. But, of course, the
real numbers might be higher since not all Muslims or humanists are registered
members. Adherents to Islam are largely Pakistanis who came to Norway for eco-
to as much as 8.5%. In their own dataset comparison from France 2006–2015, they estimate: 5.1%
Muslims in France, 2.5% in Norway, and 4.0% in The Netherlands. Their estimate of unaffiliated
persons for France is 50.5%, 46% for The Netherlands, and 17.6% for Norway. See https://www.smre-
data.ch/en/data_exploring/region_cockpit#/mode/dataset_comparison/region/FRA/period/2010/
presentation/bar [accessed 25 May 2020].
7 Many Muslims who came to France as colonial workers or colonial subjects had French citizenship
or came as guest workers; see Témime: 1999; Sayad/Gillette: 1984; Noiriel: 1988; Maussen: 2009.
8 Some Moluccan families (from East India/Indonesia) arrived in the 1950s, and a larger number
of Surinamese arrived both before and after the independence of Surinam in 1975. A Muslim
population of varying ethnic origin arrived since the 1990s as political refugees or asylum-seekers
from Bosnia, Somalia, Iran, and Afghanistan (Van de Donk/Jonkers/Kronjee/Plum: 2006, 114).
9 The Dutch Statistical Department (CBS 2017) estimates the following: 51% is nonaffiliated, 24%
Catholic, 15% Protestant, 5% Muslim, and 6% other affiliation; see https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/
2018/43/meer-dan-de-helft-nederlanders-niet-religieus [accessed 25 May 2020].
10 In 2018, it had 3,724,857 registered members. This reflects a decrease of 3.0% over the last 3 years:
https://www.ssb.no/kultur-og-fritid/statistikker/kirke_kostra [accessed 29 May 2020].
11 There are 678,433 registered members outside the Norwegian Church in 2019: https://www.ssb.no/
trosamf [accessed 29 May 2020]. The SMRE estimates 17.6% to be unaffiliated.
12 See https://www.ssb.no/kultur-og-fritid/faktaside/religion and https://www.ssb.no/kultur-og-fritid/
statistikker/trosamf [accessed 29 May 2020].
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nomic reasons in the 1970s. A large number of immigrants arrived in the 1990s,
consisting of refugees and asylum-seekers from Bosnia, Somalia, and Iran.
Thus, of the three countries, France has the most mature immigration pattern
and – presumably – the highest Muslim mortality rate as well. It furthermore has
the greatest number of Muslim residents in both absolute and relative terms. Yet,
when coupled to the number of Islamic burial places in relative terms, it has the
least. Norway, on the other hand, has the most recent migration pattern and the
smallest numbers ofMuslims but the most reserved sections relative to its estimated
Muslim population. The question, of course, is why.
Table 4.1 Estimated Muslim population versus Islamic sections and cemeteries
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13 I relied on two estimates, one from the SMRE and one from the American PEW Research Center.
14 In calculating absolute numbers, I relied on 2020 estimates of the total population, for example,
https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/france-population/ [accessed 29 May 2020].
15 These numbers are rough and rather problematic estimates. Aggoun (2006, 55) counts in L’Ile de
France 23 sections; the cemetery of Thiais (11); the region of Nord-Pas-de –Calais (15). The region
of la Basse Normandie has 7/8. In Marseille, there are (5), in l’Ile de Reunion (5). Furthermore, a
section can contain 10 or 100 graves.
16 See Harmsen: 2007, 65–74. They stress that these are provisional estimates. Presently (August 2020),
no updated numbers are available, though initiatives for a large second Islamic cemetery in Zuid
Laren are underway. The organization BIBIN (Bijzonder Islamitische Begraafplaatsen in Nederland)
is the initiative taker: https://www.bibin.nl/wie-zijn-wij/ [accessed 29 August 2020].
17 This number is based on a questionnaire executed by KA at the request of the Church Department
in 2009 (Gravferd i et flerkulturelt samfunn, KA 2010). Of the 349 joint parish councils, 50 (14.3%)
replied that they had provided for a section for Muslims; 40 (12%) answered that they had an
agreement with a neighboring municipality to bury their Muslim citizens there. St.meld.no. 17:
2007–2008, p. 105, mentions 25 sections.
18 The repatriation rate refers to the estimate of persons returned to the country of origin or to that
of their parent’s origin. These are informal estimates based on public documents, reports of burial
agents, or Muslim representatives. Dessing (2001) mentions 99% for Dutch Turks and Moroccans.
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This might be explained based on the countries’ state-organized religion regimes,
though that raises a further question: If burial regulations in France are constrained
by laïcité, why are there still nevertheless 75 carrés and two Muslim cemeteries?
And, if The Netherlands applies a logic of pillarization to religious groups, why are
there not more Muslim cemeteries there? Norway’s institutional accommodation
toward Muslims seems in line with what we could expect from ‘establishment’,
encompassing as it does an expectation of ‘compensatory evenhandedness.’ Yet
there are no Islamic cemeteries in Norway, despite their legal permissibility. And in
light of the many humanists, why did the Norwegian state charge the church with
the responsibility for public cemeteries in 1996? This is in line with ‘establishment,’
in the sense that the hegemonic position of the Church of Norway is maintained
(or made clearer) in this domain. And, indeed, one set of national arguments here
discussed confirms such a reading. Yet, this cannot simultaneously explain the
situation before 1996. Furthermore, this church-run administration compromises
evenhandedness toward non-Christian minorities or humanists. It occurs in a time
of rapid increase in religious pluralism.
Before we turn below to the national policy responses, I would like to situate the
existing provisions toward Muslims in an estimate of total existing confessional
cemeteries to provide the reader with a sense of how exceptional they really are:
There is only one Muslim cemetery in The Netherlands, despite the vast range of
confessional cemeteries. Yet, there are two Muslims cemeteries in the country in
which they are prohibited!
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Moreover, there is a wider set of burial issues, not discussed in further detail. The
table below conveys how the Muslim demand for burial without a coffin, within 24
hours, and with permanent grave-rest poses legal problems in almost all countries.
19 Interview with an anonymous person. Estimates lie at 36,000municipalities and 50,000 cemeteries. A
national organization charged with the inventory of cemeteries mentions 44,052 localized cemeteries
and 4,218 to be further investigated; http://www.cimetieres-de-france.fr [accessed 25 May 2020].
20 The source is a personal list created by a funeral expert.
21 There are Christian cemeteries in the surroundings of Kristiansand in Egersund and in Lofoten; 2
Quakers churchyards in Roga-land; 2 Catholic ones, in Trømse and Alta; and 3 Evangelical Lutheran
Free Church churchyards in Levanger and Larvik (St.meld. no. 17: 2007–2008, p. 105).
22 In 1896, Jews in Kristiania bought a part of Sofienberg kirkegård, and in 1917 they established a
graveyard at Helsfyr (Plesner/Døving: 2009, 76).
23 For the data from all countries, I rely on estimates from the French Association of Funeral Informa-
tion (AFIF): http://www.afif.asso.fr/francais/conseils/conseil33.html#INFORMATIONS%20GEN-
ERALES%20 [accessed 25 May 2020]
24 The Norsk forening for gravplasskultur reports a 44% cremation rate in 2019, see https://gravplasskul-
tur.no/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/kremasjonsstatistikk-2019.pdf [accessed 25 May 2020]
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Yet, it does not necessarily create practical problems.25 We see that the constraining
limits on these accommodations are concerns with urban planning, hygiene, or
commercial exploitation. The Netherlands is most permissive by comparison.
Table 4.3 Additional Islamic burial needs and their permissibility
Burial needs
permissible?
France The Netherlands Norway
Burial without
coffin
No. Article R. 2213–15
du CGCT. Concerns with
public health and
hygiene
Yes, since 1991 burial
law. Article 3, Decision
on the Bill on the
Disposal of the Dead
[Besluit op de
Lijkbezorging]










No. Minimum 24 hours.
Article R2213–33. Yet,
possible in case of an
epidemic or for medical
reasons
No, minimum of 36
hours, but it is possible
with permission to bury
between 24–36 hours
acc. to Article 16 Wlb
(happens nevertheless
in practice).
No (?) No mention of
minimal time period,





No. Sunday is the legal
day of rest of the work
week (Code du travail).
Yes, when private





work hours, but solved






















is possible in one’s
own graveyard, or by
extending grave-rest
at a public cemetery,
yet a 60-year limit.
25 The demand for burial within 24 hours is not legally feasible, yet it is also not an obstacle. Muslims
adapt, or it is allowed to occur in practice nevertheless (Interview with member Al Raza, 17 June
2009).
26 Forskrift til lov om gravplasser, kremasjon og gravferd (gravferdsforskriften), Para. 28.
27 Because the Islamic funeral agencies are private companies, they are more flexible and can accom-
modate Sunday burials. The church warden or hospital gives them the keys to enter, so they can do
the washing and burying themselves (Døving: 2005, 116).
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4.2.1 France: Les Carrés Musulmans from Illegality to Practical
Permissibility
With France, our first country, we limit our discussion to that of special sections
and confessional cemeteries. The previous discussion gave rise to a mixed picture.
France has fewer available Islamic sections relative to its Muslim populations than
the other two countries, yet it has many more than one would expect from its legal
framework. To account for these contradictory findings, we thus need another
explanation than the burial laws and their inherent social background. One part of
that puzzle is the slowly changing formal political attitude in France.
In France, les carrés Musulmans is a topic of relative controversy at the everyday
level. Separate confessional areas are seen by some as a dangerous practice leading
to communal tensions (crispation communautaire) or a ghettoization. As one of my
informants who chose to remain anonymous strongly expressed it in an email:
I went this afternoon to a recently constructed cemetery where there is a Muslim section,
a Jewish section, a Christian section, and then some others, it is upsetting, ... it resembles
the ghettos (my translation).
Yet, les carrés Musulmans is in fact a rather ‘dead’ (or at least dormant, excuse the
pun) issue when it comes to national politics or media coverage (unlike that of,
say, headscarves). Nevertheless, over time we do observe an increasing political
awareness that the Muslim population is growing, and that there are few provisions
available to meet the challenges.
But there are two story lines: Informally, in 1957, France installed a Muslim
division in the cemetery of Thiais.28 And as we discuss in Chapter 5, a range of
historical ‘exceptions’ existed even before this time. Yet, formally, the solution in
the cemetery of Thiais was given legitimacy only in 1975 by an administrative
directive.29 This directive, published by the Ministry of Interior, claims that the
mayor can, but is not obliged to, construct “confessional groups of graves under
the condition that the neutrality of the cemetery is particularly preserved” for all
“Frenchmen of the Islamic confession” (Circulaire n° 75–603 du 28 novembre 1975).
The area should furthermore remain open to all families of all religions (Conseil
d’Etat: 2004, 32).
The primary legal concern of this directive is not to avoid groups of Muslim
graves or the fact that groups exclude nonmembers. (Some public actors indeed
28 See discussion in Laurence/Vaisse: 2006, 142; Frégosi/Boubeker/Geisser: 2006.
29 A circulaire has the status of a public recommendation that has no legal binding powers.
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make these arguments).30 Rather, its prime legal concern is with the neutrality of
third parties. Allowing for divisions in the graveyard might seduce the mayor to
take confessional characteristics into consideration in the allocation of a grave.
France thus settles the issue through a public recommendation and thereby
avoids changing its legal framework or providing for a legal exception for Muslims,
which would have legally challenged laïcité. Furthermore, this directive delegates
the decision to the mayor, the dominant strategy for two further directives from
1991 and 2008.31
Toleration and minimal accommodation of Muslim religious needs characterize
the state’s attitude in the period from the mid-1970s until 1989. From 1989 on,
the government proactively tries to place Islam within the larger state-church
framework (cf. Vaisse/Laurence: 2006, 137).
This occurs against the backdrop of two developments: From 1981 on, foreigners
were allowed to create an association culturelle, as stipulated in the 1901 law (cf.
Godard/Taussig: 2007, 165), so that the Islamic landscape becomes overall more
diversified. Organizations like l’OUIF32 and the FNMF came into being in 1983 and
1985, respectively. Furthermore, an increasing number of voices begins to oppose
the previously powerful position of the Mosque of Paris (la Grande mosque du
Paris, GMP) and the Algerian influence behind it. For the French state, the need
for a formal interlocutor that can serve a larger constituency than just the GMP
becomes a pressing matter.
Second, the events of the Rushdie affair – and the headscarf affair in 1989 – led
SocialistMinister of the Interior, Pierre Joxe, to initiate CORIF,33 which aims to “put
in place the right and duties of Muslims” (Godard/Taussig: 2007, 167). This leads to
the 1991 second directive, which further prescribes les careés confessionels. It adds
that burial in that particular area cannot take place other than because of the explicit
will of the deceased, the family, or another person in charge; that burial in other
areas of the cemeteries must still be possible; that the confessional part cannot be
30 As Koopmans/Statham/Giugni/Passy (2005, 56) analyze: “The fact that churchyards were not open
to everybody […] was seen by the state as unjustified discrimination and against the universalist
principle of equality. Muslims insistence not to be buried among ‘nonbelievers’ is now often seen in
that same light.” This is indeed a type of reasoning in the everyday world, where administrators link
the matter to a history of Catholic exclusion. Yet, legally speaking, the French sections are open to
all.
31 For alternative solutions in a similar case in a Swiss Canton, see Pfaff-Czarnecka: 2004.
32 This large Islamic federation incorporates more than 250 different Islamic organizations, formalized
under the 1901 law. Union des Organisations Islamique de France. The fédération nationale des
musulmans de France (FNMF) is a traditional Islamic group with ties to Saudi Arabia and Morocco.
33 CORIF, Conseil de Reflexion sur l’Avenir de l’Islam en France (1989–2004), is dedicated to improving
some of the living conditions of the Muslim population in France, see Laurence/Vaisse: 2006, 145;
Hakim: 2005, 101.
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separated in any visible or material form from the rest of the cemetery. And finally,
as mentioned above, the mayor cannot take the opinion of religious authorities
into consideration in their decision on burial allocation (Bilan et perspectives de la
législation funéraire).
On the one hand, these directives show the political will to find a solution. The
latest directive of 19 February 2008 (p. 8, annulling the two previous directives)
likewise holds:
While firmly emphasizing the laic nature of the public spaces, in particular the cemeteries,
it seems desirable, out of a concernwith the integration of families because of immigration,
to favour the burial of their close relatives on French territory.34
On the other hand, France shows an equally strong political will to avoid legalizing
the carrés. As expressed in a letter from the Ministry of Interior, Security and Public
Freedom in 2003, “The law concerning cemeteries and Muslim parcels does not
require substantial modifications” (my emphasis).35
The result is a legal dilemma for the mayor: The confessional section is without
legal status, and the penal code punishes any violation of neutrality in the allocation
of graves. This is a sanction unknown in Dutch and Norwegian burial law.36 For
Muslims, too, it brings insecurity, who, as a religious community, have no reasonable
option – let alone a legal right – to be accommodated in their burial needs. The
result is a section without legal and formal status, best described as “the factual
grouping together of graves, the sum outcome of individual decisions” (Machelon:
2006, 61).37
Over the past two decades, increasing mortality rates have caused the burial of
Muslim citizens to become a challenge. Since 2000, national political initiatives
have taken up the situation regarding Muslim burial needs. La consultation de
34 “Si le principe de laïcité des lieux publics, en particulier des cimetières, doit être clairement affirmé,
il apparaît souhaitable, par souci d’intégration des familles issues de l’immigration, de favouriser
l’inhumation de leurs proches sur le territoire français”; my translation.
35 Lettre du Ministère de l’intérieur de la sécurité intérieur et des libertés publiques, 13 August 2003.
36 In Epox Darmon, 5 July 1993, the administrative Tribunal in Grenoble rejected the decision of the
mayor to deny a Jewish boy burial in a Jewish area. The mayor had decided to refuse the boy’s
interment because the Jewish community had not recognized the boy as belonging to the Jewish
confession. The court ruled that the mayor should have taken general concerns into consideration
and not have delegated his authority to religious leaders (Machelon: 2006, 62).
37 It mentions: “le regroupement de fait des sépultures, comme somme de décisions individuelles”; my
translation.
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l’islam38 installed a workgroup on the construction of mosques and Islamic burial
(Godard/Taussig: 2007, 173), also formulating policy guidelines for the newly
institutionalized (CFCM) and related regional councils (CRCMs).39
In 2005, Nicholas Sarkozy, then leader of the UMP (Union pour un movement
populaire), a center-right political party, commissioned the Machelon report. The
mission of this report was to investigate the relations between the public authorities
and organized religion. To resolve the existing legal insecurity of the mayors, it
suggested two additions to existing guidelines, providing legal support to themayors
for taking the expressed religious convictions of the deceased or the deceased’s
family into consideration.40 Second, it suggested, in cases where carrés lead to “too
much local resistance” or become “a very contentious issue,” to extend or create
new private cemeteries. While “conscious of maintaining the principle of laïcité,”
the commission preferred the reintroduction of the private confessional cemetery
“rather than to impose on the mayors the management of truly confessional parts
of the municipal cemeteries” (Machelon: 2006, 65).
The report stirred much controversy, raising questions about the status of laïcité
itself.41 The 2008 directive did not take up any of its recommendations.
4.2.2 The Netherlands: Lack of Contestation
Muslim newcomers in The Netherlands do not pose a similar challenge in the
matter of burial regulations. The topic of Muslim sections (islamitische grafakkers)
is not a very prominent issue of social contestation. Legally, there are no obstacles
to declaring part of a municipal cemetery to be Islamic or setting up one’s own
cemetery, and indeed many municipalities are very forthcoming. Yet, there is a
degree of Islamophobia in Dutch politics, and some even mention that “they do
not want to adapt to our society, and now they want in addition their own grave-
38 La consultation de l’islam is a forum for a dialogue with Islam. It led to the formation of the Con-
seil Français du Culte Musulman (CFCM) in 2003. The ministers of Internal affairs Jean-Pierre
Chevènement (1997–2000) and the socialist Daniel Vaillant (2000–2002) initiated it.
39 Conseil Français du Culte Musulman and Conseil Régional du Culte Musulman, respectively. It
proposed making an inventory of all available burial spaces, to inform mayors in an ‘objective
manner’ of Muslim needs. It recommended the creation of Muslim sections on intermunicipal
cemeteries and to prioritize the creation of sections in existing urban development plans. On the
Muslim side, it recommended distribution of information about burial legislation, see Hakim: 2005.
40 It proposed to add the following to the primary ‘neutrality’ article L2213–9: “In the exercise of
police function, the mayor should always take the expressed will of the deceased into consideration
regarding their belief/conviction.” To article L2223–13 it added: “Consideration is given in this
regard to the expressed religious conviction of the requestor” (Machelon: 2006, 65, my translations).
41 See my discussion in Section 7.3.3.
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yard” (email graveyard director).42 Some newspaper articles report that a high rate
of repatriation still characterizes the burial pattern of large parts of the Muslim
citizenry.43 However, the issue has nowhere had the symbolic burden as it has in
France.
Also, The Netherlands has been quite accommodating concerning the other
Muslim demands for burial provisions. As far back as the 1980s, policymakers were
discussing adapting the existing burial laws to remove all unnecessary obstacles for
Muslims and other religions. Under discussion were burial without a coffin, burial
within 24 hours, and separate Muslim cemeteries (Shadid/Van Koningsveld: 1991).
Burial without a coffin has been permissible since 1991, whereas the demand for
burial within 24 hours is legally still not permitted (Wlb, Article 16).
In practice, however, Muslims can claim an exemption to the existing 36-hour
rule, with the permission of the mayor and the Commissioner of Provinces. Thus,
they can bury between 24 to 36 hours (Wlb, Article 17). Nevertheless, burial within
24 hours is still not possible because such a decision – in this case, by the mayor –
cannot be enacted as long as it is still open to appeal (Wlb, Article 88).44
So, all seems well in The Netherlands. Nevertheless, as one research project
revealed, within the Dutch Muslim community there is a perceived need for better
Islamic burial provisions. There is little confidence that burial according to Islamic
ritual is in fact possible (Baba/Gustings: 2004).
One issue lies in the availability of Muslim cemeteries and the possibility of real-
izing permanent grave-rest. To date, there is only one dedicated Muslim cemetery,
inaugurated in June 2007. Plans for a second cemetery in Zuid Laren are (April
2020) well on its way but have not yet been realized.45 Furthermore, the total num-
ber ofMuslim grafakkers would be insufficient if all Muslims were to desire burial in
The Netherlands.46 Regarding the issue of permanent grave-rest, this is possible in a
42 Email correspondence, 30 March 2009 with a graveyard Director in Dordrecht, who reports on
common complaints heard (my translation).
43 For example, Enklaar (2008) in NRC 29 July 2008 and Veen/Pietersen (2007) in Trouw 23 November
2007.
44 People told me that burial within 24 hours still happens.
45 For a discussion, see Van den Berg: 2020 in De Volkskrant 27 January 2020.
46 I have omitted a study of the factors explaining these repatriation patterns. For this, see Balkan:
2015a, 2015b, 2016. All percentages are informal estimates. Patterns of repatriation are most likely
caused by a combination of factors, both host-society characteristics and cultural customs and ideas
within the communities themselves and their related institutions, e.g., the Moroccan life insurances.
Døving discusses how Pakistani funeral committees in Norway (begravelseskomitées) assist the
families with the burial process. They can have 10 to 100 families as members. Their board consists
out of several persons with a high education or solid standing. They come in three forms: arranged
by particular mosques, private, or as committees aligned with particular cities in Pakistan. They
assist families in navigating between Norwegian rules and Pakistani praxis (Døving: 2005, 91–92).
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private cemetery, and technically families can prolong the grave-rest term infinitely.
Yet, this requires both the corresponding financial means and future generations to
care for the grave (Harmsen: 2005).
4.2.3 Norway: Why French Muslims Are Like Norwegian Humanists
The situation for Muslims in Norway is quite similar to that in The Netherlands.
Norwegian municipalities, like their Dutch counterparts, take the initiative in
constructing Islamic sections. Legally, Islamic sections are neither prohibited nor a
legal right. They exist particularly in the areas around Oslo, Norway’s capital city.
There is good cooperation between the Norwegian Islamic Council and the Joint
Parish Councils.47 The public debate tends to focus rather on the hijab or forced
marriage than on matters of death and burial. Accommodation in the cemetery
functions as an example of successful integration. In the words of the former leader
of the Norwegian Islamic Council, preceding the opening of a Muslim section in
Høybraten:
The Islamic Council is grateful for the work done, but it would at the same time like to
point out an issue for reflection in today’s heated debate about Muslims and values. Is it
only after death that the humanity of Muslims is undebatable? Is it only then that it is
clear what integration is about, namely, finding practical solutions? (Ghozlan: 2004, my
translation).
Yet, as a national research project reveals, Muslims express the wish for some
improvements:
The (obligatory) use of a coffin is seen as the biggest challenge. There is a clear desire for a
graveyard managed by Muslims themselves so that both the demand for burial in a coffin
as well as the need for deviating from the constraints of working hours and holy days can
be put aside. Especially those active in the Shi’a mosques express such a wish. The section
at Høybråten is seen as small, and the wish that Muslims themselves should manage this
is prominent (Plesner/Døving: 2009, 85, my translation).48
Furthermore, in some areas outside Oslo the wish for a demarcated section is
not appreciated. Some parish councils refuse to bury Muslims in the direction of
Mecca. As the Parish Council in Balestrand puts it: “Graves in the direction of
47 I base this on interviews held with Islamic burial agents from Al-Khidmat, 29 April 2009, and the
Secretary General of the Islamic Council of Norway, 27 July 2009.
48 This research project, Livsfasesriter, commissioned by the Council of Religious and Life Stance
Communities, charts the challenges in terms of life rituals in Norway.
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Mecca are very inefficient.”49 The municipalities, particularly the smaller ones, do
not always have the means, the technical capacity, or the will to accommodate
Muslim wishes. Or there is a willingness to find solutions, but not to provide for a
separate section (Søberg: 2009). Rather than foreseeing separate sections, the parish
councils propose the separate consecration of individual graves as a solution. “We
do not want sections for special groups. The law does not require this” (Heggelund:
2012).50
This scepticism toward separate sections, discussed in more detail in Chapter 5,
has also been translated into law. In the revised 1996 Funeral Act, the legislators
avoided any reference to explicitly separate sections, and Section 5 in the former
Funeral Act was removed. The latter had allowed for consecrating (vigsling) parts
of a churchyard (kirkegård) for religious communities outside the Lutheran faith.
Section 5 in the new Funeral Act, on the other hand, mentions the possibility of
consecrating (innvielse) the cemetery as long as one does not show disrespect to
other communities.
The senior advisor involved in the 2012 revisions of the 1996 Funeral Act ex-
plained this to me51: They avoided a passage allowing for separate sections in public
cemeteries because of integration concerns, “in order to be as equal as all the others.”
Social democracy and welfare-state ideology, he said, result in the fact that, in the
cemetery, “we are all the same.”
4.2.3.1 The Norwegian Humanist Association
The second group of burial challengers, the humanists, have long been sceptical
about this ideology of sameness and equality. To their mind, the default offer for
burial, while free for all, is not “equal for all.”52
As mentioned in the book Introduction, the number of humanistic burials is
small compared to the presumed number of Muslim burials in the other countries.
The Norwegian Humanist Association (HEF) is in charge of around 570 humanistic
burials annually.53 Yet, analytically speaking, this comparison is relevant because
both groups challenge aspects of the symbolic burial order across national contexts.
49 See http://www.nrk.no/nyheter/distrikt/nrk_sogn_og_fjordane/1.7321326 [accessed 29 May 2020].
50 These are the words of the church warden in Brummendal, quoted in the newspaper, my translation.
The churchyard provides for Islamic graves, but not in a separate section. Also, see the hearings
response in the Parish council Dovre (Prop. 81L: p. 15).
51 Interview with a senior advisor in the Ministry of Government Administration, Reform and Church
Affairs, 7 December 2012.
52 “Inequality in the grave” is the HEF’s official framing (Plesner/Døving: 2009, 81).
53 There has been a small rise in numbers. In 2013, there were 562 burials; 541 in 2014; 541 in 2015;
578 in 2016; 538 in 2017; and 590 in 2018. Email 20 November 2018 from a Senior advisor (HEF).
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And, in the case of Norway, including humanists allows comparison between
different minorities within the same state. Thus, I shortly discuss the humanist
critique before addressing the 1996 burial law.
Since its founding in 1956, the HEF has fought for the separation of state and
church. It campaigns to provide Norway‘s nonreligious citizens with ways to cele-
brate their rites of passage without religious elements. This includes naming cere-
monies, weddings, confirmations, and, of course, burials. One of its biggest successes
was the installation of the ‘civil confirmation.’ Executed for the first time in 1951,
around 16.8% of all Norwegian youths choose a humanistic confirmation in 2016.54
They also offer a humanistic burial, which is defined very openly: “A humanistic
burial is based on humanistic values, and it is not natural to choose poems and
songs with a religious content in the ceremony.”55 HEF offers its own certified burial
ceremonial leaders.
In the realm of burial, humanists find that the influence of the church is, anno
2020, still very strong. The Church of Norway is still in charge of 90.2% of all burials
annually in Norway (2013 data), a minor decline since 2003 when it was 94.4% (cf.
Holberg/Brottveit: 2014, 21).
Four main points mark the HEF political agenda: First, they complain that,
while in public hospitals there is a standard offer to talk with a priest on one’s
deathbed, a similar offer to talk with representatives of other confessions is not
available (Plesner/Døving: 2009, 80). Second, and more symbolically, they object
to the strongly Lutheran coloring of the public cemetery and the public municipal
crematoria, which are often loaded with Christian symbols. They also protest the
lack of neutral ceremonial rooms in the smaller Norwegian cities.56
In regard the latter and third pont of complaint, a 2008 political agreement
(Kirke-statforliket) between all parties in the Norwegian Parliament promised im-
provements in the situation regarding ceremonial rooms. This followed in the wake
of a 2006 government commitment to pursue an “actively supportive religious and
life-stance policy” (NOU 2006: 2). A formal report to the national assembly from
2008 promised to start an investigation with the aim “to legally anchor munici-
pal responsibility” for a neutral ceremonial room for burial and marriage in each
municipality (St.meld.no. 17: 2007–2008, p. 12).57
54 See https://human.no/globalassets/dokumenter/statistikk-konfirmasjon-2014-2016.pdf [accessed
29 May 2020]. For a good discussion of founding years and ideas of the HEF, see Knutsen: 2006,
22–53.
55 See https://human.no/seremonier/gravferd/ [accessed 29 May 2020].
56 Families must gather in the chapels next to the church, which often bear a heavy Christian imprint
and are too small and cold in winter. Or they are directed to public spaces like sports halls or cinemas
in case of large gatherings.
57 “med sikte på lovfesting av et kommunalt ansvar […],” my translation.
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Yet, thus far, such a legal anchor is still missing; instead, the state provides for
practical accommodations. The report declares:
(T)here do not seem to be serious arguments for changing today’s legislation. At the
same time, we will make accommodations to accommodate minorities (St.meld.no. 17:
2007–2008, p. 11–12).58
In 2012, the Department of Culture, as part of a trial project, offered financial
support for municipalities that wished to construct a neutral ceremonial room.
Municipalities, parish councils, or even private owners of chapels or ceremonial
rooms within five counties59 could apply. Yet, they withdrew the offer when the last
pot of 7 million in 2015 failed to generate sufficient demand.60
The HEF’s most central – and fourth point – of complaint concerns the Lutheran
ownership and administration of the cemeteries since 1996.61 In fact, three later
advisory committees (2002, 2006, and 2013) discussed the question of burial ad-
ministration and recommended municipal administration.62 Yet, each time the
state maintained that the church should retain the responsibility.63
Practically speaking, this 1996 law demands that the church warden and other
graveyard employees report to the Joint Parish Council – and being a graveyard
employee requires membership in the Church of Norway!64 Particularly in Oslo,
cemetery workers object to such a demand. Therefore, the graveyard and burial’s
agency, the city of Oslo (Gravferdsetaten i Oslo), now (since 1977) insists on having
de facto administrative responsibility over the cemeteries.65
58 “(D)et ikke sees å foreligge tungtveiende grunner for å endre dagens ordninger. Imidlertid skal det
gjøres tilpasninger for å ivareta minoritetene,” my translation.
59 This involved Oslo, Akershus, Rogaland, Sør-Trøndelag, and Troms. 5 million kroner were offered
in 2012, 7 million in 2013, and 10 million in 2014 [accessed 2 June 2020]. https://www.regjerin-
gen.no/no/aktuelt/Utlysning-av-midler-til-livssynsnoytrale-seremonirom/id2001207/
60 According to the main humanist representative on this matter, this should not be read as a lack of
need but the result of insufficient dissemination of information and potentially testimony to the
meager political will at the local level. Local politicians may be afraid to make choices that go against
the status quo (email correspondence 11 November 2018 and phone conversation 4 November
2018).
61 Interview with HEF representative, 22 October 2008, and interview with General Secretary for the
Council of Free Churches, 24 November 2008.
62 This includes the Bakkevig Committee (2002), a church advisory committee, the Gjønnes Committee
(2003), a public committee (NOU 2006: 2), and the Stålsett committee (2013), see NOU 2013: 1.
63 An important recurring argument after 1996 was that “the Church of Norway is professional enough
to treat everyone equally” (NOU 2006: 2, p. 136). In other words, this inequality is justified by
procedural reasons, and those affected by it judge it to operate fairly.
64 Exceptions exist for those who have tasks unrelated to church functions, see Funeral Act, Para. 22.
65 This status was recently reconfirmed. The graveyard and burial agency, the City of Oslo, makes
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Nevertheless, despite this possibility for local solutions66, the HEF and the Free
Churches (frikirkelige) object on principled grounds.
It is very disappointing that the political parties continue this public form of discrimina-
tion. It is unjust that one belief community be given the legal responsibility to administer
all communal graveyards/churchyards in which all of us should/will be buried. It should
be the responsibility of the municipality to provide this service with neutral values as its
point of departure (Representative of the HEF).67
What are the arguments behind this initial 1996 decision? It occurred at a timewhen
Norway was experiencing a dramatic increase in religious diversity and growth of
‘immigrant religions,’ especially Buddhism and Islam (cf. Leirvik: 2007, 14). The
influx in the 1970s primarily of Pakistani and Turkish labormigrants to Norway was
followed in the 1990s by a wave of asylum-seekers and refugees fleeing the Balkan
wars. A general consciousness developed that religious minorities need to be taken
seriously in their institutional and public demands, and that, as a government report
stated, “cultural diversity enriches and strengthens our community” (St.meld.no.
17: 2007–2008, p. 7).
For one part of the answer we have to go back to the (1982) Kirkelovutvalget that
preceded the 1996 change. As discussed in Section 3.3.3, the Ministry of Culture
and Church Affairs68 aligned itself with the opinion of the minority of this Church
Act Committee. It perceived cemeteries as a place conveying cultural and religious
burial customs. Their administration should therefore not be considered a purely
administrative and neutral matter. Central to this argumentation was the relevance
of church traditions:
According to the Ministry, it seems unwise to break with the centuries-long and deeply en-
grained traditions in this area, traditions that connect the burial realm and the churchyard
administration closely to the church administration in a broader sense. […] Based on the
consultations, one should expect that it would be perceived as unnatural, unnecessary, and
incomprehensible to change well-functioning and traditionally established regulations
for churchyard administration (Ot.prp. no. 64: 1994–1995, p. 43, my translation).
decisions regarding the daily activities. In the case of eventual complaints, the ParishCouncil/Council
of Bishops is responsible (email correspondence with Director Gravferdsetaten, 27 November 2018).
66 The 1996 act allowed for local solutions. The municipality can also assume the responsibility for the
graveyard administration (NOU 2013: 1, p. 212), which, in five municipalities, is the case.
67 Quote from his personal archive (Arkiv: 5478 VT). Translation and emphasis by the me. Also, for
similar ideas, see Fri Tanke May 2008.
68 Kultur- og Kirke departementet. This department is now (anno 2020) called the Culture Department.
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Furthermore, in that same document the Ministry adds an argument about Chris-
tian burial customs and Christian cultural foundations:
Our increasingly pluralistic society, according to the opinion of the Ministry, does not
weigh heavily enough when 95% of the country’s population still chooses a church burial
and our society’s burial customs still mirror society’s Christian values and cultural foun-
dations.
A concern with increasing religious plurality is thus explicitly outweighed by the
argument in favour of an essentially Christian tradition and Christian burial cus-
toms. Furthermore, principled reasoning is outweighed by practical considerations.
As the Ministry stated in 2007:
The Ministry agrees that, from the perspective of equal treatment or neutrality, it naturally
follows that churchyards (kirkegårds) that should be open to all, regardless of religious
of life-stance affiliation, should also be administered by a public institution that has no
connections to, or grounds itself in, any particular religion or life stance […]. In the
opinion of the Ministry, the exercise of such principles should be seen in light of […] the
fact that, annually, more than 90% of those who die receive a Christian burial or are buried
according to Christian values (St.meld.no. 17: 2007–2008, p. 108–109, my translation).
This argument of tradition is somewhat thin. Indeed, the 1996 act continued the
previous connection between parish and graveyard (both the ownership and su-
pervisory relationship). Yet, regarding the administration, in fact it involved a
break with the previous formal municipal responsibility. Furthermore, it was just
as much a break in large municipalities (where the municipality was formally in
charge) as it was a continuation of actual church involvement in small municipali-
ties. As we pointed out in Section 3.3.3 , there has been much variation in different
administrative responsibilities throughout history and throughout Norway.
In the next chapter, I propose some other reasons why the state decided to side
with the church on this matter. For now, I conclude that the first set of arguments
for the 1996 Funeral Act entailed a decision that cemeteries are and remain church
territory. If we relate such an outcome back to our analytic categories, it confirms
expectations based on ‘establishment.’ The hegemonic position of the Church of
Norway is maintained (or made clearer) in this domain.
4.3 Conclusion: National Policy Patterns
This chapter investigated how France, The Netherlands, and Norway responded
to the Islamic burial challenge on a national level and over time. And it looked
at the responses to humanist burial needs in Norway. In light of the huge legal
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and historical diversity discussed in the previous chapter, we were curious to see
whether contemporary policy responses reveal similarly large differences, and,
furthermore, whether these differences are in line with these countries’ burial laws
and the standard conceptions of state-organized religion relations as found in the
previous chapter.
The general picture found is that of, indeed, significant differences regarding
the national policy responses toward Muslims. In France, we encountered a good
degree of political unease anddiscursive hostility toward les carrésMusulman. InThe
Netherlands and Norway, Muslim burial needs were rather smoothly incorporated
into the existing burial regime. Yet, in Norway, humanists emerged as challengers.
Politically and discursively, these differences agree with the different social images
and normative logics encountered in the burial laws and standard conceptions of
the state-church frameworks of these countries. But we also noticed a sense of
convergence in the actual provisions in place.
Specifically, for France, we found that the topic is symbolically charged, albeit
at an everyday level. Perceived from a distance, the establishment of confessional
sections breaks with the legal (laic) constraints in the public cemetery. For some they
evoke the danger of le communautarisme, that is, the idea that a community defines
the beliefs, opinions, and behaviours of an individual, thereby making individual
freedom of conscience secondary to the group’s ideology. This can explain social
unease and, possibly, why there are so few carrés in existence. Why they exist
nevertheless is much more a puzzle.
This chapter gave a partial answer: We observed over time an increasing political
legitimization allowing for special sections (since 1975) and national initiatives on
the part of Muslims themselves (workgroup on le carré Musulman, 1997–2003).
The common political and discursive understanding of the French carré is not that
of a full-fledged section, but as an “aggregation of individual graves according to
confessional lines.” In other words, it has been more or less entirely stripped of its
collective dimensions.
What still requires explanation, however, is a set of ‘historical exceptions’ that
occurred before the first directive (1975). The municipal case studies in the next
chapter provide a discussion of three historical ‘exceptions’ (Père-Lachaise, Bobigny,
Thiais). Furthermore, the question remains how adherence to laïcité can explain
both the absence of confessional sections as well as their presence? I raise that
question in a contemporary vignette of Parisian burial management and Montreuil.
The lack of any form of political objection to Islamic sections or whole cemeteries
in The Netherlands agrees entirely with its burial legislation and inherent normative
concerns (collective religious freedom and collective equality between groups).
Attitudes toward Muslim sections there changed minimally over time. As early
as the 1980s, debate occurred over burial without a coffin. And the 1991 burial
law was adapted to remove all remaining obstacles to Islam and other religions.
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Yet, here the lack of more Muslim cemeteries remains a puzzle, complicating any
notion of an Islamic pillar. In the Almere case study (Section 5.2.3), I investigate
the conditions for the emergence of the first Islamic cemetery in 2007.
In Norway, the smooth accommodation of Muslim burial needs seems to cor-
respond to the expectation of the establishment model. Much in line with what I.
Furseth concludes regarding to the provisions for chaplains in prisons (2003), there
is what I call a logic of ‘compensatory evenhandedness.’ The existing link between
the Church of Norway and the management of the public graveyards leads to an
explicit willingness to meet Muslim religious burial needs evenhandedly. Norway
adapted remarkably fast in making special sections available, relative to its esti-
matedMuslim population. One reason for this might also be that PakistaniMuslims
simply more persistently and early on asked for burial in Norway, as opposed to
Dutch or French Moroccan and Turkish Muslims.
For humanists, however, this logic plays out differently: Their demand for neutral
ceremonial rooms has been met since 2006–2007 with a political promise to take
care of minority needs, albeit without actually changing the laws. A trial project
that provided means for the funding of neutral ceremonial rooms is witness to the
political goodwill on the part of national politicians. The principled objection of the
humanists is met with more scepticism (this becomes clearer in Chapter 5). The fact
that the Church of Norway has been in charge of the cemetery management since
1996 can be seen as conforming with the expectation based on the ‘establishment.’
A first look at the state arguments would seem to confirm such a reading. However,
in this case I argue that the model in fact explains the outcomes too well. In the
next chapter, I address a second set of factors leading to the 1996 law.
Based on the findings of this chapter, I conclude that the Dutch and Norwegian
burial and state-organized religion regimes best correspond to the challengeMuslim
burial poses. Yet, by extending the analysis to another minority within Norway,
I found that French Muslims fulfil a similar role as the Norwegian humanists69:
Both groups challenge aspects of their countries’ burial symbolic order, albeit in
opposite directions. Furthermore, over time they are met with a similar response by
the authorities, who seek to practically and informally accommodate the needs of
minorities, albeit by leaving the laws intact. In the end, this is considered politically
less costly, and it avoids challenging existing symbolic burial orders, both laic and
Lutheran/Christian, respectively.
69 I allude to the title of an article by Zolberg/Woon (1999), “How Spanish Is Like Islam,” which argues
that Muslims in Europe evoke a similar conflict as Spanish-speakers in the United States.
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Chapter 5: Embedded Case Studies: Institutional and
Discursive Responses to Burial Needs
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter investigated the relevant national policies and their historical
idiosyncrasies. We discovered clear differences between the countries in their legal
and national policy responses toMuslim and humanist burial needs. Yet, the analysis
also showed that national differences became less clear when we include existing
material provisions. This raised three puzzles for which we have found a partial
answer in Chapter 4.
This chapter serves to further answer some of these questions. Furthermore, it
describes what actually happens on a daily basis when local agents are confronted
with situations of new diversity. I describe nine embedded cases where the processes
that lead to burial outcomes and the relevant agents are involved. And I describe
how burial professionals and the minorities involved make sense of existing legal
regulations and national traditions in their choice for solutions.These local vignettes
allow us to engage the general research questions of this project. And amore detailed
analysis of the resulting patterns of policy outcomes is found in Chapters 6 and 7.
At this level of the embedded case study, however, I address the following field re-
search questions: First, what are the relevant processes that produce burial outcomes
and related actors/decision-makers? Because the institutionalization of religious
or secular minorities is a two-way process (Bader: 2014, 1), I focus on both state
actors as well as (non)confessional representatives. Second, what material solutions
do the institutional decision-makers provide for? Third, and discursively, how do
they (or the minorities in question) give meaning to these solutions chosen and
how do they justify the solution? Fourth, how do they talk about and frame the
issue at hand?
For reasons of readability, these data are summarized in two different ways. At
the end of each country section, I provide detailed descriptions of local responses
for each embedded case. And in the conclusion of this chapter, I summarize the
findings in two tables, respectively.1 All quotations from the interviews are my
translation. I do not further specify this. I furthermore place all references to the
1 Table 5.5 summarizes the central decision-makers, initiators, and relevant Muslim/humanist or other
interlocutors per municipality. Tables 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 summarize (1) the type of solution (2) the
reasons given for the solutions and or its format, and (3) the language used and the framing issues,
respectively.
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interviews in footnotes to allow for a full description of the date and public function
of the respondent.
To contextualize each embedded case (i.e., the processes leading to burial out-
comes), I open each case study with a short description of the municipal context
including information on the municipal population in terms of ethnic or religious
diversity (if available). Where relevant, I also sketch the political situation and ad-
dress the number of cemeteries, themunicipal structures that govern the cemeteries,
before addressing the relevant processes and actors involved.
5.2 Dutch Embedded Cases
5.2.1 Amsterdam: A Public Solution
The city of Amsterdam is culturally very diverse. More than half its population
consists of first- or second-generation migrants.2 Statistically speaking, one has a
migrant status if the person itself or one (or both) of the parents was born abroad.
The four largest standardmigrant groups inTheNetherlands are Surinamese, people
stemming from the Antilles, and Moroccans and Turks. Originally, immigration
stemmed primarily from the former Dutch colonies (Indonesia, Suriname, and
the Antilles) and included guestworkers from Turkey and Morocco. Yet, the open
borders in the European Union have now resulted in more migration from Middle
and Eastern Europe. And the global economy has resulted in larger inflows of
people from the United States, China, Brazil, and Russia. Furthermore, refugees
from Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, the former Yugoslavia, and most recently Syria have
settled in Amsterdam. Other large migrant groups come from the Mediterranean
countries and Anglo-Saxon countries.
Demographically, there are presently some 177 different nationalities in Ams-
terdam, making it one of the most international cities in the world. Historically,
Amsterdam has always been a center of migration. In 1700, about 40% of its popula-
tion had been born abroad. And the city owes large parts of its wealth to the influx of
Protestants from Antwerp, the Huguenots from France, and the Jews from Portugal
(cf. Entzinger: 2019, 174). Labor migrants from Turkey and Morocco settled in
Amsterdam (and Rotterdam) in the 1960s–1970s. And with the independence of
Suriname in 1975, many Surinamese migrated to Amsterdam in large numbers.
2 See https://www.cbs.nl/en-gb/background/2018/47/population [accessed 2 June 2020]. In January
2019, the Dutch population was 17,282,163 persons. The number of inhabitants in the Amsterdam
region was a little over 1 million.
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Since the 1990s, a Muslim population of varying ethnic origin has also settled in
Amsterdam, including political refugees or asylum-seekers from Bosnia, Somalia,
Iran, and Afghanistan (Van de Donk/Jonkers/Kronjee/Plum: 2006, 114).
Since 2000, the municipality of Amsterdam has undertaken a range of initiatives
to investigate the needs of its Muslim inhabitants regarding Islamic burial. Because
of the growing number of Muslims in this city and the changes occurring in their
future perspectives, the municipality explored their burial preferences and existing
burial provisions.
Amsterdam has seven cemeteries, two of which are municipal (De Nieuwe Noor-
derbegraafplaats and the Nieuwe Ooster) and five of which are private cemeteries.3
Surinamese and Indonesian Muslims as well as refugees from Islamic countries
tend to be buried in The Netherlands, whereas repatriation rates among Turkish
and Moroccan citizens are still very high (Dessing: 2001).
In 2004, the municipality set up an Advisory Council for Intercultural Manage-
ment to figure out their wishes regarding death and burial. The respective project,
entitled ‘What Is Your Last Wish?’ focused primarily on Turkish and Moroccan
Muslims (Baba/Gustings: 2004). The report signaled an increasing need for Islamic
burial spaces and the relevance of burial practices according to Islamic ritual. Mus-
lims thought that burial in The Netherlands would make it easier for the family
to maintain Islamic traditions, like visiting the grave after Friday prayer and on
Islamic festive days. It also allowed for a much faster burial than when repatriated.
Nevertheless, perceptions of the possibility for burial in The Netherlands were quite
negative. According to the report, the reason lay in a lack of appropriate knowledge
about the Dutch legal system.4
As a follow-up, the municipal board installed a Commission Islamic Burial in
Amsterdam (CIBA),5 which had the task of formulating a common plan of action.
This included a variety of interest groups, representatives of the main Muslim
groups6 as well as the leadership of the municipal cemetery De Nieuwe Ooster
(hereinafter DNO). The CIBA, furthermore, sought the support of a variety of
3 The five private cemeteries are Buitenveldert, Vredenhof, Westergaarde begraafplaats en crematorium,
Zorgvlied, Stichting St Barbara. The Nieuw Ooster already had a special (albeit small) area for Muslims.
The Noorderbegraafplaats has no Islamic provisions. There were initiatives to create a parcel in the
Roman Catholic cemetery of the Stichting St Barbara, Westgaarde and Zorgvlied.
4 Respondents thought it would be more expensive and more complex to organize a Dutch Islamic
burial than to repatriate. Second, they associated it with “illegal immigrants, people who do not have
enough money for a burial in the country of origin and the burial of small children” (Baba/Gustings:
2004, 26, my translation). They also thought that burial according to Islamic law was problematic,
since in particular the need for permanent grave-rest could not be honored.
5 For the description of this case, I rely in part on Harmsen (2007), Chapter 7.
6 This included the large Muslim umbrella organizations like De Unie van Marrokkaanse Moskeen in
Amsterdam en Omstreken (UMMAO), Milli Görüs Nederland as well Diyanet.
https://doi.org/10.13109/9783666567322 | CC BY-NC-ND 4.0
© 2021, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Theaterstraße 13, D-37073 Göttingen
136 Embedded Case Studies: Institutional and Discursive Responses to Burial Needs
smaller Muslim communities.7 Initially, the Surinamese-Pakistani organization
Stichting Welzijn Moslims joined, but as mentioned below, a religious difference of
opinion led it their exiting the commission.
The CIBA formulated three concrete goals: the creation of an Islamic section in
DNO, providing information to the Muslim community (via Mosques, imams,
etc.), and installing a ‘Platform Islamic Burial,’ which was to execute CIBA’s plan of
action.
The CIBA had two considerations in formulating this plan of action. Given the
large diversity of Muslim groups in Amsterdam, it stated that:
Each citizen who considers themselves a Muslim should be able to use the Islamic burial
facility. No distinctions are made between the different forms of Islam or ethnicities. The
individual choice of the deceased Muslim to be buried in the respective cemetery should
be the leading consideration (Baba/Kuijer: 2005, 8, my translation).
Similar to the French reasoning, the commission thus maintained that allocation
in the separate parcel should result from the individual choice of the person in
question – not because of a proven membership in a religious community.
Here is where the conflict with the Surinamese-Pakistani organization Stichting
Welzijn Moslims arose: The latter is of the opinion that only Sunni Muslims can be
recognized as Muslim, so that the parcel should be accessible only to them. Or, if
that is not possible, there should at least be some dividing line between different
sections dedicated to the burial of Sunnis and Shia Muslims.
The CIBA, however, rejected this approach, which led to the foundation’s drop-
ping out. As one commission member of CIBA formulated it: “If we want to live
and work together in this city as best as we can, then we do not start telling each
what to do in matters of death” (quoted in Harmsen: 2007, 57, my translation). Or,
as one central figure in the development of the plans expressed it:
The municipality wished to construct a section in which all Muslims feel at home. So, we
don’t start thinking in factionalism [hokjesgeest], like ‘Oh no, I do not want to lie next
to that person’ and ‘I do not want to lie next to that person.’ No, we want freedom and
happiness [vrijheid en blijheid]. It will be a beautiful section with all kinds of provisions.
And it should be accessible to all.8
7 These included Stichting Fatima Al Zahra (representative of Shia Muslims), and Ahmadiya Lahore
(ULAMON).
8 Interview with the consultant of the national organization of cemeteries (Landelijke Organisatie van
Begraafplaatsen hereinafter LOB), August 2012.
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The second point of consideration in formulating this plan of action was to find
a solution to the requirement of permanent grave-rest. Here, the commission
proposed a two-pronged effort that sought to negotiate the rules from both sides.
On the one hand, mosques and imams should provide their communities with
information about the legal possibilities within the Dutch system. Although, con-
cessions are never ‘permanent,’ one can – theoretically – extend the lease to a family
grave to the point of infinity. Furthermore, Muslim leaders should inform their
constituency of any Islamic jurisprudence that would allow a grave to be emptied
after a certain amount of time; this is legitimate under the supervision of a spiritual
leader.
The municipality and the municipal cemetery, on the other hand, should explore
institutional options that could grant permanent grave-rest, the most self-evident
being an Islamic cemetery owned and administered by CIBA. Yet, they noted: “This
option currently seems difficult to realize, both in terms of obtaining the land as
well as in light of the current financial and organizational strength of the Muslim
community in Amsterdam” (Baba/Kuijer: 2005, 10, my translation).
Instead, it was decided that the DNO would create a large section for Muslims
(7,000 m2), with place for about 1600–2500 Muslim graves. It would provide for
graves with an ‘exclusive right’ (uitsluitend recht) for a minimum of 20 and a max-
imum of 50 years, after which the term could be prolonged for another 10 years’
time. But although this indeed provided a good solution to the requirement of
permanent grave-rest, it still left the legal responsibility for renewing the lease to
the individual lease-holder.
A second option therefore suggested using a legal construction through a foun-
dation like Stichting Grafrust, which would provide for assurances to secure infinite
renewal of the lease period. Yet, the cost of EUR 5,000 poses a serious financial
hurdle for many Muslim families.
A third option therefore involved reburying the remains when the minimal
grave-rest period is over, under the supervision of a religious leader.9 All remains
in that case would go to an Islamic ‘bonefield’ (knekelveld) free of charge.10 In terms
of the financial construction, the DNO would be responsible for the costs of the
designing and constructing the parcel (estimated at roughly EUR 300,000). They
would search for additional finances for the planned Islamic washing-facility.
9 This applies to the case of a common grave that has a minimal grave-rest of 10 years, after which the
grave-rest period cannot be renewed.
10 Knekelveld means literally ‘bonefield,’ i.e., a place where any remaining bones are deposited. Another
option was to have the remains deposited in a small box, which in turn could be buried in the same
grave but at a deeper level (under the supervision of a mosque). Yet, this would be costlier.
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In 2006, themayor and city council (hereinafter B&W) decided to cover the costs for
a special washing area as part of the municipal budget (EUR 416,630). The Islamic
community in turn would collect money among its own. The B&W motivated its
decision as follows:
In addition to the fact that the burial law [de wet op lijkbezorging, Wlb] justifies the creation
of an appropriate Islamic burial space, supported by the Muslim community, this is also
of considerable social relevance, in view of the desire to integrate the Muslim community
in Amsterdam. The personal choice of a Muslim to be buried in The Netherlands is an
expression of an orientation focused on our country. In other words, by cooperating with
the umbrella organizations of Amsterdam mosques in the (co)financing of an Islamic
burial area, and in conformity with the CIBA report, the municipality is giving a strong
social signal that all inhabitants of Amsterdam with an Islamic belief or conviction are
part of this city (Agenda punt A0, 14 februari 2006, p.3., my translation).
The B&W thus interpreted the Wlb as allowing direct financial support to an indi-
vidual belief community, while underlining that no such hard financial obligation
ensues. The Wlb merely states that municipalities should “collaborate and deliber-
ate.” Yet, as the B&Wargued, “the law can be interpreted such that, as amunicipality,
you should cooperate to enable burials according to specific (Islamic) rules.” Fur-
thermore, the mayor and city council assumed the CIBA’s phrasing of this Islamic
washing facility as a “functional provision.” The CIBA report of 2005 stated it as
follows: “multifunctional space and washing facility” (Baba/Kuijer: 2005, 10).11
The board of the cemetery (DNO) had a slightly different interpretation of the
Wlb, drawing the line between a washing area and a prayer area. They did not think
that the municipality should facilitate all aspects of an Islamic burial. Meetings or
common prayers can take place in the cemetery or in the prayer houses and should
therefore not require municipal funding. Washing, however, is in fact directly
necessary to the Islamic burial process and cannot be solved by other means.
In the end, they thus agreed, albeit for different reasons.
The construction and inauguration of the section were planned for 2008. But
delays occurred in the process. First, because of rising prices for primary goods, the
costs for actually building the multifunctional/washing room rose to EUR 550,000
instead of the earlier estimate of EUR 400,000.
Second, in their attempts to find additional financing, the DNO was confronted
with changes in the council. The previous alderman, Ahmed Aboutaleb, had been a
driving force behind the plans developed under CIBA and executed under PIPA.12
Aboutaleb’s successor, however, of Surinamese descent, was less interested.13
11 “Een multifunctionele ruimte en wasgelegenheid,” my translation.
12 Aboutaleb became later the first Muslim mayor in The Netherlands in Rotterdam.
13 I rely on the interview with the consultant of the LOB, 20 August 2012.
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Third, in 2010, the conservative-liberal political party (VVD) raised political
objections,14 claiming that this municipal financing of – in their words – “Islamic
washing-house” (Islamitische wasgelegenheid) “rubs against” (schuurt) the principle
of the separation of state and church” (Raadscommissie Verslag: 2010, 11).15 The
state, so their argument, should not engage in financing the content of religion in a
constitutional state. How can this be justified, they asked, when – to their knowledge
– no other religious community has received a similar provision covered by the
public budget?
The answers by the mayor and other participants in the municipal board meeting
were indicative of the underlying reasoning. A member of the Christian Demo-
cratic Party (CDA) suggested recourse to a principle of ‘compensating neutrality’
(compenserende neutraliteit). The washing-house/prayer room was being financed
because the religious community was in a position of delay or disadvantage. But
indeed, she added, the executive board B&W should have informed the Munici-
pal Council of Directors (Gemeente Raad), since the latter should have made the
decision, not the former.
The mayor added to this line of critique that the meaning of the terms ‘inclusive’
and ‘compensatory neutrality’ is not particularly clear (Raadscommissie Verslag:
2010, 14). According to him, the essence of Dutch church-state relations consisted
of the fact that the government does not interfere with the content and doings of
religion; no preferential treatment is allowed. In The Netherlands, we do not rely
on exclusive neutrality as in France, he said, where the government stays out of all
matters pertaining to religion. On the contrary, facilitating religion is part of the
government responsibility. Consequently, there is a legal obligation in the Wlb to
provide for a section if a religious community asks for it. Yet, this does not include
a washing-house or a prayer room.
In other words, he agreed that the principle of separation was under pressure, and
that the procedure has not been properly followed, but nevertheless concluded that
the motivation behind the 2006 decision and public financing was ‘integration.’ On
5 June 2012, the alderman approved the Islamic section and the washing pavillion.
14 At this time, the construction of the section and washing room were already underway, and the
financing of the additional EUR 150,000 had been approved by the B&W. Yet, the Executive Board
still needed the approval of the Municipal Council of Directors (Gemeente Raad).
15 The minutes of the Municipal Council of Directors Meeting do not include literal transcripts, so I
am paraphrasing the terminology used in these minutes. (My translation).
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5.2.2 The Hague: The Seven Gravefields of Westduin: ‘To each their own
spot’
The Hague is the political capital of The Netherlands. More than half of its popu-
lation (54.7%) has a migrant status (January 2019); the largest groups are Turks,
Moroccans, Surinamese, and people from the Antilles.16 Different fromAmsterdam
but similar to Almere, the Surinamese form the largest migrant group. Together
with Amsterdam and Rotterdam, The Hague is one of the Dutch cities with the
highest number of Muslim inhabitants. The Hague is furthermore a city with a
long history of Muslims migration from former colonial empires (Indonesia and
Suriname).
There are two municipal cemeteries in The Hague, Kerkhoflaan and Westduin,
and five private cemeteries.17 The municipal cemeteries were ‘made independent’
(verzelfstandigd), meaning that a separate department (afdeling begraafplaatsen)
governs the daily administration and finances of these cemeteries. The department
is not supposed to turn a profit but does have to cover its costs independently.
The mayor and the City Council (B&W) are nevertheless still relevant by setting
the rules in collaboration with this department.18 (On the distinction ‘municipal
independent,’ see Section 3.1.2.)
The oldest municipal cemetery, constructed in 1830, is that on Kerkhoflaan,
where the first Muslim section in The Netherlands was constructed beginning in
1930.19 It was installed to bury the Muslims from Java who had arrived from the
‘Dutch Indies’ (i.e., Indonesia). These Muslims were largely retired persons, people
on leave, or indigenous people who had worked as servants or helpers in the Dutch
family households.
In 1930, The Hague counted some 12,000 Indonesia-born inhabitants. Most
of these Muslims strictly maintained their beliefs and religious practices once
in The Netherlands. In 1932, this led to the formation of an Islamic foundation
Perkoempoelan-Islam, which had as its goal maintaining and respecting the Islamic
laws as well as furthering the internal solidarity of the community. To this end,
it required a prayer house as well as its own cemetery, so that Muslims could be
buried “separately from those who think differently and as much as possible in
accordance with the Islamic laws” (Hulsman/Hulsman: 2008, 89, my translation).20
16 https://denhaag.incijfers.nl/dashboard/Overzichten/Bevolking/ [accessed 2 June 2020].
17 These include Begraafplaats Ter Navolging, Begraafplaats St. Petrus Banden, Begraafplaats Oud Eik
en Duinen, Begraafplaats Crematorium Nieuw Eykenduynen, Begraafplaats St. Barbara.
18 Interview with juridical burial advisor, 10 August 2012.
19 I rely on Hulsman/Hulsman (2008) for a description of the section in The Hague.
20 The quote is not well referenced but seems to have come from a magazine or news brochure: De
https://doi.org/10.13109/9783666567322 | CC BY-NC-ND 4.0
© 2021, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Theaterstraße 13, D-37073 Göttingen
Dutch Embedded Cases 141
On 9 December 1932, the municipality provided for a parcel of 10 m2, demarcat-
ing the area with bushes and making a separate entrance for this section. Beginning
in the 1960s, the municipality also provided for a second section of similar di-
mensions. Currently, both sections are still intact on the municipal cemetery of
Kerkhoflaan.
In the 1980s, because of the larger influx of labour migrants, the demand for
more Islamic graves arose. Instead of further extending the Kerkhoflaan cemetery,
the municipality chose the municipal cemetery of Westduin as the primary location
for future burials. Whereas Muslims from Indonesia were – and still are – being
buried on the Municipal cemetery of Kerkhoflaan, Surinamese Muslims and some
Islamic asylum-seekers go to Westduin.
In 1994, the Municipal Board of The Hague decided to allocate seven gravefields
(grafakkers) to seven different mosques on Westduin. Here, according to the head
of Department of Cemeteries in The Hague, “to each mosque their own spot” 21
(iedere moskee zijn eigen plekje). Furthermore, it provided one field for Muslims
who did not belong to any of these mosques.
In my conversation22 with the head of the Department of Cemeteries, he explained
that, at the time, the seven gravefields had been suggested because of remaining
available space. They were not proposed in response to any initial demand from
the Muslim community. “We thought it would be a niche in the market (gat in de
markt),”23 and that they could make some money. While the initial motivation for
the parcels was thus rather commercial in nature, its formal justification in a letter
of the municipality was based on a reading of Article 39 of the Wlb: “Regarding the
stated Article 39 in the Wlb, the municipality considers itself obliged to provide
church communities that do not have their own cemetery with a separate burial
place” (RV54: 1994, my translation).
My respondent explained that Article 39 says “every church community”
[kerkgenootschap]. If one takes that seriously, you cannot treat all Muslims like a
single church community. This would be equivalent to saying all Christians go
to one church and should thus be buried in one area. My respondent was not
in favour of this legal obligation and would have preferred the lawgiver leaving
Indische Verlofganger, 4 November 1932, p. 241. Vereeniging perkoempoelan-islam voor een eigen
islamitische bedehuis en begraafplaats.
21 Interview with the Director of Municipal Cemeteries, The Hague, 4 December 2008.
22 I rely here on a second interview (21 April 2009) with the head of Department of Cemeteries in The
Hague and two municipal letters. Together with the mayor and the council (B&W), he is in charge
of developing the regulations concerning the two municipal cemeteries.
23 Interview with the Director of Municipal Cemeteries, The Hague, 4 December 2008.
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it out. However, “there is not one Islam. If you take that literally, you have to
accommodate the differences.”
But he was not sure he would choose this solution again, not for principled
reasons or because of any change in his opinion about how to give institutional
form to religious diversity. Instead, it turned out that some of the gravefields had
remained entirely empty while others had too little space. This compelled the
municipality to reorganize matters several years ago (RIS143608: 2007). He talked
to the imams of the different mosques to see if they could trade in some of their
abundant space for those who had too little. There was some fear with the other
policymakers that his visits might lead to conflict, but all the imams were very
understanding and went along entirely with the suggestions.
In general, he explained that the individual mosques have large differences of
opinions in how a proper Islamic burial should take place. But most things can be
discussed and negotiated. In case of conflict, the imams told him that he should
frame the demand as a governmental or municipal requirement. In that case, the
imams said, they would be able to convince their people, as Muslims too must
respect the laws of the land.
Because of this interpretation of the Wlb and the consequent willingness to allow
for differentiation between religious factions, there are currently several types of
sections in both municipal cemeteries.
Kerkhoflaan has three different forms of Muslim areas. First, the area with graves
of the first immigrants (1930s–1960s), with graves that are not in the direction of
Mecca. As the director explained, at the time the Muslims were probably not in a
position to make such demands. Second, there are several recent ‘common graves’
in the direction of Mecca, for Muslim families without resources. The imam had
asked for this, disregarding the demand for permanent grave-rest in that case. This
area is so far still empty. Third, there are family graves with a grave-rest period of
30 years in the direction of Mecca (but with several bodies in one grave). Here’s the
institutional typography of the cemetery of Kerkhoflaan24:
24 This is entirely schematic and does not mirror the actual form or position of the sections.
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Scheme 5.1: Institutional typography of the cemetery of Kerkhoflaan, The Hague
The second municipal cemetery, that of Westduin, has separate Muslim fields
for the seven mosques.25 In addition, three fields are reserved for Muslims who do
not belong to any of the mosques, and a section for foetuses less than 26 weeks old.
The latter area is not allocated to any mosque in particular, and no distinction was
allowed between the different religious groups.
My respondent’s reasoning again relied on the Wlb – or rather on the absence of
any prescriptions on this matter: “I am very flexible in providing for this as it falls
outside the scope of the Wlb. They cannot make demands on me in this case.”26
He also had no problem respecting the Islamic wish to have only one body in each
grave, “but in that case they have to pay for two bodies,” as the lease on each grave
spot is foreseen for two persons.
“How have you dealt with the Sunni and Shia’s differences?” I asked. “Oh, that
was easy,” he said. “We just put some high hedges in between. They do not have to
be bothered who lies on the other side of the hedge.”
There were no formal agreements between the municipality and the different
mosques. One of the former imams had set himself on fire, and the archives went
25 Association Ahle Soennat Wal Jamaat Hanafie, field 28; Foundation Noeroel-Islam, field 29; Founda-
tion Ahmadiyya Isha’at-i-Islam, field 30; Foundation Ahmadiyya Anjuman Isha’at Islam Nederland,
field 31; Foundation Faizul-Islam Ahle Soennat Wa Jama’at Hanafie, fields 33, 34; Foundation
Jammaat-al-Imaan field 35; Foundation Ahmadiyya Anjuman Isha’at-i-Islam Holland, field 36.
Those who do not belong to any mosque are in fields 26, 27, 32.
26 In The Netherlands, foetuses of this age are considered as medical ‘disposal,’ whereas according to
Islam, they should be buried; interview 4 December 2008.
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up with him. As a result, no written material is now available regarding agreements
with mosques and their policies of admission. Typically, the imam came with a
handwritten note, to allow for the burial of mosque members. So, the logic was
that, if you do not have such a note, you cannot be buried there.
5.2.3 Almere: A Private Muslim Cemetery
The first Dutch Muslim cemetery, Raza Ul Mawa, was inaugurated in June 2007.
It is the proud possession of Stichting van Almeerse Moslims Al Raza (hereinafter
Al Raza). This Muslim foundation bought the land from the municipality and is
entirely in charge of its management and admission policy.
Almere is a planned municipality in the province of Flevoland. As one of the
youngest cities in The Netherlands (a municipality since 1984), it lies just a short
distance from the capital. It has 212,965 inhabitants (May 202027) and a demo-
graphic composition that includes Surinamese, Moroccans, Turks, and people from
the Antilles. Together with the European immigrants, they make up a total of 40%
of the overall population. Almere is particularly popular with the Surinamese. The
development of a middle class among them led to an exodus from the big cities to
smaller surrounding cities like Almere, where there is more room and affordable
housing.
There are two cemeteries in Almere: the cemetery of Almere Stad and the ceme-
tery in Almere Haven, both of which are municipal property but run and managed
by private companies (Yarden and PC Hooft). This means they fall in the category
of ‘municipally delegated’ (gemeentelijk uitbesteed) (see Section 3.1.2).
The Islamic cemetery borders the cemetery of Almere Stad but has its own
entrance. It was originally meant to provide burial space only for Surinamese
Sunni Muslims. But the high demand from Muslims all over the country and
an open attitude of the owners resulted in currently providing access to all Sunni
Muslims of different nationalities.The current cemetery provides for about 140–150
concessions but can be extended if they run out of grave space.
The process of obtaining permission for the cemetery has been largely smooth.
The cemetery was realized over the course of 3 years as part of a project to build a
mosque (which was inaugurated in 2010).28 The municipality had been very helpful
in this endeavor: Although it did not provide for any direct financial support for
the cemetery, it did provide indirect support by selling the land at a low price.
Furthermore, Al Raza managed to obtain a significant loan from the bank, which,
I was told, was unusual. Banks are typically not comfortable lending money to
27 See https://www.almere.nl/over-almere/feiten-en-cijfers/ [accessed 2 June 2020].
28 http://www.alraza.nl/ [accessed 2 June 2020].
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churches or religious communities. “We are very well organized, so they trust us,” a
board member said.29
The cemetery was financed in part by the mosque budget, the budget for the
mosque being largely derived from membership donations of the members of Al
Raza, a small group of mainly Surinamese Muslim inhabitants (about 300 families
and individuals).
In 1999, they came together to brainstorm about the possibility of building a
mosque. In 2000, they founded Al Raza and talked to the municipality about plans
for a mosque. Initially, they had considered cooperating with two other Muslim
groups in Almere, one of which was the Stichting Welzijn Muslims (the Pakistani
Muslims who left the platform in CIBA). This group had, in this case as well, come
with all kinds of demands. So, Al Raza decided to remain independent in order to
“set our own rules” and not accept external money.
Obtaining permission from the municipality was unproblematic, yet tensions
in the neighbourhood delayed the building of the mosque. Ever since the start of
their foundation, they had been under attack from a neighbourhood organization,
founded a few years after theirs, the members of which were wealthy and had
bought villas there.
My respondent was unsure why they had tried to obstruct the program, suing
them on many occasions. “Maybe they are afraid that their villas would diminish
in value because of our mosque … The whole thing has cost us about 2.5 years.”
It also cost them a lot of money, not just because of the legal procedures: Al Raza
ended up winning all of the legal battles, but the price of raw materials to build the
mosque skyrocketed over the past years.
Four facts stand out in this successful case: First, securing permanent grave-rest
is in fact possible, and much like the many existing Jewish graveyards, Muslims
can thus – at least in principle – secure this themselves.30 My interviewee did not
think the current provisions on Dutch public cemeteries were sufficient. Islamic
custom requires burial in the place of death but strictly prohibits cremation or
transferring the remains of a body.31 Second, the municipality was forthcoming in
the process. Third, Al Raza seems very well organized. Finally, the financial burden
of this cemetery was not large – in fact, as the municipal letters mention, they sold
the land for EUR 7,701.15 (RV-63/2007).
29 Interview with a Board Member of Al Raza, 18 March 2009.
30 The price for a concession is EUR 7,500 for members of the foundation and EUR 8,500 for non-
members. This includes all ritual aspects of the burial. See https://www.ar-raza.com/begraafplaats
[accessed 2 June 2020].
31 Algemene graven can only be prolonged twice, and sometimes the bones are then buried within a
large container grave among non-Muslims. Or, he said, the remains are cremated. Interview Al Raza,
18 March 2009.
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“This is, of course, not how it ever goes elsewhere,” remarked a Director of the
public cemetery in Dordrecht in an email:
Normally, there is no land available dedicated for burial purposes. One can make much
moremoney renting it out to companies or using the land for normal domestic purposes.32
Very specific urban-planning circumstances in Almere, she added, had contributed
to this opportunity to make the land available and at a modest price.
Her scepticism was somewhat founded because Al Raza had originally been
promised to obtain a small Islamic cemetery within the cemetery of Almere Haven.
The municipal document speaks of a ‘cemetery’ and not a ‘section’ (RV-62/2006).
When, in 2002, the cemetery of Almere Haven was nearly full, the municipal
board allocated EUR 1 million to enlarge it, although, following an initial inves-
tigation of the soil, much larger quantities of sand were needed to enlarge the
cemetery, adding costs of EUR 2.2 million. The municipality then decided to look
for alternative solutions. Having already promised Al Raza an Islamic cemetery,
the municipality instead proposed to dedicate a part of the cemetery of Almere
Stad. Thus, Al Raza would benefit from the fact that the land there had already been
declared a burial ground. The municipality justified its decision as follows:
The foundation of Muslims in Almere (Al-Raza) has asked the municipality to provide
for an Islamic cemetery. The Corpse Disposal Act obliges the municipality to cooperate
in the realization of this request. And in its meeting of 29 June 2006, the board decided
to allocate a part of the cemetery of Almere Stad (Kruidenwijk) as an Islamic cemetery
(RV-62/2006, my translation).
In addition, they proposed selling the land below market price:
– The deceased of the Islamic faith would obtain permanent grave-rest. By selling the
land to Al-Raza, we can help to secure ‘their feelings’ that eternal peace is ensured.
– The promises made in the past (…) need to be kept. Initially, it was foreseen that Al
Raza would obtain a part of the cemetery in Almere Haven. Yet this option has now been
abandoned because of the high cost to the municipality (…). The consequent delay is not
their fault.
– The land for the Jewish cemetery has also been sold. (…) Al Raza, (…) should be treated
like the Jewish community before it (RV-63/2007, my translation).
32 Director of Begraafplaats en Crematorium Essenhof, 30 March 2009 (my translation).
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5.2.4 Summary Dutch Municipalities
The cases discussed address the following primary field research questions: (1)
What are the (materially) chosen institutional solutions? And (2) how do burial
decision-makers (discursively) substantiate these burial solutions? What reasons
are given for the existence of a particular format? (3) In what terms do they talk
about and provide a framework to justify their choices? I summarize the relevant
decision-makers in a table at the end of this chapter.
Field Research Question (1): What Are the Solutions Chosen?
By relying on a replication logic in the choice of our municipalities, it was my
expectation that burial solutions in Amsterdam and The Hague would be similar.
Both are large cities with a significant Muslim population.
The solutions envisaged in Amsterdam and The Hague were indeed both public,
namely, confessional sections in a public cemetery. But they differed in how they
understood these sections and in the degree of religious governance they allotted to
the respective communities. There exist seven gravefields (grafakkers) in the public
cemetery in The Hague, each allocated to a specific mosque. These are understood
to underlie full self-governance.33 Yet, the exact legal responsibility and form of
that governance is unclear. The agreement was made in an ad-hoc and informal
manner, so that no written sources are available. The Islamic section in de Nieuwe
Ooster (Amsterdam) is open to allMuslims, and the cemeterymanagement allocates
the graves. A publicly financed washing-house borders the Islamic section. It is
understood and legitimized as a “multifunctional provision.”
The investigation of the unusual case of Almere taught us more about the con-
ditions that turned this case into a success. The burial area provided is a piece of
terrain privately owned, managed, and governed by a religious community (Al
Raza). The public documents speak of an “Islamic cemetery” (and not a section
grafvak). This is fully in line with the possibility of having Islamic cemeteries as
prescribed in theWlb.34 Yet, the piece of land is a de-facto extension of the cemetery
of Almere Stad (Begraafplaats Beatrix-park).35 ADutch legal burial expert describes
it as a “confessional section”36; like the status of the confessional sections in The
Hague, agreements are vague.
33 The respective religious leaders decide who is buried there and what form the section should have.
34 More precisely, it corresponds to the right to a confessional cemetery (Article 38) and the obligation
of the municipality to sell the ground for a reasonable sum (Article 40.3).
35 The Jewish cemetery, inaugurated in 2005, is also located at the cemetery of Beatrix Park.
36 Whether they are full-fledged private cemeteries or confessional sections within a public graveyard
depends on the agreements made. Yet, “The parties involved are often unable to say what exactly the
agreement entails”; interview Juridisch Adviesbureau, 10 August 2012.
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Field Research Question (2): What Are the Reasons Given?
In Almere, the reported municipal motivations for the solutions chosen were
legal adherence to the burial law, acknowledgment of religious freedom, the need
for eternal grave-rest, and equity between religious communities (treating Muslims
on par with the Jewish residents). For the Muslims involved, self-governance, inde-
pendence, and securing permanent grave-rest (as demanded by Islamic custom)
are the main motivations for choosing this private solution. Financial and urban-
planning considerations are central and explicit to the decision-making process for
all parties involved. But finances need not be an obstacle for Muslims to obtaining
their own cemetery. Crucial, however, are a high degree of organization on the
part of Muslims and the need to be well informed. Admittedly, the Muslims here
benefitted from the fact that their cemetery is an extension of an existing municipal
cemetery (so that the plan of destination allocates that area for burial purposes).
InTheHague, a reference to the burial law (Wlb) is relevant, next to concernswith
commercial exploitation (they hope to make money). The policymakers interpret
the Wlb as prescribing the right to a confessional section for each kerk-genootschap.
In their reasoning, this implies that you have to distinguish between the different
Muslim groups and cannot treat them as one religious community; hence, the seven
gravefields (grafakkers).
In contrast, in the Amsterdam case, Islam is treated as one kerk-genootschap. This
municipal solution aims to avoid factionalism (hokjesgeest). A concern with state-
church separation becomes visible in the discussion about the financial support for
the washing-house/prayer/multifunctional room. But it is overruled by the concern
with citizen/immigrant integration.
Field Research Question (3): What Are the Terms and Frameworks Used?
In none of the Dutch embedded case studies was secularism used as a term or a
framework. Nor is there a proxy. When we asked explicitly about the way in which
secularism affected their decisions and choice of solutions, the respondents became
annoyed or uncomfortable (transcription in Section 7.5.2).
In Almere, the offer of a private Islamic cemetery by the municipality was cast
as a legal obligation and a religious right. There is no explicit reference to Dutch
state-church relations, though they do refer to general normative principles: The
decision to sell below market price is motivated with reference to equity among the
religious communities and historical precedent. But the offer of the cemetery is also
framed as following from particular financial and urban-planning considerations.
Only in Amsterdam did the mayor make an explicit reference to “the core of
Dutch state-church relations,” justifying the financing of the washing facility as
part of a concern with citizen integration (integration regime). Calling the Islamic
washing-house a “multifunctional facility” emphasized that this was a facility for
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all, thus downplaying the extent to which the Islamic community was being done
favours.
In The Hague, the relevant actors and documents mention general principles of
governance: freedom of religious practice and equity between religious communi-
ties in light of the burial law. Cemeteries are also seen as an explicit commercial
enterprise.
In sum, in terms of the main frameworks the Muslims demand for burial ac-
commodation were in the Dutch context understood in light of the burial law,
financial and urban planning concerns, but also to some extent that of integration
and state-church relations.
5.3 Norwegian Embedded Cases
5.3.1 Støren: ‘Soft’ Sections and Individual Consecration
The village of Støren lies in themountains among agricultural lands in the Northern
part of Norway, half an hour’s train ride from Trondheim. Støren is the largest of
four villages (Soknedal, Singsås og Budal) that together form the municipality of
Midtre Gauldal. The total number of inhabitants of all villages lies at around 6,000,
half of whom lives in Støren. Being a train hub, the village of Støren was historically
a place where workers come and go. The presence of industry and factories thus
opened up the local community to an influx of foreign workers.37 Initially, the train
station provided work to a large pool of workers, and in the 1970s a big company
specializing in prefabricated houses and roof constructions also attracted a lot of
temporary workers here.38
Over the last decade, Støren’s population has fluctuated because of a chicken
factory (Norsk Kylling) operative since the mid-1990s which employs workers from
Poland, Somalia, and Turkey. Furthermore, Støren is home to a small annual quota
of refugees primarily from Somalia.
Since June 2012, Norsk Kylling is owned by the food chain REMA 1000. The
factory was negatively featured in the news for its maltreatment of some of its labour
force. In 2002, the labour unions alerted the police to the company’s breaking of
labour laws. After a range of investigations by the labour unions in 2003, 2005,
2006, and 2011, the unions still reported lingering problems in 2011.39
37 Interview with minister in Trondheim, previously a church minister in Støren, 17 October 2013.
38 The company was originally called Block Watne Hus and currently Støren treindustri.
39 The problems involved the duration of working hours, the lack of permanent contracts, the refusal
to pay overtime, and the low level of unionized organization.
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Yet, despite the somewhat dubious standing of its factory and its (not entirely
hospitable) employment policies40, the village of Støren is positively described by
one of its former church minister and dean of church41 in Gaudal as a de-facto
“multicultural society.” The change in demographics is positively recognized as
an integral part of the new composition of Midtre Gaudal. Thus, the municipal
plan proudly states that one of its goals for 2020 is to “integrate labour migrants
and refugees with an eye toward permanent settlement” (Municipal plan Midtre
Gauldal 2008–2020, my translation). According to the present church warden of
Støren, this change in self-definition has brought with it an increased sensitivity
toward respecting the religious and cultural affiliation of others.
In my conversation with him,42 he explained the plans to extend the graveyard,
which lies around the church of Støren. (I use graveyard here because it actually
surrounds the church.)
Since 1999, the graveyard in Støren has had a special section for ‘other religions,’
which is informally separate from the main part. This special section was originally
intended for ‘all other religious communities.’With a laughmy respondent explained
it as a “common bag” (felles sek), explaining that allocation to this special part
occurs using the distinction “consecrated earth and nonconsecrated earth.” So,
Catholics typically would be buried in the main (Christian) part of the graveyard,
non-Christians in the special part. The previous church warden set up this section
a long time ago, so that my respondent did not know the precise motivations.
Because this ‘special’ area remained unused and the rest of the graveyard was
filling up, they decided to reorganize the whole graveyard. First of all, the plans for
the new area intended to integrate the non-Christian part. Second, they aimed to
extend the old cemetery by adding a whole new gravefield, which until recently
was just a bordering piece of agricultural land owned by the neighbouring farmer.
The informal, hand-drawn plan he showedme indicated a field for the humanists,
a field for urns, and a section for Muslims. The drawings showed what he called
“normal mixed fields,” where Christians and other religious people can lie together.
The demarcation ‘consecrated or nonconsecrated’ was of crucial relevance, also
for the development of the new plans. They took the recommendations in the new
2012 funeral law very seriously. The whole new section of the graveyard would not
be consecrated, only individual graves.
My respondent thought this was a good solution: Christians can still have it the
way they want it, without disrespecting others:
40 Also, Adecco, the temp agency with whom Norsk kylling closely cooperates, is held re-
sponsible. http://www.nationen.no/2012/06/10/naring/norsk_kylling/kylling/kyllingslakteri/rema/
7488022/ [accessed 2 June 2020].
41 Interview Støren, 17 October 2013.
42 Interview with the church warden Støren, 18 October 2013.
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We’ve taken care of our own needs by consecrating a Christian grave. At the same time,
we’re allowing for possibilities for others who do not think Christian consecration is so
alright, so that we do not exclude them from the same area.
“But,” I asked, “could you also makes sections, some of which would be consecrated
and others not?” I referred to the old solution found in Para. 5 of the former funeral
law.
My respondent was not opposed to the idea of some sections being altogether
(as his hand-drawn plan had also showed); but he feared that consecrating too large
areasmight work exclusively. Rather, there should be a balance between allowing for
some small demarcations (“some bushes”) but without creating separate islands in
the cemetery. So, for example, “putting the Muslims at the far end of the cemetery”
was not a good way of providing for sections. And here he shifted the conversation
from consecrating parts of the graveyard to accommodating Muslims.
He told me that, thus far, no Muslim had been buried in Støren. There was no
demand whatsoever on their part. My respondent was a little frustrated over their
lack of interest. In accordance with Para. 23 in the 2012 Funeral Act, just a fewweeks
before my visit to Støren the Joint Parish Council had invited 11 religious groups
and the humanists to a common meeting to discuss the new plans. An invitation
letter had been sent to the Muslim society in Trondheim and a neighbouring Shia
mosque. But only a representative of the humanists came, who rejected the need
for a special humanist section as drawn on the provisional plan and preferred the
solution of individual consecration.
I had asked in a separate interview with this humanist representative, whether he
thought consecration mattered to the humanists.43 He told me, “No, but the priests
came up with this suggestion.”
So, I inquired, if consecration does not matter, then why do you prefer that
option? He answered that it was ultimately a concern with “dignity and respect.
(…) I see it from their side. I find it unworthy toward the Christians, to say this
consecration thing is nonsense. That lacks respect for them.” This also allows for a
good solution, he thought, for those who take offense at being put in consecrated
earth.
In other words, the opinions seemed to differ within the humanist organization.
The real issue, however, he continued, is that the church is trying tomaintain its grip
on society by monopolizing death. It was not respectful that a hegemonic church
obtain the administrative responsibility of graveyards, of “something we would
typically call a public duty. (…) This is not a solution that befits a multicultural
society. Furthermore, there is a lack of sufficient neutral ceremonial rooms.”
43 Interview with the Burial Representative and Ceremonial Leader HEF, Trondheim, 17 October 2013.
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I asked if he thought that theHEF still had a battle to fight on the principled point,
but hewas very sceptical about such an agenda. In his opinion, themore constructive
solution would be to provide for alternatives: “We should have something to offer to
those who have no relationship with the church.” In his opinion, cemeteries were a
last corner of society where the church still held a stronghold. “They try to maintain
as much grip on it as they can.” The number of Norwegians who choose a humanist
confirmation, for example, is much higher than those choosing a humanist burial.
He explained that, as the result of a generational shift and a lack of information,
people do not always know about the humanist burial alternative. “At the moment
of death, you don’t start investigating your options. You chose what lies in front of
you.”
Returning to the conversation with the church warden of Støren, my respondent
regretted the absence of any Muslim representative. He would have liked to ask
themwhether they preferred vegetation around their section or whether they would
prefer just “blending in.”
“So why,” I asked, “do you make all these efforts if Muslims do not ask for it?”
He answered that it was important to think ahead: “Those who are foreigners”
– he paused to look for the correct word – ‘immigrant,’ ‘non-Norwegians,’ ‘of a
different culture’? – “right now, they are sending their dead back home. But in a next
generation, they may want to be integrated here, that’s just the natural development.
So, we have to be prepared, and they should feel just at home as we do. We don’t
want to get caught saying one day: ‘Oh, no, we never thought about that.’”
We [the Joint Parish Council] have a social role to play.We take care of all burials, religious
or not, and we would like to continue with that. (…)We have developed great competence,
and we score high on user evaluations, also among other religious communities.
He also told me that the bishop had visited Støren and emphasized the need for
the Joint Parish Council to take its public role seriously, as it operates both as a
confessional and a public entity. “We have the task of meeting others and extending
respect for their life-stance perspectives. For me personally this is very important.”
He mentioned that, in other rural areas, the church warden might not always
be willing to provide for Islamic sections. It depended greatly on the individual in
charge. But he had traveled a lot, studied in England and lived abroad. So, for him
it was self-evident that you accommodate newcomers. And precisely because he
was a representative of a specific religious community (and a public servant), he
felt an obligation to respect the religious needs of others – where ‘respect’ for him
meant finding a balance between providing for some form of divisions and retaining
wholeness (helhet). He did not wish for the “absence of divisions, all unified under
the soil” (like in Elverum), but he did not want too strong divisions, either.
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Therewill always be some demarcations, but still our goal is to see the graveyard as a whole.
(…) To put it plainly: people are people. (…) We tend to our traditions, but nevertheless
there should be an integrated solution.
His wish for helhet (wholeness) has its roots in the ideology of the labor movements
of the 1920s, he said. To his mind, social democracy did not necessarily imply
avoiding all division: “To achieve wholeness (helhet), we do not all have to be the
same.”
5.3.2 Elverum: Individual Consecration as a Solution
Elverum is a small but strongly growing municipality with about 21,000 inhab-
itants.44 It obtained the status of city in 1996, and today it is one of the main
municipalities around Norway’s largest lake, the Mjøsa region. Rural in character,
it lies on the far outskirts of the Oslo region. In 2007, it counted 1,128 inhabitants
of foreign origin or Norwegian born but with one or two foreign-born parents (ca.
5% of the total population). This number is twice as high as it was in 1995.
Elverum refers to itself as a “multicultural” as well as an “international” mu-
nicipality, largely because of the migrants who arrived in Elverum in the 1980s
(Elverum kommune: 2008, 8 and 11). Since the first Vietnamese boat refugees,
Elverum has “circa 85% more refugees than the average Norwegian municipality”
(Elverum kommune: 1996, 57, referenced in Elverum kommune: 2008, 11). While
the first refugees initially came from Vietnam, after 1988 they tended to come from
Iran or Chili, and from 1991 on from Somalia. In addition, in 1993 there was a wave
of refugees from Bosnia. In 1995, there were a total of 313 refugees in Elverum,
including persons from Afghanistan, Burundi, Congo, and Chechenia (Elverum
kommune: 1996, 49).
The growing immigrant and refugee population gave rise to a variety of munici-
pal reports on the status of refugees45 and the development of a “holistic integration
plan” aiming for “inclusion and pluralistic integration” (Elverum kommune: 2008,
5–6). This report says nothing about cemeteries and burial needs, but it does em-
phasize the general need for adaptations. Quoting from a text from the Department
of Foreigners, the authors underscore that:
Norwegian integration politics has as its goal that everyone has similar possibilities, rights,
and duties, regardless of their ethnic, cultural, religious, or linguistic background. To
44 Over the last 30 years, Elverum has grown more rapidly than its neighboring municipalities and
on average more than municipalities in the entire country, see https://www.ssb.no/kommunefakta/
elverum [accessed 2 June 2020] and ‘Elverum mot 2030’, p. 2.1.
45 These include Elverum kommune: 1996; Elverum kommune: 1997.
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achieve this goal, it is necessary not only that immigrants and refugees learn Norwegian,
accommodate themselves in the Norwegian societal context and qualify themselves for
the Norwegian labour market. Rather, integration is a two-way process that also puts
demands on the majority society to adapt and change. This entails, among other things,
that public services be adapted and made available for different user groups so that equal
offers are guaranteed for all (…) (UDI: 2005, 3, referenced in Elverum kommune: 2008,
5–6, my translation).
But what does “equal offer” entail – and to what degree does this requires special
adaptations?
Currently, there is only one churchyard, next to the Elverum church, in which
two Muslims have been buried. They lie among all others, in no special direction.
The few other Muslims who have passed away in this municipality were repatriated
or buried in Oslo.46 But the growing immigrant population will likely produce the
need for burial provisions that match the demographic composition.
This is well recognized by one of the spokesmen of the Joint Parish Council
and dean and church minister47, who in a local newspaper article explains: “We as
Christians do not have a monopoly over [funeral] rituals” (Søberg: 2009). For that
reason, the minister plans to tear down the existing old chapel located next to the
church building and replace it with a new ceremonial room. Yet he is dismissive of
establishing confessional sections or alternative cemeteries.
In my interview with him on 23 July 2009, I asked him what kind of solutions he
could envision for Muslims and humanists. His response begins along a general
vein:
We should remember that the churchyard [kirkegård] is also a graveyard [gravplass] for
all, but one that the Joint Parish Council administers. This is largely unproblematic. The
Norwegian Islamic Council does not have a problem with this. They are very satisfied.
“Why do you think that is?” I ask. “They trust us,” he says. “In Islamic circles they
are more sceptical toward secular organs than toward religious ones. In Norway,
we maintain a very good dialogue between the Church of Norway and the Muslim
population.”
“Is that because you are both religious groups?” I ask. “Yes” he says. I think you
see the same thing going on in the realm of education. There, we have a similar
situation, where there has been a long tradition of Christianity being present in the
educational system, which is largely unproblematic for Muslims.”
46 This was the case at the time of my second conversation in 2009.
47 He was minister of the church (sogneprest) in Elverum and dean of church (prost, i Sør Østerdal
prosti).
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I inquire further: “Does that understanding also work the other way around? Is
the Joint Parish Council inclined to accommodate Muslim burial needs, because
you share this (…) importance of religious rituals?”
Yes, you are absolutely right (…). If I can be even more specific, it is a historical matter.
(…) Precisely because we have a state church, the state and the church are both very
concerned with securing the equal rights of minorities. And so, if we did not have a state
church system, this would be left to a much larger degree to the groups themselves, and
that could easily lead to forms of competition and opposition. But now, where we have a
state church system and a constitutional state behind it, it follows automatically that both
state and church have to make every effort to ensure that minorities do not suffer any
form of injustice. (…). For this reason, we also have such fabulous economic regulation
in Norway.
So, rather than seeing it as a disadvantage, the church minister is adamant about
how the historical state-church legacy works to the benefit of minorities.
“But,” I ask him, “what about humanists? I have heard complaints from humanists
about the fact that a church is in charge of a public domain.”48 Towhich he responds:
That is because the HEF is a form of protest movement. These are people who, for individ-
ual reasons, are provoked by the majority system of the state church. They have formed a
protest movement, and they are very outspoken on all questions where the rights of the
individual are threatened by the decisions of the majority. That holds in particular for
the question about schools and the administration of the churchyards (kirkegård). (…)
The Muslims say, ‘Ok we get good treatment and a good understanding for our religious
symbols.’ But the humanists say [angry and annoyed tone] ‘We do not want anything to
do with a church authority!’
“And, do you agree?” I ask.
Well, then, let me be even more practical: How do we solve this in the cemetery (grav-
plass)? As long as we had only a Lutheran Church to which everyone belonged, the
tradition was clearly to consecrate every churchyard. There was a religious ceremony
that consecrated the whole churchyard (kirkegård) for religious purposes. And then the
humanists protested: ‘No, we do not want this.’ We understand, (…) but today, because of
the humanists – but even more so because of other religious communities – we should
stop consecrating the whole churchyard (kirkegård). Instead we should consecrate only
grave by grave and make consecration part of each individual burial ceremony.
In other words, this church minister does not think the humanist protest is justified.
In his answer, he moves from talking about church involvement in the administra-
tion of the cemetery to that of individual consecration of the grave:
48 I heard these complaints in an interview with a Senior Advisor in the HEF, 22 October 2008.
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But perhaps we can also find another solution, something partly done in Oslo. There, the
Joint Parish Council has set off an area and said: ‘Here is where we bury the Muslims, here
is where we bury the humanists, and here an area we do not consecrate at all.’ This way
different groups can have their own section. If Muslims were to completely argue that this
is important for them, namely, to be buried as a collective, then probably the political
environment would listen up to them and take their needs into consideration.
“So, you do not like it, but you think they would consider that?” I ask.
Yes, exactly, I think so. They will take the Muslims’ own opinions into consideration. But
I think we at least need both solutions. Humanists do not want to be buried together
with Muslims, and I think it is unrealistic to set aside an area for Muslims, an area for
humanists, and an area for Christians.
“Why,” I ask, “is that being unrealistic?”
Because there are so few of them. That makes sense only in the large cities.
He is clearly not in favour of this strategy:
I believe it will strengthen integration in society if we could instead have a common
churchyard (kirkegård) where the graves are all mixed up [laughs]. If we segregate in
the churchyard (kirkegård), then that is a major statement of the idea that ‘No … we
are different, we are not the same.’ Despite all attempts at integration and integration
politics, we are nevertheless different, and when we die, we all need our own churchyard
(kirkegård).
Two things stand out from this conversation: (1) This church minister is focused on
the issue of individual consecration as a solution. (I return to this further below.)
(2) He is not in favour of confessional sections but rather believes this solution
is viable only for larger cities with a sufficient number of Muslims or humanists.
Moreover, he sees sections as conflicting with his understanding of integration
politics, being a “major statement of the idea that ‘No … we are different, we are
not the same.’” And he adds that the Joint Parish Council as well as people in most
rural areas agree with him.
In the course of the conversation, I try to understand what the connection is
between a rural society and the desire not to install divisions. “Do people at a
local level feel that you should be like one Christian community?” I ask. “No,
that puts it too strongly,” he answers. “But that does point in the right direction.”
Distinguishing between religion in society as entailing a meaning component as
well as a belongingness component, he explains: “The belongingness component
will always be more developed in the rural areas.”
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He continues: “Collective religious rituals are important in small communities. It
is not so much that they feel like Christians, but there is a sense of belonging to the
church and the churchyard (kirkegård).” He thinks the fact that there are various
sections in the Oslo cemetery is a matter of pragmatism: “Det er helt rent praktisk.”
Yet, the experience gathered in Oslo has shown that such cemeteries often invite
acts of vandalism. Moreover, he repeats, things are different in rural areas:
It is not good for a local community to have a churchyard (kirkegård) for Christians, one
for Muslims, one for Jews, and so on. If we segregate in death, does that mean we should
be segregated in life in a local community?49
In other words, he makes the empirical claim that there is a stronger sense of
belongingness to the church and to the churchyard in rural areas. He connects this
thought to a prescriptive claim that we should avoid demarcated areas, which only
attest to segregation.50
But how are these two ideas related? In order for a local community to stick
together, does it truly require a sense of homogeneity? What about this connection
of the local community to the graveyard standing in the way of divisions in the
graveyard?
The theme of consecration also raises some questions. Why does the minister
suddenly start to talk about individual consecration when the humanists are criti-
cizing the very fact that one confession is in charge of a public domain? He thinks
humanists need not be frustrated, and if they should nevertheless choose to be so,
this is because they are a “protest movement.” “Humanists fight for nonreligious
human rights, so they are political actors rather than life-stance actors.”
In my interview with the church employers’ organization (KA),51 the representa-
tive answered similarly. He also automatically jumped to the example of consecrat-
ing the soil when I asked him how to secure equality in the cemetery in light of a
hegemonic Church. “Going the French way” and eradicating all religious imprints
from the public graveyard, he thought, would be “catastrophic for Norway” – it
would “eradicate its historical roots” and “favour the secularist.”52
Like the church minister, he also dismissed providing for separate sections. He
was “not in favour of a patchwork strategy: We should not segregate minorities in
the churchyard (kirkegård).”53 He also fiercely rejected my suggestion to provide
49 Quote from private email correspondence September 2013.
50 This is akin to the French respondent who compared confessional sections with ghettos.
51 KA stands for Kirkelig arbeidsgiver og interesseorganisasjon.
52 He did not agree with the humanists that the church administration favours the Lutheran con-
stituency.
53 Interview KA, 23 October 2008. He referred to a lappeteppe strategi.
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for a private cemetery next to the Lutheran one (like in The Netherlands): “Norway
does not like privatization. We should all be buried next to each other in the same
soil.” Hence, he, too, prefers solutions of individual consecration.
Returning to my conversation with the minister of Elverum, I asked: “How is
individually consecrating the graveyard a good answer to a principled and symbolic
inequality claim that one confession is in charge of a public domain? Humanists do
not care about consecration: To them, soil is soil.” But he stands by his answer.
I think they care about it in the way you say: They are protesting against the symbolic
meaning. Soil is soil, but they do not like the religious symbol of consecrated soil. I think
that humanists, and I know this because I have a good dialogue with the humanists here,
are very satisfied with the proposal to consecrate grave by grave. Humanists do not want
to be buried in an Islamic area because there you get the Islamic traditions and symbols,
and humanists cannot have their own graveyards everywhere. From a purely practical
point of view, they are buried among all others and in between Christians in a place that
has traditionally been a Christian churchyard. And so, humanists are satisfied. (…) Ok,
we have to adapt to that situation. (…) It is the best solution to consecrate each grave
individually.
He makes three points here: (1) Humanists do care about consecration. (2) Rather
than contesting the hegemonic position of the church of Norway, humanists realize
that they are better off “adapting to the situation.” (3) He simply reiterates the
argument that humanists can be accommodated within his framework. For him, it
remains an issue of consecrating the cemetery.
“Ok,” I answered, “I understand that theoretically humanists can be accommo-
dated within your framework. But where does this importance of consecration
come from? Is that a Lutheran thing?”
The church minister is unsure. He considers it a “cultural tradition, (…) a fight
against the underground spirits.”
You know, in the old Nørrone culture, consecrating the earth was very important. The
soil should be freed from the grip of the forces beneath it. It is old mythology, we do not
believe it anymore, (…) but it is still present.
He gives the example of the burial ritual:
The priest puts a pole in the earth to consecrate the soil with the cross. Don’t you know
the Norwegian fairy-tales about the troll? [He makes a threatening gesture] It smells like
Christian blood here! Her lukter det kristenmansblod! Christianization is an antidote to
the evil forces.
Another example stems from the old agricultural system. In earlier times, he tells
me, shepherds had houses in the mountain where the cattle grazed during the
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summer. These farms (sæter) were uninhabited in the Fall and Winter and were
taken over by the underground spirits (underjordiske krefter). In the Spring, when
the humans returned, the spirits had to be asked to leave. Similarly, the graveyard
has to be Christianized, consecrated, and protected, he suggests.
In summary, the church minister is unsure where the importance of consecration
actually comes from.
5.3.3 Oslo: Public Solutions and Negotiations in Practice
Oslo has three areas for Islamic burials.The firstMuslim section dates from the early
1970s in the Gamlebyen cemetery, where about 380 Muslims have since been buried.
A second section was opened in 1998 in Klemetsrud, with about 375 places available
and a prayer room. Both sections are currently considered full. A third was opened
in November 2004 in Høybråten, where we find Norway’s first (state-sponsored)
Islamic ceremonial room where Muslims can pray and wash their hands and feet.
There are currently no new projects underway as the section in Høybråten presently
provides enough space for theMuslim population in Oslo. It is nevertheless possible
to get an insight into the nature of negotiations over this last section from June
2002 as they took place.
In her dissertation, the Norwegian anthropologist C.A. Døving provides an
interesting discussion from a meeting on the construction of an Islamic parcel on
Høybråten kirkegård.54 Present at the meeting were the Director of the Graveyard
and Burial Agency, the city of Oslo (Gravferdsetaten I Oslo),55 the Director of the
KlemetsrudCemetery, the leader of the Islamic Council (IRN), a landscape architect,
and the imam from the Islamic Cultural Centre (present as a specialist in sharia).
They discussed the intended form of the Islamic section.
In a conversation between the Director of Oslo’s Gravferdsetaten and the imam,
the former wanted to know whether stillborn children could be buried in an anony-
mous memorial grave. Currently at Klemetsrud, the Director said, they have their
own space (as is custom in Pakistan). Yet, this takes up a lot of space. The imam
answered that an anonymous grave is possible since a stillborn has no name yet and
would thus not contradict sharia. But then the imam asked: “Why don’t you divide
up the space of one adult grave into two child graves?” The Director answered that
the Gravferdsetaten would have to alter the regulations for this, as currently all
graves are required to have the same size and dimensions.
54 I rely here entirely on Døving (2005, 114–117), in particular Chapter 5.
55 This is the executive body concerning everything surrounding burials and graveyards in Oslo, see
Section 4.2.3.1. Since 1977, it has de-facto administrative responsibility over the graveyards.
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On the matter of spatial concerns, the Director inquired further whether it
would be possible to bury a man and his wife above one another in one grave, as is
customary in Norway. This is more complex, said the leader of IRN and the imam,
because in Islam one cannot bury several individuals in one grave. They suggested
asking for advice on this matter during a fatwa conference in Paris.
The leader of IRN asked whether it was possible to make a clear demarcation
around the Islamic section, for example, in the form of a fence. The architect said
that would not be a problem. The Director of Klemetsrud did not object to a fence
around the Islamic section, but in her cemetery, the Muslims had already started to
make small demarcations around individual graves, which obstructs mowing the
grass. So, she preferred to avoid any form of demarcation around individual graves.
The imam stated that he had no problem forbidding this practice to his constituency,
yet he did want to point to the Norwegian state as a sort of backup (similar to the
Muslims in The Hague). They decided to collaborate on the matter and to write
an information paper for the Muslim community in which the Gravferdsetaten
explained its rules.
The last point discussed was the municipal working hours. The leader of IRN
brought up the problems surrounding burials on Friday. The requirement to per-
form the final burial prayer after the Friday prayer conflicted with the closing time
of the cemetery. The Director of Gravferdsetaten Oslo agreed to adapt the openings
times to the Friday prayer. Alternatively, the leader of IRN suggested that a prayer
building in the cemetery might solve the time problems. This then became reality
in 2004.
What I want to highlight with Døving’s case description is how rules have to be
adapted – or even newly invented (as in Amsterdam) – on both sides.
On the part of the Muslims, religious interpretations of sharia law are authorita-
tive.The outcome of the European fatwameeting produced a new fatwa allowing for
the burial of man and his wife in the same grave, provided there is a certain amount
of earth between the two. In order to claim authority, Muslim leaders distinguish
between Islam proper and culture/tradition where religious justifications overrule
cultural ones.
On the Norwegian side, the existing burial law and local regulations are definitive
– and yet Gravferdsetaten Oslo adapted the openings times of the cemetery to fit
the Friday prayer practice. However, regarding an individual grave for the stillborn
or some sort of demarcation around individual graves, regulations were not altered.
This was dictated by a lack of sufficient space and a pragmatic concern with mowing
the grass.
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5.3.4 Solving the Humanist Puzzle and Adaptation of the 1996 Funeral
Act
Regarding the final case study of Norway, I would like to discuss the background
for the adoption of the 1996 Funeral Act. This does not concern the politics or
processes within any one specificmunicipality, but rather speaks to the fundamental
municipal dimensions of Norwegian state-church politics and the ramifications for
my conceptualization of the Norwegian model.
To summarize, in Chapters 3 and 4 I already gave parts of the answer why the
1996 Funeral Act was adopted. In Chapter 3, I showed how the administrative
responsibility for the cemeteries was historically spread out over both confessional
and municipal institutions (Section 3.3.3). There was furthermore variation over
time in the legal framework and within Norway between villages and cities.
With this fact inmind, in Chapter 4 I judged the argumentation of the Norwegian
state for the 1996 Funeral Act to be somewhat thin. The state defined cemeteries as
the domain of the church and backed this up with arguments of Christian burial
customs and administrative traditions, although this argument of tradition ignores
the de-facto variation on this point.
My guess is that there must have been other reasons, too, one of which, as I
present here, is at least partially a political one entailing the decision to assign the
cemeteries to the local church as part of the tasks of the Joint Parish Council. This
occurred with the aim of enabling a larger process of disestablishment and as a
way of securing the Joint Parish Council as a relevant local player vis-à-vis the
municipality.
In order to see this, we have to look at the processes that led up to the formulation
of the 1996 Church Act.56 An important goal of this Church Act was to give the
local church more administrative and juridical independence vis-à-vis the munic-
ipality. The reforms – of which the Funeral Act was only a part – aimed to clear
up some of the intertwinement that had arisen in the 1800s when the local church
administration developed as part of the municipal administration.
The NOU 1989: 7, p. 5 states the following:
Conscious of the particularity of the Church of Norway as one religious community
among several, and in light of an increasing secularization process and diminishing
homogeneous culture, it has become more problematic to see municipal representational
bodies as representatives of the local church.
As a later public document by a national advisory committee specifies:
56 I rely here in my discussion on Breemer: 2014, 188–190.
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The Joint Parish Council shall have extensive administrative responsibility, particularly
for financial and legal issues pertaining to persons active in public services, which to-
day formally lie with the municipality. The Joint Parish Council shall bear the employer
responsibility for most of the church positions. Church employees, who today are mu-
nicipal employees, shall hereinafter no longer stand in a direct employee relationship to
the municipality but to a purely church organ. The municipal steering committee shall
no longer be seen as part of the local church steering committee and shall have a more
delineated voice within the church administrative realm (Innst.O.no.46: 1995–1996, p. 2,
my translation).
However, the advisory committee thought, this increasing church independence
should not lead to a cutting of the ties between church and local community. On
the contrary, it should lead to its strengthening “as a center of faith, culture, and
everyday issues” (ibid., 3). By strengthening the local church’s representation in
elected bodies, like the Parish Council and Joint Parish Council, and by drawing
on a broad constituency, the Church would enhance a process of democratization.
“This way the Church can create identity in the people” (ibid., 3).
TheChurch of Norway shall have considerable administrative independence, although the
majority of the committee is of the opinion that the popular church within the framework
of the state church should be closely connected to the local community. The practical
arrangements between municipality and church are important to convey the church as
inclusive. The popular church depends for its well-being on the municipality recognizing
this responsibility (ibid., 3, my translation).
Two things stand out in the above quotations: First, there is a general process going
on that seeks to strengthen the Joint Parish Council as a relevant local player vis-à-
vis themunicipality. In that light, themaintenance and administration of cemeteries
fulfilled an important role by giving substance to the set of tasks of the Joint Parish
Council.57 It also provided a critical mass of tasks to legitimize it. Second, it seems
such strengthening of the local church structures was also theologically (rather
than purely politically) motivated by aligning with a conception of the church as
open, independent, and close to the people.
But, regardless of the mixture of motives,58 we have here in a nutshell all the
ingredients for the contradictory Norwegian situation.
Relating the analysis back tomy proposed analytic categories allows us to observe
the continuing relevance of the Church of Norway and its enduring intertwinement
with public institutions (in this case, the public cemetery – ‘establishment’) as
57 I base this argument on an interview with the Former Director General of the Department of
Ecclesiastical Affairs, 1 November 2012. See also Alsvik (1995, 111) for a similar argument.
58 We can note amixture of motives: the argument of tradition and the political and possible theological
reasons for empowering a local church.
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well as increasing the independence and separation of the local church from the
municipality within the state church framework (‘disestablishment’).59
Specific to the Norwegian situation and to the adaptation of the 1996 Funeral Act
law is the understanding of the Church of Norway as a ‘low church’ (Thorkildsen:
2014, 85–87).The representation/administration of the church is deeply intertwined
with that of the municipality. In Norway, as in Denmark – but unlike Sweden – this
intertwinement is very strong at the local level.60
The reasons for this go all the way back to the introduction of Lutheranism by
King Christian III after the Reformation. Rather than appoint state representatives
in a top-down manner, the king enforced his power by giving local representatives
an additional state – and thus church – function. As we saw in Section 3.3.3, the
church warden was drawn into the moral project of the state and church. There are
also examples of an opposite movement of intertwinement, such as the introduction
of the Alderman Act of 1837, where the church minister very often became the
leader of the new municipal board.61
This intertwinement might help explain why, after 1996 and despite recurrent
national advice on municipal responsibility, the church administration has stayed
in place.
The recently failed trial offer of financial support for establishing neutral ceremo-
nial rooms may be due to a similar dynamic (Section 4.2.3.1). It is not the result of
any national political ill will or a lack of interest in the population; rather, at the mu-
nicipal level, (a) church and public institutions have historically been intertwined;
(b) the church has retained its influence, and local politicians do not dare (or care)
to take up this issue, for fear of losing votes and/or destabilizing the symbolic order;
(c) theologically, there might be support from both Grundvigians and pietist groups
to give the church a solid role in the local structures of governance.62
5.3.5 Summary Norwegian Municipalities
Field Research Question: (1) What Institutional Solutions Are Chosen?
In Oslo, since 1977, the municipal agency supervising graveyards and burials
(Gravferdsetaten), has had the practical responsibility over thesematters. In contrast
59 See also Section 3.3.3, where I underscored this latter point as an essential ingredient of the Norwe-
gian mode of religious governance.
60 The church of Sweden, however, is more of ‘high church,’ and it has historically had a more indepen-
dent relation to the state.
61 One of the first responsibilities of the newly created municipalities was to take care of the local
church and church affairs. In other words, intertwinement works both ways.
62 For the former, this invites a conception of the church as open and near to the local community,
rather than structured by ecclesial elites. For pietists, an independent local church might provide
the possibility of increasing self-governance vis-à-vis local state structures.
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to the 1996 decision to transfer this right to the Joint Parish Council, it has asked
for an exception to this rule. The solution provided for was to establish confessional
sections in the public cemetery.
The city of Elverum was chosen to investigate one often-heard claim: People
had suggested that the solutions in rural areas for Muslim burial needs would
be different from those in the large cities. This claim seemed to hold some truth
for Elverum, where the Parish Council proposed individually consecrating the
graveyard. The Støren case study partially falsified the proposition again, since the
solutions chosen were confessional sections understood as “soft demarcations” as
well as the consecration of individual graves.
Concerning the solutions adopted toward the primary burial needs of human-
ists63, I found evidence for a similar treatment of Muslims and humanists: the offer
to individually consecrate a section (Støren). In Elverum, the minister planned
to tear down the existing chapel and construct a more neutral ceremonial room.
Yet, the “automatic” jump to the solution of grave-by-grave consecration effectively
discredits the principled complaints of humanists. In fact, different consequences
result from the respective solutions offered these minorities.
Field Research Question (2): What Are the Reasons Mentioned?
For Oslo, my material does not allow me to say for certain for what the reasons
were for establishing these sections. But, clearly, one of the primary reasons lay in
the influx of newcomers (causing a need for new sections over time).
The minister in Elverum argued that, in a local community, we should not
“segregate in death what we want not segregate in life.” Integration of all citizens to
him meant being equal and lying in the same soil. Further, the connection between
the church and the graveyard soil was perceived to bemuch stronger than in the city.
A church-state legacy was mentioned as an important reason for extending equal
rights to all minorities. However, this was translated as accommodating Muslims
and humanists on an individual basis (i.e., consecrating each grave) rather than as
a collective. This reasoning was also applied to the humanists, whose complaints
about a symbolic and principled inequality did not resonate as well as the religious
burial needs of Muslims with the sensitivities of the leader of the parish councils.
The case study of the village of Støren showed that rurality and/or size in and of
itself do not matter. Rather, experiences with the influx of workers and foreigners
over time and the personal attitude (i.e., personal discretion) of the church warden
in charge seemed decisive for the solutions taken. Similar to Elverum, the choice
for a confessional section was motivated by a concern with arranging matters
equally for other minorities as well as their integration. Yet, unlike Elverum, the
63 Subsumed under the need for neutral ceremonial rooms and the removal of principled inequality.
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church warden proposed collective sections, and integration was not understood as
avoiding divisions in death. To provide for confessional sections was not a problem
– as long as the integrity of the graveyard was ensured: “To achieve wholeness
(helhet), we do not all have to be the same.” Humanists were treated on a par with
Muslims and explicitly included in the integration objectives.
Field Research Question (3): What Are the Relevant Terms/Frameworks?
In the case of Elverum, the church minister explicitly refers to the Norwegian
historical state-church legacy to underscore his commitment to accommodating
the needs of minorities. “Precisely because we have a state church, the state and
the church are both very concerned with securing the rights of minorities.” A
commitment to integration and integration politics prevented him from providing
for sections or alternative confessional graveyards.
On many occasions, the church warden in Støren referred to the newly adapted
Funeral Act: Exactly because he was a representative of one specific religious com-
munity as well as a public servant, he felt the obligation to respect the religious
needs of others – where ‘respect’ for himmeant finding a balance between providing
for some form of divisions (if needed) and retaining wholeness (helhet).
In none of the Norwegian embedded cases was the term secularism mentioned
or used. When asked explicitly about the effect of secularism on the work of the
official in charge, responses consistently faltered (see Chapter 7).
5.4 French Embedded Cases
5.4.1 Paris: Historical Examples and Contemporary Governance
Paris is an extremely multicultural city. 334,566 foreigners (étrangers64), equal to
15% of the Parisian population, were living there in January 2019.65 A total of 110
nationalities are represented in the demographic composition of Paris, the four
largest groups being Portuguese, Moroccans, Algerians, and Italians. The category
of immigré (immigrants) constitutes an even larger group and comprises people
born outside of France but living in France, that is, someone of a foreign nationality
who may eventually acquire French nationality in the course of their life. A total of
20.3% of the total population are considered immigrants according to the website
64 The category of étranger includes those who reside in France but do not have French nationality.
65 https://www.paris.fr/services-et-infos-pratiques/social-et-solidarites/droits-des-citoyens/
integration-et-citoyennete-2464 [accessed 4 June 2020].
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of the city council. The status of étranger is thus not a life-long designation as one
can acquire French citizenship over time. Yet, one stays an immigré for life.
The 20 cemeteries in the Paris region66 are administered and regulated according
to an administrative and political schedule. At the top of the political hierarchy we
find the mayor of Paris, Anne Higaldo (January 2021), with her 21 assistants and
the Council of Paris (Conseil de Paris). The head of the administrative hierarchy is
the Secrétariat Général de la Ville de Paris, who oversees four sectors in the public
administration. The cemeteries fall under ‘public space’ within the department for
‘Green Spaces and the Environment,’67 which includes le Service des cimetières, the
primary administrative body that governs all decisions regarding cemeteries. It
oversees in turn the eight offices that tend to the everyday operations occurring
in the 20 Parisian cemeteries. A conservator is typically located on the site of the
respective cemetery.
In addition to the national burial law and the legal regulations as specified in the
Code of the Autonomous Regions, a relevant municipal decree68 stipulates for all
Parisian cemeteries the rules regarding exhumations, concessions, and the prices
of individual concessions. It is revised and formulated by the Service des cimetières
following conversations with the field offices.
The estimate of the number of Muslims currently living in the Paris region can
only be approximate. The French census does not gather information on religion
or ethnic affiliation, though historically the city of Paris and the Department of the
Seine have been home to the largest part of the Muslim population.
Their presence remained fairly marginal during the 19th century, although that
was the high time of France’s colonial activities. Only in the years before and after
the First World War did migration from the North African colonies really take off
(Renard: 2004, 54), due in part to the active recruitment of workers from the North
African colonies and protectorates (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia) by the French
industry.69 France was one of the first European countries to actively recruit foreign
labour (Bowen: 2006, 66). Also, in 1905, controls on migration from Algeria were
66 Fourteen cemeteries are located within the municipal boundaries of the city of Paris, referred to as
the Cimetières intra-muros. Six reside in what is called la petit couronne, the neighboring departments
of Seine Saint Denis,Val – de Marne andHauts de Seine that surround the city of Paris.The cemeteries
intra-muros are Auteuil, Batignolles, Belleville, Bercy, Charonne, Grenelle, La Villette, Le Calvaire,
Mont-martre, Montparnasse, Passy, Père-Lachaise, and Saint-Vincent et Vaugirard. The extra-muros
include: Bagneux parisien, Ivry parisien, La Chapelle parisien, Pantin parisien, Saint-Ouen parisien,
and Thiais parisien.
67 Direction des Espaces Verts et de l’Environnement (DEVE).
68 Code Général des Collectivités Territoriales and Règlement des cimetières parisiens 2005, https://
api-site.paris.fr/images/149748.pdf [accessed 4 June 2020].
69 For example, in Marseille oil and sugar refineries recruited Kabyles (a Berber people from northeas-
tern Algeria) to replace the European immigrant workers on strike (Maussen: 2009, 68).
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relaxed, making a large reservoir of peasant laborers accessible (Maussen: 2009,
68). Furthermore, the First World War created a large need for soldiers as well as
factoryworkers and fieldworkers. The government recruited almost a million men
from the colonies to support the war effort (D’Adler: 2005, 64).70
This migratory pattern and geopolitical reality are also reflected in the burial
domain. Although the first Muslim enclosure was already installed in the cemetery
of Père-Lachaise in 1857, it was not until World War I that the question about
Muslim burial was really posed by the military authorities (Nunez: 2011, 13).
From 1914 on, the Ministry of War circulated precise instructions drawn up
by the Army Health Services concerning the rituals to be carried out in case of a
Muslim death. A variety of military sections (or rows) were thus installed at the
Paris cemeteries of Ivry, Pantin, and Bagneux. In 1937, Muslim cemetery of Bobigny
was inaugurated, and in 1957 a Muslim section was installed in the cemetery of
Thiais.
Thus, a wide range of accommodations had been in place in the Paris area well
before the first decree of 1975. Furthermore, the Jewish population had long been
accommodated, with seven Jewish enclosures created in the Parisian cemeteries
until 1882 (Nunez: 2011, 17).
5.4.1.1 Historical Examples in the Paris Region
In the following discussion, I forgo an analysis of the provisions for military sec-
tions71 and Jewish provisions. Instead, I would like to discuss specific cemeteries:
that of Père-Lachaise, which allowed the first formal Muslim enclosure in France;
that of Bobigny, which for a long period was the only Muslim cemetery on main-
land France; and that of Thiais, which today is an important cemetery with Mus-
lim sections and where, in 1957, France informally created a Muslim division.
Taken together, they provide a relevant range of historical examples for the period
1857–1957.72
70 Estimates speak of between 535,000 and 607,000 colonial soldiers, thereof some 170,000 Algerians
(Le Paultremat: 2003, 173). Colonial workers often came on temporary contracts recruited, for
example, from Morocco, Tunesia, and Algeria (ibid., 280).
71 Because military burial accommodations were a state matter and were based on military achieve-
ments rather than any confessional identity, they fall outside the analytic focus of the discussion.
72 By ‘relevant’ I mean that the historical cases include an example before the 1881 prohibition as well
as two examples of accommodations (Bobigny and Thiais) that occurred well before the political
legitimization of confessional sections in 1975. I have bracketed a discussion of theMuslim cemeteries
in l’Ile de reunion and possiblyMarseille. Renard (2000) speaks of a cemetery of the Turks inMarseille
in 1723. Furthermore, a Muslim cemetery was created in Marseille within the cemetery of Saint-
Pierre during the World War II, see Renard: 2000, 147–150. For a detailed discussion, see Petit: 2006,
115.
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The last part of the case study addresses a contemporary vignette of how modern
central administrators justify these historical provisions.The discussion relies on the
work of Nunez on the accommodation of Islam in Parisian cemeteries (1857–1957),
that of Telhine, Maussen, and Renard on Islam in France, on the works of Chaïb,
Bowen, and D’Adler73 on the Muslim cemetery of Bobigny, and on Aggoun and
Petit on Thiais. The contemporary discussion is based on interviews and on-site
visits.74
5.4.1.1.1 Cimetière du Père-Lachaise: L’enclos musulman
The city of Paris never had a cemetery dedicated solely to one confession (apart
from Catholic cemeteries). Rather, until their prohibition in 1881, it allowed for
confessional enclosures (les enclos confessionnels). Le cimetière du Père-Lachaise
(hereafter Père-Lachaise) opened in 1804, and the first Jewish enclosure was created
in 1809.
As Paris’ most prestigious and explicitly laïque cemetery, the marks of Catholi-
cism were nevertheless visible (Nunez: 2011, 15). A large Catholic chapel, paid
for by private funds, has marked the aesthetic appearance of the interior of Père-
Lachaise since 1822 (Telhine: 2010, 60). Furthermore, during the 19th century, the
Catholic parish councils (les Fabriques) were in charge of the funerary processions
on Père-Lachaise (and elsewhere in many other Parisian cemeteries), which meant
that the Catholic Church took care of the Catholic burials as well as the burial of
those belonging to other confessions. Not until the law of 28 December 1904 was
this responsibility transferred to a municipal authority (Bellanger: 2008, 26).75
Thus, from its very inception, Père-Lachaise was laïque as well as Catholic, even
while allowing for confessional parts in line with the Napoleonic Decree (1804),
Article 15.
The question of Muslim burial and the consequent need for a Muslim cemetery
was raised for the first time in the 1840s–1850s.76 In 1847, La Société orientale de
France, algérienne et colonial discussed concrete plans for “a college, amosque, and a
cemetery” in Paris (Telhine: 2010, 52). This organization, composed of intellectuals,
73 Nunez: 2011; Renard: 2004; Chaïb: 2000; D’Adler: 2005, 2008; Bowen: 2006; Maussen: 2009; Telhine:
2010; Petit: 2006; Aggoun: 2006.
74 I rely on interviews with the conservators of the cemeteries of Pantin, 3 October 2012, and Thiais, 2
October 2012, and the administrator of Le service des cimetières, 9 October 2012, at Père-Lachaise.
75 The municipal monopoly for burial undertakers, pompes funebres, was installed 100 years after the
municipal monopoly of the ownership over the cemeteries. However, the former monopoly was
abandoned in 1993, see Trompette: 2008. The latter municipal monopoly is still in place today.
76 Earlier plans were present in the treaty of Saint de Saint-German-en Laye in 1682.
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diplomats, military men as well as scientists, religious leaders, and tradesmen,
aimed to improve the relationship between France/Europe and ‘the orient.’77
The motivations of the organization were philanthropic, dictated by Christian
morality and charity as well as by political and geopolitical motives: They aimed
to secure French interests as an imperial power in the conquest of Islamic soil (cf.
Telhine: 2010, 56). In 1847, they delivered an official proposal to the Department
of Justice and organized religion, though the proposal was dismissed because
of the small number of Muslims residing in France and the perceived lack of
representational legitimacy vis-à-vis the other Muslim powers (Telhine: 2010, 57).
In 1853, a Muslim enclosure was nevertheless authorized by the municipal board
of Paris and established in 1857 in Père-Lachaise. The direct reason for this move
was a demand by a high Muslim leader Ottoman Sultan Abdülmajid the 1st, who
requested a burial area for Muslims residing in Paris or those who died while
passing through France. Napoleon III responded favourably to the demand of the
Turkish embassy.
The decision was informed by the French-Russian war la guerre de Crimée
(1854–1856), in which the French were in alliance with the Turkish (and British)
nation against the Russians. Nunez suggests (2011, 19) that the decision should
furthermore be seen in the larger context of Napoleon III’s colonial politics in
Algeria. She frames it as indigenophile (favourable to the indigenous), displaying a
willingness to respect local traditions and an aversion to assimilating the conquered
population as well as the attempt to exert social control (cf. Rey-Goldzeiguer: 1977,
referenced in Nunez: 2011, 19).
The Prefecture de la Seine made an area of 3260 m2 available in the 85st division
for burials according to Islamic rites. The enclosure provided for graves in the
direction of Mecca as well as containing a waiting room, a small mosque with a
washing area, and a special area for religious objects. A timber wall, furthermore,
surrounded the Muslim enclosure. The enclosure, dedicated to the inhumation of
persons “professing the Mahometanian religion,” was inaugurated in the presence
of Turkish high officials (AdP, VD4 10, pièce 2916, referenced in Nunez: 2011, 19).
This did not cause any protest and was largely ignored by the press. As Telhine
(2010, 69) explains, these provisions were discretely inscribed in the “Christian
surroundings” because of particular historical circumstances and an orientalism in
vogue.
Over time, a series of internal and external geopolitical developments changed
the character of this enclosure. As early as 1870, the cemetery board decided to
reduce the area reserved for Muslim burial to 1380 m2. This was never made official,
77 They provided information and assisted travelers to the orient with the journal La revue de l’Orient.
https://doi.org/10.13109/9783666567322 | CC BY-NC-ND 4.0
© 2021, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Theaterstraße 13, D-37073 Göttingen
170 Embedded Case Studies: Institutional and Discursive Responses to Burial Needs
but the municipality of Paris decided to use the space for a depository and for
expanding the Jewish enclosure, which had run out of space.
Then, because of the 1881 law, which required the abolishment of all visible
forms of demarcation, the wall surrounding the enclosure was removed, though
subsequently, under protest from the Turkish and Persian embassies, replaced by a
hedge. A note by the general inspector of the cemeteries invited the Department of
Work (le direction des travaux) in reference to the 1881 law:
(…) to destroy the walls of the enclosures allocated for the burial of Israelites (…) as well
as [to destroy] the purification edifices constructed in each of these enclosures and the
wall of the Islamic enclosure (Note 7 December 1882, quoted in Telhine: 2010, 65, my
translation).
The washing-house should thus also be removed. But, in a compromise move, they
continued to allow it to exist.
In 1914, the board of the cemetery decided to demolish the remains of the
mosque and suggested rebuilding plans. In 1873, the Turkish embassy had requested
authorization to clean the Muslim enclosure but never did. The result was that the
mosque became dilapidated, and after demolishment, it was never rebuilt. By now,
during World War I, Turkey and France had become enemies (cf. Telhine: 2010,
19).
Today, only 487 m2 remains of this large area, still surrounded by a 1-meter-
high hedge. On the mosque’s former location (currently outside the terrain of the
remaining 487 m2), there is now a chapel for a Dominican General whose remains
were transported to Spain. The area is only rarely used for Muslim burials, as most
go to Thiais, though some symbolic exceptions remain. People of status, political
exiles, and others are buried here (such as a youngMaghreb student who was beaten
to death in the students protest of December 1986).
5.4.1.1.2 The Muslim Cemetery of Bobigny
Given the small numbers of Muslims present in Paris at the end of the 19th century,
the provision at Père-Lachaise was exceptional. Only around 1900 and during
the first two decades of the 20th century was the question of Muslim burial more
seriously posed by the Parisian authorities, the result of France’s military endeavors
and geopolitical ambitions. By this time, the French empire had expanded to include
colonies and protectorates in various parts of the world, including a range ofMuslim
states in Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific. The war of 1914 also created a
large need for soldiers and for workers of various kinds.
All this resulted in a variety of military accommodations in the Paris area. In
May 1915, the military governor of Paris requested the prefect of the Seine to
allocate a piece of terrain for the fallen Muslim soldiers. A row of 40 graves was
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allocated in the cemetery of Ivry as well as several lines within existing divisions in
the cemeteries of Pantin and Bagneux. In total, 307 Muslim soldiers were buried in
Parisian cemeteries in 1918, among a total of 7,909 soldiers (Nunez: 2011, 25).
Interestingly, this eventually led to the accommodation of civil casualties as
well, as may be inferred from the Muslim cemetery of Bobigny, where the civilian
(nonmilitary) Islamic population was buried by the municipality (and not the state)
within its municipal cemeteries.
In 1918, the military authorities expressed their regret that there had been in-
stances where indigenous Muslim workers had been buried in a military section.
Worried that they might be mixing workers with real soldiers, a situation that might
weaken the veneration attached to these military necropoles, they proposed the
creation of a specific section. The 30th division of the cemetery of Pantin was then
allocated for these Muslim factory workers in 1918. The graves were faced in the
direction of Mecca and were administered by the municipal agency.
Clearly these ad-hoc solutions – and “discretely negotiated spaces” in Nunez’s
(2011, 25) wording – paved the way for more official solutions in Bobigny. But other
factors played a role as well.
In these first decades of the 20th century, the relationship between Paris and its
colonies became more intimate, stemming from the increasing trade relations be-
tween the colonies and France, resulting in a flow of goods and people (cf. Maussen:
2009, 67). Also, during this period, France became very concerned with its sta-
tus as a Great Muslim and colonial power, visible in the organization of national
colonial exhibitions (five in total between 1900 and 1930), which aimed to inform
and enthuse French audiences about its colonial empire (Maussen: 2009, 67). This
became visible during the celebrations surrounding the 100-year colonization of
Algeria (1830–1930) and in the wish of the French government to construct a grand
mosque of Paris.78
In 1920, the French government charged the Society of Pious Trusts and Islamic
Holy Places79 with the task of creating a Muslim institute in Paris and helping to
realize the construction of a Paris mosque. The government wanted to construct
this prestigious edifice to symbolize France as a Muslim power and to recognize
the sacrifices made by the fallen Muslim soldiers in the 1914 war.
The mosque was subsequently built between 1922–1926 and inaugurated in 1926
in a grandiose ceremony with a range of high officials present. At this point in time,
the French state was proud to identify itself with Islam (albeit a “French Islam”). In
the words of the President of the Municipal Council of Paris, Pierre Godin:
78 For details on the process of constructing the Grand mosque of Paris and the historical context, see
Bayoumi: 2000; Le Pautremat: 2003; Bowen: 2006; Maussen: 2009.
79 This association, La société des Habous et des lieux Saints de l’islam, was created in 1917 to aid
Muslims in their pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina.
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This foundation shows our brotherly affection for the Muslim populations who are part of
our colonial empire (…) Ever since it has put foot in Africa, taking up the civilizing work,
of which Rome has handed over the tradition, France is a Great Muslim Power (Granet:
1993, 28, as translated by and quoted in Maussen: 2009, 78).80
In order to circumvent the 1905 law, which prohibits the state from directly sup-
porting any form of organized religion (culte), the Muslim institute was created
with the status of an association culturelle (a cultural association), so that it could
receive donations to finance themosque.The 1901 law permitted the state to finance
cultural organizations. As Bowen (2006, 37) remarks, by that legal construction the
state replicated the old Gallican political pattern of promoting as well as controlling
religious institutions. The French state created respectable sites for religion not only
to be equal but also to control the Islamic presence. This is a logic of recognition
and control, which we then see replicated in the construction of a Muslim hospital
and cemetery.
The idea for a Muslim hospital was born during the celebrations of the inaugura-
tion of the Grand mosque (D’Adler: 2005, 73). Members of the Parisian Municipal
Board like Godin argued for erection of a Franco-Muslim hospital to honour the
Muslims who had battled for France – and to court the North African population,
required to secure the future of the French empire. But also concerns with hygiene
and surveillance mattered. The Parisian elite was worried about the presence of this
new North African population, who had illnesses like tuberculosis and whom they
preferred not to mix with the French population. Unlike the grand mosque, located
in the heart of Paris and appealing to the Muslim elite, the hospital was constructed
in an outer (workers) suburb of Paris, in Bobigny.
The Communist mayor at the time did not want the hospital. Yet, the decision
was taken at the level of the departement without his approval (D’Adler: 2005, 75).
The hospital called today Avicenne was inaugurated on 22 March of 1935 in the
presence of high officials, without the mayor present.
The Muslim cemetery of Bobigny followed as a complementary provision to
the hospital. The initiative came from the Society of Pious Trusts and Islamic Holy
Places. Originally intended as a place of burial for the Muslims of the hospital,
the cemetery was soon opened up to receive Muslims in the broader Paris region.
Godin authorized its creation in 1931:
80 “Cette fondation traduit notre affection fraternelle pour les populations musulmanes qui font
partie de notre empire colonial (…) Depuis qu’elle a mis pied sur le sol de l’Afrique, reprenant
l’œuvre civilisatrice dont la Rome antique lui a transmis la tradition, la France est devenue une
grande puissance musulmane.” The original transcript of the speech comes from a brochure called:
“Fondation de l’institut musulman et la Mosquée de Paris,” see Bayoumi: 2000, 173.
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Is it necessary to say that our respect for their religion is absolute? It is the honor of our
history that has made us defenders of the belief in the individual right to freedom of
conscience. We do not need to recall here that it is not without our help that the Muslim
institute was created. (…) The Institute of Nord African Affairs in agreement with the
Society of Pious Trusts and Islamic Holy Places is currently studying the possibility to
buy a terrain destined to allow for the inhumation of Muslims in a special cemetery, and
which will be declared as Islamic soil. (…) The realization of our idea will once more
testify to the respect with which we embrace their conception of the moral life and their
social customs (Ben Fredj: 1989, quoted in Chaïb: 2000, 169, my translation).
Yet there was some local opposition. The inhabitants of the area protested, fearing
the expected devaluation of their living quarters and the exodus of inhabitants
(D’Adler: 2005, 86). The municipal board of Bobigny also objected. Yet, the depart-
ment dismissed all objections and inaugurated the cemetery by a modest ceremony
in June 1937 without any high officials present.
The cemetery extended over 3 hectares, containing around 6,000 graves, all in the
direction ofMecca. It contained awashing area, a prayer room, and a small concierge
building. Legally, the cemetery was constructed as a private cemetery administered
and paid for by the hospital (cf. D’Adler: 2005, 84). Although confessional cemeteries
had been prohibited since 1804 and 1881, creation of private special cemeteries (in
this case, a hospital cemetery) was not uncommon.81 Until 1961, the hospital fell
under the administrative responsibility of the Prefect of the former Seine district of
Paris (Bowen: 2006, 45).
From 1961 on, Assistance Publique, the hospital service for the needy, was put in
charge of the Franco Muslim Hospital. Now, the cemetery functioned as a private
holding of a public entity and could thus retain its confessional character (Bowen:
2006, 45). The cemetery remained for Muslims only, but had opened up to all
patients from 1945 on.
During the following 30 years the cemetery was poorly managed and neglected.
In practice, not only the Prefect but also the Islamic Institute (institute Musulman)
had the power to allocate graves. It worked with a system of free concessions where
families made donations to the mosque. Effectively, the Grand Mosque of Paris
thus managed the terrain.
Consequently, Petit remarks, it “became a space of lawlessness [un espace de
non-droit] managed in a random and sometimes preferential manner” (2006, 110).
It was this aspect, in Petit’s words, that fact “gave it its very distinct confessional
character” and “exceptional status” (statut dérogatoire) (Petit: 2006, 110).
81 Chaïb (2000, 168) mentions the hospitals Paul-Brousse and psychiatric hospital Villejuif in the
département of the Seine, which were also authorized to have a common special cemetery.
https://doi.org/10.13109/9783666567322 | CC BY-NC-ND 4.0
© 2021, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Theaterstraße 13, D-37073 Göttingen
174 Embedded Case Studies: Institutional and Discursive Responses to Burial Needs
This became problematic only in 1989 (the year of the first headscarf affair in
France), when the general inspection of the Ministry of Internal Affairs took a
survey and subsequently published a report suggesting the abandonment of the
“exceptional status” of the cemetery. It proposed connecting the cemetery to the
intermunicipal union (syndicat intercommunal) of Bobigny, La Corneuve, Drancy,
and Aubervilliers.
Since 1999, the intermunicipal union has been the formal managing institution,
and the cemetery has since been legally opened to all deceased in the respective
municipalities. In theory, it became one large Muslim section within an intermu-
nicipal cemetery, though in the restructuring plans, the intermunicipal union did
not want to give each group their section, saying this would violate the historic
character of the cemetery. Furthermore, they argued, “Giving a specific section
to each group would make the question of how to manage the graves extremely
complex and would inevitably allow for conflicts of interest to occur, resulting in a
closing off” (Petit: 2006, 113).82
The union insisted on transferring the management of the prayer room (later
transformed into a little mosque) to the responsibility of a local religious association
(association cultuelle). In Petit’s words:
The space is thereby separated in two: on the one side, the place of worship, private and
religious, for which the union does not bear any responsibility; on the other side, the
cemetery (Petit: 2006, 112).83
She concludes that, by this transmission of powers, the cemetery is “reintegrated
into the normal legal system” (Petit: 2006, 110).
Currently, the cemetery has two entrances: a main entrance with a large monu-
mental entrée and a monitoring station; and the older entrance with a subtle Islamic
outlook, which looks out onto a courtyard with the mosque at the end.
5.4.1.1.3 Thiais: at least six Islamic sections
The Muslim section in Thiais was installed in 1957 at the request of the mosque of
Paris. Much in line with the construction of the mosque of Paris, an initiative of
82 I quote them because they either represent what the syndicate has told her – or they reflect her
contemporary concerns: “(…) attribuer un espace spécifique à chaque groupe rendrait la gestion
des sépultures extrêmement complexe et donnerait obligatoirement lieu à des conflits d’intérêt et à
un cloisonnement.” Either way, they suggest how a contemporary focus on laïcité results in critique
of the institutional format of this historical cemetery.
83 “L’espace a donc été séparé en deux: d’un côté le lieu de prière, privé, cultuel, dont il n’a (sic)
absolument pas la responsabilité et de l’autre, le cimetière”; my translation.
https://doi.org/10.13109/9783666567322 | CC BY-NC-ND 4.0
© 2021, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Theaterstraße 13, D-37073 Göttingen
French Embedded Cases 175
the French government, “confessional regroupings in the interbellum period are
discretely allowed for in the public cemeteries” (Nunez: 2011, 28, my translation).
In Nunez’s account, the section in Thiais results from the lack of space in the
cemetery of Bobigny. When, in 1952, the prefect of de la Seine is invited to “study
the possibility of creating a Muslim cemetery in an area more distant from Paris”
(AdP, D6K3 13,21, quoted in Nunez: 2011, 30, n88), the choice falls on Thiais.
Petit, however, situates the provision of the Islamic section in a slightly more
politicized context: that of the events in Algeria. The regroupment in Thiais was,
in particular, intended to allow burial space for Algerians Muslims. The mode of
burial in that case was not – like today – in the direction of Mecca. This pertained to
regular concessions issued for 5 years, after which the bodies were to be exhumed
again (Petit: 2004, 106).
She does not further allude to it in her analysis but implies that the Algerian
Muslims, named harkis or musulmans francais, who fought on the side of de Gaulle
in the Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962), could not be repatriated to
Algeria upon de Gaulles’ departure but needed a place of burial in France during
the war and thereafter.
But whether this was indeed the motivation to establish the first Muslim section
is hard to answer. The archives of Paris lack any formal documentation in the form
of either a municipal or a departmental decree (arrête prefectoral),84 which suggests
that the accommodation occurred unofficially. This may also be related to the low
status of this cemetery (compared to that of Père-Lachaise, for example).
The cemetery of Thiais, created in 1929, covers a massive area of 103 hectares,
which, together with the cemetery of Pantin (106 hectares), makes it one of the
largest cemeteries in Europe. It is divided into 130 squares (divisions) along 18
avenues and is informally referred to as the “paupers’ cemetery”; it used to contain
a large set of common graves, that is, graves for the destitute. Furthermore, it is
known for the large variety of cultural and confessional divisions. Some judge it
negatively precisely because of that diversity.
Now a look at the contemporary reality of Thiais. It currently contains separate
Asian, Buddhist (division 36), Orthodox, and Catholic confessional and cultural
sections as well as a Jewish section (divisions 24 and 25), although most Jews
in Paris are buried at the Pantin and Bagneux cemeteries. There are at least six
differentMuslims sections.85 According to Petit, they are spread out over 15 different
divisions: a mixed Muslim section, the largest (81, 89, 97), where Muslims from a
84 I researched in the archives of Paris (les Archives de Paris) and found no traces of this decision. Nor
could the conservator of Thiais or any administrators provide the justifications given.
85 I rely here on Petit: 2006 and a 3-page informal document stamped by the Services des cimetières
which enumerates the existing cultural and religious divisions in Thiais with specific details. Aggoun
(2006, 58), however, mentions a total of 10 divisions (74, 81, 89, 91, 93, 97, 100, 101, 103, 109).
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variety of Maghreb countries as well as l’Afrique du Sahel (Mali, Senegal, Niger, etc.)
are buried. There is furthermore an Albanian carré in division 89, a carré Iranian
(division 110), and a carré ismaelite (division 34). A small hedge separates the part
reserved for Ismaelian Muslims to prevent the Muslims buried here from mixing
with others.Then there areMuslims fromMadagascar and an ethno-religious group
of Muslims from India (carré de musulmans indiens in division 90). A low hedge
surrounds all divisions.
In light of that striking diversity one can ask how much the cemetery of Thiais
truly differs from De Nieuwe Ooster (see the Amsterdam case study)?
5.4.1.2 Contemporary Part of the Paris Region
Howdo contemporary administrators relate to these historical exceptions? And how
do they navigate the contemporary contradictions? Do they really allocate graves
without taking confessional affiliation into consideration? And what role does secu-
larism/laïcité play? I posed these questions in three separate conversations with the
highest administrator of the Parisian cemeteries (le Chef du Service des cimetières)
and two conservators located at the cemeteries of Thiais and Pantin. The head of
the cemetery services has an important administrative role in the management of
the cemeteries and is a direct advisor to the mayor in matters of burial.
Inmy conversation with him, I discussed the contemporary contradiction: that of
the diverging legal regime of Alsace Moselle vs. the rest of France. I also discussed
the continuing legal prohibition of confessional sections despite their political
legitimization since 1975.
In his statements, these contradictions are closely linked to the historical devel-
opment of different forms of laïcité.
Regarding the contradiction between the reality in Alsace Moselle vs. the rest
of France, my respondent explains that, “when the old funeral laws were dismissed
because of a hard regime of laïcité (laïcité dure),” one part of France was occupied by
Germany. Everywhere in France cemeteries were removed from of the hands of the
Catholic Church. Yet, these new laws were not applied in the region of Alsace and
Moselle, nor were they installed when this region was reunited with France in 1918.
Thus, currently, the inhabitants of the French region of Alsace and Moselle have the
legal obligation to provide for confessional sections in the cemetery, while elsewhere
in France this is legally prohibited. “That is really quite unbelievable,” he says.
Regarding the current prohibition (but political legitimization since 1975), he
explains further: “The conception of French laïcité (laïcité française) must be un-
derstood by the desire throughout French history (…) to separate the state and the
Catholic Church.” And he provides a historical sketch in three stages: Initially, all
cemeteries were confessional and in the hands of the Catholic Church. In theMiddle
Ages, Jews and Protestants were buried everywhere else but in the Catholic ceme-
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teries – sometimes in the pits. Second, after the French Revolution, the cemeteries
become municipal and laic. However, “This municipal system initially integrated
the various religions.”
What he means but does not further explain is that this entailed a form of ‘open
secularism’ (his words): The introduction of the Napoleonic Decree in 1804, Article
15, still allowed different confessional groups to have their own sections of the
municipal cemetery with a surrounding hedge and their own entrance.
My respondent continues: “But later on, they abandoned this notion of an open
and communal secularism (laïcité commune et ouverte), so that, from then on, we
could no longer have distinctions and confessional sections in the cemeteries.”
In other words, in a third historical period leading up to the Third Republic
(1870), all that was legal becomes illegal from 1881 on. And according to my
respondent this led to two sets of problems:
The problem (…) is that cemeteries do not lend themselves to being steered at the level
of a mandate (…). If one has done things a certain way for the past century, you cannot
simply eliminate them, change them. This concerns private properties, sacred places –
that is what cemeteries are all about. So, by definition, one ends up with things that are,
in fact, (dans les faites) contrary to the law.
Second, he explains that, since the 1970s, political leaders have discovered that this
prohibition of confessional sections is at odds with the needs of modern society.
And thus, with the publication of the three circulaires in 1975, 1991, and 2008,
French mayors were encouraged (again) to provide for confessional sections:
Now, they say, ok, go ahead. (…) and the administrator is well obliged to provide for them,
if you like, by observing themodern concept of positive secularism (laïcité positive), which
means you remain neutral but also try to satisfy everybody. (…) But I, as an administrative
manager of the cemeteries, I do not agree. We have an enormous hierarchical legal system:
an administrative directive (circulaire) has absolutely no value regarding to a law.
I ask him what the solution should be. “Well, here I have to be pragmatic. As a
matter of fact, and also because we are obliged to provide for these sections, mainly
because there is a very strong demand.” That demand does not come from the
historical sections, he explains. Since the revolution, the Jewish French community
has been accommodated in different ways, whereas the Muslim population, even if
they are very important in France today, has not expressed such a strong desire for
their own sections in the Paris region:
But new segments of French society, different Asian groups with strong desires for special
sections, are making such demands on us. They have such different burial customs, that
not regrouping them together would lead to large problems in the cemetery.
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“So,” I ask, “should these sections be legalized?” Here my respondent takes a bit of a
defensive stance:
Oh, well, here I most certainly do not want to do the work of our legislators! You should
understand that, as a member of the Parisian administration, I have to maintain a certain
reserve. The opinions I express as an administrator are not necessarily those that I hold
as an individual. (…) We have to leave it to the legislators to decide whether they make
this illegal or legal. But, as a functionary, it is my right to say to the lawmakers and to my
constituency: ‘Do something for us, give us a legal framework that is coherent and viable!’
Every day, in fact, we are forced (…) to juggle our words and texts to please the people
(donner satisfaction), but without managing the cemetery in opposition to the law.
He had been interviewed in 2008 on this matter by a legal commission of the Senate.
He discussed with the senators the problems of laïcité:
I said, if in other parts of France confessional sections are not a problem and in large
parts of Europe they are not a problem, perhaps it’s time to revise French law? Perhaps
our French legislators should think about whether our funeral law, which is based on
a combative secularism (laïcité de combat) versus Catholicism, should now be altered?
Maybe this is the moment to put our concept of positive secularism (laïcité positive) to a
test – and at least unify our funeral law nationwide.
He fully agreed with the first suggestion from the Machelon Report to provide for
a legal framework. However, the second suggestion in the report, namely, that of
creating private cemeteries, he dismissed, referring to bad examples of this kind
in Spain. “Who decides whether this person should be buried here or there? Well-
understood secularism (laïcité bien comprise) is a guarantee for equal treatment.”
In the administrator’s reasoning, laïcité has become a general norm that should
be obeyed in society at large, irrespective of whether it is applied to the public or the
private sphere. He was simply unsure whether certain religious groups were enlight-
ened enough to be guaranteed equal treatment. By allowing for private cemeteries,
the state would relinquish control. “And then things will happen like with the
Catholics: They exclude and decide who can be buried where and who cannot.”
I countered his fear by giving the example of The Netherlands. The director of
the Catholic graveyard in The Hague had reassured me that he was not interested
in exclusion whatsoever. Rather, they welcomed other religions, eager as they were,
to keep their cemetery financially sound. Second, I said, this is a private domain.
Laïcité only applies to the public. “I am afraid I must disagree,” he answered:
The state has a moral collective responsibility to take care of the cemeteries. I don’t believe
that, one day, the municipal cemetery will accept everyone, but that all the problems
confessional communities have with their possible exclusion of members, I leave to their
own.
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“But they do that already, don’t they? They can already say in the private sphere:
‘We are a little club and we don’t want you to be part of us!’” I reply. “Yeah, but that
is civil society,” he answers. “Well, but the private cemetery is also civil society,” I
maintain. “Yes, but here I am a fervent believer: I do not want private cemeteries in
France.” “Ok, I understand that,” I answer, “but I do not understand why you see it
as incompatible with laïcité. Why is exclusion a problem if it is already occurring
within private groups?” He answers:
No, not in death. In death, you’re dealingwith the sacred!The collective has a responsibility
to take care of its dead in an equal way, while taking their differences into consideration:
Private cemeteries would create so much abuse.
The fear of confessional exclusion is thus a sensitive topic for the administrator. He
cannot further explain to me why he fears this, other than recounting a historical
narrative of Catholic exclusion in the graveyard at the time of the French Revolution.
He emphasizes the state as the public caretaker, which serves to guarantee that the
confessional identity of the deceased does not play a role in the allocation of a grave.
Yet, as he readily acknowledges, the existence of confessional sections complicates
this ideal. If he receives a demand from a family for a place in the 25th division in
Pantin, he has to say yes, if in fact such a place is available. He cannot ask them if
they are Jewish. If he observes that, in all likelihood, the family is not Jewish, he
tries to deny the request. “But we do not have the legal ability to actually say no
(…). French law does not allow us to take religion into consideration.”
“But,” I ask, “in practice you do try to avoid having a Catholic in the Jewish
section?” Then, somewhat contradicting his former statement, he said: “Oh no,
no, we cannot do that! Well … the case has not really turned up yet. Typically, a
Catholic does not want to lie next to a Jew.” “But what if it’s a provocative secularist
(laïcard) who wants to make a point by being buried in the Muslim section?” I ask.
This was a reference to my conversation with the conservator of Pantin, who
confessed she would not “amuse herself ” by putting a Catholic in the Jewish section.
The administrator shifted focus again: “Well, when push comes to shove, we
would refuse and see what that brings legally, yet this has not yet occurred.”
He did have an example of the conservator of Thiais, who was called in one day
to the cemetery with an emergency. When the conservator arrived at the scene of
the burial, she encountered a family in great distress: The Muslim who was about
to be buried belonged to the Shia Muslims and the grave was located at the Sunni
section. “Impossible,” noted my respondent. They decided to halt the burial and to
arrange for a new burial in another section.
Do you know how many Islamic subdenominations we have at Thiais? Seven! That’s
entirely unmanageable! We have to find a balance: please people but within certain limits.
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Where those limits lie – that is the question. That, however, is the job of the legislator not
the administrator.
The other problem with Muslim sections, he explained, is not their illegality, but
that it takes up so much space:
When you have 100 people to be buried every day, then ‘hoppity hop’ they are allocated a
grave, one after the other. But if you have 100 people divided over 15 different denomina-
tions, that takes a lot of resources and space. In one division, we cannot alternate tombs
(caveux) with soil graves, and we cannot put different confessions next to each other. If
then, on top of that, we have to accommodate special subdenominations within a religion,
it all becomes a very complex management.
The administrator wavers in his answers between providing a formal solution,
staying neutral in the allocation of a grave, and meeting the challenges of the daily
situation. He is hesitant to admit that he would take confessional identity into
consideration if there is a conflict between a family’s wish and the will of a religious
community.
I ask him further on that: “Are you afraid one day to really transgress laïcité?”
“Well, if you follow the word of the law, you cannot do anything,” he explains.
“People demand to be buried in confessional or cultural sections every day.”
So, he makes a distinction between “the word of the law” (le texte de la loi) and
“the spirit of the law” (l’esprit de la loi).
“Could you give me a concrete example?” I ask. “What goes beyond?” “Well,
burying someone without a coffin is clearly beyond the limits.” Me: “Yes, but do
you have an example in terms of space?” He answers:
One problem we currently have is that the Jewish sections are all full, and we dare not
touch them because Jews cannot be exhumed. The law does not allow us to consult with
religious authorities, but in the end, we [he and the mayor] had to break the law and enter
into a dialogue with the Jewish community. We are out of space. (…) We agreed to a
solution whereby we exhume according to French law but do this taking their religious
rules and customs into consideration in the strictest sense.
They agreed to a solution where all the remains of the bodies of an entire division
would be collected and put into one ossuary. “So, a Jewish ossuary?” I asked. “Oh,
no, no! These are municipal ossuaries, and we put the remains of the entire division
together.” “Ah ha,” I say, “so it is not a Jewish ossuary but the remains of the deceased
from that division – who all happened to be Jewish?”
“Now, you have understood laïcité.” [he laughs] The laic logic was that this was a
process managed by division and not by religion (culte).
I inquired further into the possible consequences of going beyond the law. “Well”,
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he said, “imagine a laic extremist who says: ‘Les Services des cimetières de Paris do
not respect the law.’ I would have to defend myself in court.” I replied: “Ok, that is a
reality, something you really have to think about?” “Absolutely. Officially I cannot
have carrés, but I use all the possibilities within the law.”
“Would you go to prison?” “That depends. One could go to prison. French law is
very protective of human remains.”
Another example where he “violated” laïcité was the tragic event of a 17-year-old
boy who died in a traffic accident a little before Easter. They decided to make an
exception out of respect and bury the boy on Easter, an official Christian holy day
on which one should not work. “We stand for a humane management. One cannot
apply rigid texts to this domain.”
I answered: “So there you violated laïcité?” “Yes, of course, but I violated it as a
rule written in a context without positive laïcité. It is in essence a problem of the
spirit and form of the law.”
“But,” I wondered, “are there not other ways to interpret what working within
the spirit of the law implies?” Here, I mentioned that some people see confessional
sections as ghettos. He responded:
Well, people in the field will give you by and large the official version. We cannot admit
that we do not obey the law, so some of my colleagues may be afraid to speak their mind.
But I am used to working with ministers and take a certain liberty expressing my opinion.
I am a consultant to the mayor. If I should make a mistake in my interpretation, then I
will take the administrative responsibility.
I was curious to see whether I too would be served up an official version of laïcité
in my conversation with the conservator of Pantin. I asked her how secularism
affected her work:
For me, all places/spots (emplacements) in the cemetery do not belong to any religion. I
sell a spot whether it is Jewish or Catholic (…). As a logical consequence, I do not take
religion into consideration. So, I can give them whatever spot. Unfortunately, however,
there are people who think they are entitled to more respect than others regarding their
religion. They sometimes exert pressure to obtain a place in a confessional section, where
only their own people lie. And that goes beyond my framework. I ask those higher in the
hierarchy what they think.
The head of the cemetery services is her superior; he makes the decision together
with her. “Can you tell me how this works: Say, there is a person who wants to be
buried in a special section? Do these sections exist?”
Oh, yes, they have long existed (…) they have always been there since the opening of
Pantin (1886). There are 100% confessional sections and there are mixed sections.
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“And anybody can be buried there?,” I ask. “Theoretically everybody must be able
to be buried there. They were created because of personal pressures and exist today
(…). So, today, because they exist, we use them.”
She tells me that if the Jewish council asks her to bury somebody there, she calls
her boss. “We talk. If I have spots available, I say yes. If not, we discuss how to solve
it.” She explains that there was a time when people bought an enormous amount
of concessions. There were no real limits, so they bought a whole row (typically
10 concessions) and thus secured a place for several families and made sure there
would be no other religions nearby.
They played it by ear. The neighbor said, ‘Ah, you are Jewish. Well, we will buy the other
row,’ and so we ended up with these divisions, where (…) the result was 100% confessional
division.
“Were these families or religious communities?” I asked. “They were families who
created the confessional divisions by buying whole rows of concessions.” “So, it was
not a political decision to provide for a confessional section?” She replied:
No, it was the will of the families, not a political will. In a way, it happened by itself. And
now people know there are more Muslims in Thiais and more Jews in Pantin. (…) [with
great dissatisfaction] They perceive us [Pantin] as the Jewish cemetery, but I am laic!
But then, similar to the head of the cemetery services, she modifies her answer.
I asked, “You told me earlier that laïcité expresses itself by not taking into con-
sideration religious affiliation.” She answered:
Well, although I am required to respect laïcité, I cannot shock families. If I’m dealing with
an Islamic family, it should be clear that I am not voluntarily going to put someone next
to a Jew. I know very well that that will create conflict. I am not going to do something
just to amuse myself (…) No, no, I am careful. And it is true in a sense: We now create
these sections ourselves.
“So,” I asked, “you do not in fact allocate graves at random?”
Ah, no, I try not to shock. However, if they tell me nothing and the family name does not
indicate any particular confessional belonging, I put them in an open division according
to arrival.
She guessed confessional belonging in several ways: by looking at the family name
or because the funeral undertaker was of a specific confessional affiliation. Or, quite
regularly, the funeral undertakers wrote “carré Musulman” and “carré Israelite”
on the files. “That,” she emphasized, “is strictly prohibited, of course! We are not
https://doi.org/10.13109/9783666567322 | CC BY-NC-ND 4.0
© 2021, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Theaterstraße 13, D-37073 Göttingen
French Embedded Cases 183
allowed to say ‘This person is a Muslim, Jewish, Catholic,’ (…). So, we give it codes
‘1, 2, 3’ and colours to avoid giving it names.”
5.4.2 Montreuil
Montreuil is a densely populated municipality and suburb in the Paris district,
with somewhat over 100,000 inhabitants.86 Informally called Montreuil-sous-Bois
and part of the Department of Seine-Saint-Denis,87 24.7% of its population has an
immigrant status (immigrées), i.e., people born abroad but residing in France.
The largest groups of foreigners (étrangers) are the Algerians, Portuguese, and
large numbers coming from Mali, Morocco, Tunis, and Italy.88 The presence of
those from Mali led to the nickname of Mali-sous-Bois or Bamako-sur-Seine (the
second largest Malian town) (Bordier: 2005). They also comprise the largest part of
the Muslims residing in Montreuil. Furthermore, Muslims came from the Maghreb
area (Morocco, Tunis, Algeria) with the migration wave of the 1960s and after the
Algerian War.
Montreuil has historically been part of “the red belt” (la ceinture rouge), a series
of Communist cities near Paris. Although the Communist party, which became
strong in the 1920s, is increasingly losing influence over the municipalities sur-
rounding Paris, Montreuil has remained a prominent bastion (Desmoulières: 2014).
Communist until 2008, thereinafter shortly led by a member of the Ecologist Party,
in the municipal election of 2014 it once again chose a Communist mayor.89
Pivotal in this case study, and for understanding the policy outcome toward
Muslims in the cemetery, are the decisions of a former mayor who served in that
function from 1984 until 2008. As a former Communist and mayor for more than
20 years, this man has a contested reputation as a politician. Seen by some as a
defender of Muslim rights, he is accused by others of being an ‘ultrasecularist’
(ultra-laïcard)90 and Islamophobe.91
In what follows, I look at some of his municipal decisions regarding the pub-
lic presence of organized religion (e.g., cemeteries, public financing of houses of
86 It has a total of 106,691 habitants (2015), 26,306 of whom are estimated to be immigrants, see http://
www.montreuil.fr/la-ville/population/ [accessed 6 June 2020].
87 It is part of the region of Ile-de-France and the arrondissement of Bobigny.
88 See http://lepoivron.free.fr/article.php3?id_article=217 [accessed 6 June 2020]. The numbers quoted
are estimates from 1999 and 2005, but they give an approximate idea.
89 Dominique Voyne was previously mayor. Patrice Bessac (Front de Gauche) became mayor in 2019.
90 As Taifour (2012) remarks in Oumma 09 June 2012: “We have really seen everything. Those who
yesterday did not have harsh enough words to denounce Islamic communitarianism in the name of a
very narrow conception of laïcité, flirt today with theMuslim voters promising them the construction
of a Muslim cemetery.” (My translation).
91 I would most certainly not support the description of him as Islamophobic.
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worship, etc.). First, I take a closer look at some of these decisions that address
the question about justification and institutional formats in the cemetery. Are the
solutions chosen here similar to those in Paris? Second, it shows the large degree of
discretion a French mayor has. Third, it reveals the differing ways in which laïcité
(or, in his case, primarily the 1905 law) is used and upheld (or, the opposite, avoided)
to support accommodation of certain practices or firm prohibition of others.
There are two cemeteries in Montreuil, an old and a new one (l’Ancien cimetière de
Montreuil, Nouveau cimetière de Montreuil). Unlike Paris, where the governance of
the cemeteries is carried out by a separate administrative body, in Montreuil civil
affairs and cemeteries are administered in an office under the direction of d’accueil
et proximité, typical for smaller cities. Similar to Paris, there is an administrative as
well as a political hierarchy whose decisions affect the way the cemetery is managed.
Also, in Montreuil the political establishment overrules the administration.
In my conversation with the administrative head of the Office of Civil Affairs and
Cemeteries and her assistant92, I learned that an Islamic section had been installed
in 2007 in the old cemetery of Montreuil.
It was put in place forwhat they referred to as “technical reasons,” namely, demand
from the Muslim community and the direct need for burial space. Furthermore,
there has long been a Jewish section in the old cemetery. So, they felt they could not
deny Muslims a similar provision. Most importantly, they told me, the decision was
handed down from the political establishment, the former mayor being the primary
decision-maker. He was known for “always having had a good relationship with
the organized religions (cultes),” but the decision was without doubt also informed
by his wanting to gain votes among the Muslim population.
The process for constructing the section had been simple: The former mayor
made the decision after talking to different Muslim groups. There were no official
documents or municipal writings on the matter. As the mayor later told me, “It is
me who said, ‘We put the Muslims there,’ that’s all.”93
The Islamic section is located in gravefield 1–18 and is surrounded by a (still low)
hedge separating it from the other parts of the cemetery. The graves are situated
in the direction of Mecca, though one big gravestone is completely at odds with
the others. There was a mistake on the part of the religious representative, who
had been confused to exactly where Mecca was. After the first internment, several
imams spent an entire Sunday figuring out in exactly what direction Mecca lay. The
family had accepted the mistake, the assistant said, because the deceased was not
92 Interview 4 October 2012 with the administrative leader of the civil services and cemetery ser-
vices and her assistant of the Office of Conservation and responsible for the everyday activities of
cemeteries.
93 Interview with the former mayor of Montreuil, 10 October 2012.
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much involved in the Muslim community anyway. The divergent grave was seen as
a symbol of the fact that the deceased belonged to Islam but with “an individual
direction.”
The carré musulman is aligned with the back entrance of the cemetery so that
Muslims can use this entrance. Although it is nowhere mentioned that this is
formally the Muslim entrance, my interviewee tells me (with a gesture of secrecy)
that, informally, it functions that way, something he personally disapproves of.94
Apart from an Islamic section, there are also three Jewish sections, two in the
new cemetery (fields A9 and A12) and one in the old cemetery of Montreuil (field
5–1) (Hivert: 2008). A 1.5-meter high hedge surrounds the Jewish sections in the
new cemetery, separating it entirely from the rest of the cemetery.
The assistant (once more discretely) tells me that the hedge is paid for and
maintained by the Jewish community. The oldest section Israelite dates from the
1940s and is composed of several lines of graves that then merge into a collection
of Christian graves. It came into being, they thought, because of families buying
graves in advance. It occurred spontaneously and was not the result of a municipal
decision.
In my conversation with the former mayor, I was keen on understanding how
he justifies his decisions. He proved not very interested in the topic of cemeteries,
though he is proud of a decision that he has made regarding to a bail emphytéotique
– a peppercorn rent – a case that achieved national legal status. This case, in his
words, “gives continuity to the 1905 law under modern conditions.”
This legal case,95 to which he returned several times in the conversation, involved
the decision by the town council of Montreuil to grant a long-term lease for a
parcel of communal land to the Federation of Muslim Associations96 for building
a mosque. For the symbolic amount of EUR 1 a year, the federation leased the
land for a period of 99 years. If after this period the lease is not prolonged, the city
council once again becomes the owner of the soil and all things built on it.
A member of the town council challenged this decision in 2007 on grounds that
it violated the 1905 law of separation of state and church, Article 2. The member
thus accused the city council of providing for a disguised subsidy of religion.
After a series of legal battles, the Council of State ruled that the town council was
justified in derogating from the doctrine of separation of state and church “(…)
for the grant of certain aid to facilitate the activities and operation of certain cults,
94 He had asked the Imam why they preferred entering there. The Imam had answered that they were
afraid of being harassed by others. My interviewee thought that this made no sense and was an
overly defensive reaction, “very much against the spirit of laïcité.” I rely here on my fieldnotes after a
walk over the cemetery with the Assistant of the Office of Conservation, 4 October 2012, Montreuil.
95 CE, 19 juillet 2011, Mme V., n° 320796.
96 This concerns la Fédération Cultuelle des Associations Musulmanes de Montreuil.
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where the grant of that aid was in the general public interest and specified by law”
(Cianitto/Tirabassi: 2012, 535). According to the Council of State, the constitutional
principle of laïcité does not in and of itself prohibit the possibility of certain forms of
support (cf. Conseil d’État Assemblée, 19/07/2011, no. 320796, second paragraph).
“Why did I take up this battle?” the mayor asks rhetorically. And then he tells me
about the strong opposition he faced from the people of the neighbourhood when
constructing the mosque. He was also under fire from the extreme right. Locally as
well as on a national level, it was claimed that the peppercorn rents violated state
neutrality.97 The mayor explains:
Well, we have to manage the problems of today in the light of the 1905 law, of its spirit.
Back then, we did not have any Muslims (…). The 1905 law provides first and foremost
freedom of conscience; second, the Republic does not recognize any religion, nor does it
pay the minister of any religious group, with the exception of Alsace. And, furthermore,
the Republic guarantees everybody the right to practice their own religion.
“Why have religious freedom if the material conditions for expressing this freedom
are lacking?”
In other words, he finds room within the 1905 law to accommodate Muslims’
need for a house of worship and to let them catch up.
And once you have these principles, then come the concrete challenges. How do you
deal with cemeteries and mosques? I felt I had to accommodate these religious commu-
nities, in this case the Jews and the Muslims, because they are not very well off. If they
simultaneously pay for the construction costs and the terrain, that is not going to work.
The mayor is adamant that this should occur within the boundaries of the law.
Some mayors have constructed mosques in all illegality, justifying them as cultural (cul-
turelle) places instead of religious ones (cultuelle) (…). They have tricked the law. I think
my solution is much better, and it has been recognized by the Council of State. So now it
has a legal standing.
But while being very careful about justifying his peppercorn rent as lying within
the spirit of the 1905 law, he is remarkably unconcerned with – or maybe unaware
of – violating the laic constraints in the cemetery.
97 As the leader of Front National, Marine le Pen argued: “These peppercorn rents … are a disguised
form of donation. It is not me who is against this, it is the law.” Le Pen quoted by AFP (2011),
unknown author, in: Le Figaro 5 April 2011. (My translation).
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I asked him why he has no problems providing for a carré musulman.
For me as mayor – where is the problem? The problem is the number of available spaces
in the cemetery. Thereafter, whether they believe in Mecca, Jerusalem, or whatever, that is
not our concern.
“But,” I insist, “Islamic sections are prohibited.” “No, they are not prohibited, and in
France everything that is not legally prohibited is permitted”, he says.
Then, I explained the prohibition and the political encouragement occurring
since 1975.
Well, I have arranged it as follows. I have argued that if sections existed, it was not because
of the wish of the Jews, it was not the result of the wish of the Muslims – it was the Catholic
Church that was doing the excluding, before the Revolution. The Catholics did not allow
burial of Jews, comedians, drunkards (…). Catholic exclusion lies at its origin.
That surprised me: “Oh, really?” “Yes,” he said, “we do not favour discrimination:
Whether you are buried in the direction of Mecca or wherever you want, for a
mayor this is not important.”
I persisted: “Still, it is illegal to say: ‘This part is for Muslims’?” [He interrupts]
“It’s just logical!”
With this the mayor justifies the contemporary existence of confessional sections
through his concern with treating Jews and Muslims equally, to avoid discrimina-
tion. And this is given particular meaning within the historical narrative of previous
confessional exclusions by the Catholic Church.
At this point of the interview, I am a bit puzzled as to why he is so easy-going
about his provisions. To see how far he would go in adhering to the requirement of
neutrality of third parties, I present him with a hypothetical case of a Jewish section
and the family of a Catholic citizen who wants to be buried in that section. What
do you do in such a case if you have to follow the laic prescription to let the will of
family be the main determinant?
Ah, that would be a catastrophe! Impossible! We’ve had the problem here before. One day
the rabbi comes to see me (…). He tells me: ‘I went to the cemetery to pray … and what
do I see: a Jew and a non-Jew lying side by side!’ Think about it – a non-Jew in the Jewish
section. That does not work at all, because now the section is no longer a real section. Well,
that is their illusion (leur fantasme). After this complaint, we gave them a new section,
but the Jews who were buried in the old one remained, because theoretically you cannot
exhume them.
In other words, although the mayor’s answer is slightly different from my question,
he indicates his giving significant weight to the wishes of the Jewish community
rather than insisting the cemetery be open to all, everywhere.
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This aligned with what the administrative head of the cemeteries had also an-
swered: She was clear about the fact that the wish of the family was the leading
motivation for allocating a grave in a section. However, she continued, “We will
explain that, yes, we could put you there, but for the well-being of others, we cannot
honour your request.” This indeed violates laïcité, she admitted:
Allowing this [burying a Catholic in a Jewish section] would cause a political conflict, big
problems with the religious groups. They would get angry and say: ‘You are not respecting
your promise to us to only bury people of our confession there. There are 50 other places
where you can put them!’98
Returning to the conversation with the mayor, I was curious to find out what
reasons he had for the particular formats of the Islamic and Jewish sections. As he
had mentioned, the argument for an Islamic section, “was the freedom for all to
bury as they wished (…).” But, I remarked, “What these communities wish for is
their own part of the cemetery, in the right direction, with their own entrance and
surrounding demarcation.” He replies:
They do not have their own entrance. Others can use the entrance as well. It is not solely
reserved for Muslims. Nowhere does it state: ‘For Muslims only.’ But it is true that it
is situated in their corner of the cemetery, so they indeed do not cross the rest of the
cemetery.
I asked: “And what about the high hedge around the Jewish sections?”
Well, [defensive tone] what does that mean? We have cemeteries in the countryside with
hedges. What do we do there? We have hedges. Listen! Those are just pieces of vegetation,
not religious symbols.”99
I replied: “I have no problem with that, but your laws prohibit it. I simply want to
understand how you justify it.” “Oh well, listen, in France to prohibit a mayor from
doing something, it has to be very serious. A mayor does whatever he wants in his
municipality as long as his citizens accept it.”
The mayor thus decides what rules to enforce as long as he can publicly defend
them.
98 But, if one day they were to run out of space, they would put a Catholic there. In other words, the
promise to the religious communities was a political reservation (un réservation politique), she said,
not an administrative one. “If we administratively need it, we would use those spots.”
99 In my conversation with the administrators (4 October 2012), both said that they were not in
agreement with the separation provided for by these hedges. “But they demand it” (referring to the
Jewish community). They were unsure whether to see it as an outright violation of laïcité.
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I ask, “What would be beyond the acceptable then?” to which he replies:
Burial without a coffin (…). Muslims, they have to obey the sanitary regulations. Here, we
are not allowed to bury someone without a coffin, as is the case in Islamic countries. The
rules are the same for everybody, and for a mayor: dead is dead. We also have problems
with the gypsies [Roma/Sinti] here, they have a very particular practice: One year after
the person’s death they come and eat together on the grave. That we have succeeded in
preventing since it is very shocking for the other families. So, we have our limits. One
should not disturb the social customs of the place (la bienséance) (…). It is all rather
subjective, I know, but we have decided not to allow it.
Furthermore, slightly contradicting his earlier example of the Jewish section, the
mayor is keen to note that no exceptions are made for both Jews and Muslims
regarding their confessional prohibition of being exhumed. “The law applies to
everyone. The rule here is that we remove the remains. We exhume sometimes after
5, 10, or 20 years – or a maximum of 50 years. Those are the conditions of burial.”
So, the mayor argues strongly for religious freedom of practice as a central
commitment. Granting confessional sections is just “logical” because funeral rites
are deemed central to the religious practices of the community in question. This, he
claims, in fact follows from the 1905 law (even as I remark that they are in fact illegal
in the letter of the CGCT). Yet, other very central funeral practices (prohibition of
exhumation, burial without a coffin, the Roma custom) are overruled by a single
rule valid for all – arguments about hygiene or public order.
Who then decides what practices are central enough to be accommodated? And
what religious practices does the law prohibit?
I ask him about the example of burial without a coffin. In The Netherlands, burial
without a coffin used to be prohibited, too. Since the 1980s, however, the hygiene
argument has been overruled by the freedom of religious practice. Why does the
French law prohibit it and the Dutch allow it? He answers:
You first take into consideration the way in which the religious community identifies itself
and then comes the legal situation. That’s not how we do it: It is first the law and only then
do we use the freedom the law still allows for.
“But,” I countered, “then you should not have anyMuslim sections because according
to the law here that is illegal.”
Ok, listen, here you’re being very exacting about things, I recognize, but you are right! Yet
our 1905 law says we should recognize the freedom of religion, and if the funeral rites are
a fundamental part of the practice of the religious community, then … So, if you think
this is really part of the religious practice, well then, that is the limit that freedom permits
you.
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I didn’t let up: “But, you see, on the one hand, you come at me with the burial law
and its constraints, whereas, on the other hand, you answer me with the freedom
of religious practice of the 1905 law as the overruling motivation.”
The mayor answered: “I understand that this is part of the contradictions. But
there is a saying dating from the revolution to the effect: ‘It is the freedom that
oppresses and the law that sets free.’”
So, there are three main points: First, what qualifies as fundamental to the reli-
gious practices and what does not qualify is, as the mayor himself acknowledged, in
some cases “entirely subjective.” Second, the mayor controls local order and sets the
rules. Third, the mayor gives little thought to contradictions. In fact, as I learned
further on into the conversation, this seems to be his way of operationalizing laïcité.
I inquire what he thinks about changing the law, which would resolve the contra-
dictions in the cemetery while also making his accommodation of confessional
sections legal.
On the subject of the cemeteries, I have experienced very few conflicts, except for that
example of the Jews (…). It’s all not so difficult, I think. We certainly should not make a
socio-political issue out of it. We should not frame this as a matter of laïcité. That would
serve the extreme right (…). We certainly should not change the law.
Thus, for him, the preferred solution was to leave the letter of the law intact while
simultaneously providing for practical accommodations in the spirit of the 1905
law.
We are nevertheless quite pragmatic, contrary to the image they have of us abroad. (…)
We find solutions, while trying to stay loyal to the spirit of the text. And I think there is a
consensus. To give an example, Francois Hollande wanted to put laïcité in the constitution.
Why? That is not necessary. It’s already in the constitution, well it’s in the Preamble: ‘The
French Republic is laïque.’That is enough. Why put anything else in there? It’s unnecessary.
We should keep things very simple. (…) Laïcité, the moment you add an adjective, it’s
betrayal. Those who talk about laïcité ouverte do so to betray her.
Maybe not surprisingly, he thus dismissed the propositions of the Machelon report
as commissioned by Sarkozy, to make confessional sections legal and to reintroduce
the private confessional cemetery.
What a horror, a Catholic integrationist, that Machelon. In his commission he had rep-
resentatives of his sect. He was for the abandonment of laïcité. That is why Sarkozy chose
him. But his report is now forgotten. (…) Dead and buried! [with dramatic gesture]. (…) It
destabilized us completely. He wanted to question laïcité. The place of religion (religion) is
not in the public sphere. He wanted to put it into the public sphere, and we did not agree.
It contradicts the 1905 law. (…) Religion (la religion) is by principle in the private space.
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“What about private confessional cemeteries?” I asked, to which he replied: “Here,
we cannot imagine that, regarding death. No, that is taken care of by a public power.”
“Is this thinking part of laïcité?” I ask.
I do not think we have even asked that question before. We have always buried everybody
that way. Allowing for private cemeteries – ah, no, that’s untenable. You know we chased
the nuns out of the public hospital!
I nodded and said, “Yes, but the question is rather why, if there is a public hos-
pital, could there not be a private hospital?” “No,” he answers, “being buried is a
fundamental right!”
I tell him about The Netherlands, where it is also the mayor who sees to it that
everybody gets buried. Nevertheless, there are private cemeteries. He disagrees.
“But you see that would violate our tradition, nobody could imagine a private
cemetery here. I cannot imagine that anyone would propose something like that in
the public debate.”
But in this instance, too, the mayor turned out to be little bothered by contra-
dictions. As I later discovered, he promised a Muslim cemetery to potential voters
during his recent run for the legislative elections of Montreuil and Bagnolet in June
2012.100
As you know I was the first mayor of France to allow for the construction of a mosque
(…), by means of a peppercorn rent. I have been attacked by the extreme right, but we
have persevered, and finally the Council of State has agreed with our decision. Thanks to
you – thanks to our common effort – all Muslims in France today have the possibility
to ask their mayor to provide for a terrain with the construction of a peppercorn rent,
which is a great advancement. Now, we should go further. I am committing myself to
constructing a large Muslim cemetery for Montreuil and Bagnolet, with at least 3,000
spots, which will allow families to bury their loved ones close by their place of residence.
This is – simply put – a matter of humanity and respect. Because I am laic (laïque), I
refuse any stigmatization toward Islam. Also, I am engaging myself today on your behalf
to reject all new laws aimed at stigmatizing the Muslim community. Laïcité is already in
the law. There is no need to reopen absurd debates making Muslims the scapegoat.
5.4.3 Rhône d’Alpes/Lyon
In the Rhône Alpes region, the size of The Netherlands and with a population larger
than that of Norway (5.5 million), there are eight départements, one of which is le
100 See the electoral pamphlet in the article at http://oumma.com/13049/ultra-laicard-jean-pierre-
brard-drague-les-musulmans [accessed 6 June 2020], my translation.
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Département Rhône (no. 69).101 The region Rhône Alpes has one of the highest
densities of Muslim citizens in France, largely of North African and Algerian origin,
with a total estimate of 600,000 (Bilan 2: carrés musulmans, p. 4). About half of
them live within the Département of Rhône with as its capital city Lyon ville.
Lyon ville represents France’s geographical and cultural center as “the civilized
bourgeois exterior of the ‘gateway to the South’” (Hussey: 2007). At the same time,
it has been – and still is – an extremely racially and socially divided city. It has a
large number of poor suburbs, which are physically and socially isolated from the
core city.
High unemployment rates hit these suburbs hard in the 1970s because of the
closure and subsequent export of auto factories. Furthermore, in 1981, severely im-
poverished living conditions in HLM housing projects caused the first set of urban
riots in the city of Les Minguettes, followed by more violence in the neighbouring
suburb of Vénissieux in 1984 and a consequent invasion of armed police forces.
Today, these suburbs are considered to be ‘sensitive quarters’ (quartiers sensibles),
to be avoided by police or outsiders. They stand as “symbols of the ‘malaise’ of the
declining peripheries of French cities” (Parvez: 2011a, 294).
Politically, “despite its stolid bourgeois appearance” (Hussey: 2007) and its so-
cialist mayor Gérard Collomb (anno 2020), Lyon has evident links to the spectrum
of far-right politics. It was the strategic capital of the Front National (FN) through-
out the 1990s and home to a majority vote for the FN in both national and local
elections. Furthermore, there remains a strong persistence of ‘negationism’ in some
French Universities, particularly Lyon III (Rousso: 2006, 67–88).
As early as 1970, a professor of literary theory at Lyons II openly denied the
Holocaust, stimulating a range of works published on Hitler and the gas chambers.
As a public report traces it, negationism102 first mobilized among right-wing in-
tellectuals with an already established academic standing and became popular at
the universities. One of the report’s concrete political results was the temporary
expulsion from the university of Bruno Gollnisch, a prominent Front National (FN)
leader and Professor of Japanese at Lyon III. Adding to Lyon’s reputation as the
“world capital of negationism” (Hussey: 2007), the late Raymond Barre, mayor of
Lyon from 1995–2001, was known for his anti-Semitic remarks in public.
Simultaneously, and adding to the existing tensions, Lyon is “witnessing amarked
growth of conservative Islamization vis-à-vis Paris and other urban centers” (Parvez:
2007, 13–14). Propelled by a social atmosphere that heavily politicizes Islam and
101 France is divided in 26 regions. Each region in turn is divided into départements.
102 Negationism refers to denying the Holocaust or the gas chambers. With a long standing in both
the neo-Fascist and extreme right corners, its legacy goes back to the Vichy era. It has since found
resonance with certain small groups from the anti-Stalinist extreme left.More recently, it manifested
itself among certain Islamic groups and fringe groups of the Islamic population (Rousso: 2006, 68).
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links it to terrorism, working-class Muslim communities are increasingly distrust-
ful of the state and tend to withdraw into their own communities. Add to this the
transnational influences of Salafism, which promotes cultural practices that sup-
port strict gender segregation, for example, full burqas and polygamous marriage
(Parvez: 2007, 14).
Nevertheless, there are important class differences, also reflected in terms of
Islam’s political organization. More middle-class Muslims in Lyon are rejecting
the conservative forms of Salafism and organizing through middle-class Muslim
organizations that do not shun state engagement.103 Tellingly, most Islamic organi-
zations are headquartered near Villeurbanne, not far from Lyon’s center – not in
the suburbs. Poorer Muslims, living in HLM public housing complexes, are much
less likely to participate in Islamic associations, especially when these organizations
engage with the state.
Against the backdrop of these racial and cultural tensions we should see the
attempts by the Conseil Regional du Culte Musulman (hereinafter CRCM Rhône
d’Alpes) to obtain more Muslim burial plots in the region of Rhône d’Alpes and
what is called the Greater Lyon Urban Community (le COURLY).104
The total number of carrés musulmans in the entire region is unknown, but under
auspices of its president, the CRCM Rhône d’Alpes has researched the matter for
the Département Rhône. The outcome of their study (conducted between 2005
and 2007) was seven carrés and one to be opened in Venissieux with a total of 300
available graves for an estimatedMuslim population of 300,000 (CarrésMusulmans,
p. 9).105 As the study further mentions, “The CRCM Rhône d’Alpes estimates that
Muslims in France need more than 600 Muslim sections in public cemeteries”
(Carrés Musulmans, p. 2).
In my conversations with the President of the CRCM Rhône d’Alpes and the
head of the commission Carré Musulman du Département Rhône, I inquired about
the goals, the process, and the actors involved.106
103 Yet, they are suspicious of a state that seeks to ‘control and curb’ Islam (Parvez: 2011a, 2011b).
104 Referred to as Le COURLY, this urban community embodies 57 municipalities. As one result of a
general process of decentralization in 1996, the French administration established the Greater Lyon
Urban Community (La Communaute Urbaine de Lyon), adding a fourth level of administrative
territory to the existing three: the region, the département, and the town. A communauté urbaine is
an administrative structure at the highest level of intermunicipal cooperation and is designed to
meet the needs of the metropolitan area in a less centralized manner.
105 Of the seven carrés, only two are in the intercommunal cemeteries in the city of Bron and the city
of Rilleux de la Pape, accessible for the whole population of le COURLY.
106 Interview with the President of the CRCM Rhône d’Alpes, 10 February 2009, and interview with
the head of the commission Carée Musulman du Départment Rhône, 11 February 2009. I would
like to thank the latter for keeping me updated over the years. I rely on materials from his private
archive.
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Both explained that the overall goal of the commission, created in 2006, was to
satisfy the increasing need for Muslim sections. Against the backdrop of the local
Muslim community and the sacredness of death in Islam, they aimed to inform the
Muslim community and burial undertakers about several facets of Islamic burial
in a French context. Furthermore, they aimed to make the French mayors more
sensitive to the needs of the Muslim community:
The Muslim community demands the same rights as other citizens, that is, to enjoy
equality regarding death, and that means a burial in accordance with their faith (‘Les
maires ont un rôle central,’ p. 1).107
Four main goals stood out: (1) to inform both their constituency and mayors about
the need to be buried in the ground and the prohibition of cremation; (2) to provide
for graves in the direction of Mecca or, more precisely, to position the deceased on
the right side facing Mecca; (3) to recommend to families to buy concessions for 30
(or at least 25) years; (4) if exhumation cannot be avoided, to request a confessional
ossuary.
In fact, the study explicitly recommends that the municipality of Lyon should
create a confessional ossuary where the remains of the bodies can be stored af-
ter exhumation: “regrouping the remains of the persons deceased of the Muslim
confession” (Carrés Musulmans, p. 11).108 Furthermore, the study outlines the
technical aspects of the construction of the carré, how the graves are positioned
toward Mecca, and a recommendation on the form of separation of the carré. In
their opinion, “the decrees propose the use of bushes as a way of demarcating”
(Bilan 2: p. 11).109 Finally, the study requests that public authorities legalize the
carrés Musulmans and install sections at intermunicipal cemeteries, which would
solve a lack of Islamic sections in smaller municipalities.
In a press conference on the matter, they justified their demands in reference to
the framework and language of the latest 2008 Circulaire, saying this decree
encourages the mayors (…) to favour the existence of spaces which regroup persons
deceased from the same confession. Laïcité does not consist of a prohibition of religion,
but rather the recognition of the freedom of belief, that is, the freedom to believe or not to
believe. The principle of laïcité demands strict neutrality of the mayors, meaning they have
to respect the deceased according to their religion, whether known, declared, or presumed.
If they act in opposition to this, this creates discrimination, which is prohibited by the
Code of Autonomous Regions. So, the mayors must be able to accommodate everybody,
regardless of their confession (‘Les maires ont un rôle central,’ p. 1, my translation).
107 “La communauté musulmane demande les mêmes droits que leurs autres concitoyens, c’est-à-dire
une égalité devant la mort, et cela veut dire une mort dans le respect de leur foi” ; my translation.
108 This is contested. Although citizens have the right to have their remains stored in an ossuary (Art.
R. 2223–20 du CGCT), this should not qualify as a confessional ossuary.
109 Again, this is a contested interpretation of the 2008 decree.
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I asked them how they had proceeded in their demands. After their own inventory
of available Muslim burial places, the first step was to formulate a demand for more
sections. This was difficult in a French context, where numbers are neither available
on religious affiliation nor permissible. So, they decided to take the existence of
houses of worship as an indicator, the logic being that ‘where there’s a mosque, there
are Muslims.’ The region as a whole has an estimated 173 places of worship, some 50
of which are located in the department of Rhône. The second step involved talking
with the prefects of le COURLY to establish a common plan of action. Third, they
approached the mayors of the 57 individual municipalities, hoping that agreement
on the level of le COURLY might convince hesitating mayors.
To my question whether they met with a lot of resistance, the president of the
CRCM responded that this was rare: Most mayors were very willing to listen and
consider action, but sometimes concerns with available space stood in the way of
creating a parcel. Occasionally, their demands were refused, for example, in the
municipality of Chambéry, where the majority of the municipality was willing to
construct a Muslim section.
Yet one man, a socialist and former minister, wielded a lot of power and was
against Muslim sections. “Not only because he is racist,” said the president, “but also
because he does not think that favours integration.” He formulated the latter’s logic
as follows: “If we are together in life, why be separate in death?” As the president
remarked, people from the left political spectrum were generally less amenable to
accommodating religious needs. “Men from the right (hommes du droit) have fewer
complexes about religion.”
He strongly disagreed with the former minister’s position. “Not allowing for
Muslim parcels is counterproductive. If Muslims wish to be buried here, that means
they feel at home.” The state or municipalities should play a facilitating role in this
process, he thought. But he was very keen on emphasizing the role of Muslims in
this endeavour.
The explanation for so few existing carrés in France, he said, is first and foremost,
“because there has been no demand, simply put.” This changed only recently, first
because people have started to feel at home and second because they are increasingly
becoming aware of their religion. According to the president, this meant exactly
the opposite from what is usually associated with repatriation. Islam prescribes
burial in the land of death. And burial in France allows them to fulfill the duty to
pray and visit the deceased on a regular basis. Furthermore, the lack of resources
and organization within the Muslim communities and, in his quite critical formu-
lation, their previous “intellectual laziness” had not helped. Describing himself as
‘a man of action’ (l’homme du terrain), he said: “Here, if you want to get something
done, you have to ask for it. (…) Here [in France] we have to think.” He gave the
counterexample of the United States, where society was very open and proactive
when it comes to religion.
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I inquired about the role of the CFCM and different regional CRCMs in this
process. A widely held opinion is that the national CFCM is quite dysfunctional as a
national body in contrast to the regionally active CRCMs. In the president’s opinion,
the CRCMs provided for a good potential venue of establishing parcels, but, as
with everything, “people have to make the change.” Thus far, only his CRCM had
initiated action. “We are the ones who demands most, who take the most action.”
When I confronted him with the statement by one of my previous respondents, a
former advisor to the Minister of Interior110, that Lyon was an exception, and that
the CRCMs were in fact merely symbolic, he answered “That bastard!”
I interpreted his strong reaction to this statement as not being taken seriously
and undermining what he saw as a potentially effective political tool for Muslims.
Did he not agree with the often-heard argument that the CFCM and related CRCMs
were merely symbolic constructs, a Gallican effort of the French state to control
Islam and domesticate it according to French logic?111 As one burial agent working
in the area Lyon expressed it, using meat as metaphor for Muslim cemeteries:
We are like chained dogs. They do not give us meat, rather they give us Styrofoam to still
our immediate appetite. But that doesn’t work. A little bit later we’re hungry again. We
remain hungry, and that makes us aggressive.112
The president was little impressed by arguments about domestication.
Eh, well, I could care less! I work on behalf of the Muslim community. If they leave us to
ourselves, it will never happen. We will never organize! I know the young people do not
want the state to help, but we absolutely need to work with the French state.
5.4.4 Summary French Municipalities
The embedded cases described above answer the primary field research questions.
For the historical examples, I limit the answer to solutions chosen and the reasons
given. And in preparation for the general research question 3 discussed in Sec-
tion 7.3.3, I summarize here the case findings in regard to the question: “How is
secularism used and argued for?”
110 Interview with the former advisor to the Minister of Interior and Professor at the Imam Teaching
Catholic Seminar, 5 February 2009.
111 See Bauberot: 2004 and Bowen: 2007 on the Gallican strand in laïcité in relation to the CFCM.
112 Interview with the Muslim burial agent in Lyon, 11 February 2009. This is a close approximation of
his wordings, based on my fieldnotes.
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Field Research Question (1): What Institutional Solutions Are Chosen?
The Muslim enclosure in the cemetery of Père-Lachaise (1857) was a full-fledged
section, referred to by some as “the Muslim cemetery.” It had a clear demarcation,
entrance, mosque, and graves in the direction of Mecca, until 1881. Bobigny (1937)
was a private cemetery until 1999. The form of governance of the cemetery has
changed over time. The first Islamic section in Thiais (1957) contained only regular
concessions (5 years) that were not in the direction of Mecca.
The contemporary reality in the Parisian cemeteries includes – and has included
– a wide variety of confessional as well as cultural sections (e.g., Asian). Currently,
Thiais contains Asian, Buddhist, Orthodox, Catholic, Jewish, and at least six dif-
ferent Muslim sections. Confessional sections exist in Montreuil, even with a high
demarcation (Jewish section) and unofficial private entrance (Muslim section).
Typically, the confessional sections are understood by the lower-level adminis-
trators as “regroupings the result of individual choices.” Yet, the mayor of Montreuil
and the Parisian head of cemetery services are more blunt about their collective
dimension. In Lyon, the demand by the commission of CRCM Rhone D’Alpes
entails an explicit demarcation around the section (in the form of bushes). They
propose giving the confessional section a legal status and suggest Islamic ossuaries
as a solution to the demand for eternal grave-rest.
Field Research Questions 2 & 3: What Are the Reasons Given/Issue Frameworks?
The historical material in the Paris region revealed primarily a concern with
geopolitical motivations: wars, the role of France as an imperial and Muslim power,
and the Gallican motivation of the French government to support a visible and
‘good Islam’ that can be controlled.
It is hard to know from the secondary sources how confessional sections or
cemeteries were publicly justified. Godin justifies the cemetery of Bobigny out of
an “absolute respect for their religion” and in light of a defense “of the belief in the
individual right of conscience.” We can infer that legal changes, for example, the
1881 prohibition to demarcate sections, have had some (albeit limited) bearing
on the institutional format of provisions on Père-Lachaise.113 Bobigny’s form of
governance changed over time. A concern with the de-facto management of the
terrain by the grand mosque of Paris became problematic only since the late 1980s,
when it is ‘brought back’ into the legal framework. The historical cases show that,
at a time when France was trying to establish itself as a ‘grand Muslim power,’
113 Under political pressure from the Turkish and Persian embassies, the washing house continues to
exist, and the surrounding demarcation remains in the form of a prominent hedge.
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orientalism became in vogue and “Islam did not scare yet” (D’Adler: 2005, 11),114
the public presence of Islam was much less politicized.
In contemporary Paris, the head of the Cemetery Services ascribes the wide
variety of existing confessional and cultural sections to four sets of reasons: First, in
his narrative, the historical changes in laïcité resulted in demands for changes in the
burial management, regardless of the factual situation.With the historical transition
of an open and communal laïcité (laïcité commune et ouverte) at the time of the
Napoleonic Decree (1804) toward a more stringent, combative version (laïcité de
combat) at the time of the Third Republic, everything previously permitted became
prohibited. The legislation changed, but not the reality at ground level. This explains
the existing contradictions. Today, that ideology is further continued in the burial
legislation, which is yet even more out of tune with the contemporary existing
demands (laïcité and logique du terrain).
Second, that administrators continue to provide for them is nevertheless a matter
of pragmatic consideration. “As a matter of fact, and also because we are obliged
to provide for these sections, mainly because there is a very strong demand.” He
thinks the solution should be to fine-tune the legal burial framework to factual
reality – “put our concept of positive laïcité to the test.” He does not believe in a
private solution. Properly understood, laïcité (laïcité bien comprise) was a guarantee
for equal treatment. Legalizing confessional cemeteries might result in exclusions
reminiscent of the Catholic practices before the Revolution. He is very conscious
of his position as an administrator rather than a legislator.
Third, administrators regularly overrule their commitment to the neutrality
of third parties with that of a humane management and providing satisfaction
(professional codes). Both he and the conservator are sensitive to the power of
the religious groups that make demands: “We are not going to amuse ourselves by
putting the Jew next to the Muslim.”
Fourth, the conservator of Pantin furthermore mentions the weight of history
– “And today, because these sections exist, we use them” – and her place in the
hierarchy. Her account shows that the ideology underlying the 1881 legal changes
has consistently contrasted with the actual facts. Since the beginning of Pantin
(1886), the Jewish population has been given rows of graves making it the ‘laic
Pantin,’ the ‘Jewish cemetery.’ Yet, this was the result of family regroupings and a
system of buying in advance rather than a political decision (logique du terrain).
In terms of the dominant frameworks, administrators see the matter as an issue
of being pragmatic and providing (consumer) satisfaction (professional codes), the
114 ‘Bad’ forms of Islam were scary – those associated with Arab fanatism and anticolonial resistance.
This fear gave rise to the governing strategy of fostering ‘good Islam’ by co-opting Muslim leaders
and the financing of religious institutions, e.g., the Paris mosque and cemetery (Maussen: 2009,
247).
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weight of history and system of achat en avance (logique du terrain). The different
forms of laïcité and the various interpretations of the funeral laws (esprit du loi)
should explain these contradictions and exceptions.
In Montreuil, there are likewise roughly four sets of reasons to explain why sec-
tions exist: First, the mayor and administrators apply a certain level of pragmatism:
“What is the problem for the mayor? (…) The problem is the number of available
spaces in the cemetery. Afterwards, whether they believe in Mecca, Jerusalem, or
whatever is not our concern.”
Second, several of the mayor’s decisions seem to be motivated by a concern
with electoral gain and avoiding conflict (see the political pamphlet in which he
promises a Muslim cemetery). As in Paris, the mayor is sensitive to the wider
political ramifications of his decisions, the possible attacks by the extreme right,
and conflicts with religious leaders. Both the mayor and the administrators express
their readiness to violate the requirement of leaving all parts of the cemetery open
to all, if politically pressured. Yet, similar to the situation in Paris, the administrators
are hesitant to admit it. The mayor, however, has less trouble admitting this and
uses his professional discretion: “It has to be a very serious matter to prohibit a
mayor from doing something.” This political sensitivity applies today but was not
present historically.
Third, similar to the Paris case study, the oldest Jewish section at the old cemetery
of Montreuil resulted from a factual dynamic. This did not require grand political
decisions, but rather developed ‘organically’ because of demands by the families
(logique du terrain).
Fourth, the mayor’s reasoning shows his commitment to practicing religious
freedom as a central commitment. Granting confessional sections is “logical” be-
cause funeral rites can be seen as central to the religious practices of Muslims. This,
he claims, follows from the 1905 law. Furthermore, he is committed to the idea of
equity between Jews and Muslims, that is, the need to let Muslims catch up and thus
to provide them with the material conditions to realize practical religious freedom.
The key ways in which the mayor justifies his decisions are pragmatism, profes-
sional code (which, as mayor, means electoral gain and discretion, avoiding conflict),
pragmatic logic, and the 1905 law. Explicitly avoided as structuring framework is
laïcité, and he hardly references the burial legislation.
For Muslims in Lyon, the motivation for asking for sections is, first, the Islamic
prescription to be buried in the land of death (and the sacredness of death) and,
second, a change in demand: the increasing settlement and integration of the
Muslim community in the host country (to feel ‘chez eux’).They frame their demand
in large part in the language of the 2008 political decree: as a request for equal
(individual) citizen rights on behalf of the Muslim community. This is a demand for
individual rights insofar as the bearer of the right in this formulation is a citizen (in
conformity with the logic of the 2008 Circulaire). But it also emphasizes Muslims as
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a collective. “The Muslim community demands the same rights as other co-citizens,
that is to say, equality regarding death and a burial in accordance with their faith.”
Laïcité is referred to as a proxy for secularism. The principle of laïcité, they argue,
demands strict neutrality of the mayors, the need to respect the deceased’s religion.
Confessional sections are not only compatible with laïcité, indeed the latter requires
it.
The main frameworks through which they perceive the issue are that of citizen
integration, Islamic prescripts, and laïcité.
Finally, as input for Chapter 7: How is secularism used and argued for? The
administrators in Paris and Montreuil very actively apply the term laïcité (as the
French proxy), which is the legal, historical, or normative horizon that – strictly
interpreted –would constrain the administrators’ actions. “If you follow the letter
of the law, you cannot do anything.” But because burial is also seen as public service
and a pragmatic notion, they regularly overrule their commitment to neutrality of
third parties with that of a humane management and providing satisfaction.
What holds for all French respondents is that laïcité has real-life connotations.The
fear of transgressing against laïcité forms an inevitable part of the administrators’
daily work situation, which is probably why in the course of our conversation they
shift from a formal ideological answer to more honest versions. Certain versions
of laïcité (laïcité positive, laïcité ouverte) are seen as justifying violations of the
legal text regarding burial. Occasionally, in their reasoning, laïcité becomes a more
general action-guiding norm of equity, to be obeyed by society at large, irrespective
of whether it applies to the public or private sphere. Laïcité is furthermore also
presented as the foundational narrative of the French Republic.
The head of the Cemetery Services refers to a wide variety of forms of laïcité
that have developed over time: laïcité française, laïcité dure, laïcité de combat, laïcité
commune et ouverte, laïcité positive, laïcité bien comprise. In this narrative, the
historical changes in laïcité result in demands for changes in the burial management,
regardless of the factual situation. In other words, laïcité functions as an imagined
historical actor.
The mayor of Montreuil does not use the term laïcité very often, out of fear of
politicization. Adding adjectives to laïcité would “betray her.” Yet, like the Parisian
administrator, he draws a similar historical canvas:
The 1905 law, have you studied it? It is crucial! You have to put yourself in the context of
that time. [dramatic voice] … Conflicts between the state, a Catholic church that wants to
determine everything, and a very anticlerical government (…) Then a time of peace, of
dialogue where one returns to the serious matters and makes the compromise: freedom
of conscience. Freedom of religion is nothing but a consequence thereof.
Similar to the Parisian administrator, he relies on a historical narrative about
Catholic exclusion in the cemetery before the Revolution. This foundational nar-
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rative serves both as an explanation and a justification. Confessional sections are
basically just a bad thing, resulting from exclusionary Catholic practices. Yet, it is
only a matter of justice that today this provision is equally extended to all organized
religions.
5.5 Conclusion: Comparative Municipal Findings
After all this discourse, much rich insight has emerged into the actions and public
reasoning of burial professionals and Muslims/humanists who deal with these
diversity issues on a day-to-day basis. Furthermore, the embedded case studies
provide pertinent insight into the relevant actors and processes that led to these
solutions.
Table 5.5 summarizes the central decision-makers, initiators, and relevant Mus-
lim/humanist or other interlocutors in each of the embedded cases (further dis-
cussed in Chapter 6). Tables 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 summarize the answers on the ‘how
and why’ of accommodation (further discussed in both Chapters 6 and 7). To avoid
redundancy, I refer to the discussions in those chapters, respectively.
By way of summary, I would like to highlight four important findings. First,
central to the complaint of the Norwegian humanists (Section 5.3.4), I discovered at
the municipal level a set of arguments that can explain why the Church of Norway
was given administrative charge of the cemeteries in 1996.This entailed the decision
to give the cemeteries to the local church as part of the tasks of the Joint Parish
Council, which in turn occurred as part of a larger process of disestablishment
and as a way of securing the Joint Parish Council as a relevant local player vis-
à-vis the municipality. With this centrally municipal and intertwined dimension
of Norwegian state-church politics, I argue, we are now in a better position to
understand the 1996 decision.
Second, in all embedded cases across all countries (with the exception of Elverum)
I found that burial officials provided a designated area for Muslims in the public
cemetery. This was no surprise, insofar as Chapter 4 had already shown that, even
in France, there exists a range of confessional sections. However, what this level of
municipal analysis exposed is that French Thiais is materially no different from the
Dutch Nieuwe Ooster: The Thiais cemetery currently provides separate Asian, Bud-
dhist, Orthodox, and Catholic confessional and cultural sections. It also contains a
Jewish section and at least six different types of Muslims sections. The policies in
the different countries are thus even closer to one another in their responses than
expected.
Third, an in-depth historical analysis of the Paris region showed that confessional
sections in France do exist, since 1975 – but not because of their political allowance
or any public framing of the matter in terms of immigrant integration and finding
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pragmatic solutions, which is what the discussion of national policies in the previous
chapter had suggested. However, the historical analysis and fieldwork in the Paris
region showed that confessional sections and a Muslim cemetery existed long
before the 1975 decree. Even more remarkable, I determined that they are not only
the result of grand political decisions (as the historical analysis of Bobigny and
Père-Lachaise suggest), they arose from a factual and practical dynamic.
One major example is the way in which a Muslim section rather haphazardly
comes into being in Pantin: In 1918, the 30th division of the cemetery was allocated
for Muslim factory workers to prevent their graves getting mixed up with those
of Muslim soldiers! Also, both the Montreuil and Paris case studies revealed the
natural existence of family groupings, resulting from a system of ‘buying in advance.’
In other words, focusing solely on formal national politics and public reasoning
would omit the dynamic reasons that led French municipal agents to accommodate
Muslim burial needs. In this light, the French decrees are important as a way of
closing the gap between legal prohibition and an already existing logique du terrain
that has informed burial practices for centuries.
Fourth, nevertheless there are large differences as well as some remarkable simi-
larities in the discursive understanding between the countries studied.
The French downplay the collective dimension of a section, seeing it as a “mere
aggregate of individual choices” and presuming that “all places in the cemetery
are available to all.” More generally, they juggle their words and navigate between
formal ideological answers and everyday actions.
TheDutch approach stands out because they have very few problems allowing for
collective demarcation. They see the confessional sections as strongly demarcated
areas to which – in the case of The Hague – religious leaders can allocate their
own people: “To each their own spot.” And they justify their solutions by explicit
concerns with urban planning and financial considerations. I recall the graveyard
director who had no problem honouring the wish of Muslims to put one person in
one grave – “as long as they pay for two bodies.”
Norwegian respondents stand out because they tend to emphasize ‘soft sections’
and to rely heavily on an idea of ‘individual consecration’ as the solution for both
Muslims and humanists.
Concerns with secularism are relevant only in the French context.
In summary, and tentatively, I find evidence for national differences in the way
in which the burial agents and confessional/secular actors reason and make sense
of the solutions provided for. Yet, the national state-church legacies seem to have
little relevance for material outcomes. What then explains this material similarity?
Second, how are state-church legacies or secularism relevant in the public reasoning
of these actors? Here, I refer to Chapters 6 and 7.
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Table 5.2 Summary of all embedded cases in The Netherlands
a) Type of solution and its discursive understanding
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115 Syndicat intercommunal de Bobigny, La Corneuve, Drancy et Aubervilliers.
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Chapter 6: Institutional Patterns of Governance
6.1 Introduction
Chapter 5 amassed a wealth of empirical information. It summarized the solutions
found and the reasons given for each embedded case study. Four central discoveries
surfaced, two of which are relevant for the discussion in this chapter. First, looking
at municipal praxis, countries are even more similar in their material solutions
chosen than presumed. Second, a focus on material praxis revealed the centrality
of a ground dynamic: La logique du terrain played an important role.
Could this similarity in institutional material outcomes be expected based on
the state-organized religious models (hypotheses H1 and H2)? What other factors
might play a role?
In Chapter 4, I already looked at these questions: Why do so many carrés exist in
France? Why there is a lack of Muslim cemeteries in The Netherlands and Norway?
Here, I would like to conclude that discussion in two stages. The respondent’s
answers (see the previous Tables 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 in Section 5.5) suggest a set of first-
hand explanations depending on each municipal context. Second, to do justice
to the complexity of the practical reasoning1 at ground level, I develop a general
analytic understanding of religious governance. Upon comparing case studies,
I discuss the main dynamics affecting policy outcomes and the relevant actors
involved in this process (see the previous Table 5.5, in Section 5.5). And I gather an
even wider set of possible causes: The reasons mentioned can be, but do not have
to be, actual causes.2
Section 6.2 provides a short description of the institutional municipal pattern.
Section 6.3 discusses hypotheses H1 and H2 concerning the material component
of the municipal pattern. Section 6.4 reveals the full gamut of possible factors and
processes at play in the governance of these group needs, visualized in the Actor
1 Complexity of practical reason and judgment stem from political philosophy. They refer to different
normative arguments at play: moral prescriptions, conflicting with prudential and or realistic pre-
scriptions, and the difficulty of weighing and balancing them. The highest administrator in Paris has
to weigh the professional ethical code of humane management while not disturbing the public order
(prudential prescription) with a legal prescription that prohibits consulting with religious leaders
in decisions concerning burial in a confessional section. This weighing cannot take place in any
meaningful way, according to a priori lexical ordering; it takes place in a given institutional context
(cf. Bader: 2007a, 90).
2 Respondents might not always know why they choose certain solutions. They might hide, leave out,
or be unaware of actual motives. Furthermore, actions can have a multiplicity of causes.
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Institution Constellation Chart (Section 6.4.2), which serves as an analytical tool.
Section 6.5 concludes with three sets of reasons for similar material outcomes across
national contexts.
6.2 Municipal Pattern: Material Similarity, Legal Differences
The following municipal pattern emerges upon comparison of the embedded cases
across countries. The most commonly followed strategy in all countries is public. In
a purely material sense, public officials provided for a designated area for Muslims
in the public cemetery, the exception being Elverum. In Almere, the solution entails
a private Muslim cemetery, although some consider this to be a confessional section
of a municipal cemetery as well (see Section 5.2.3). In this respect, there are no
clear indications of a ‘French,’ ‘Norwegian,’ or ‘Dutch’ way.3
This changes, however, when we include the qualitative rules governing these
sections (i.e., their legal status). When we ask: “Where are sections legally not
allowed?” all French municipalities become the outliers. Alternatively, the confes-
sional section exists legally only in The Netherlands, where it is differentiated into
self- and non-self-governed sections; the latter distinction has a legal basis within
Dutch regulations.4 Private cemeteries, too, are forbidden only in France, whereas
in the other two countries they are part of the legal offer (albeit politically frowned
upon in Norway).
A third way of comparing takes the discursive understanding of the solution
taken into consideration.5 I deal with that in the next chapter.
The table below summarizes the above-discussed material and the legal policy
outcomes among the various countries at all levels of governance. It condenses the
information from Chapters 3, 4, and 5. Furthermore, it anticipates the question of
the hypotheses H1 and H2.
3 It is, of course, still significant that there are fewer Muslim sections in France than in the other two
countries. But such numbers are very informal and probablymuch higher than the typical 75 reported.
4 The interpretation of Article 39.2 in the burial law allows the particular church community to make
decisions about the design, the material form of demarcating that part of the municipal cemetery,
in deliberation with the cemetery management and municipality. Interview with legal advisor, 10
August 2012.
5 A discursive understanding is not disconnected from a legal reality, but they are of a different quality.
What the burial agents say about the solutions provided for is not just a matter of discourse.They often
provide a justification while referencing a political reality, e.g., the decision-makers in Amsterdam
know that a ‘multifunctional facility’ is amore politically correct way of describing the Islamic washing
facility.
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Table 6.1 Institutional policy outcomes (material, legal) specified at three levels of governance
Coun-
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6.3 Hypotheses H1 and H2
Let us now examine these legal and material municipal patterns and link them to
the hypothesis from the Introduction. To avoid redundancies, I refer to the tables
in Section 5.5 for the relevant reasons given by the central actors involved:
(H1): If we base our understanding of the national state-organized religion models as
‘strictly secular’ for France, as ‘pillarized’ for The Netherlands, and as ‘established’ for
Norway, we might expect France to express an unwillingness to accommodate Islam
in any way that compromises the neutrality of the public sphere; that The Netherlands
would find some formof pillarized Islamic set of institutions: group rights for all, a large
number of Islamic cemeteries, and Islamic sections in public graveyards; that Norway
would conclude that the Lutheran Church continues to be relevant as the privileged de-
nomination, extending rights and facilitative services to other confessional and secular
groups as part of that privilege.
(H2): If we base our conception of nationalmodels on amore heterogeneous version,
we might expect to find different ideological traditions within a country’s repertoire
which come into play on different issues and vary over time. Yet, we should still be
able to identify policy responses in one country that are absent in another (i.e., there
would be true ‘national’ differences). These differences could be plausibly linked to
state-organized religious regimes. We conceptualize French relations as a combination
of Gallican, associational, and strictly secular scripts (Bowen: 2007, 2012); those ofThe
Netherlands as a combination of ‘principled pluralism’ (Monsma/Soper: 1997) and a
secular tradition (Maussen: 2009, 2012); those of Norway conceptualize according to
its state-organized religious legacy as entailing ‘establishment’ (the remaining Lutheran
hegemony), ‘compensatory evenhandedness’ (compensation toward other minorities),
and (municipal) disestablishment schemes (Breemer: 2014, 2019).
French Embedded Cases
From the interviews depicted in Chapter 5, three main sets of factors help to
explain why so many Islamic sections and cemeteries exist in France:
1) Logique du terrain: A ground-level praxis has provided for confessional and
cultural sections over time, in particular for Jews. Because these exist, and because
they are materially embedded in the physical contours of the cemetery, decision-
makers (also) provide them for Muslims today. Historically, groups (or families)
have requested to be buried next to one another. Because of the previous system of
buying burial plots in advance (achat en avance), families bought up whole rows
of graves. Thus, these sections arose “naturally.” This pressure is being felt again
today. Religious representatives put pressure on the administrators to abide by their
burial wishes. They also get their way in terms of special hedges and entrances (e.g.,
Jewish and Muslim communities in Montreuil).
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2) Professional codes: These lead the burial decision-makers to avoid causing a
public disturbance: “I am not going to amuse myself by putting a Jew next to a
Muslim” (Paris contemporary). They stand up for a humane management even
if this violates laic guidelines (Paris contemporary). Or they simply want to be
pragmatic6 and use their professional discretion: “For amayor, what is the problem?”
(Montreuil). The mayor has to bury his citizens and satisfy his electorate.
3) Alternative regimes: These overrule the burial regime. Decisions are justified
by referring to certain versions of laïcité: “open,” “positive,” “well understood” (Paris
contemporary). Alternatively, in the case of the mayor of Montreuil, accommo-
dating Muslims is reasoned to be in line with the 1905 law, in order to provide
the material basis for their religious freedom of practice (following from freedom
of conscience). The national decrees (1975, 1990, 2008) allow Muslim sections
based on a concern with immigrant integration that overrules laic guidelines. Yet,
in the embedded case studies, only the Muslim representatives in Lyon mention
this as an argument. Of the existing Islamic cemeteries, I investigated only Bobigny.
Presumably, this was put in place because of Gallican motivations (control and
support).
As to the hypothesis H1: A standard state-organized religious legacy (laïcité)
plays an important role in determining outcomes.
I was unable to confirm this statement for H1. The existence of so many Mus-
lim sections and the Muslim cemetery of Bobigny through 1999 is not conform
with the expectation of the unwillingness to accommodate Islam in any way that
compromises the neutrality of the public sphere.
That policy outcome better fits the expectations based on H2. There, both the
Gallican element and that of associational freedom could lead one to believe that
the French state would support this Islamic provision (as well as want to control it).
The descriptive powers of the internally heterogeneous model have thus improved
in this example.
Can we better explain outcomes with a heterogeneous model? I will hold off my
final answer to this question until the discursive analysis in Chapter 7. Possible
proof would involve showing that decision-makers appropriate the state-church
legacy in different ways in the different countries.7 And it would involve showing
that the scripts have a systemic and/or historical dimension.
An initial answer to that question is that the inferred motivation for the Muslim
cemetery of Bobigny was indeed that of colonial celebration and (sanitary) control
of its Muslim subjects (the Gallican element). Second, part of the reasoning of the
mayor of Montreuil indeed fits Bowen’s script of associational freedom.
6 In my summary here, I have included pragmatism as part of burial professional codes.
7 I say ’possible proof ’ because discursive relevance does not always imply explanatory relevance.
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The Dutch embedded cases: Why are there almost no Islamic cemeteries, despite
such a religious evenhandedness concerning burial legislation?Why do they finance
the Islamic washing facility in Amsterdam with public funds?
The Netherlands counts around 267 Jewish cemeteries and an additional 2,233
other confessional cemeteries (see Table 4.2 in Section 4.2). The reasons for the
absence of Muslim cemeteries are said to lie in a lack of financial and organiza-
tional resources on the part of Muslims, their unwillingness to assume the large
administrative burdens, and the high percentage of repatriation (90%).8
The ‘successful’ case of Almere, however, revealed that financial obstacles may,
but need not, be a concern. The degree of organization and extent to which Muslims
are well informed mattered. As their main motivation for establishing a private
cemetery, Muslims in Almere mention the desire to be independent, to “set our own
rules,” and to secure permanent grave-rest in accordance with Islamic guidelines.
They benefitted in the process from a willing municipality and specific urban-
planning and financial considerations.
The reasons mentioned for financing the Islamic washing facility with public
funds in Amsterdam are a concern with citizen integration, despite state-church
separation.
Regarding hypothesis H1: A state-organized religious legacy plays an impor-
tant role in determining outcomes. I was unable to confirm this statement for
pillarization. There are no signs of an Islamic pillar.
Relying on a more heterogeneous model, as was central to H2, removes the
expectation of a pillar, so in that sense it was an improvement. Yet, the constitutive
elements of the heterogeneous model (separation and principled pluralism) did
not change much in terms of the expected institutional outcome. We would still
anticipate a wide variety of collective provisions for Muslims, which of course
exist in the form of legally well-anchored confessional sections. But the constitutive
elements of the heterogeneousmodel did not better anticipate the absence ofMuslim
cemeteries. This is more of a puzzle in the Dutch context than in the Norwegian
one, given the vast numbers of confessional cemeteries in The Netherlands.
As for the financing of the washing facility, the separation element did not help
to anticipate this outcome. But, as we will see, it did help anticipate which issues
were discursively relevant.
In sum, internal factors of governance mattered most in the absence of Islamic
cemeteries. This involved the repatriation behaviour of Muslims, on the one hand,
and their willingness or capacity for organizing themselves, on the other hand. I
explain the public financing of the washing-house in Amsterdam by a concern
8 Interview with the President of the Association for Islamic Burial, 9 December 2008.
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with state-church separation that is overruled by concerns with citizen integration
(alternative regime).
At this point in the analysis, I find that the more nuanced model does not better
explain the discrepancy between the legal burial guidelines and actual practice.
Rather, factors of internal governance and alternative regimes matter most.
Was the reformulation of the standard model then without merit? See Chapter 7
for my comments.
Norwegian embedded cases: In the Norwegian context, I inquired into two contrasts:
First, private Muslim cemeteries in Norway represent a legal option that is not
exercised. Second, why did the Norwegian state give the church charge of the public
cemeteries in 1996 at a time of increasing pluralism?
Starting with the first question: could we have expected this based on the char-
acterization of the standard model as ‘established’? In a sense, this is the case: The
lack of Muslim cemeteries could be explained against the backdrop of the financial
context, in which the public Lutheran/public cemeteries are paid for by the public
budget.9 Yet, Muslim or other registered communities do not receive compensation
for the expenses of this public item. The municipal expenses for the maintenance
and construction of new cemeteries are not reported as expenses made on behalf of
the Norwegian church. Such an explanation would confirm the privileged role of the
Lutheran Church, although it would leave the ‘evenhandedness component’ rather
weakly realized. ‘Establishment’ thus seems to be a partially correct description
and anticipation of a lack of Muslim cemeteries.
But it is not necessarily the correct (or only) explanation. The answers and
considerations of Muslims confirm this. In Oslo, Muslims emphasized that the
public offer for collective sections is good enough. Further reasons mentioned
for not following the Jewish example were a lack of financial and organizational
resources.10 There is an unwillingness to take on the large administrative and
regulative burdens that come with getting permissions for a cemetery. (French
Muslims also argued this way.11)
9 Yet, these costs are not calculated into the sum of expenses made on behalf of the Norwegian
church. The sum of all state and municipal spending on the Church of Norway is used as a baseline
to calculate the allowance per member of each religion or secular minority. Since 1996, belief or
life-stance communities receive a state and municipal compensation per member. In other words,
unlike its commitment to a full evenhandedness in other domains, other religious or life-stance
communities do not receive compensation for this set of public (cemetery) expenses.
10 I base this on interviews with the Representative from Al-Khidmat, 29 April 2009 and the Secretary
General of the Islamic Council of Norway, 27 July 2009.
11 In France, this is not a legal option, but there too Muslims themselves do not prefer this as a solution
because of possible financial and organizational burdens, see Hakim: 2005, 104.
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Furthermore, the relevance of internal factors of governance becomes visible if
we compare them with another minority within the same state: Early on, the Jewish
minority in The Netherlands sought to construct their own cemeteries, leading
to 267 Jewish cemeteries. And even in Norway, where Jews were only formally
allowed since 1851, there are nevertheless three Jewish cemeteries. This is telling,
considering the total of only 15 confessional graveyards beyond the Lutheran/public
offer. In other words, in neither country are there any Muslim cemeteries, although
they are legally permissible in both. On the other hand, there are Jewish cemeteries
in both countries.
In sum, the absence of Muslim cemeteries must stem from the internal gover-
nance structure of the Muslims themselves. Explaining the lack of Muslim ceme-
teries through the lens of establishment (external factor of governance) fails to
properly respect the internal factors of governance.
The second question tried to understand why the Norwegian state gave the church
charge of the public cemeteries in 1996. That legal act was perceived to contrast
the commitment to increasing pluralism and evenhandedness toward religious and
secular minorities. Although the standard model seemed a good predictor of this
fact, along the line of ‘established religion states want to maintain their hegemony,’
it was nevertheless less precise for explaining institutional change.12
In this example, I have worked backwards, inferring an explanation for the 1996
change from interviews and literature.13 Second, I traced this element more system-
atically back in the history of Norwegian state-church relations (see Section 3.3.3).
This served to explore whether it constituted a well-established type of reasoning
– or the idiosyncratic reasoning of a specific public official. Then I added that ex-
planation to the model: ‘municipal disestablishment’ or more elaborately: ‘(local)
disestablishment of the church from the municipality with the aim of establishing
the local church among the people.’
If my analysis was correct, I should have improved the explanatory power of the
heterogeneous model.
Yet, as a descriptive device, it proved hard to derive an institutional prediction,
because terms like ‘establishment’ and ‘disestablishment’ are vague and require
much more specification to be descriptively useful. At the least, they require the
specification of the level of society. Over the last decade in Norway, a process of
12 If the standard model can explain why the church is in administratively in charge of the cemeteries
since 1996, how can it explain the situation before 1996, when formally the municipality was in
charge?
13 Interview with the Former Director General of the Department of Ecclesiastical Affairs, 1 November
2012. Alsvik (1995, 111) makes a similar argument.
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national and constitutional disestablishment has occurred, while strengthening
local church establishment.
Furthermore, disestablishment without a specified national institutional con-
text could be understood as separating the link between cemeteries and church
(separation according to a Dutch or French logic).
In this Norwegian example, however, ‘separation’ is understood as separating the
function of local state from that of the local church by giving the parish full charge
of the cemeteries. This is indeed a form of administrative separation, albeit one that
still keeps the financial and ownership functions intertwined.14 Furthermore, it
explicitly aims to strengthen the position of the local Lutheran Church by “creating
identity in the people” (Innst.O.no.46: 1995–1996, p. 2).
In sum, the rather heterogeneous model I suggested was not much of an im-
provement for anticipating the Norwegian municipal and national policy outcomes.
Yet, it did offer improvement in explaining the 1996 change and preventing an
understanding of that change through the lens of establishment. More than any-
thing, the 1996 funeral act was the effect of municipal-church politics, rather than
state-church politics. Second, maintaining an important local role for the church
occurred through disestablishment, rather than establishment.15
If we combine the two sets of arguments from Chapters 4 and 5, the 1996 funeral
act now makes sense as a further ‘disintertwinement’ (or disestablishment) of local
church and municipality. At the same time, it confirms – or for the moment at
least does not challenge – the wish of a national political majority to hold on to the
church as an important cultural/value foundation for the state’s national and local
projects (establishment).
6.4 Reasons for Accommodation: Multiplicity of Factors and Means
In what follows, I step back from the particular country and municipal case studies
and return to a general picture of the governance of the burial needs of these
groups. Here, the purpose of the discussion is more general and analytical: I discuss
for all embedded cases the observed dynamic affecting policy outcomes – that of
minorities making claims and the local authorities trying to find solutions. (I rely
especially on Table 5.5, Chapter 5.)
Generalizing from these empirical findings, I return to Bader’s governance frame-
work and his focus on internal and external factors of governance, both of which
14 The parish legally owns the graveyards, yet the municipality pays for them. It is a bit of a halfway
house.
15 We can, of course, also nuance our conception of establishment as entailing (1) a control dimension
(2) a support dimension, and (3) political and symbolic alliance dimensions.
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can be seen top-down and bottom-up. But I also include elements of Scharpf and
Schmidt’s actor institutionalism into Bader’s explanatory framework.
I propose an actor constellation chart to visualize this complexity. Using this
heuristic device, I discuss the relevant external factors of governance that can bear
on policy outcomes and conclude with three sets of reasons that can account for
similar material outcomes across national contexts in this study.
6.4.1 The Institutionalization of Minorities: Internal vs. External
Governance
Bader conceptualized the institutionalization of religion orminorities as a “two-way
and conflictive process” (2014, 1). In most of my case studies,16 the construction
of Muslim sections or Islamic cemeteries indeed involved consultation processes
between states (or in The Netherlands private cemetery owners) and Muslim/hu-
manist interlocutors. Both sides had to adapt the rules and regulations – or even
invent new ones. Alternatively, formal rules are left in place but accommodation
occurs nevertheless.
On the Muslim side, imams, European fatwas, or regional representative bod-
ies (CRCM Rhône d’Alpes) played a role in sanctioning certain practices and in
informing their constituency of the permissibility of burial practices within an im-
migration context (internal governance top-down).17 Moreover, it proved crucial
for this institutional domain to understand the bottom-up behaviour of groups
(internal governance bottom-up). This included both the changing repatriation pat-
tern as well as the desire (and pressure) of confessional/cultural groups, or families,
to be buried as a collective.
On the part of the state or public authorities, I observed a set of actors (mostly
municipal agents) who play a role in this institutionalization process, as well as
relevant private actors. This was most pertinent for the Dutch context.
Dutch cemetery owners play an important role in the decision-making and the
form an Islamic section takes. This is strongest when the ownership is private
(Muslims Almere), but it also holds for independently held forms of municipal
ownership (Amsterdam and The Hague).18 This allows for a wide diversity in
regulations (or in some cases the absence thereof). Second, it results in a larger
sensitivity tomarket forces and – Iwould presume – amore accommodating attitude
16 This is true, with the exception of The Hague, where the initiative for Islamic divisions in the 1980s
came entirely from the municipality. It was likewise the case in Støren.
17 Should Muslims repatriate or be buried in the host country? Is the burial of men and woman in one
grave allowed? May the remains be reburied after a certain time period? (see the Oslo case study).
18 The ‘independent municipal’ cemetery manager (gemeentelijk verzelfstandigd) is a public actor with a
large degree of independence and financial responsibility. He operates it as a not-for-profit business.
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toward religiousminorities.19 Dutch cemetery ownersmust run their cemetery with
an eye toward profit – or at least toward not losingmoney. Instead of their becoming
exclusionary – the fear of many French burial professionals – this can work to the
benefit of religious communities. Private cemetery owners have no interest in being
too restrictive. In the words of one Director of a Catholic cemetery, “That just costs
money.”20 Several Muslim sections exist in Dutch Catholic cemeteries.
My research confirms Døving’s (2005) argument that private burial agents are
important to explaining the smooth integration in the Norwegian burial domain,
regarding religious burial rituals (washing, time of burial). Being private agents,
they are more flexible than public institutions.21 Also, in France, a private burial
undertaker who is well connected to mayors with an Islamic parcel in their munici-
pality is a determinant factor. Through their lobby, families are able to bury their
family member in an Islamic parcel when their own municipality does not have
one.22
Yet, I found the role of private actors to be less important for the decisions over
the spatial and institutional aspects of a burial (cemeteries, parcels). In our study,
these private actors did not influence the form and solution in the cemetery, with
the exception of Al Khidmat, Oslo’s Islamic burial agency, which has a dual role.23
Overall, if we look at the processes and relevant agents, my material indicates a
more proactive role by local governments in The Netherlands and Norway than in
France. Yet, it is hard to generalize for all of France, where there is a tendency to
downplay existing provisions. Probably many more French mayors have provided
for sections without giving it much publicity.
In Amsterdam, The Hague, Støren, and Høybraten (Oslo), initial action comes
from the municipalities. In Almere and the Lyon Region, Muslims themselves
are the initiators and claimants. In The Netherlands, cemetery owners (private or
public) have an important initiating role.
In Norway, the Joint Parish Council initiates action and makes the decisions
in close cooperation with the municipality. In Oslo, the arrangement is slightly
different because Gravferdsetaten operates with more independence from the Joint
ParishCouncil. Remarkably so, the process for constructing a sectionwas possible in
19 This is a question for further empirical research.
20 Interview with the Director of the Catholic Cemetery, The Hague, 4 December 2008.
21 For example, constraints from Norwegian public work hours to bury on Sunday are pragmatically
solved by giving the burial agents the keys to the hospital for the ritual washing or use of the cemetery
(cf. Døving: 2005, 116). Furthermore, the leadership of the Norwegian Ullevål hospital decided to
build a neutral ceremonial room for ritual washing – without Muslims even asking for it, see Døving:
2009.
22 Interview with the burial undertaker, Lyon, 12 February 2009.
23 As addressed later, this functions as a private company and Muslim representative organ.
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Støren without any claims on the part of Muslims. Only the humanist representative
showed an explicit interest in discussing solutions.
In Lyon, Muslims themselves were initiators. Their lobby involved convincing
mayors at the level of le COURLY, which includes 57 municipalities as well as more
targeted action in the department Rhône d’Alpe (69) and the city of Lyon.
Collective sections had historically been present in Paris and Montreuil, so that
extending this provision to Muslims did not require explicit lobbying. The mayors
in Montreuil and Paris were the primary decision-makers, representing the political
establishment. Furthermore, the chef of the Services des cimetières (in Paris) had an
important decision-making role together with the different conservators.
Muslim interlocutors: Muslims in the Lyon case study are represented by the
CRCM Rhône D’Alpes. Its former (and later reelected) president and initiator of
the burial research project was a leader within the UIOF (l’Union des organisations
islamiques de France), a youth-orientated and more hardline Muslim organization
founded in 1983.
Dutch Muslim representatives vary greatly on the matter of burial. There is a
formal Islamic Burial Association, which has operated since 2005 (Stichting Islami-
tisch Begrafeniswezen, IBW), but apart from a representative and informative role,
it has not been very consequential for the existing public and private solutions. In
the Amsterdam case, a platform of large and small Islamic groups, Sunni as well as
Shia, collaborate.24 In The Hague, the different Sunni, Shia, and Ahmadiyya groups
communicate individually with the municipal cemetery management.25 In Almere,
Sunni Muslims largely of Suriname descent decide on the rules in the cemetery.
In the Norwegian context, the role of two separate actors coincides: The Norwe-
gian Islamic Council (IRN) is the main representative organ at the national level
and is consulted on matters of burial. But Islamic burial undertakers play an equally
important role: Since 2007 Al Khidmat has had the authority to speak on behalf of
Muslims on matters of Islamic burial.26 As a formal member of the Islamic Council
(IRN), consisting of Sunni Muslims, it operates on a status equal to mosques, thus
playing a dual role of private company and Muslim representative organ. As seen in
Døving’s case study onHøybraten, otherMuslim representatives are also sometimes
involved in the advisory process. For example, the imam in the Høybraten case
24 This includes large organizations like De Unie van Marrokkaanse Moskeen in Amsterdam en Om-
streken (UMMAO), Milli Görüs Nederland, Diyanet, and other, smaller Muslim groups like Stichting
Fatima Al Zahra (representative of Shia Muslims) and Ahmadiya Lahore (ULAMON).
25 I have no informationwhichMuslim groupswere part of the initial negotiation process. Yet, currently,
each group talks with the cemetery management separately.
26 This I mean regarding political administrative matters, not religious interpretation. Interview with
the Secretary General Islamic Council (IRN), 27 July 2009.
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study comes from the Islamic Cultural Centre, a mosque belonging to the Deobandi
movement.
In summary, the focus on multiple actors in Bader’s governance framework
and Scharpf’s (multiple) actor institutionalism proved applicable to this study. Ac-
commodation is not merely the result of national intent (structure of laws and
regulations) but can result from the actions of local governments or nongovern-
mental actors. Notably, the role of private actors holds stronger for a country like
The Netherland, where cemeteries are privatized to a greater degree.
What has also become clear is that these intentional structuring mechanisms
can be layered between levels of social reality. The figure below shows that they can
come from a transnational, national, regional, or municipal level – or even from
the familial level. As a result, different means of governance ensue, beyond formal
rules and laws (more on this later).
As for Bader’s description of the institutionalization of religion as a two-way
“conflictive” process, I can confirm its two-way nature. Nevertheless, I found little
evidence of conflict. Only the Amsterdam case shows rivalry over how to design
an Islamic parcel, the reason why the Surinamese-Pakistani organization Stichting
Welzijn Moslims left the platform.27 Collaboration with this group failed further-
more in Almere. In the Oslo region, there is a tacit understanding that Ahmadiyya
are buried in the cemetery of Alfaset. The burial agents of Al Khidmat will not assist
them with their services because they are not recognized as Muslims. But this does
not seem to lead to any real conflicts.28 In the cemetery in The Hague, there are
explicit separate sections for Sunni and Shi’a Muslims as well as Ahmadiyya, and
the respective groups can refuse access to nonmembers. Again, no conflict leading
up to, or as a result of, this solution is known.
6.4.2 Actor Institution Constellation Chart
Above, I summarized the main dynamic and actors affecting policy outcomes for
all the embedded cases. What needs to be included for a fuller understanding of
the policy outcomes are the external (structural and cultural) factors.
In summary, I propose the following descriptive heuristic, which integrates
elements (1) from Scharpf’s actor-centered institutionalism (a focus on multiple
actors and processes); (2) from Bader’s governance approach (a focus on internal
and external factors top-down and bottom-up); and (3) from Schmidt’s discursive
27 The organization thinks that only Sunni Muslims are true Muslims. Therefore, the section should be
accessible only to Sunnis – or at least have a division between the Sunni and the Shia sections.
28 Interview with Al Khidmat, 29 April 2009.
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Scheme 6.2: Actor institution constellation chart.
institutionalism (institutions visualized as concrete structures and as constructs in
the mind of the actor).
On the right side of the chart, I put the respondent/decision-maker and that
person’s discourse (‘what they say’) and action (‘what they do’). From this outcome,
I reasoned backward to determine what processes played a role and what actors
were involved (in accordance with Scharpf). I distinguished four layers of social
reality: policy process, institutional regimes, praxis, and a discursive level (relying
on Van Engelen: 2000, 6).
The arrow and actors portrayed in the chart are an example of (1) a policy
process: an exchange between the group’s own representatives (Muslim/humanists)
and relevant burial decision-makers. Each party makes their burial demands or
formulates an institutional response in light of (2) a range of institutional regimes
or other sources of authority. The chart shows four examples: burial regime, state-
organized religious regime, integration regime, and Islamic sources of authority.
These proved most relevant in the answers of my respondents across national
contexts.
The rules or scripts emerging from these institutional regimes (or Islamic scrip-
tures) are layered. There can be various intentional steering mechanisms at the
transnational, national, or local level. A good transnational example is the repatria-
tion behaviour of Muslims from Morocco.29 That, furthermore, implies that the
29 Repatriation is steered here by a transnational institution and the availability of an insurance policy
obtained at birth (apart from local customs and family rulings). When parents open a bank account
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modes or means of governance can differ, entailing coercion by means of hard laws,
but also political encouragement providing incentives. Or they can include rules of
local religious leaders who try to alter a social practice of repatriation.
Then, there is (3) the level of praxis. I placed the potential role of cultural sensi-
bilities on this level and the logique du terrain (addressed later on).
Finally, the figure visualizes how the institutional regimes are both concrete
structures as well as ideas and frameworks in the mind of the agent. This points
to (4) a discursive level. In the public discourse of the burial agent or minority, we
see how they make sense of a given burial demand or need. Typically, professional
discourse expresses certain key principles and values (equity, freedom, respect)
that can come from a variety of sources. But discourse is also amenable to change:
Influences from the larger society (a crucial event, a media controversy, or different
discourse alliances) can lead to a reframing of the matter and thus a different
regulation. At the microlevel, the agent can reinterpret a given institutional script
and thereby alter the regulations. This is addressed in the next chapter.
Leaving this general picture of governance, what factors explain similar material
responses despite large legal burial differences? I suggest a ‘multiplicity of factors’
and a ‘multiplicity of means’:
(1)A variety of institutional factors can overrule legal burial guidelines.Cemeteries
are the object of a wide variety of regulations: urban planning, public health, and
rules for commercially exploiting burial services.
In several municipalities in the various countries, considerations with immigrant
integration prevail over concerns with state-church separation or burial guidelines
(e.g., France’s administrative allowance or the public funding of the Islamic washing-
house in Amsterdam). The fact that people perceive confessional sections as an
integration issue can also – negatively – result in their opposition because of anti-
immigrant sentiments or Islamophobia. My cases did not show this, but Y. Klaussen
(2005, 220) talks about it in the case of Denmark.30
In the Dutch context, two regimes proved relevant: urban planning and commer-
cial exploitation. It is a stereotype to say that the Dutch always talk about money.
But in this study, it proved a consequence of the privatization going on in this do-
main and the commercial exploitation by ‘for-profit’ companies or private cemetery
for their newborn in a country like The Netherlands or France, they are offered a set of provisions,
like repatriation of the body to Morocco in the case of death (cf. Dessing: 2001, 161). This links
the newborn automatically to the state of Morocco. For Turkish Muslims in The Netherlands, the
mosques make these arrangements. In Norway, Døving (2005) discusses how Pakistani funeral
committees (begravelseskomitées) assist the families with the burial process. See Section 4.2.3.
30 My material contained suggestions of anti-immigrant motives, for example, in the reasoning of one
central figure in municipality of Chambéry (Section 5.4.3).
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owners. The exposure to market forces is felt much stronger by Dutch cemetery
owners than elsewhere.31
Apart from the possible effect of a variety of institutional regimes, the set of
external or internal factors of governance can be layered and change over time. So,
if we look at the chart and recall the French situation, we note that the burial regime
placed on the left side of the graph entails burial regulations at a variety of levels.
In this study, it was relevant to distinguish national legal and political from
municipal practice. And we furthermore note how this is marked by changes in
law or policies over time (for France, indicated by the years 1804, 1881, 1905 along
the national legal line32) and the political decrees of 1975, 1991, and 2008.
Note that I also included a transnational level, though in terms of the external
rules of governance this was of lesser relevance in this study. Yet, the transnational
level mattered for the internal burial behaviour and regulation among Muslims.
Muslim demands are formulated in respect with internal rules about burial in the
context of immigration. Those can involve (transnationally) European fatwas (see
the Oslo case study) or, for example, the existence of burial insurance issued by
the Moroccan state. It can also include decisions of national or regional Islamic
networks (e.g., CRCM Rhône d’Alpes and national representative bodies), local
imams, or even the pressures of groups of families (Paris contemporary).
2) Multiplicity of means. The case studies showed that there is a ‘multiplicity of
means’ to meet the demands of minorities. This grey zone is where – despite strong
legal differences – convergence can occur in outcomes between countries.33 This
is exemplified in the French attitude toward Muslim parcels and the Norwegian
attitude toward the symbolic inequality for humanists.
Both countries, instead of enacting legal changes, opt for practical and additional
accommodations to compensate for the inequalities, which arise from these default
templates. As one central Norwegian public document on the church administration
of the cemeteries states: “Today’s legislation in this area will be continued. At the
same time we will make accommodations that take care of minorities” (St.meld.no.
2007–2008, p. 11–12). The Norwegian state provided a financial incentive with its
2012 trial project, to support the construction of neutral ceremonial rooms (Section
4.2.3.1).
31 As one graveyard owner expressed it, he changed his strategy from emphasizing the Catholic identity
to making his cemetery more attractive for a more general public. Interview with the Director of the
Catholic Cemetery in The Hague, 4 December 2008.
32 These correspond with the Napoleonic Decree of 1804, the 1881 law on the neutrality of the cemetery,
and the 1905 law of separation between state and church. See Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion.
33 Sections can be permissible but undesired (Elverum), illegal but administratively allowed
(France/Lyon), a legal right (The Hague, Amsterdam), an exception (Père Lachaise/Thiais), or a
violation of the law but nevertheless present (Bobigny 1937–1999).
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Recall the French letter from the Ministry of Interior 2003 discussed in Section
4.2.1: “The law regarding cemeteries andMuslimparcels does not require substantial
modifications.” Yet, “it seems desirable, out of a concern with the integration of
families because of immigration, to favour the burial of their close relatives on
French territory” (Third Directive). The French state thus opts for an administrative
encouragement of providing for confessional sections rather than legal change
(Section 4.2.1).
(3) Most importantly, there is a burial praxis and a logic of the terrain. Strangely
enough, this is the hardest factor to formulate. It is not so easy to say where the
institutional variables (the regimes) or the internal factors of governance (the
groups’ own internal behaviour) end and the ‘this-is-how-we-do-it’ logic of the
burial agents begins.
Throughout time, the norms, scripts, or habits of certain institutions or the in-
ternal burial habits of groups (Muslims, Jews) played into this logic of the terrain
(visualized in my chart). If we recall our discussion of the French cases: Over time,
families or groups, typically Jewish communities but also Muslims or Asian popula-
tions, desire to be buried as a collective. These families or religious representatives
put pressure on the administrators if they do not abide by their burial wishes. The
result is a ground-level practice that provides for confessional and cultural sections
over time, in particular for Jews. Because these exist, and because they arematerially
embedded in the physical shape of the cemetery, decision-makers provide them for
Muslims today.
And it is this materiality of cemeteries that is so fascinating! It reveals not only
the traces and habits of the past, it also guides action for contemporary decision-
making. It set limits on the extent to which cemeteries can be regulated from above.
As the Parisian chef des cimetières aptly formulated:
The problem (…) is that cemeteries do not lend themselves being steered at the level of a
mandate (…) If one has done things a certain way for the past century, you cannot simply
eliminate them, change them. This concerns private properties, sacred places – that’s what
cemeteries are all about. So, by definition, one ends up with things that are, in fact (dans
les faites), contrary to the law.
Analytically, as originally intended, this passes as an internal factor of governance
(families want to be buried together). Yet, ultimately, it becomes part of professional
practices, entailing a set of professional codes, a plain practical reality that “the
dead need to be buried.” “If we are out of space, we cannot put them there.” Or,
referring once more to the cemetery head, “if you have 100 people who need to be
buried on a particular day, then ‘hoppity hop’ they are allocated to one grave one
the other.”
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As he explained, Muslims all have to be buried facing toward Mecca. Yet, in some
denominations, the body is positioned on its side in the grave (or, in France, in
the coffin), whereas again other groups have the custom of placing the body on
its back, so that upon resurrection the deceased would come to a sitting position
facing Mecca. This requires a different positioning of the graves in that section. Yet
the traditional French (Catholic) burial position means having two rows of bodies
touching head to head. If we then have to accommodate special subdenominations
within a religion on top of that, “it becomes a very complex management.”
Dutch respondents do not talk about the logic of the terrain because that is their
very point of departure: It is self-evident. Giving every mosque their own spot (ieder
zijn eigen plek) effectively means aligning oneself with demands for confessional
demarcations.
In the Norwegian context, this is not an explicitly mentioned factor, perhaps
because the demand for confessional or humanist sections is only just beginning
to surface. And the homogeneity of the Norwegian population, reflected in the
cemetery, has simply gone unchallenged up until now. Alternatively, it might be
less necessary to defend confessional demarcations with reference to a logic of the
terrain simply because the public visibility of organized religion is less problematic
than it is in France.
6.5 Conclusion
This chapter concentrated on the material component of policy outcomes at the
municipal and national levels. It sought to explain why public actors in these three
countries ultimately take similar actions despite large legal differences in burial
practices. It drew on the reasons mentioned that are specific to the embedded cases.
But because these reasons mentioned can, but do not have to, be actual causes, this
also required a more general analytic understanding of (religious) governance.
I first tested the descriptive powers of the state-churchmodels. Could the hypoth-
esized heterogeneous state-church model better anticipate the material institutional
outcomes?
I found that only in France did it (with its Gallican script) better predict the
existence of collective sections and aMuslim cemetery like Bobigny. ForTheNether-
lands, principled pluralism and a separation tradition instead of pillarization was an
improvement and removed the expectation of a pillar. Yet, it could not predict the
lack of Muslim cemeteries or the public financing of the Islamic washing-houses.
For Norway, the designation ‘municipal disestablishment’ added in the hetero-
geneous model was too vague a description to formulate concrete expectations.
Here, in fact, establishment did a pretty good job of anticipating the lack of Muslim
cemeteries and the legal changes made in 1996.
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However, as the next chapter argues, the risk of reification looms when using
these descriptive models to try to explain policy outcomes.34
I concluded using three sets of reasons why decision-makers, despite large differ-
ences in the legal burial frameworks, end up doing the same thing: (1) The influence
of various (alternative) institutional regimes, like ‘integration,’ ‘state church regimes,’
or – in The Netherlands – concerns with urban planning and commercial exploita-
tion that can overrule legal burial concerns. (2) A ‘multiplicity of means’ to meet
the demands of minorities. (3) The reality and local pressures of the terrain: families
or groups of a particular religious or cultural affiliation who desire to be buried
together.
The bottom-up behaviour of groups (internal governance bottom-up) was very
central to understanding policy outcomes in this domain, both in terms of a chang-
ing repatriation pattern and the desire of confessional or cultural groups to be
buried as a collective. And as part of that established praxis in all local contexts,
there is professional respect for death and burial in accordance with one’s (religious)
conviction.35
Analytically, this can be summarized in different ways. In the most general sense,
policy outcomes result from both external and internal factors of governance. Fur-
thermore, each of these factors is layered (see the chart). This suggests that the
multiplicity of causes can explain outcomes. As to their explanatory power: Poten-
tially, institutions, praxis, and cultural/structural factors all matter. Yet, outcomes
ultimately also depend on how actors discursively interpret these institutions or
cultural factors.
To get an idea of how the Actor Institution Constellation Chart ‘works,’ the next
chapter looks at the practical reasoning of burial agents in the fieldwork narratives.
Furthermore, it remains to be explored how national, state-organized regimes
mattered discursively. They seemingly did little to explain the material component
of themunicipal pattern.36 But how about their significance for the public reasoning
of the burial agents? That is our next topic.
34 This is the case because of the multiplicity of causes and modes of governance, the challenge of
underdeterminacy, and the difficulty of distinguishing justification from motivation (Section 7.4).
35 I placed cultural sensibilities at this level, as the doxa by which burial administrators automatically
find certain solution inconceivable without being able to tell why.
36 I say “seemingly” because a descriptive misfit does not prove that they were not an influencing factor.
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Chapter 7: Discursive Patterns of Governance
7.1 Introduction
Chapter 6 tried to make sense of the similar institutional patterns discovered in our
analysis of the embedded case studies of Chapter 5. In this chapter, I address some
of the other remarkable findings of Chapter 5. For example, I look at the discursive
component of the municipal pattern – the public reasoning of municipal agents
across national contexts – and ask to what extent secularism or a state-church
legacy plays a role for their answers. If the postulated standard state-church legacies
failed to properly predict material outcomes, as concluded in Chapter 6, might they
nevertheless have relevance for the agent’s discursive responses?
Section 7.2 describes the municipal reasoning in three observations of both
discursive similarity and difference. In Section 7.3, I engage the standard and
heterogeneous state-church models as discursive tropes. Do elements of these
models turn up in the agents’ discourse?
Section 7.4 rounds off the discussion of Chapter 6 on the explanatory power of
these models. If the mayor of Montreuil relies in part on what we could identify
as an ‘associational freedom’ script, does that explain his actions? By means of a
Discursive Chart (Table 7.1) and a look at the practical reasoning, I make clear how
state-church legacies are relevant as issue frameworks in France and Norway. But it
is hard to prove causality. This chart also allows me to inquire how secularism is
used and argued for (discussed under the Sections of 7.5) and to substantiate the
theoretical critique toward Asad.
In my conclusion in Section 7.6, an unexpected finding surfaces, which allows
me to stretch my argument as far as possible to Asad and inquire about the role of
secular sensibilities.
7.2 The Municipal Public Reasoning: Differences and Similarities
There are different ways of picturing the discursive component of the municipal
pattern. The first way is to simply recall from the embedded case studies how the
matter of confessional sections and private cemeteries is much more contested for
French burial agents than it is for Dutch ones (e.g., need to ‘juggle words,’ tense
atmosphere). Norwegian burial agents lie somewhere in between because they are
very open toward the Muslim needs for confessional sections.
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Another way of showing discursive differences (and similarities) is to jump
forward to the Discursive Chart mentioned in Section 7.3.5 (Table 7.1). The chart’s
first row summarizes the solutions provided for by all municipalities (typically a
confessional section) and how this is to be understood. In their official explanations,
the French reduce the section to ‘regrouping the result of individual choices.’ But
the Norwegians too prefer to solve the matter rather by ‘individual consecration’
(Elverum) or ‘soft sections’ (Støren). French and Norwegian agents thus typically
use an ‘individualizing logic.’ The Dutch, on the other hand, seem to have few
problems with collective demarcations in the public sphere.
Staying with that same chart, we can also note a finding of similarity, highlighted
in italics. In the second row under ‘central ideas’ we note the discursive relevance
of guiding principles like ‘equality,’ ‘freedom,’ and ‘respect’ in each municipal case.
Despite all the differences between countries, why do they apply similar principles
when arguing for their solutions?
Then again, if we place these principles in the context of the conversations (in
light of the issue in which they given meaning, row 3.), relevant differences appear.
I address the second and last observation in Sections 7.4 and 7.5.
7.3 The Relevance of National State-Organized Religion Legacies
One way of formulating what I am looking for means returning to Bowen’s distinc-
tion between a ‘model of and ‘model for.’ As discussed in the Introduction (Section
1.2), a ‘model of’ describes a given reality, whereas a ‘model for’ intends to change
social reality, not to merely describe it. As Bowen readily acknowledged, however,
the distinction between these two is not clear-cut. In fact, I would argue they are
crucially connected.
When social scientists try to capture and describe a given reality, they encounter
agents using (national) models or categories like laïcité to explain or justify a given
situation (i.e., the encountered model for shapes the scholarly understanding of
the reality: the model of). Vice versa, social scientists introduce their preconceived
framing and scholarly categories, their understanding of that empirical reality.
Agents in the field in turn take these up to justify their own decisions.1 Scholars
furthermore might have implicit or explicit normative motivations for explaining
outcomes in terms of the national model or category.
1 The leader of the burial commission of the CrCM Lyon read the same book as I did regarding Muslims
and laïcité. His responses reproduced their scholarly analysis as an explanation of his situation. An
uncritical reliance on his explanations would thus have led to a perfect example of reification, where
we all – scholars and public officials alike – reproduce other scholars’ frameworks.
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Remaining conscious of this distinction, says Bowen, who is concerned with
France, means seeing laïcité for what it is: Rather than a sufficient (descriptive) or
explanatory model of the French reality, it is a ‘model for’ – a normative model that
is an ideological distortion of the social processes it purports to describe (2007,
1005). Understanding the workings thereof (i.e., how agents appropriate it and for
what reasons) is part of the scholarly attempt to describe social reality.
Below I summarize how agents discursively engage state-organized religion
legacies for all embedded cases, first as an explicit model or category (“I do this
because of our state-church history”). Second, I look at how respondents engage
some of the scripts I hypothesized as falling under the standard or heterogeneous
model (e.g., a concern with ‘principled evenhandedness’).
7.3.1 Dutch Discourse: Principled Evenhandedness, Separation,
Pillarization
In the Dutch municipal cases, all decision-makers argued for the principled equal
treatment of (religious) communities, in one way or another. The consequent need
for their own cemeteries or section in cemeteries was well captured by the slogan:
“to each their own spot” (ieder zijn eigen plekje)
People explicitly referenced ‘religious freedom’ and ‘equality’ between church
communities as leading normative principles in decisions over parcels. Yet, as
discussed, differences did exist as towho should receive this equal treatment. Should
we treat Islam as one community (Amsterdam) or address the internal divisions
in Islam, as we do for Christians (The Hague)? Adherence to these principles of
religious freedom and equality was not couched in any framework of laïcité or
secularism, but solely from their reading of the Dutch national burial law (Wlb): a
concern with citizen integration, a concern with financial exploitation (The Hague),
and/or urban planning (Almere).
Rarely did agents explicitly reference a historical Dutch state-church legacy. The
exception is the Dutch mayor of Amsterdam, who situates his reasoning about the
public washing-house in the context of “Dutch state-church relations.”2
We could recognize reliance on some of the scripts of the heterogeneous model:
This involved the commitment to ‘principled evenhandedness’ between religious
groups (in all municipal cases), a large emphasis on ‘collective religious freedom’
(most prominent in the Hague), and a concern with a ‘separation element’ (mayor
Amsterdam).
2 The essence of state-church relations, according to him, emerges from the fact that the government
does not interferewith the content of religion and no preferential treatment is allowed. Public financing
of the washing house is thus not allowed yet overruled by a concern with citizen integration.
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I found no explicit discursive reference to ‘pillarization’ (neither as a term, an
institutional meaning context, nor as a historical narrative).
7.3.2 Norwegian Discourse: Establishment, Compensatory
Evenhandedness, Municipal Disestablishment
In the Norwegian case studies, only the minister in Elverum explicitly justified the
decision over Muslim sections in light of a mutual understanding between Muslims
and the Norwegian church and a state-church legacy: “It is a historical matter. (…)
Precisely because we have a state church, the state and the church are both very
concerned with securing the equal rights of minorities.”
In the Støren case study, there was a similar emphasis on a more individualized
solution, in addition to that of collective sections. Likewise, therewas an explicit con-
cern about ‘treating other minorities evenhandedly’ and with ‘respect.’ The church
warden in Støren situates these normative commitments in his professional role as
the representative of the Joint Parish Council. He thus also reveals an awareness of
the existing state-church link. But rather than argue explicitly about a state-church
history, he gives it a professional twist: “We have developed great competence, and
we score high on user evaluations, (…).” He understands his double role: being a
representative of the Joint Parish Council as well as a public servant. Furthermore,
he relates this to his personal philosophy of accommodating newcomers. “We [the
Joint Parish Council] have the task of meeting others and showing respect for their
secular perspectives. For me personally, this is very important.”
The humanist in Støren explains his choice for individual consecration as a
solution because “it is the priests who came up with this suggestion.”
Evidence for the relevance of the ‘compensatory evenhandedness’ script is ex-
pressed when agents defend a commitment to secure minority rights in light of a
state-church hegemony or their professional role as a representative of the Joint
Parish Council.
Evidence for an ‘establishment script’ is present insofar as agents take the hege-
monic position of the Norwegian church as self-evident and given. Yet, this hege-
monic position is not always explicitly argued (or positively valued). Rather, it forms
the starting point for discussing possible solutions. As the minister in Elverum
advises the humanists: “From a pure practical point of view,” they realize that they
are better off making their peace with the situation.
We found no explicit discursive reference to ‘municipal disestablishment’ in the
embedded case studies, except for the former national senior advisor mentioning it
as a reason for the 1996 Funeral Act.3
3 Interview Senior Adviser Norwegian Ministry of Government Administration, Reform and Church
Affairs, 7 December 2012. See also Alsvik (1995, 111) for a similar argument.
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7.3.3 How Is Laïcité Used and Argued for in the French Discourse?
French respondents stood out in their heavy reliance on laïcité as a ‘model for’ (see
Section 5.4.4). Many respondents prefaced their answers with a historical sketch of
the Third Republic and Catholic exclusion, putting their arguments in a framework
for institutional solutions within some understanding of laïcité. The question of
national models here thus coincides with the question of secularism usage. But,
in light of my own research strategy of actual deployment (Section 2.3.4), I also
remain sensitive to situations of nonusage. Furthermore, laïcité is not the only issue
at stake. Therefore, I inquire whether ‘strict neutrality,’ ‘Gallican,’ and ‘associational
freedom’ are present as discursive resources.
In the interviews, laïcité is perceived to be a thing with consequences for the
administrators’ daily activities. Yet, how laïcité was perceived as a factor for legit-
imizing outcomes varied enormously, primarily because agents meant different
things by the term. In the course of a conversation, they sometimes change from
an understanding of laïcité as a legal prescript to a set of norms, a principle, an
attitude, a French way of doing things, or a historical narrative of theThird Republic
(ambiguity of meaning).
These different meanings may then lead to opposite institutional recommen-
dations (e.g., sections are prohibited by the legal text of laïcité but permitted in
‘spirit’). Second, once settled on a particular meaning, the application of this le-
gal text, or norm of conduct to a concrete domain, led to denotative difficulties.
Which religious/institutional practices fall within its boundaries and which don’t
(denotational vagueness4)?
The question of what prescriptively follows from laïcité proved closely tied to
the question of what laïcité is. Conversely, defending the conceptual boundary
(what falls within and what without) was seen as an intrinsically normative matter:
what the ideal should or should not include. I would like to illustrate this point
below.
What follows prescriptively from laïcité in burial matters? To resolve the existing
legal insecurity, the Machelon report proposed legally supporting the mayors in
taking the deceased’s (or deceased’s family’s) expressed religious convictions into
consideration. Second, it proposed extending or creating new private cemeteries,
“conscious of maintaining the principle of laïcité.”
Likewise, a study on Islamic burial in France argued that, if Article 9 of the
European Human Rights Court was to be taken seriously, France should abandon
the municipal monopoly (Hakim: 2005). As much as laïcité entails a prohibition to
4 Can the concept denote what references lie within its boundary and which do not? Failure to provide
for clear demarcation criteria is referred to as ‘denotational vagueness’ (cf. Sartori: 2009b, 109).
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discriminate on the basis of religion, they stated, it simultaneously obliges the state
to allow its citizens the free exercise of religion.5 In the spirit of the Third Directive
(2008), they emphasized the respect for freedom of religion and conviction of the
individual. Confessional cemeteries would provide for a legal alternative.
Without settling that legal question here6, both proposals question what struc-
turing the burial domain according to laic constraints would entail. Does it require
a municipal monopoly over cemeteries? But also, and at a deeper level, they ques-
tion the meaning of laïcité itself. Does the Machelon proposal exemplify a partial
departure from laïcité, in which private confessional cemeteries are a lesser evil?
Was the municipal monopoly laïcité avant la lettre? Or, is it an open – or moderate
– form of laïcité (laïcité modérée ou ouverte)?
The same ambiguity is reflected in the answers of the respondents in the field.
In its most stringent form, laïcité constrained the administrators’ actions, many
thinking: “If one follows the word of the law, you cannot do anything” (Paris con-
temporary). For the CRCM Rhône d’Alpes, the principle of laïcité was thought to
require Islamic sections. The administrative chef in Paris thought that the confes-
sional section should be legalized to synchronize with the facts on the ground. The
former mayor of Montreuil, however, maintained that the meaning of the 1905 law
was constant: We should avoid debate on laïcité, refrain from pluralizing it, and
most certainly not alter the law. This served the extreme right.
There was also little consensus concerning the matter of confessional cemeteries.
In agreement with the Machelon report, the CRCM Rhône d’Alpes argued that
private cemeteries are compatible with laïcité; the third Directive and the admin-
istrative chef in Paris, on the other hand, declared this to be inconceivable. The
mayor of Montreuil was against the idea of private cemeteries (although he offered
them in his political pamphlet). But he was unsure whether this had anything to do
with laïcité.
The question of the permissibility of private cemeteries according to laïcité re-
sulted in five options: (1) The issue has nothing to do with laïcité. (2) It can be
accommodated within a legal text of laïcité. (3) It falls not within the text, but
within the ‘spirit’ of laïcité. (4) It falls neither within the legal laïcité nor its spirit,
but it is justified as an ‘exception’ (historical, geographical, or pragmatic). (5) It vio-
lates laïcité. Some administrators solved this ambiguity by distinguishing different
5 For a discussion of solutions, see Hakim: 2005, 44; Frégosi/Boubeker/Geisser: 2006, 104; Machelon:
2006, 65.
6 The question whether the French legislation violates Article 9 was central to a case of 6 January 2006,
M. Remy Martinot et autres. Does the prohibition of burial without a coffin not violate religious
freedoms? The result was that Articles 8 and 9 of the European Convention of Human rights may be
constrained by concerns of public health and the general interest (Machelon: 2006, 65).
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(historical) versions of laïcité, some constraining and some facilitating accommo-
dation.7 The different versions stood then for different (historical) state attitudes
toward religion in the public sphere.
Two specific points follow: Naming or framing things as laïcité (or not) is always
normatively and politically charged from the perspective of the everyday world.
There is an intrinsic connection between its descriptive and prescriptive component.
Second, if we follow the reasoning of the different agents, laïcité explains everything.
This answers our question (Section 4.3): How can adherence to laïcité explain
both the absence and presence of confessional sections? Laïcité, we conclude, is not
an explanans, but very much itself an explanandum.8 The alternative, as Bowen has
suggested, is to conceive of French state-organized religion relations in terms of
historical scripts.
7.3.4 Strict Neutrality, Associational Freedom, and Gallican Logic
A variety of public actors draw on a neutrality scheme as a matter of rhetoric.
One concern with strict neutrality is prominent as a matter of legal fact: The legal
reasoning in the CGCT (‘neutrality’ article L2213–9) emphasizes the importance
of separation and the neutrality of third parties in the burial governance. Also,
at the level of the everyday world, local administrators paid lip service to this
ideal. Being concerned with neutrality was recognized as an important constraint
on their activities. The mayor of Montreuil told us how the extreme right, as a
matter of political strategy, attacked his decision to provide for a peppercorn rent,
claiming it violated state neutrality. “These peppercorn rents … are a disguised
form of donation. It is not me who is against this. It is the law” (Marine le Pen, Front
National).
Yet, as a matter of day-to-day practice, this ideal mattered less; Bowen (2012, 361)
makes a similar observation. Administrators showed willingness to work around
this neutrality.
Evidence for the relevance of the Gallican script was visible through the historical
discussion of the cemetery of Bobigny. From secondary sources, we inferred that
the motivation for the Muslim cemetery of Bobigny was the colonial celebration
but also hygienic control of its Muslim subjects. The first involved the celebration
of fallen soldiers who had fought for France as well as Muslim civilians who had
passed away in the neighboring hospital or region.
7 Laïcité francaise, laïcité dur, laïcité du combat were the constraining versions; laïcité commune et
ouverte, laïcité positive, laïcité bien comprise the more permissible versions (Paris contemporary).
8 It is not an explanation, but rather the thing to be explained.
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Some contemporary actorsmade proposals for establishing privateMuslim ceme-
teries.9 Yet the majority of the respondents objected, rather fiercely, to this solution:
“Then what happened with the Catholics will occur once again – they will become
exclusive, deciding who can be buried there and who cannot.” (Paris contemporary)
Here, we can read a Gallican scheme, or perhaps an explicit Republican political
philosophy, into the agents’ thinking. PrivateMuslim cemeteries break with the idea
of an unbroken relationship between the state and the individual citizen, first be-
cause they are private institutions (clubs) and second because they are ‘religious.’10
The leader of the Services des cimetières was unsure whether certain religious groups
were enlightened enough to be guaranteed equal treatment.
Evidence for an ‘associational freedom scheme’ can be found in the discourse
of the mayor of Montreuil: “The 1905 law provides first and foremost freedom of
conscience; second, the Republic does not recognize any religion, nor does it pay
the minister of any religious group, with the exception of Alsace. And, furthermore,
the Republic guarantees everybody the right to practice their own religion.”
He further remarks: “What is religious freedom if the material conditions for
this freedom are lacking?” Based on a liberal reading of the 1905 law, he wants to
let the Muslims ‘catch up.’ Yet, this should not occur under the pretence of being a
voluntary association as some colleagues have done (“They trick the law”) but as a
religious association. Against a strict neutrality script, he emphasizes support for
religion by facilitating worship in properly built houses of worship.
7.3.5 General Summary: The Model’s Elements as Discursive Resources
Do the scripts of the standard or more heterogeneous state-church models appear
in the discourse? For France, the standard model (laïcité) was, in a discursive sense,
very apt at predicting what the issue was seen as being about, albeit in different
forms: sometimes directly guiding action (“I do this because of laïcité”) but mostly
as an institutional context providing meaning to other principles (equality). The
Gallican script seemed relevant for understanding the existence of the Muslim
cemetery of Bobigny until 1999. But I have little to say about its explicit discursive
usage. The nature of the investigation was not discourse analytic. The objection
against private cemeteries could be interpreted, for the moment at least, as the result
of a Gallican/Republican fear of broken loyalties between the state and individual
citizens. Finally, the ‘associational freedom script’ provided a good fit with parts of
the Montreuil mayor’s reasoning.
9 See Machelon: 2006 and Hakim: 2005.
10 Again, I can only confirm Bowen’s observation (2012, 361).
https://doi.org/10.13109/9783666567322 | CC BY-NC-ND 4.0
© 2021, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Theaterstraße 13, D-37073 Göttingen
The Causality of State-Organized Religious Legacies 237
In contrast to the French and Norwegian agents, Dutch agents don’t often explic-
itly reference a state-organized religion legacy as the background for their ideas.
However, concerns with ‘principled evenhandedness’ and ‘separation of state and
church’ did surface.
For Norwegian respondents, ‘compensatory evenhandedness’ was a salient script.
We found evidence for an ‘establishment script’ insofar as agents take the hegemonic
position of the Norwegian church as self-evident and given. But it is not always
explicitly argued. ‘Municipal des-establishment’ was not mentioned.
In sum, I found evidence across municipal cases for the discursive relevance
of some of these normative scripts. With a heterogeneous conception of a state-
organized religion model we are better able to divine what (normative) consider-
ations are at stake in the deliberation process of the decision-maker(s). I found
this was the case for France and The Netherlands but not entirely for Norway. Yet,
this still does not actually prove causality. In order to address these issues and the
question of ‘secularism usage,’ below I summarize the material according to levels
of ideas.
7.4 The Causality of State-Organized Religious Legacies
What do agents talk about and what do they not talk about? The chart divides:
(1) the factual material solutions chosen and their discursive understanding; (2)
central ideas that guide actions; (3) frameworks/institutions.
The first level should be clear by now; the second level summarizes ideas that
respondents mention when explaining their choice for a certain solution. These can
be explicitly normative (moral-political) reasons: ideas about what agents ought
to do as members of a political or professional community – or more realistic and
prudential obligations.11 At this level, I stuck to the language of the everyday world.
The chart reveals a remarkable similarity regarding central (universal/public)
values that agents claim guide their action, i.e., ‘equity,’ ‘freedom of practice,’ ‘respect’
(in italics). We can furthermore observe the absence of ‘secularism’ or some proxy
as a guiding idea in Norway and The Netherlands.
11 E.g., don’t shock!, weight of history, “satisfy” (the customer), logic!, “for amayorwhat is the problem?,”
“niche in the market,” “we are a practical people.”
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At the third level, I interpreted what respondents see as the issue. Here, too, I
closely followed the everyday world discourse. Yet, the choice of issue framing is
ultimately my own. I remain sensitive to the meaning of the scholarly terminology
in the context of the life world, but not slavishly. Sometimes I summarize in terms of
the literal terminology of the life world (as with the logique du terrain); sometimes
I summarize in terms of a more generic terminology like ‘financial and commercial
exploitation,’ even though that way of grounding the respondents reasoning may
not fit the respondents’ own understanding.40 An issue framework can refer to an
institution, a public discourse, or an event – or other sources of authority altogether.
Lastly, I demarcated cultural and confessional narratives: a level of ideas on par
with Schmidt’s distinction of public philosophy (Section 2.3.3). Actors may be
unable to define these ideas clearly or to explain how they changed or developed.
Yet, everybody knows what the basic philosophy is. At this level, I chose examples
from the material in which respondents could not really explain their actions, but
where they were at the same time deeply committed to avoiding certain institutional
solutions. This level comes closest to what Asad would refer to as “sensibilities.” To
keep the chart accessible, I discuss this separately under Section 7.6.
Both issue frameworks and cultural and confessional narratives are, of course,
also ideas. So, the scholarly challenge has been to divide this into levels. For ex-
ample, is ‘integration’ the basic idea motivating the agent into action, is it an issue
framework, or is it a public philosophy in which a concern with helhet (wholeness)
is formulated? Is laïcité an explicit guiding norm, or is it an institutional framework
or a historical narrative used to argue for equity for Muslims and Jews? In the
everyday world, these terms are given a multiplicity of meanings.
My aim in using these distinctions is to secure a broad understanding of discourse,
one not limited to agents’ literal use thereof. But an understanding of discourse that
can also encompass potential similarity in narratives or sensibilities. Yet I would
maintain that the scholarly interpretation of that narrative as being ‘Republicanism,’
‘laïcité,’ or ‘social democracy’ then requires explicit justification (strategy of perceived
deployment). I return to this point later.
Why am I so concerned with foundations and provide such a detailed chart of
the reasoning behind agents’ justification or ‘sense’? I am trying to understand (a)
how practical reasoning41 works in the context of the everyday world; (b) what
the role of institutions is, in particular that of a state-organized religious regime or
secularism; and (c) given the methodological concern with scholarly reification,
40 When in the interview I summarized that commercial exploitation was an important theme for
Dutch agents, my respondents reacted with disapproval. Interview with the Director of Municipal
Cemeteries, The Hague, 21 April 2009, and interview with the Juridical Advisor, 10 August 2012.
41 See Section 6.1 for an explanation of the complexity of practical reason.
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I am wary of overinterpretation: I try to make the levels of everyday world and
scholarly interpretation transparent to all.
With reference to the chart, let me return to the observations of the discursive
municipal pattern mentioned in Section 7.3.5. The chart can now substantiate my
observation of similar action-guiding principles across municipal contexts, yet
different context of meanings/issue frameworks. As illustration, I take reference
to ‘respect,’ ‘religious freedom,’ and ‘equity’ in this chart and situate them in the
contexts of the particular interviews below.
In contemporary Paris, ‘respect for families’ is used as an argument to justify the
decision to bury even on a Christian holiday. Although this is prohibited by French
work law (Easter is a Christian holiday on which burials should not take place) and
is seen by the respondent as violating laïcité, he gives ‘respect’ meaning as part of
his being a burial professional (sign of a humane management) and the spirit of the
law (rather than the word of the law). The same administrator uses ‘securing equal
treatment’ (of individuals) as an argument against private cemeteries, an opinion
grounded in an understanding of laïcité bien comprise (“well understood”).
In Montreuil, the mayor uses the argument of ‘religious freedom of practice’ to
justify accommodation of aMuslim house of worship, grounded in an interpretation
of the 1905 law. He is committed to an idea of ‘equality and nondiscrimination’
between Jews and Muslims when arguing for confessional sections and against
the background of a historical narrative of Catholic exclusion. But he also argues
strongly for ‘religious freedom of practice’ when granting confessional sections.
Funeral rites are seen as central to the religious practices of the Muslims grounded
in the 1905 law.
TheMuslims in Lyon argued for confessional sections by pleading for recognition
of ‘the freedom of belief,’ ‘respect for the deceased in regards their religion,’ and a
concern with nondiscrimination, all interpreted in light of an overarching principle
of laïcité. They also argued for burial in accordance with one’s faith by relying on
‘equality regarding death’ as a matter of citizen rights.
In the Bobigny study, Godin authorized the creation of the Muslim cemetery as
a token of “respect for their conception of moral life and social customs” and in
light of a French (colonial) history as a nation that defends freedom of conscience.
In the Amsterdam case, ‘equality between religious groups’ is translated into
an institutional provision of an Islamic section for all denominations. And it is
given meaning based on an interpretation of ‘each church community’ in the burial
law. In The Hague, ‘equality (between groups)’ is translated into seven separate
confessional sections and inspired by an interpretation of ‘each church community’:
“there is no one Islam” from the burial law. In Almere, ‘equal treatment’ toward
the Jewish community (treating Muslims on par with Jews) is used as an argument
to justify granting land for an Islamic cemetery and it is given meaning in light of
existing financial and urban planning circumstances.
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In Elverum, the minister argued for accommodating Muslim burial needs in
order to “secure minorities their equal rights” in light of the existing state-church
history. In Støren, the church warden makes new plans for confessional sections out
of “respect, taking care of traditions but through an integrated solution.” And he
grounds this respect in an understanding of his professional role as a representative
of the Joint Parish Council and the existing state-church link as well as a personal
philosophy of welcoming foreigners. For the humanists in Støren, the burial solution
of individual consecration is understood as a ‘matter of respect and dignity’ toward
the Christian concern with consecration. The 1996 change of burial administration
is understood as ‘disrespectful’ and as a matter of unjustifiable church hegemony.
In sum, these three normative principles are relevant in all local contexts. But
they are given various meanings in very different ways. We can observe what is
called the challenge of ‘underdeterminacy,’ best demonstrated with a principle like
equality: The same principle can give rise to different institutional solutions. On
the one hand, it is used as an argument defending seven gravefields in The Hague;
an Islamic cemetery in Almere; no Islamic cemetery in contemporary Paris; and
the individual consecration of graves in Elverum.
Furthermore, the principle can be confirmed on different grounds: based on
burial law, urban planning, financial considerations, laïcité bien comprise, or state-
church history.
In other words, institutions tend to bend under the weight of interpretation. Not
only are there several scripts in an institutional regime, the scripts themselves can
allow for various institutional translations. In that sense, these general normative
principles are the malleable glue of public reasoning. But what I want to highlight is
that, vice versa, scholars can interpret the presence of a normative script as proof of
an existing institution. They can read their ‘variable’ back into the everyday world
reasoning.
So why is establishing causality hard? As indicated with the actor constellation
chart (Scheme 6.2, Section 6.4.2), the complexity consists in a variety of institutional
regimes forming the context for the agent’s reasoning. In our scholarly eagerness
to find causality (patterned structures), we are inclined to find evidence for the
variable through which we analyze the situation.
In the example of The Hague, the central decision-maker who allowed for seven
grave fields for each Muslim group does not mention (or even seem to ponder)
Dutch state-church relations. Rather, he situates the normative scripts (evenhand-
edness toward each group, there is no one Islam …) from within his reading of
Article 39 of the national burial law (Wlb).
We as researchers can conclude that he makes this choice because of an internal
heterogeneous state-organized religious regime. But, technically speaking, he is not
thinking about this institutional regime, but rather the burial regulations. It would
thus seem to be more correct to say that he is motivated by, or draws legitimation
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from, a certain (normative) script that works across both regimes – that of the
burial regulation and state-church relations, which possibly also inform his picture
of how to integrate minorities. Furthermore, I hasten to comment that this is not
the whole explanation: He crucially explains his decision as being motivated by
making money (realistic argument).
In the example of the mayor of Montreuil, the opposite occurs: The burial legis-
lation is not part of his reasoning at all. I interpret his institutional action as rather
unreflected, in the sense that he knows there is already a Jewish section. Demand
exists from Muslims (whom he likes to please, in order to get votes). Furthermore, it
probably does not strike him as contradicting his earlier decision on the peppercorn
rent and earlier interpretation of the 1905 law. Because he is the mayor, he does
not have to be concerned with superiors. He and he alone decides; he goes forward
with something until he runs into an obstacle or contradiction. When I note the
legal prohibition, he is surprised and defensive. Prohibited? It is logical. He finds
legitimation in practical solutions:This is what we do. Furthermore, there follows an
ad-hoc explanation about the Catholics having first historically excluded and how
it is only a sign of nondiscrimination and equal treatment that Jews and Muslims
now can have their own section, too. Employing a liberal reading of the 1905 law,
he wants to let Muslims ‘catch up.’ He is not aware of the guiding institutional burial
rules (legal prohibition). Or maybe he simply does not care.
The mayor’s reasoning could thus stand as an illustration of the ‘associational
freedom script.’ Yet, in order to explain the mayor’s actions, we have to add the
importance of pragmatism, his flirting with the Muslim community, and the logic
of the terrain. His actions result from a combination of pragmatism and logique du
terrain.
As mentioned earlier, Bowen calls these lower-level schemes “categories, habits,
ways of doing things and evaluating practices that are often quite path dependent
and may be quite specific to particular domains” (2012, 362). Only then does a
justification in light of the 1905 law follow (an ‘associational freedom script’) and a
Catholic narrative of exclusion in a second instance.
Generalizing from these examples, studying public reasoning in action poses
several challenges: (a) distinguishingmotivation from justification; (b) often dealing
with a multiplicity of causes; (c) discovering that institutional action is not always
reflected, but initially rather practice-driven, confirming Schmidt’s knowhow type
of social action; (d) being faced with the challenge of underdeterminacy.
Ultimately, this shows the explanatory limits of these models: The more refined
ones give a more nuanced idea of the different commitments at stake. Yet, indi-
vidual outcomes still depend on what the decision-maker does with them and the
multiplicity of factors at stake.
I see the explanatory value of state-church legacies as closely related to the
process of practical reasoning in the everyday world. I propose an understanding
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Scheme 7.2: Picture of practical reasoning in between praxis and institutions.
of practical reasoning as (a) influenced by a range of (layered, see previous chapter)
institutional regimes; (b) the level of praxis (encompassing professional codes,
cultural narratives/sensibilities, and a ground logic); and (c) ultimately, the decision-
makers who make sense of the burial demand in light of these structures through
their discourse. Scheme 7.2 visualizes this from the perspective of the decision-
maker.42
7.5 The Viability of Secularism as a Structuring Term for Comparison
Moving on from the question of causality, I wish to return once more to the discur-
sive chart. There is another significant discursive difference between contexts: the
absence of a concern with secularism or laïcité. With this observation, we are in
the position to substantiate empirically the theoretical argument of reification.
As argued in Section 2.3.4, in his methodological approach Asad creates a situa-
tion of ‘indiscriminate scholarly secularismmaking.’There are no explicit definitions
in his framework, so that the question about denotation – what falls within and
what falls outside of the boundaries of the concept – is recast in terms of ‘concept
42 Note that the influence of other actors or the role of Muslims is no longer included in this drawing
as opposed to the Actor Institution Constellation Chart. I implicitly rely on an understanding of
social reality as layered into (1) a discursive level, (2) an institutional level, (3) a praxis level, (4) a
level of behaviour and action. See Van Engelen (2000, 6) who relies on Bader.
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deployment.’ But because he pays no attention to the identity of the person doing
the deployment, Asad’s analysis about ‘the secular’ does not explicitly justify why
that is (and whose secular he’s talking about).
I criticized his approach as well as formulating one way in which it could be
defended for the purpose of empirical research.
Based on the chart, let me say the following: (1) In France laïcité is a term from
the everyday world. Asad’s question about usage internal to practice thus functions
if specified as a strategy of ‘actual deployment.’ I can chart the different usages and
meanings of secularism because the actual usage of the term by the decision-makers
in the field holds the analysis in place.
(2) The question ‘who argues for secularism or not’ also proved relevant. Bertossi
suggested that national model scholars end up reifying the French debate because
they focus only on formal levels of policy-making. “Social contexts, concrete in-
teractions, and institutional settings are curiously never the place where ‘model
scholars’ do any research” (Bertossi/Duyvendak: 2012, 241). Indeed, focusing on
everyday things revealed much more diverse action scripts. Nevertheless, in con-
trast to Bertossi, I found that the lower-level administrators were more inclined
to talk in terms of laïcité. The higher-ranked administrators or political actors, on
the other hand, were allowed higher levels of discretion, allowing for more ‘honest’
accounts of their actions.
But what the chart also shows is (3) that, on all levels, laïcité was only one idea.
Just like in the other countries, respondents talked in terms of general normative
principles: ‘religious freedom of practice,’ ‘equality,’ ‘respect,’ ‘neutrality.’ They used
ideas like logique du terrain, ‘don’t shock!,’ ‘logic!,’ ‘sacredness of death,’ ‘satisfy the
customer,’ ‘let Muslims catch up,’ to justify their actions.
At the level of laïcité as an issue framework, itmattered as one consideration (most
often as a constraining element). Yet, respondents also situated their arguments
vis-à-vis ‘logic du terrain,’ ‘integration,’ or ‘being pragmatic.’ The chart reveals laïcité
thus as one discursive trope, or context of meaning, and a contested one at that.
Why frame the entire French analysis in terms of it? This downplays the crucial
importance of pragmatic factors and the role of burial praxis. And it would risk
framing the French scripts as being only about laïcité. Now, the point is not to
say that ‘the associational freedom script’ could not be reframed as laïcité. Yet,
summarizing the reasoning in the everyday world as laïcité – as a matter of etic
intervention – we resort to a higher level of abstraction again (“go meta” in Bader’s
parlance). This mystifies and clouds rather than clarifies. Such a totalizing account
stands in the way of comparative analysis (Bertossi: 2012; Bertossi/Duyvendak:
2012).
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7.5.1 Denotative Troubles43
The matter does not become easier in the Dutch and Norwegian contexts. What
demarcation criteria do we apply when the term is not used? A scholarly framing
into Dutch or Norwegian secularism would suggest that what happens to Muslims
or humanist burial needs in these contexts – and how agents make sense of it (two
different things in our analysis) – is ‘secularism’ of some sort. Now, that is, of course,
possible. Because the term ‘secularism’ is so unspecific, anything can be framed into
it. The question is rather what do we stand to gain? I think that it rather hinders
comparative analysis.
The first comparative point is that secularism or laïcité – however contested –is
something real for the French respondents, though it does not exist as a discursive
resource for Dutch and Norwegian respondents. Secularism or laïcité thus appears
as an element of difference, not commonality. With an etic framing in terms of
secularism, we would exactly fail to understand comparative cultural specificity.
Second, if we want to compare what happens to Muslims and humanists and
understand the differences, what we need are more precise terms and analytic
distinctions, not taking recourse to a higher level of abstraction. As just argued
for the French case, laïcité is indeed an important discursive element. Yet focusing
on this discursive term as the structuring concept would give analytic primacy to
ideology. That would overshadow the relevance of actual practice and pragmatic
reasons for understanding actions.
Third, it is important to leave analytical room for the meaning-giving process
of the everyday world itself. Asad’s etic framing ultimately overdetermines this as
a matter of governing ‘religion.’ Yet, as my chart shows, the burial demands are
largely seen as a combination of issues: They are justified and possibly regulated in
light of a diversity of regimes. And the differences between countries are large.
Finally, in a terminological sense, that framing stands in contrast with the under-
standing of the everyday world itself. Let us look at a few quotations in which the
Dutch and Norwegian respondents are explicitly asked for their ideas on secularism
in connection to the cemetery management.44
7.5.2 Relevant Quotations: “How Does Secularism Affect Your
Decisions?”
Here is a passage from the interview with the church warden in Støren:
43 Can the term ‘secularism’ denote what references fall within its boundary? Failure to provide for
clear demarcation criteria is referred to as ‘denotational vagueness’ (cf. Sartori: 2009b, 109).
44 For reasons of space I have limited this to four examples from the Norwegian and Dutch material.
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Me: How has secularism affected your work?45
Church warden: I don’t think the secular is so important. I can meet all other believers
with respect, even though they are different, without letting go of my own convictions.
So, I don’t believe that is actually secular thinking at all. We are part of the same society,
so we have to find solutions that are the least polarizing.
Me: So, you say this is actually not secular reasoning? What would have comprised secular
thinking then?
Church warden: If you take France as an example, with its very secular profile … take
away most the symbols. I am more interested in (…) The HEF representative said he
preferred no symbols or crosses in the graveyard, and I can go along with that thought
and negotiate about that and agree that we should do nothing offensive. At the same time,
I am not going to take away the whole Christian background.
Me: What would have happened then if you had taken away all symbols?
Church warden: I cannot take away a 200-year-old history. That would require a whole
new graveyard – only then can we talk about “here it is life perspective neutral.” But right
now, we have to find the best common solution.
Me: So, you would not erect a cross here on the new part of your cemetery?
Church warden: No, I will not put a cross on the entrance of the new part, but that is not
so secularly motivated but out of respect for the others, in order not to provoke. As I said,
they should feel equally at home as we do.
This respondent’s thinking shows that being secular is not the leading motivation.
Rather, his choice is motivated by a concern with “respect for the others,” “not to
provoke,” and that “they should feel equally at home.”
Interview with a humanist in Oslo:
Me: How has secularism affected the way Norway regulates the graveyard?
Humanist: Eh … I am not sure what you mean by that question (…) whether it is secular?
You mean you want to know whether Norway is secular? [He waits for confirmation] …
Yes very. They just don’t think about it (…) what it means to go to church. They find it
enjoyable to go to church at Christmas. It is part of the Norwegian way.
Me: I mean more regarding the cemeteries and the way the state regulates them.
Humanist: No, that is not very secular ... certainly not. The church of Norway is in control,
so I don’t see how that can be secular.
Me: Should it be secular?
Humanist: I don’t know, the issue is that they respect other religions but not us. It’s OK to
make fun of us (…). Yes, as a humanist you feel discriminated against.
Here the respondent conveys the opinion that the burial regulations are not secular:
“The church of Norway is in control, so I don’t see how that can be secular.” But
he also tells us that whether or not it should be secular is ultimately secondary to
45 “Hvordan har sekularisme påvirket dine arbeidsoppgavene?”
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the question of discrimination and equal treatment: “The issue is that they respect
other religions but not us. It’s OK to make fun of us.”
Interview with a humanist representative in Trondheim:
Me: In what way does secularism affect the way you provide for burials?
Humanist: That is, maybe … well … eh … burial is maybe that domain where traditions
are most deeply anchored … because it is such an absolute life situation, where traditions
sit very deep. So … ehm … Have you ever been at a humanistic burial ceremony?
Me: No.
Humanist: No? Well because then you would recognize many Christian elements in our
ceremonies as well … though they concern more the formal elements of a burial – songs,
music, lyrics, speeches … But we completely focus on the deceased (…) Typically, I would
say, we paint a verbal and a musical picture of the departed. That helps us to remember
who that person was. And that is how the person lives in all eternity, through our stories
and memories others live.
Me: But what does this have to do with secularism?
Humanist: What do you mean by secularism? Do you mean nonreligious?
Me: [Silence] Well that is exactly what I am asking you …
Humanist: [laughs] Ha ha.
To make him less uncomfortable, I add, I am curious to know how you connect
secularism with burial.
Me: Are there things that you cannot do because of secularism? Are there rituals, ways
of burying someone that are not possible because of secularism, or that we should do
because we are secular?
Humanist: By secular society I mean a society where one is not automatically registered
at birth in the state church.
Me: But what about the cemetery?
Humanist: [Silence and discomfort] …
Me: I am interested to learn whether you connect secularism and burial or the burial
administration.
Humanist: Ok, well, in a secular society the administration of all ritual actions should
be connected to the different religious communities … eh ... And if you then don’t have
any affiliation, then there should be a neutral public institution that helps you with your
ceremonies.
The respondent was at a loss about how to connect my question about secularism to
cemetery practices: “Do you mean nonreligious?” Only after my intervention does
he arrive at a meaning by translating secularism as “a society being secular.” And he
contextualizes that question toward a set of institutional practices “a society where
one is not automatically registered at birth in the state church.” “There should be a
neutral public institution that helps you with your ceremonies.” The respondent
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does not explicitly argue that the current Norwegian burial regulations are not
secular; yet, it follows from his description of what a secular society entails.
Interview with a legal burial expert in The Netherlands:
Me: How do you think the Dutch burial law (Wlb) addresses concerns with secularism?46
Legal expert: What do you mean by secularism?
Me [silence]: … That is my question to you.
Legal expert: I … eh, yes, eh … [uncomfortable]
Me: It is not a quiz, I am simply curious.
Legal expert: I get it … Well … I learned a lot from my predecessor (…). God rest his soul
… He worked 40 years at the Ministry. He functioned as the Secretary for the Advisory
Commission on the burial law.He explained tome… that we have givenmaximal freedom
to religious groups to do as they please (…). And this is how I have always understood
the Dutch attitude, not only regarding burial but other areas, too. The burial law is in fact
very short, only 100 articles. In terms of substantive issues, it prescribes very little. That
is a very conscious choice. We don’t want to prescribe how things should be done. That
creates too many problems in practice.
Me: To what extent is that secular?
Legal expert: I don’t know what you mean by that. We have state-church relations. The rel-
evant question is: “Does the state facilitate religious communities?” For example, because
they think religion is good for the community.
The examples given above share three features: In most cases, the respondents
were uncomfortable with my questions. They were often unsure what to answer,
because they didn’t know what the term stands for. In each case, they reframed the
scholarly question into what they think is the central issue. “The relevant question
is: ‘Does the state facilitate religious communities?’” And insofar as they come to
an understanding of what being secular or secularism would entail regarding the
burial domain, (“nonreligious,” “like France,” “a neutral public institution that helps
you with your ceremonies”), this is a meaning they don’t see fit for their own actions
or the burial practices at hand. They thus tell us that ‘secularism’ or ‘being secular’
is not a leading motif in their thinking.
So, finally, we have an answer to the fieldwork puzzle: Why do they not talk about
secularism? For Dutch and Norwegian agents, the term does not guide their actions
– or it has a meaning that is perceived as conflicting with how they understand
the burial practices or their choices at hand. In the case of the Oslo humanist, a
scholarly framing in terms of Norwegian secularism would mean taking sides in a
battle over the legitimacy of the Norwegian burial regulations – practices he does
not consider secular at all. For the church warden in Støren, France functions as the
46 “Naar uw opvatting hoe houdt de Wet op Lijkbezorging rekening met sekularisme of sekulariteit?”
Interview Juridical Advisor in matters burial, 10 August 2012.
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exemplary case of secularism, distancing his own actions from that understanding.
For the humanist in Trondheim (Støren case study), themeaning of a secular society
does not fit existing Norwegian practices.
But there is nothing unique about Norwegian and Dutch respondents choosing
certain words over others. As the mayor of Montreuil emphasized in the discussion
over the confessional sections: “We should not frame this as a matter of laïcité. That
would serve the extreme right …” As observed in the French context, naming or
framing things as laïcité (or not) always implies an implicit normative stake.
7.6 Conclusion and Unexpected Finding
One central line of argument in this book has been that, instead of relying on
national models (like pillarization) or categories (like secularism) for capturing
or explaining what happens to Muslims or humanists when they make burial
demands, we are better off using analytical tools that “take account of the ways in
which government and other public actors view their social worlds and act in them”
(Bowen: 2012, 354).
Hence, I set up the comparative investigation in terms of a generic (religious)
governance framework. And I integrated into Bader’s framework an explicit focus
on discourse, drawing on Schmidt’s discursive institutionalism. This allowed for
analytic openness to the meaning-giving process of the everyday world, and for
sensitivity to the usage of categories like religion or secularism. Yet, it avoided the
methodological problems that Asad-inspired scholars run into by keeping constant
the thing to be compared (namely, responses to these groups burial needs).
Furthermore, this book looked at scholarly proposals that suggest a range of
normative scripts and schemas as better analytic tools. This chapter concluded on
the relevance of a state-organized religion legacy for the public reasoning of the
burial agents: first as an explicit argument. This indeed returned in the discourse
surrounding the French and Norwegian contexts (action-guiding idea). Alterna-
tively, agents situated their arguments for specific solutions against the backdrop
of a narrative of state-church relations (issue framework). This again was mostly
visible in France and Norway.
Third, I inquired into the relevance of the scripts of both the standard and the
heterogeneous model. Dutch respondents talked about giving everybody their own
spot, which can be interpreted (or not) as a concern with ‘principled evenhanded-
ness,’ and there was reference to ‘separation of state and church’ in the discussion
over the public funding of the Islamic washing-house. Yet nobody referenced pil-
larization.
Norwegian respondents tried to be evenhanded toward minorities in light of the
Church hegemony. They thereby also confirmed the relevance of an ‘establishment
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script’ insofar as agents take this hegemonic position as self-evident and given. This
occurred as an explicit consideration but also as a tacit presumption. ‘Municipal
disestablishment’ was not salient as an argument. But a former national senior
advisor mentioned it as a reason for the 1996 Funeral Act. I substantiated it as an
essential ingredient of the Norwegian mode of religious governance (see Section
3.3.3 and Section 5.3.4).
French respondents talked in terms of general normative principles: ‘religious
freedom of practice,’ ‘equality,’ ‘respect,’ and ‘neutrality.’ At the issue level, laïcité
mattered as one consideration (often a constraining one). Yet, respondents also
situated their arguments in light of the logique du terrain, ‘integration,’ or ‘being
pragmatic.’ And they weighed different elements of the French state-church legacies
against each another. The neutrality of third parties is counterbalanced by more
accommodating interpretations of laïcité (Paris contemporary). The mayor of Mon-
treuil avoided framing in terms of laïcité. The Gallican script seemed relevant for
the objection against private cemeteries. The ‘associational freedom script’ fits with
certain parts of the mayor of Montreuil’s reasoning.
In sum, the heterogeneous models were an improvement over the standard
national models, in the sense that the more nuanced ones better describe the range
of (normative) concerns at stake.47
Yet, I was cautious in attributing explanatory power to these institutional models.
The nature of practical reasoning as encountered in the everyday world revealed a
complex picture of (a) praxis and lower-level schemes, (b) different institutional
contexts, their internal layeredness, and shared normative scripts between institu-
tions, and (c) ultimately, the individual decision-maker that weighs these – different
and often conflicting – commitments in the particular context.
Building further on the idea that some of the building blocks for practical rea-
soning consists of these scripts (that are shared between institutional regimes48),
I would like to close with a further suggestion. Left undiscussed are cultural and
confessional narratives: a level of ideas on par with Schmidt’s distinction of public
philosophy (Section 2.3.3). Might there not be a tacit level of ‘secular’ sensibilities
that informs an agent’s actions? Causal factors are not always visible in the discourse.
And especially with a subject matter like religion, people’s behaviour or attitudes
often depend on implicit assumptions.
Returning to Asad’s basic point in Formations of the Secular, sensibilities are
something like ‘naturalized attitudes’ toward, for example, pain and agency, which
already prevent certain citizen’s actions and state practices. Even if respondents don’t
47 I found this to be less the case for Norway, since my proposed script disestablishment was not
mentioned as a reason in the discourse.
48 It is, of course, the scholar who first separates reality into ’variables,’ only to then conclude that, in
reality, these variables are interwoven.
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talk explicitly of secularism, and even if it is not an explicit issue they use to structure
their justifications – points I now consider to have been sufficiently demonstrated –
might they nevertheless be motivated by something like tacit ‘secular’ sensibilities?
That depends again on what the scholar means by secular. Furthermore, because it
is tacit, it is hard to find counterevidence.
7.6.1 Ways of Living and Sensibilities
Two examples in my material suggest something like sensibilities. They concern
burial solutions that are seen as inconceivable from within the range of possible
institutional options. I recall the interview with the Parisian Chef du Service des
cimetières (hereafter Chef du cimetière).
Me: Why are you against private cemeteries for Muslims in France?
Chef du cimetière:Then it will happen what happened with the Catholics:They will exclude
and decide who can be buried there and who cannot.
I countered his fearwith the example of theDirector of theCatholic Cemetery inThe
Hague, who had reassured me that he was not interested in exclusion whatsoever.
Rather, they welcomed other denominations to keep their cemetery financially
sound. Second, I said, this is a private domain. Laïcité only applies to the public.
Chef du cimetière: I am afraid Imust disagree.The state has amoral collective responsibility
to take care of the cemeteries. I don’t believe that one day the municipal cemetery will
accept everyone, but that all the problems confessional communities have with their
possible exclusion of members, I leave to their own.
Me: But they do that already, don’t they? They can already say in the private sphere: “We
are a little club and we don’t want you to be part of us!”
Chef du cimetière: Yes, but that is civil society.
Me: Well, but the private cemetery is also civil society, is it not?
Chef du cimetière: Yes, but here I am a fervent believer. I do not want private cemeteries
in France.
Me: I understand that, but I don’t understand why you see it as incompatible with laïcité.
Why is exclusion a problem if it is already occurring within private groups?
Chef du cimetière: No, not in death. In death one touches the sacred.
He has no further explanation for me why he fears this, other than appealing to a
historical narrative of Catholic exclusion at the time of the French Revolution. (The
mayor of Montreuil referenced a similar narrative justifying confessional sections.)
My Dutch counterexample does little to change his mind. Or, when I tried to give
a proper ‘laic example’ from another context: Zurich, a Canton in Switzerland,
prohibits separate divisions of the public cemeteries for reasons of laïcité. Yet, Swiss
law allows for the possibility of private cemeteries (Pfaff Czarnecka: 2004).
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In other words, as an abstract set of principles laïcité cannot explain why private
cemeteries are unacceptable.This points toward another dimension in the discourse:
the fear of exclusionary religious communities, what I would call an important
sensibility for the administrator. And to this is coupled the responsibility of the
state to prevent just that:
Allowing for private cemeteries – ah, no, that is an untenable thought. You know we
chased the nuns out of the public hospital! (...) That would violate our tradition; nobody
could imagine a private cemetery here (Mayor of Montreuil).
The collective has a responsibility to take care of its dead in an equal way, while taking
their differences into consideration: Private cemeteries would create so much abuse (Chef
du cimetière).
In Norway, too, the suggestion to provide for a private graveyard next to the
Lutheran one was rejected outright: “Norway does not like privatization. We should
all be buried next to each other in the same soil.” And thus, like the church minister
(Elverum), the KA representative suggested individually consecrating the cemetery
by different faiths. That way we can all lie on the same Christian graveyard.
Norwegian respondents “jump” in their argumentation toward the humanists,
similar to how the French “jump” in their argumentation regarding private ceme-
teries: They automatically transition from a humanist complaint about the church’s
administrative role, which is a principled and symbolic argument of administrative
inequality, to a solution that offers ‘individual consecration.’
A look at the explicit arguments shows that Norwegians don’t like ‘hard’ or
‘firm’ divisions or private cemeteries, for reasons of ‘social democracy.’ The implicit
premises behind this solution are that religious rituals matter. The representatives
of the Parish Councils and Muslims alike tacitly agree on this. Humanists, on the
other hand, are seen as ‘political actors’ – or worse as a ‘protest movement.’ Second,
there is an implicit understanding that what matters is being pragmatic: “Well, then,
I can be even more practical” (minister Elverum).
Different from France, consecration is an important framing issue. This leads my
respondents to ‘automatically’ jump at the solution of consecrating the soil grave
by grave. Because humanists can be accommodated by that solution, the force of
their arguments is discredited.
7.6.2 ‘Secular’ Sensibilities?
Where do these sensibilities come from? Are they ‘secular’ sensibilities? As it stands,
I interpreted the objection against private cemeteries in France as a sign of laïcité
and Republican thought.This serves as an explanation unique to the French context.
But what aboutNorway, where we see a similar objection against private cemeteries?
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Here there is no sign of ‘Republicanism’ or ‘Gallican control’? Why are they too
against privatization? And why do they, in a similar way, discursively ‘individualize’
the solution chosen? The Norwegian burial professionals automatically translate
the humanist and Muslim demands into a solution of individual consecration.
I can give a satisfactory explanation at the level of issue frameworks: ‘social
democracy’ and ‘Lutheran establishment’ internal to Norway, ‘Republicanism’ and
‘laïcité’ internal to France. Note that I have not been able to give a good explanation
what the consecration issue is part of: belonging to the soil or to Lutheran custom?
Yet, at a deeper level, what unites France and Norway (and sets them apart from
parts of the Dutch cases) might be a similar sensitivity and objection to too much
‘groupness.’
Could the burial agents, in deciding how to give form to a confessional sec-
tion or private cemetery, tacitly be guided by a basic binary of wholeness versus
fragmentation?
I would like to propose this, albeit with a certain hesitancy. First, it is impossible
to prove the motivations of agents. They might say one thing yet be motivated by
another. Or, reversely, and as applicable here, certain motivating factors might have
to be reconstructed from the discourse. Agents are not aware or explicit about these
motives, but they rather pop up when you compare the language. Second, in face of
the complexity of practical reasoning, I don’t want to suggest that, ultimately, it all
comes down to one basic theme. The level 5 of the chart suggests there are several
leading themes: wholeness vs. fragmentation/separation as well as belongingness vs.
alienation. That said, the striking discursive similarity across contexts concerning
how to provide for a solution cannot be ignored. Compare the chart at level 5.
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One interpretation of this discourse is to see it as particular (cultural) variations of
a general binary opposition. Rein/Schön (1994, 33–34) suggest a cross-cultural set
of normatively guiding ground metaphors that guide the respondents reasoning:
Institutional action frames are local expressions of broad culturally shared systems of belief,
which we call metacultural frames. The oppositional pairs of disease and cure, natural and
artificial, and wholeness and fragmentation belong to the realm of metacultural frames.
Metacultural frames, organized around generative metaphors, are at the root of the policy
stories that shape both rhetorical and action frames.
Relying on this idea of a metacultural framework allows us to find a deeper expla-
nation of why Norway and France resemble each other in their discursive under-
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standing of the solutions (individualize the solution). Although they differ in the
particular issue framework49 (‘Republicanism’ for France and ‘social democracy’ for
Norway), in contrast to the Dutch agents, they share scepticism about having too
much groupness. Across national contexts, respondents talk about how inclusive
or how separate the solution should be, and how people should feel at home and
belong. There are even some indicators of an underlying organizing metaphor of
sharing the bed.
But, regardless of the particular metaphor implied, this language suggests that
the challenge of dealing with ‘groups’ might come prior to dealing with ‘religion.’
And, if I am right about this, at an even deeper layer it might point to the risk
of scholarly overinterpretation along an Asadian scheme: The binary of ‘secular’
versus ‘religion’ is irrelevant – or only secondary to a ground binary of ‘wholeness’
vs. ‘fragmentation.’ And here lie the differences between national contexts.
In what we could interpret as the Republican discourse (at level 4 French cases),
there is a direct link between being one undivided nation and what we could call
secularity as a precondition for such unity (note that I intervene!).50 Religion is
seen as a potentially dividing and exclusionary force. As suggested on the issue of
private cemeteries, Muslim cemeteries break with the idea of an unbroken relation-
ship between the state and the individual citizen: First, because they are private
institutions (clubs) and, second, because they are ‘religious.’
Yet, this connection between an undivided nation (or bed!) and secularity is not
made for the respondents in the Norwegian and Dutch contexts. The institutional
format of confessional sections in these contexts is, first and foremost, a question
of groups/collectives as well as the amount of visibility and legitimacy allowed in
the public domain.
The concern of the minister in Elverum with (holistic, helhetig) integration leads
him to avoid sections: “If we segregate in the churchyard (kirkegård), then that is an
extremely strong manifestation of the idea that, ‘No … here we are different, we are
not the same.’” The church warden in Støren gives institutional form to ‘respect’ by
allowing for some ‘soft divisions,’ without losing sight of wholeness (helhet). “We
tend to our traditions, but nevertheless there should be an integrated solution.” And
that helhet was in turn loosely grounded in an interpretation of social democracy:
“To achieve wholeness, we don’t all have to be the same.”
The Norwegian respondents are more sceptical toward fragmentation. (“I am not
in favour of a patchwork strategy,” KA man). That is why they resemble the French
in the discursive solutions they choose. That it concerns ‘religious’ collectives does
49 In the terminology of Rein and Schön, this is called an ‘institutional action frame.’
50 My respondents do not use these words or give this explanation. Yet, to present the best case possible
for Asad, I suggest we could reasonably see it as being about an undivided and secular nation.
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not really change much. For the Norwegian burial professionals, being a religious
collective is rather an advantage in matters of burial. Muslims can count on a large
degree of understanding. There is no need or interest in making this about being
secular or not.
Not all Dutch respondents are oblivious to collective demarcations. The insti-
tutional translation of ‘freedom’ and ‘equality’ occurred in the Amsterdam case,
where “the individual choice of the Muslim” to be buried in the respective ceme-
tery was emphasized as the leading consideration. This is somewhat similar to the
French and Norwegian individualizing strategy. Factionalism among groups was
not desired: “We don’t start thinking in factionalism (hokjesgeest), like ‘Oh, no, I
don’t want to lie next to that person, and I don’t want to lie next to that person!’” Yet,
the central question here concerned intragroup differences, not whether Muslims
could (or should) have their own section. The latter was self-evident. The cemetery
director in The Hague dealt more bluntly with group differences: “We just put some
high hedges in between. They don’t have to be bothered with who lies on the other
end.”
For Dutch respondents, all groups deserve a place around the table, ieder zijn
eigen plekje. So, they don’t spend their energy on deliberating this as a religious or
state-church issue. It unproblematically is so.
In order to understand the differences and similarities in the discursive solutions
chosen, it thus equally mattered to understand what respondents do to ‘groups’ as
what they do to ‘religion.’ And it suggests that concerns at the level of sensibilities
with being ‘secular’ manifest themselves only in the contexts in which the lived
attitude toward religious collectives is one of (deep) distrust. Also, at this level of
sensibilities then, we would have failed to understand relevant differences between
national and local contexts, if framed in terms of ‘secular’ sensibilities.
Stretching my argument as far as possible toward Asad yields the question: Can
we nevertheless not say that this is about secular sensibilities? Along that line of
reasoning, the Norwegian and Dutch respondents fail to recognize it as explicitly
secular sensibilities because their picture of religion is much more benign; religion
is a nonissue for them, not a matter for explicit theorization. And because they do
not see it as an explicitly religious issue, they do not see it as a secular issue either.
Rather, the decisive issue is primarily one of groupness regarding the unity of the
cemetery.
Once more, we can, of course, reframe some of the material as different secular
sensibilities, by which the scholar then means different (lived and implicit) attitudes
to religion. But why not state the research objective in those terms: ‘lived and
implicit attitudes to religion’?
Furthermore, to understand what gets done to Muslims and humanists, it only
partially mattered to chart the respondent’s implicit attitudes toward ‘religion.’ It
proved equally important to note when it was not about ‘religion’ (or the ‘secular’).
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The more implicit motivations of agents for choosing institutional solutions were
rather – or at least equally as much – about what to do to groups. And instead
of being about ‘religious’ versus ‘secular,’ it is rather about how ‘whole’ versus
‘fragmented’ the cemetery should be.
7.6.3 Full Circle
This has brought us full circle. Going back to the discussion of Asad, Hurd, and
Dressler/Mandair (Section 2.3.4), it has now become obvious why their heuristics
would fail to capture this reasoning of the everyday world. In my understanding of
the everyday world, the actions or practices at hand can be about religion – or not.
Second, if conceived as being about religion, this is not automatically coupled to an
understanding of the secular for respondents.
Yet, the underlying presuppositions in the framework of Asad, Hurd, and
Mandair fail to allow for the specification of the noncase. Asad’s study of “forma-
tions of the secular” avoids any operational definition of the secular phenomenon
under study and fails to specify what is not a case. These scholars’ shift to the
deployment of categories rather than their definition suggests that they can
stand neutrally on the sidelines just ‘charting deployment.’ But this fails when no
deployment is going on.
Second, their analytic frameworks exclude the possibility that, for the layman,
something can be about religion but has nothing to do with secularism or being
secular (see quotations in Section 7.5.2). Vernacular understandings of secular
or secularism evolved for Dutch and Norwegian respondents around a standard
picture of France, being “nonreligious,” “like France,” “removing most the symbols.”
Yet, for example, “meeting other believers with respect” was not understood as
secular reasoning (church warden Støren). Nor could one denote current burial
regulations inNorway as secularism or secular. “TheChurch ofNorway is in control,
so I do not see how that can be secular” (a humanist from Oslo).
These nuances cannot be addressed in Mandair/Dressler and Hurd’s framework.
As soon as something is construed as religion, secularism is always implied. Such
a position aligns with a very particular genealogical and epistemological under-
standing of the secular in which secularism comes first and then gives rise to the
category of religion (see Section 2.3.4).
In other words, the meaning and conceptual hierarchy of the terms in the every-
day world fundamentally contrast with that of the Asadian scholar. Consequently,
looking through their analytic lenses, wemisunderstand the everyday world. Rather,
we find the implicit Asadian epistemological picture reconfirmed.
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Conclusion: A Comparison of State Responses to the
(New) Diversity in the Cemetery
8.1 Introduction
How do different states respond to similar situations of (new) religious and cultural
diversity? That is the key question this book has sought to solve by looking through
the prism of cemeteries. By means of a comparative and multileveled study of how
three states respond to a common challenge, namely, the need for special burial
facilities for Muslims, it provides a striking image of societal accommodation in
Norway, The Netherlands, and France.
This book addresses two instances of ‘new’ religious and cultural diversity: the
demand of Muslims for graves that face in the direction of Mecca and the related
desire for collective sections in public cemeteries, or rather a separate Islamic ceme-
tery. In Norway, we also focused on the humanist demands for neutral ceremonial
rooms and a neutral governing institution instead the Church of Norway.
Clearly, the characterization of the presence of Muslims in Europe can be called
‘new’ only if we choose to disregard the heritage of European colonialism, the
Ottoman Empire, and the previous Spanish Muslim Caliphates (cf. Bader: 2007b,
871). Furthermore, the ‘newness’ of humanist burial needs lies not in any migratory
events but occurs because of ongoing internal social changes in Norway. Neverthe-
less, recent changes in the repatriation pattern of Muslims (that differs among the
various Islamic groups) have brought the question of Islamic burial to the fore. An
increase in the overall number and a changing attitude toward the place of burial
over the generations has resulted in new burial preferences. Likewise, the humanist
dissatisfaction with the Lutheran burial governance has gained salience in light of
an increasingly pluralized and secularized population.
So, a certain sense of newness seems fitting concerning the selection of burial
challengers. Furthermore, this occurs because the topic of Muslims living in Europe
has only in the last decades become so contested. Up to the 1990s, the religious
background of post-1945 immigrants to Europe was largely a nonissue. Yet, events
like the Rushdie affair, the Iranian Revolution, and of course the terrorist attacks
brought this particular religious dimension to the forefront.
Rather problematic, as by now many have pointed out, is the resulting public
debate, which tends to be carried out based on a set of binary oppositions that posit
Muslims as the religious backward other of Western modernity and secularity.
Alternatively, the attitude toward Muslim immigrants and their institutional
needs can be informed by what Asad would call secular sensibilities, that is, au-
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tomatic ways of responding that depict certain practices as very cruel or even
inconceivable in Western society (e.g., animal slaughter without a sedative, the
wearing of the niqab), whereas other solutions are deemed acceptable. This occurs
while conveniently forgetting how Western institutional practices entail their own
cruelties or are coloured by their own specific religious past.
Clearly, this does not mean declaring animal slaughter without sedation is not
cruel, nor does it mean accommodating all demands. Rather, we must turn our
analytic gaze toward Western categories and understandings of what constitutes
secularism. And this turn toward secular self-understanding as an object of analysis
– be it anthropologically, sociologically, or philosophically – is what gave impetus to
the research agenda of ‘the multiple secularisms,’ as discussed in the Introduction.
This book repeatedly refers to the work of Asad, one of its leading scholars,
because his emphasis on sensibilities is a main ingredient in the question: “What
do states do to the Muslims or humanists?” Yet, my analysis departs from Asad –
and the fashion of the day – by calling these practices or sensibilities ‘secular’ or
‘secularism.’ This study finds that such a scholarly interpretation overdetermines
the meaning-making process of the respondents. Thus, instead of approaching
the burial challenges in Europe through a predetermined analytic framework of
‘comparative secularisms,’ as I initially had set out to do, in the end I chose a more
standard historical, institutional, and comparative approach.
Under the banner of a multileveled discursive (religious) governance approach,
this book contends the following: How states currently respond to the burial needs
of Muslims and humanists must be understood against the backdrop of (various)
historical institutional structures, the role of local burial agents charged with burial
praxis as well as the role of the minorities themselves. In particular, it hypothesizes
– and confirms – the relevance of a legacy of state organized-religion relations as
an important institutional structure.
To see what states actually, and not just legally, do to (religious)minorities, we first
mapped policy responses at three levels of society over time. Second, we looked at
the claims of Muslims and humanists as shaping institutional arrangements. Lastly,
as part of a study of everyday practice and municipal application, we distinguished
between institutional and discursive responses. How states respond to cultural and
religious diversity in their public domain depends largely on framing: what public
agents see this as the main issue.
Why ask this question of a legacy of state-organized religion relations and resort
to such a level of empirical and discursive detail? I have three reasons.
First, in the scholarly debate concerning Islam in Europe, one consistent issue
remains, namely: Can we observe an overall trend of convergence between public
policies in the various countries? Do countries become similar over time? Or do
they retain their national and peculiar differences?
Second, as part of such a question: How should scholars conceptualize such
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national legacies/models? There exist a wide range of national overview studies that
chart the French, the American, the German way of dealing with new minorities.
These traditions are often portrayed in rather stereotypical ways. ‘French laïcité,’
‘Dutch pillarization,’1 or ‘Norwegian establishment’ – authors argue that these are
important factors in explaining how these countries react to newcomers.
Yet, the problem with crude conceptualization is that these labels are often
inferred from particular time periods. And there is a tendency in the literature to
use descriptive stylized models as explanatory factors. Thus, for example, the fact
that France falls descriptively in the category of ideal typical Republican countries
could somehow explain a public speech on immigration, attitudes vis-à-vis Islam,
or a women’s decision to wear a veil (cf. Bertossi/Duyvendak: 2012, 239). But not
only does this confuse descriptive relevance with explanatory relevance, it also
presumes an all-encompassing normative structure that somehow drives individual
behaviours, social movements, and public opinion.
Furthermore, national overview studies typically look at legal and formal forms of
regulation. Yet, as some predict, the gap between “predominant normative models
of appropriate institutions and policies and ‘what is going on, on the ground’”
(Bader: 2007b, 880) is huge.
The costs for doing comparative research are then twofold: Not only do such
approaches stand in the way of individual scholars’ adequately comparing insti-
tutions and social interactions, they also define the research agendas that “have
a structuring impact on the international literature – a paradigm in the Kuhnian
way” (Bertossi: 2012, 250).
This is then the third reason for a detailed inquiry into the relevance of state-
church legacies as well as secularism: Scholars need models or analytic categories to
help reduce complexity, but they risk reification with overly one-dimensional ones.
This applies to the work of the individual scholar as well as to metalevel discussions
over appropriate concepts for the global study of religion or Islam.
And it is this challenge of reification that links my discussion on national state-
church models with that of a conceptual discussion on secularism.
To address this challenge, this book proposed a two-pronged strategy entailing
a back-and-forth movement between: (meta-)theoretical/conceptual frameworks
and empirical data; between scholarly terminology and the everyday language
and actions of professionals. The close relationship between project and research
questions further reflects such a two-pronged concern.
At the most general level, I asked: How do states respond to the new religious
and cultural diversity? And what scholarly frameworks or concepts are best suitable
1 See for example Koopmans/Statham/Giugni/Passy: 2005.
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for international comparisons of these responses? I answer these project questions
in Section 8.5.2.
At the second most general level, I asked three research questions:
1) What are the institutional and discursive policy responses to Muslim and humanist
burial needs, compared among countries over time and at three levels of governance?
What similarities and differences do we observe?
2) What role does a state-organized religious legacy or national repertoire play in deter-
mining burial outcomes?
3) How is secularism used and argued for?
As a first step in this analysis, Chapters 3, 4, and 5 compared institutional and
discursive policy responses to Muslim and humanist burial needs at the legal level,
the national policy level, and the municipal level. A fine-grained answer to the first
question is summarized in a Master Table later in this chapter. The most central
finding herewas that of astonishing legal differences, yet surprisingly similar actions.
I then tried to make sense of the above puzzle in light of state-organized religion
legacies or ideas concerning secularism.
To answer the second research question about the role state-organized religion
played, I followedBowen in distinguishing between a state-churchmodel as a ‘model
of’ and ‘model for.’ The former tries to describe a given reality, i.e., it is a descriptive
analytic tool. The latter is a discursive resource used for specific purposes. Thus,
Chapter 6 summarizes the extent to which legal and material municipal policy
outcomes agree with the expectations based on the standard state-church models;
‘laïcité,’ ‘pillarization,’ and ‘establishment’ as well as the more nuanced models as
‘models of.’ Chapter 7 summarizes the extent to which these models, or their scripts,
turned up in the public reasoning of municipal burial agents as ‘models for.’
The short answer to the second research question is that the legacies of state-
organized religion better describe legal outcomes and some of the ways in which
burial agents publicly reason than they capture material actions. They return in
the public discourse of French, Dutch, and Norwegian agents, albeit not in their
actions.
To answer research question three “how is secularism used and argued for?”, we
looked at how burial agents and Muslims/humanists justify the solutions chosen.
The short answer is: In the Dutch and Norwegian everyday worlds, secularism is
not used and argued for.
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8.2 Reification
Before I address these outcomes in further detail: What is at stake in this investiga-
tion? For the nonspecialist, these distinctions (i.e., between ‘model of’ and ‘model
for’) might appear far removed from a public discussion over the accommodation of
Islam or new minorities in Europe. By means of its two-pronged strategy, this book
tries to show that scholarly framings and concepts are in fact closely connected to
such discussions.
Scholars have the obligation to inform public opinion with nuanced accounts
of state responses to new minorities, far removed from reified one-dimensional
pictures.Thismeans they first must knowwhat actually happens; hence, the detailed
everyday institutional, discursive and material approach. Further, such factual
investigation should be amenable to being translated into good scholarly concepts
that capture such complexity, beyond the grand narratives of ‘multiple secularisms.’
And at least for research projects that claim an interest in everyday life analysis,
scholarly concepts should be informed by lifeworld reasoning and not obstruct
comparative analysis.
The connecting point between these two arguments is the relevance of discourse
and challenge of reification. As part of their knowing what happens, scholars should
take public reasoning seriously. How states respond to cultural and religious di-
versity depends in part on framing what public agents see as the main issue. But
discourse can also mislead and overemphasize national differences. It should thus
be complemented with material analysis and an investigation of a broad range of
factors.
It was not self-evident to recognize this relevance of thematerial reality as something
distinct from the discourse. A short anecdote as illustration: At the end of my first
fieldtrip in France, I truly thought that the French burial agents saw these sections as
“the aggregate of individual choices according to confessional lines.” I really believed
that the few existing cemeteries were indeed historical exceptions or anomalies. (I
had read all public documents and legal texts.) And both the Muslims respondents
in the field and the burial representatives structured their reasoning in terms of
laïcité and its constraints (NB: they also mentioned other concerns). Also, the work
of a scholar like Nunez, on whom I relied, replayed some of this ideology.2
Thus, not until my second round of fieldwork and visits to the cemetery of Pantin
and Thiais did I begin to understand that they reason and reconstruct their history
2 Nunez (2011) discusses the range of Muslim (and Jewish!) accommodations occurring well before
the first decree in 1975. But it is unclear whether her wordings of “these discretely negotiated spaces”
reflect her own contemporary concerns with laïcité – or whether they describe the way in which the
matter was seen at the time. I make a similar point about Petit (2006); see discussion on Bobigny.
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that way. On the other hand, they provide for sections that do not differ in any
material way from the Dutch or Norwegian ones. Moreover, they have always done
it this way. Many Jewish sections have long existed (since its inception in 1886,
laic Pantin has been referred to as ‘the cemetery of the Jews’!). And of all countries
under investigation, France has the most Muslim cemeteries.
In other words, the institutional solutions chosen in the countries studied was
even more similar than I had initially presumed (or the French were much less
laïque than they self-proclaimed). Yet, it remained significant, of course, that French
cultural/confessional sections have no legal status and are conceptualized in that
way. Such dealings reveal a socially charged climate that is very real for the Muslim
families involved, namely, a frustrating situation in which families have to rely
on the lobbying expertise of their burial agent to obtain a place on a section in a
neighbouring municipal cemetery. Likewise, some of the administrators express
real frustration over the lack of coherence between legal rules and everyday reality
and their consequent need to “juggle words.”
So, what to make of all this? To be clear: What this book claims is not that
consideration of public reasoning is futile; in fact, looking at public and everyday
reasoning is of great import for understanding what happens. Yet, this is only part
of what happens. To take the French example, reification occurs when we mistake
the discursive salience of laïcité for an explanation; it occurs when discursive reality
is taken as representative for all reality, disregarding material reality; and it occurs,
as I conclude further on, with respect to the usage of secularism, when scholarly
framing is not in line with the reasoning of the everyday world under investigation.
I address the theme of reification in more depth in Section 8.5.1.
8.3 Summary of Burial Patterns
Having briefly oriented the reader toward the theme of reification, we turn to a
discussion of burial outcomes at different levels. This provides a detailed answer to
research question 1. Section 8.4.1 provides detailed answers to research questions 2
and 3. And Section 8.5, finally, discusses the main theoretical and metatheoretical
implications of the book’s findings.
8.3.1 Legal Burial Outcomes and Comparative Reflections
France governs its burial domain through a collection of articles in the French local
government code of practice. The cemetery is perceived as an ouvrage public, a
public work, that is “public, mandatory, and secular.”TheNapoleonic Decree of 1804
effectively abolished confessional cemeteries, with the exception of some Jewish
and Protestant cemeteries; since then, only the municipality can maintain, create, or
https://doi.org/10.13109/9783666567322 | CC BY-NC-ND 4.0
© 2021, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Theaterstraße 13, D-37073 Göttingen
Summary of Burial Patterns 269
extend cemeteries. Further exceptions are three departments in the region Alsace-
Moselle (Haut-Rhin, Bas Rhin, and Moselle), which still operate under regulations
of the Concordat.
In 1881, separate confessional parcels were legally prohibited, and an 1884 law
stipulated that the mayor of a municipality should not make “distinctions or recom-
mendations based on the faith or religion” of the deceased (Article L2213–9). The
final formative moment was when Article 28 of the 1905 Law on the Separation
of Churches and the State was enacted, which prohibited the display of religious
symbols in the public parts of a cemetery. Symbols became permitted only on indi-
vidual graves, where they signify the private expression of confessional or cultural
affiliation in an otherwise neutral public space.
By contrast, The Netherlands allows for a wide variety of cemeteries. Primarily
regulated by a national burial law, the “Bill on the Disposal of the Dead,” cemeteries
can be public or private. Since 1827, each municipality has the obligation to provide
for a municipal cemetery or to share one with a neighboring municipality. Only
one-third of all cemeteries are owned, administered, and paid for by municipali-
ties, whereas two-thirds fall under the category of “special cemeteries” [bijzondere
begraafplaatsen]. This means they are owned by various confessional groups or by
private legal entities (foundations, companies).
Despite liberal attempts to abolish confessional graveyards altogether, religious
communities have secured the right to their denominational cemeteries. And in
cases where they cannot afford these, they have the right to claim parts of a public
cemetery. And these rights are extended equally to Catholics, Protestants, and
Jews. Financial considerations have also played a role in maintaining confessional
graveyards. Many municipalities objected to shouldering the costs of creating a
municipal, nondenominational cemetery, resulting in a wide range of burial options.
In Norway, two primary laws govern the burial domain: the 1996 Funeral Act
and the 1996 Church Act, both of which were altered since January 2012. The
Funeral Act satisfies individual equality for all because it does not discriminate
based on religious affiliation and provides a free grave for everybody for at least 20
years. It expresses a concern for collective religious freedom, inasmuch as private
confessional (and therefore Islamic) cemeteries are allowed. The updated Funeral
Act says nothing about confessional sections. Para. 6 allows for “Burial in a grave that
is adapted to the particular needs of the religious or nonreligious communities.”The
solution has thus been individualized rather than constituting a right to a collective
section.
The legal and institutional differences in the three countries are immense. The
French cemetery has a strong symbolic dimension as a laic public domain in which
all Frenchmen and Frenchwomen are united and should be treated equally. In the
Dutch burial domain, the principles of individual and collective religious freedom
are most prominent, resulting in a wide range of burial options. Dutch cemeteries
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are more prominently seen as pieces of land and objects of financial consideration.
But the legal reasoning also contains strong respect for the logic of the terrain and
church autonomy. In Norway, as in France, burial regulations are informed by a
concern for individual equality. Yet, unlike France, Norwegian public cemeteries
are seen as the explicit embodiments of a ‘cultural/Christian’ heritage, downplayed
in the language of the latest legal reforms.
State-church relations have played a formative role alongwith concerns of hygiene
and public health. French burial regulations are informed by anticlerical sentiments
and political attempts to reduce the power of the Catholic Church. Dutch burial
regulations were shaped in the context of several religiousminorities, whowished to
safeguard their cemeteries against a Dutch Reformed status quo and liberal secular
proposals to abandon confessional cemeteries altogether. In Norway, the Funeral
Act and Church Act, both of which to date still govern the Norwegian cemetery,
were shaped in the context of a historical Lutheran monopoly and homogeneous
population.
We can expect substantial differences in the degree to which Muslims are able to
obtain Islamic burial facilities in these countries.
8.3.2 National Policy Outcomes and Comparative Reflections
At this level of analysis, there are some clear national differences, but some findings
do not conform to this picture. If we take the numbers of available burial facilities as
a first indicator, for an estimated Muslim population of 3.3 to 4.9 million (5.1–7.5%
of the total population), France has two Islamic cemeteries and about 75 Islamic
sections in public cemeteries.TheNetherlands, for an estimated 696,000 to 1million
Muslims (between 4–6% of total population), has one Islamic cemetery and about
70 Muslim sections. Norway, for an estimated Muslim population between 133,000
and 197,000 (2.5–3.7% of the total population), has no Islamic graveyards but
sections on public/Lutheran graveyards in 20 to 50 municipalities.
Beyond sheer numbers lies the substance of institutional responses. In France,
the prohibition of confessional sections as well as burial without a coffin and within
24 hours of death makes a proper burial according to Islamic custom problematic.
Over time, however, sections have been hesitantly legitimized by means of a public
framing of the matter in terms of ‘immigrant integration’ and ‘finding pragmatic
solutions.’
The 1975 administrative directive (circulaire) by the Ministry of Interior stipu-
lated that a mayor can – but is not obliged to – construct “confessional groups of
graves under the condition that the neutrality of the cemetery is particularly pre-
served.” The directive sought to settle the issue without constitutionally challenging
laïcité. It has remained the prevailing strategy for all subsequent directives (1991
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and 2008). Since 2000, there have been several initiatives at the national level to
further improve the situation, see Section 4.2.1.
The political uneasiness stands in marked contrast to the Dutch situation, where
attitudes toward Muslim parcels and cemeteries have changed only minimally over
time. As early as the 1980s, there was discussion of adapting existing burial laws so
as to remove all remaining obstacles to Islam and other religions. Burial without a
coffin has been allowed since 1991. As in France, plans were made for additional
Islamic burial facilities, especially in cities with larger Muslim populations (such as
Amsterdam). But these initiatives resulted from decisions made at the municipal
level – or they occurred in civil society without involving the national government.
The reality of Norwegian burials is striking compared to the other countries. 90%
of all Norwegians are buried according to church ritual, a number that has remained
stable over the years. Less than 15 cemeteries exist with a private confessional status.
How does this affect Muslims and humanists? For Muslims, there is a generally
accommodating attitude: A national overview study indicated that there is good
cooperation between the Norwegian Islamic Council and the Joint Parish Councils.
But the wish to provide delineated sections is not always welcomed in certain
areas outside Oslo. This scepticism was also translated into law: Para. 5, which
in the previous Funeral Act allowed for consecrating parts of a churchyard for
religious communities outside the Lutheran faith, has now been removed. The new
passage mentions only the possibility of consecration – as long as one does not
show disrespect toward other communities.
With respect to humanists, we noticed two main objections: the lack of neutral
ceremonial rooms and the principled objection against the administrative Lutheran
dominance. Over time, the political establishment responded here with a similar
reaction as the French toward the Muslims: informally accommodating minorities
but not changing the actual law.
Thus, when comparing countries at the national political level over time we saw
that, both institutionally and discursively, there are real differences.These align with
the social imaginaries and normative logics encountered in the legal frameworks
(Chapter 3).
The Muslim issue is more contested in France, whereas in Norway the discussion
is held only on the part of humanists. The most significant differences pertain
to the prescribed institutional features of the French carré and, for example, the
Dutch section. The French parcel cannot be visibly demarcated from the rest of the
cemetery and cannot be mentioned as an official part of the cemetery. Allocation
results only from the explicit wish of the deceased or the family. Dutch sections in
turn can be visibly demarcated from the rest of the cemetery and are reserved for
citizens of only one confession. And allocation to such a grave is dependent on the
local agreements but can be decided on by the religious leader. In Norway, explicit
regulations are absent altogether.
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But the comparison also suggests some departure from these national images.
If opportunities for Muslims in France are constrained by laïcité, why are there
nevertheless still 75 carrés? And why does France have the most Muslim cemeteries
of all? Why are there not more Muslim cemeteries in the ‘pillarized’ Netherlands?
In Norway, there are no Islamic cemeteries, despite their legal permissibility. And
regarding humanists, why did the Norwegian state charge the church with respon-
sibility for the public graveyards in 1996, at a time of increasing pluralism? The
question of burial administration has been ongoing since the early 1980s, the dom-
inant transition over time being that various public and church committees only
advise municipal responsibility. Yet, the state has upheld church administration.
The three countries do converge in their desire to resolve practical problems re-
lated toMuslimmigration.Within a relatively short timespan, Norway has provided
for the relevant sections, which without doubt is related to the specific repatriation
behaviour of Norwegian Pakistani Muslims. Furthermore, France appears to be
‘catching up.’ Yet, as the embedded case studies show, formal policies reflect only
one aspect of the overall picture. By looking solely at national initiatives, we miss
one of the central dynamics for accommodation.
8.3.3 Local Embedded Cases and Municipal Outcomes
The embedded cases at the municipal level of analysis revealed four interesting
aspects. First, central to the complaint of the Norwegian humanists, a second
set of municipal arguments could explain why the Church of Norway was given
administrative responsibility for the cemeteries in 1996. Second, not only do nearly
all municipalities provide for a designated area for Muslims on the public cemetery,
these sections are also entirely similar in appearance. Third, an in-depth historical
analysis of the Paris region showed that confessional sections in France still exist,
albeit not because of their political allowance since the 1970s or because of the
public framing in terms of ‘immigrant integration’ and ‘finding pragmatic solutions.’
Rather, confessional sections and Muslim cemeteries existed long before the 1975
decree. Moreover, they came from a dynamic on the ground: Families bought
rows of concessions, resulting in confessional sections. Fourth, there remain clear
differences in the discursive understanding among the three countries.
I recall the example of the conservator at Thiais and her ‘privatizing reflex’ when
I asked her why she had a map of Thiais above her desk (Section 2.4.2). She blushed
and was clearly embarrassed. But the Norwegian respondents too have reservations
and choose to solve the matter by ‘individual consecration.’ Dutch burial agents
have no problem allowing for sections. In The Hague, seven mosque associations
each have their graveyard sections in the municipal cemetery of Westduin.
These discursive differences also appear in the respondents’ understanding of
the proposed solution. The French reduce the section to a “regrouping of the results
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of individual choices.” They refrain from calling a hedge around a Jewish section
a religious symbol, instead deeming it a “piece of vegetation” (Montreuil). And a
Jewish ossuary is not necessarily a “Jewish ossuary,” but “the remains of the deceased
in that division, who all happened to be Jewish.”3 Norwegian respondents talk about
the section as “a manifestation of difference” (Elverum), proposing “soft sections”
(Støren). The Dutch understand these sections to be strong collective demarcations.
Of course, juggling words is not only a French thing. The CIBA project in Ams-
terdam speaks of a “multifunctional facility” rather than an Islamic washing facility.
But the French consistently navigate between formal ideology and the logic of the
terrain. The Dutch light-heartedly frame their arguments in terms of financial and
urban-planning concerns. The Norwegians speak a whole lot about “consecrating
graves.”
8.4 Comparative and Explanatory Reflections
So, what is the overall picture? Do countries converge in their response to new-
comers? Or do national differences remain that can plausibly be linked to path-
dependent repertoires? The answer depends on where scholars look.
Comparing burial solutions at the legal level, there is evidence for stable (national)
differences between countries over time.4 The national repertoires are furthermore
reflected in parts of the public reasoning across national contexts, particularly
visible at the municipal level. Yet, these national differences dissolve when we
compare actual practice. Rather than explaining these commonalities by means of a
convergence thesis – “a Western response against the perception of an anti-Western
threat!” (Minkenberg: 2007, 2) – I conclude, as we will see, much more soberly, by
deriving them from a multiplicity of factors, among others, that of praxis and the
logic of the terrain.
3 These are my words summarizing the respondent’s answer. See Paris contemporary, Section 4.4.1.2.
4 Chapter 2 provides nuances on this. The French legal burial regulations became more laic over time,
going from municipalization (1804) to laicification (1905). The Dutch legal regulations moved from
confirming the Reformed status quo to pluralization with the first burial law (1869). Thereafter, they
remained quite similar over time. The latest legal changes integrated concerns with burial without a
coffin (the 1980’s). The Norwegian burial regulations moved from being completely within church
governance in the law of 1897 to establishing their own law in 1996 and an increased concern with
religious pluralism and evenhandedness in the reformulations of 2012, i.e., from kirkegård to gravplass.
https://doi.org/10.13109/9783666567322 | CC BY-NC-ND 4.0
© 2021, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Theaterstraße 13, D-37073 Göttingen
274 A Comparison of State Responses to the (New) Diversity in the Cemetery
8.4.1 Answers to General Research Questions 1, 2, and 3
So, why do burial agents come to such different discursive answers, yet similar
institutional actions? And what is the role of state-organized religious legacies or
ideas about secularism? Finalizing an answer to our research question 1, I have
constructed the Master Table below, which summarizes the legal, national, and mu-
nicipal patterns described above. This table summarizes the findings from Chapters
3, 4, and 5, thereby compiling the tables in Chapter 6 and 7.
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Table 8.1 Master table: Institutional (material and legal) and discursive policy outcomes at three levels
across countries
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On to Research Question 2: What role does a state-organized religious legacy or
national repertoire play in determining burial outcomes?
Legally speaking, burial outcomes correspond to what one would expect from the
standard pictures (see first row in Master Table). Furthermore, this aligns with the
genealogy of the countries’ burial legislation and state-organized religion relations.
The latter played a central role in the formation of the first burial laws in France
and The Netherlands, together with concerns of hygiene and public health (see
Section 3.2). In Norway, even recent changes in the Funeral Act (2012) went hand
in hand with changes in the larger state-organized religion framework.
Yet, as I established in Chapter 6, when trying to understand similar material
outcomes,5 the descriptive powers of the state-organized religionmodels are narrow.
This was true for the standard version, and it gave rise to three national puzzles.
Could perhaps the more nuanced models better capture outcomes?
Only for France did the more heterogeneous version do a better job anticipating
Islamic sections and cemeteries. The Gallican element in the model, namely, the
French attitude of granting state support but also control over Islam, might lead us
to expect the existence of a Muslim cemetery like Bobigny. And the ‘associational
script’ of supporting the formation of associations (both cultural and religious)
might lead us to expect that mayors would want to provide for collective sections
nonetheless. However, a multitude of reasons played a role, in particular the logic
of the terrain and praxis.
For The Netherlands, principled pluralism and separation tradition was an im-
provement over ‘pillarization’ by removing the expectation of a pillar. Yet, it could
not anticipate the lack of Muslim cemeteries or the public financing of the Islamic
washing-house. This was rather the result of Islam’s own organizational structures
(factors of internal governance). The public financing of the washing-house in
Amsterdam resulted from concerns with citizen integration, which outweighed
concerns over the separation of state and church (external factors of governance).
For Norway, the designation ‘establishment’ seemed to explain many outcomes
(Breemer: 2014). Yet, the lack of Muslim cemeteries resulted more from internal
factors of governance (Muslims’ failing interest in organizing their own cemeteries).
But the absence of public financing of confessional cemeteries also might play a
role.6
The legal change in 1996 I viewed as resulting from a disestablishment script:
‘(local) disestablishment of the church from the municipality with the aim of es-
tablishing the local church among the people’ as well as the continuing Lutheran
hegemony. A more refined and dynamic characterization of the Norwegian model
5 See the number of provisions at both the national and the municipal level, Table 8.1, rows 2 and 3a.
6 This occurs although the Lutheran public graveyard is paid for by the public budget.
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better addresses this. Its different strands – establishment, compensatory even-
handedness, municipal disestablishment – conflict or coincide over time. Support
for one strand over the other varies depending on the level of governance. Thus
conceived, the 1996 legal act makes sense as a further ‘disentwinement’ of local
church and municipal interests. At the same time, it confirms the wish of the na-
tional political majority to retain the church as a central cultural/value foundation
for the public domains of the state (‘establishment’) (see Section 6.3).
Bader’s metaframework came to fruition for explaining the lack of Muslim ceme-
teries in The Netherlands and Norway.7 Differences in the internal organization of
Islam and Judaism explained this better than external factors of governance. My
Actor Institution Constellation Chart (Section 6.4.2) visualized the layered nature
of internal and external factors of governance.
In my explanation of the existence of confessional sections, I suggested a ‘multi-
plicity of factors’ and a ‘multiplicity of means’: (1) The influence of (various) institu-
tional regimes, like ‘integration,’ state-church regimes, etc., and in The Netherlands
also concerns with urban planning and commercial exploitation. (2) There is a
‘multiplicity of means,’ to meet the demands of minorities. Both France and Norway
chose to keep their laws intact while finding pragmatic solutions to accommo-
date both Muslims and humanists. (3) Most significant for this domain, there is
a basic ground reality: Families or groups of a particular affiliation desire – and
exert pressure – to be buried together. Analytically, this passes as an internal factor
of governance. Their behaviour resulted from a certain way of doing things, and
this has left its material traces in the cemetery. But this has also become part of
professional burial praxis (external factor of governance).
In sum, state-organized religion legacies have impacted the original formation of
the burial laws. But in the complexity of everyday governing, they are overruled or
outweighed by other concerns (among them the logic of the terrain). This explains,
I think, a good deal of what happens materially. Yet, this should not imply that
these legacies are irrelevant.
8.4.1.1 Discursive Relevance of State-Organized Religion Legacies
To summarize the analysis of Chapter 7, state-church legacies formed an explicit
argument in the discourse of the French and Norwegian agents: “I do this because
of the history of state and church” (action-guiding idea). Or the agents situated their
arguments for specific solutions against the backdrop of a narrative of state-church
relations (issue framework). This was again mostly the case in France and Norway.
7 Jews have many cemeteries in The Netherlands and some in Norway, while Muslims in both countries
have none (or only one in The Netherlands).
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Third, I inquired into the relevance of scripts hypothesized as falling under the
Dutch, French, or Norwegian more nuanced state-organized religion models.
Dutch respondents talked a good deal about giving “everybody their own spot,”
which can be interpreted (or not) as a concern with ‘principled evenhandedness.’
And there was reference to ‘separation of state and church’ in the discussion over
the public funding of the Islamic washing-house. But I found no reference to
‘pillarization’ in the discourse. Dutch agents do not often explicitly reference a
state-organized religion legacy as the context for their ideas. My guess is that the
scripts within the Dutch church-state regime conform with the basic logic of the
burial domain. A concern with principled evenhandedness and giving everybody
their spot effectively means aligning with demands for confessional demarcations.
On the whole, Norwegian respondents tried to be evenhanded toward minorities
in light of the hegemony of the Church of Norway (‘compensatory evenhanded-
ness’). They thereby also confirmed the relevance of an ‘establishment script’ insofar
as agents take the hegemonic position of the Norwegian church as self-evident
and given. This occurred as an explicit consideration, but also more tacitly as the
self-evident point of departure. “Municipal disestablishment within a state-public
religious constellation” was not salient as an argument in the embedded case studies.
As in the other countries, French respondents talked in terms of general nor-
mative principles: ‘religious freedom of practice,’ ‘respect,’ and ‘neutrality.’ At the
issue level, laïcité mattered as one consideration. Tension surrounding the topic of
confessional sections and private cemeteries comes from this required laic commit-
ment to the neutrality of third parties. This was particularly true for the lower-level
administrators. Thus, as Bowen suggested (2012, 361), arguments about secularity
and separation remain important rhetorical positions in the public debate, though
respondents also situated their arguments in light of the logique du terrain, ‘inte-
gration,’ or ‘being pragmatic.’ And they weighed different elements of the French
state-church legacies against one another.
I concluded that a heterogeneous conception of state-organized religion model
allows us to better divine the range of (normative) considerations at stake in the
deliberation process of the decision-maker. In that sense, they are an improvement
over the standard type of national models, although this was discursively more of
an improvement for the French and Dutch model than for the Norwegian one.
These scripts, furthermore, may help us understand discursive particularities.
And finally, we have an answer as to why the conservator in Thiais blushed when I
pointed to the map hanging above her desk (see Section 2.4.2)! “As long as it hangs
here and I do not show this in public, I think I am fine,” she said.
That reaction allowed her to quickly defend her action as lying within the realm
of the private: The map was hanging above her desk and not in the public part of the
conservatory building. Formal burial ideology has it that one cannot publicly demar-
cate a public cemetery into confessional bits, as this would enable the public agent to
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take religious affiliation into consideration in the allocation of a grave. Such action
would render public what is in essence a private matter. Her reflex thus secured a
hint of private judgment in her allocation policy and captured in a nutshell her at-
tempt to navigate the reality of the terrain while respecting republican/laic ideology.
The lighthearted reaction of the graveyard director in The Hague revealed a
concern with ieder zijn eigen plekje. “Oh,” he said, “We just put a hedge between the
Shia and the Sunni Muslims.” Arguably, it can be seen as an element of the Dutch
state-church legacy – or that of the burial regime (he situates it as lying within a
reading of the Wlb). Second, his response to respecting the Islamic wish to have
only one body in each grave is marked by concerns with commercial exploitation.
“But, in that case, they have to pay for two bodies,” he said. This is the result of a
real structuring influence in this domain.
The publicly funded Islamic washing-house in Amsterdam is called a ‘multifunc-
tional room’ in order to bypass the separation element in the Dutch state-church
regime.
To explain why the Norwegian agents respond with the solution of ‘individual
consecration,’ I suggest that they want to allow minorities their provisions, even
though they are not fond of public divisions.Thus, they avoid creating ‘hard sections’
and private Muslim cemeteries for reasons of ‘establishment’ and ‘social democracy.’
In other words, the framing issues (institutional regimes, among which the state-
organized religious legacies) can suggest why the French ‘individualize’ and are
against private cemeteries (‘strict neutrality’ and ‘republicanism’); they suggest why
the Norwegian propose ‘soft sections’ and do not like private cemeteries (‘establish-
ment’/’social democracy’); they suggest why the Dutch act light-heartedly but talk
about money and a ‘multifunctional room’ (‘commercial concerns’/’state-church
separation’).
But does discursive salience now denote explanatory salience for their actual
actions? Possibly, but we cannot be certain. I have provided a range of reasons
(Section 7.4). Mapping discourse engages public justifications, yet justification does
not always equal motivation. Furthermore, there is often a multiplicity of causes.
Finally, underdeterminacy means actors can interpret a given commitment (say
‘evenhandedness’) in a variety of institutional ways. Nevertheless, it is unclear what
precise institutional solutions follow from it (see also Jensen: 2019, 12). Moreover,
underterminacy can also lead to multiple interpretations by the scholar; hence the
risk of scholarly overinterpretation – or of giving discourse too much weight to
one’s explanation.
8.4.1.2 “How Is Secularism Used and Argued for”?
Our last research question takes up the challenge of multiple lines of interpretation.
In answer to this question, I found that in France laïcité was an actual term from
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the lifeworld. Following my own suggested research strategy of perceived versus
actual deployment (Section 2.3.4), laïcité was both an action-guiding idea (“I do
this because of laïcité”) as well as a framing issue. Yet, laïcité was only one idea. As in
the other countries, respondents talked in terms of general principles to justify their
actions. At the level of framework issues, laïcité mattered as one consideration, most
often as a constraining element. For the Dutch and Norwegian agents, however,
secularism was not a guiding idea or even a framework issue.
Schmidt’s distinction between ideas and meaning context was helpful in making
this point.There was overlap in some of the ideas that agents claim across embedded
cases to have guided their decision (e.g., equity, respect, religious freedom).8 Yet,
there are crucial differences in the framework in which agents embedded these
ideas and thus the meaning attributed to them.
Norwegians perceive the issue of confessional sections to be about ‘integration,’
‘state-church relations,’ ‘being pragmatic,’ ‘consecration,’ and ‘social democracy.’ The
Dutch see this as a matter of ‘urban planning,’ ‘financial issues,’ ‘the burial law,’ and
to some extent ‘integration.’ Only the French see this as concerning ‘secularism’
as well as ‘pragmatism,’ logique du terrain, ‘funeral laws,’ ‘professional codes,’ and
some reference to ‘integration.’
Secularism or laïcité thus appeared as an element of difference in the comparative
analysis and not a commonality. An etic framing in terms of ‘secularism,’ or ‘secular
formations,’ would fail exactly to convey the cultural specificity between national
contexts. Furthermore, this etic framing ultimately overdetermines this regulation
as a matter governing ‘religion.’ Yet, most of the time burial demands are seen as a
combination of issues (see Scheme 7.1, Level 3).
Lastly, when explicitly asked (quotations in Section 7.5.2), Dutch and Norwegian
respondents expressed that secularism (or being secular) was not their leitmotiv.
Or that it had a meaning in tension with their understanding of the burial practices
or the choices at hand (Section 7.5.2).
In sum, not just for this study, I would nevertheless argue for ethnographic
comparative purposes in general, ‘secularism’ being an inappropriate structuring
concept.
My argument could have ended there. But one unexpected finding surfaced in the
discursive analysis. Might there not be a tacit level of ‘secular’ sensibilities that
informs an agent’s actions? Causal factors may simply not always be visible in the
discourse, for example, ‘the logic of the terrain.’9
8 See Discursive Chart, Scheme 7.1, Level 2, or in the Master Table 8.1, Level 3b.
9 French burial agents mention this explicitly. It is absent from the Dutch and Norwegian discourses.
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That of course depends once again on what the scholar means by ‘secular.’ But
the question is interesting insofar as it extends our argument as far as possible
toward Asad. Second, people’s behaviour or attitudes toward religion often depend
on implicit and accepted assumptions. Taylor’s discussion of the immanent frame
and “sensed context” and Casanova’s “phenomenological secularism” both make
this point in various ways.10
But especially when studying implicit and lived attitudes do scholars have to tread
lightly with their interpretative lens. And thus, standing on the shoulders of these
influential scholars, my book provides the argument that studies on secularity need
to become (even) more empirically and inductively informed. From the historical
and genealogical canvasses of Taylor’s Secular Age and Asad’s Secular Formations
‘in the West,’ through the more geographically nuanced sociological variations of
secularities in Casanova’s work, there is still a way to go to reach such actual ‘lived
experience.’
In Sections 7.6.1 and 7.6.2, I looked at two examples of sensibilities in situations
where certain burial solutions are chosen automatically and others are seen as
inconceivable. The French find it inconceivable to consider private cemeteries. In
Norway, too, the suggestion to provide for a private graveyard next to the Lutheran
offer was rejected outright. Norwegian respondents “jump” in their argumentation
toward the humanists, similar to how the French “jump” in their argumentation
regarding private cemeteries. There occurs an automatic transition from a humanist
complaint about the church’s administrative role, which is a principled and sym-
10 How do “ordinary people” experience being secular? Casanova asks (2009, 1052). And how does
their ‘phenomenological secularism’ (the lived experience of being secular) relate to the secularist
assumptions in two types of secular ideologies, namely, those of ‘philosophico-historical’ or ‘political
secularism’? Casanovawants to establish a relationship between theories of religion and how ordinary
people experience some of these theoretical assumptions. He thus probes a link between explicit
formulations (ideology) and more implicit sensibilities: the “sensed context” in Taylor’s formulation.
The immanent frame is “not usually, or even mainly a set of beliefs which we entertain about our
predicament, but rather the sensed context in which we develop our beliefs” (Taylor: 2007, 549). To
Casanova’s credit, he tries to make sense (empirically) of some of the highly theoretical distinctions
of Taylor. Thus, Taylor’s ‘stadial consciousness’ or ‘subtraction theory’ are no longer abstract features
of Western history but can refer to actual lived attitudes. This it is one step closer to an engagement
with “ordinary citizens.” Casanova relies on public surveys to illustrate the presence of a ‘stadial
consciousness’ in Europe (and its absence in the United States). He suggests empirical evidence
because Europeans underreport and Americans overreport their religiosity (pp. 1055–1056). Yet,
the experience of these ordinary citizens is relevant in Casanova’s analysis insofar as they are
representative of national states. The public opinion polls measure the opinion of ‘the Spanish’ versus
‘the Norwegians’ or ‘the Americans.’ Furthermore, it can be questioned to which extent public surveys
can even capture the complexity of ‘being secular.’ Moreover, Casanova’s categories are derived from
theoretical distinctions by liberal scholars like Taylor, rather than being inductively derived.
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bolic argument of administrative inequality, to a solution that offers ‘individual
consecration.’
So, yes, this does intimate the role of sensibilities. Yet, are these really secular
sensibilities? Thus far in the analysis, I have interpreted the objection against private
cemeteries in France as a sign of Republican thought and the Gallican script. But in
Norway there is no sign of republicanism or Gallican control. So, why are they too
against privatization? And why do they also discursively individualize the solution
chosen?
At a deeper level, I suggest that what binds the French and Norwegian agents
might in fact be a similar sensitivity and objection toward too much visible ‘group-
ness.’ Relying on a range of quotations, I showed how respondents talk across
contexts about how whole and/or separate the solution should be and how peo-
ple should feel at home and belong. There are even indications of an underlying
metaphor of ‘sharing the bed.’ This language suggests that the challenge of deal-
ing with groups might occur prior to dealing with religion. This is not so much
an argument against the explicit relevance of ‘republicanism’/’laïcité’ and ‘estab-
lishment’/’social democracy’ for explaining discursive responses (i.e., why they
individualize the solution and are tense about private cemeteries). Rather, it inter-
prets these national explanations as expressions of a metacultural, action-guiding
metaphor (Rein/Schön:1994, 33–34).
Such an interpretation might suggest that the binary of secular versus religion is
irrelevant or only secondary to a ground binary of wholeness vs. fragmentation.
And here the differences between contexts prevail.
Again, this does notmean that the scholar could not interpret some of thematerial
as different secular sensibilities; this connotes ‘different (lived and implicit) attitudes
to religion.’ One could say that the Norwegian and Dutch respondents do not
recognize it as being about secularity because their picture of religion is much more
benign: To them, it is simply a nonissue.
But in that case, why not state the research objective in those terms – ‘different
implicit attitudes to religion’ – rather than go to the metalevel and cloud things
by abstracting in terms of the secular? Second, remember that what gets done
to Muslims and humanists mattered only in part when charting the respondent’s
implicit attitudes toward religion. It proved equally important to note when it was
not about religion, but about immigrants, consumers, political actors, or simply
groups. Finally, if conceived as being about religion, for respondents this was
not automatically coupled to an understanding of the secular or secularism (see
discussion of quotations in Section 7.5.2).
These nuances are all but lost on the Asadians. The analytic frameworks of Asad,
Hurd, and Dressler/Mandair do not allow for specifying the noncase. They also
foreclose the possibility that, for the laymen, something can be about religion and
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whether the state “facilitates religious communities?”11 But for the laymen it has
nothing to dowith ‘secularism’ or ‘being secular’ (see quotations in Section 7.5.2 and
discussion in Section 7.6.3). In the heuristic of Asad, Hurd, and Dressler/Mandair,
however, each instance of religion-making is a case of secularism (Section 2.3.4).
In other words, the meaning and conceptual hierarchy of the terms in the ev-
eryday world are in fundamental conflict with that of the scholar. The result is
that when we look through their analytic lenses, we necessarily misunderstand our
respondents. We simply find reconfirmed the implicit epistemological picture of
the Asadian scholar (Section 7.6.3).
8.4.1.3 Back to Asad and the International Discussion on the Secular
This speaks to an international research agenda on multiple secularisms. In a
terminological sense, it suggests that secularism is deeply contextual (in this case:
French) as well as an unnecessarily mystifying terminology. And much in line with
arguments by postcolonial scholars, for example, B. Sayyid, it raises questions about
the consequences of superimposing a secular religious binary on the analysis. He
raises this for the study of Islam: “Are we not re-reading that history according to
Western categories and its implied epistemology and politics?” (2009, 194).
To my mind, we do not need to travel outside the West to see this occurring.
Furthermore, my concern is a methodological one rather than one with Western
imperialism. Everyday burial professionals in Norway and The Netherlands fail to
use the words ‘secularism’ and ‘secular’ to make sense of their actions. Substantively
speaking, concerns with secularism turned out not to be an explicit theme or
transnational leitmotif. And even when we explored them as a tacit motivation, the
binary of wholeness versus fragmentation/separation seemed more relevant.
Can we generalize that latter finding? Well, on this point I am hesitant.12 My
intention was not to trade one leading binary for another as the basis for an inter-
national research agenda. Rather, it was to show the need for contextual sensitivity
and generic scholarly framing for such international agendas. That said, my finding
might point to the more artificial and likely elitist nature of a term like secularism.
Although the underlying current in the multiple secularism debate is to dismiss the
master narrative of secularization and secularism as ‘Eurocentric,’ ‘one dimensional,’
or ‘overly deductive,’ this debate is itself still pretty theoretical and deductive. If the
main theorists suggest a phenomenological turn toward the lived experience of
11 I rely on the words of the juridical burial expert in The Netherlands (Section 6.5.2).
12 The empirical context from which I would generalize is that of a burial domain and everyday level of
application. Yet, when looking at the issue of ritual slaughtering in an analysis of political discourse
(rather than municipal praxis), other metaframes might be relevant.
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secularism, then they must be open to the possibility that their (liberal) categories
conflict with understanding that world on its own terms.
Why is it important to stay close to the terms used in the everyday world? Well,
for one, the contributors to this debate agree about being sceptical toward grand
narratives. Referring once more to Asad’s own words (Section 2.3.4), getting rid
of this universal metanarrative serves the purpose of being in a better position to
describe things in their own terms, partly attempted in the move from ‘secularism’
in the singular to ‘secularisms.’
Yet, by introducing the term ‘secularism’ for explanatory purposes (or descriptive
ones), one still takes for granted that a certain historical change is normative. I
would go as far to say even when it is your explicit objective (as is the case with Asad
or Casanova) to cancel out, or question, those standard normative connotations.
Then it does not help to keep using the term, or alternatively add ‘post-‘ signifiers.
Scholars need a language that is better suited to describe ways of life. Casanova
(2013, 46) formulates it well:
(…) when it comes to “religion” and its antonym, “the secular,” there is no global rule.
We must humbly recognize that many of our received categories fail us when we try
to understand developments in the rest of the world, in that rather than facilitating
understanding these categories actually lead to a fundamental misunderstanding. (…) We
first need a “de-secularization” of our consciousness and of our secularist and modernist
categories before we can develop better concepts to understand the novelty and the
modernity of these developments
I do not think we need to travel outside the West to see this.
8.5 Ramifications for the Theoretical Scholarship on Governing
Minorities
In the following and final round of discussion, I want to review some of the previous
findings, albeit with the aim of drawing out more explicit theoretical and meta-
analytic implications. The theme of reification was central to the two scholarly
literatures on which this book rests.
For Asadians, showing how ideas or cultural practices “are discursively reified as
‘religious’ ones” (Dressler/Mandair: 2011, 21) has a deconstructive purpose. The ef-
fort of defining religion converges for Asad (1993, 28) with a liberal political agenda,
or is part of a colonial cartography for classifying and surveying.13 Political scien-
tists in the immigration and governance literature question reified one-dimensional
13 King (2011, 38) speaks of religion as an “imaginative cartography of Western modernity.”
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national models in order to develop better analytic tools for studying immigration
or integration.
In both scholarly agendas, deconstruction can be a useful method for developing
a better comparative understanding. Yet, paradoxically, I conclude, it is precisely
Asadians who run the risk of reification. Furthermore, both scholarly agendas
should reckon with the limitations that come from a mere discourse analytic ap-
proach. I illustrate this with three examples.
8.5.1 Deepening the Thematic of Scholarly Reification
I. Reification Through the One-Dimensional National Model. By now it is well es-
tablished that, contrary to the standard images of what these states do to Muslims
and humanists – France the laic society, The Netherlands the pillarizing society,
and Norway a society ruled by an established Christian state church (until 2012)
– these countries end up being quite similar in their responses at the level of mu-
nicipal praxis. But maybe more interesting at this point, this study also suggests
why these standard images nevertheless retain some validity: They are still partially
reflected in the legal burial rules – which is exactly where the countries indeed vary
enormously. So, if scholars working on religion and state focus solely on the formal
and official levels of policymaking, their analysis will turn up these large national
differences.
But I found an even deeper reason for why these national images are reproduced:
They surface in the public reasoning of the local agents themselves. Bertossi (2012)
suggested that national models get reproduced because scholars focus only on
the formal levels of law and policymaking. Yet, in my analysis, the lower-level
administrators in France were in fact more inclined to explain their actions with
reference to laïcité. The higher-ranked administrators or political actors (such as
the mayor of Montreuil), in turn, had greater levels of discretion at their disposition,
allowing for more “honest” accounts. So, if taken at face value, these models reify
what is a more nuanced empirical reality. Correcting this too ideological focus then
becomes not just a matter of shifting levels of governance; it demands looking at
actual material praxis.
The French context has enjoyed ample attention in this study. In this country,
the conflict between theory and praxis is extremely manifest (and, as an aside, also
quite fun!). Yet, Bader’s claim (2007b, 833) about a “huge” gap between ideology
and actual practice did hold true somewhat for the Norwegian commitment to
evenhandedness.
Despite expressed concerns about treating all minorities equally in light of the
existing hegemony of the Church of Norway, humanist burial claims resonate dif-
ferently – but not because Norwegian professionals intend to discriminate. On the
contrary, humanists are treated very equally and are offered the same solution of
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individual consecration or use of a Christian chapel for their burial ceremonies. Yet,
that solution hardly fulfills their needs. Their disadvantage lies in the tacit presump-
tion of the Norwegian burial agents that humanists are (somewhat annoyingly)
political actors and thus not ‘religious.’ What matters for the burial professionals is
being pragmatic and caring about consecration. The principled humanist complaint
thereby misfires.14 Furthermore, their burial request is of a symbolic and ultimately
negative quality: It is defined by what humanists do not want. They resist the sym-
bolic order and dominance of one church andwant to leave the symbolic space open
(e.g., the neutral ceremonial room). As also observed for French Muslims, symbolic
claims are much more politically sensitive and thereby harder to accommodate
than requests for concrete material accommodations.
In the case of Amsterdam, there is a significant discrepancy between ideological
concerns with state-church neutrality and the mayor’s actions in the question of
the public financing of the Islamic washing facility.
II. Reification by Mistaking Discursive Relevance for Explanatory Relevance. Con-
cerns with reification also resulted in an investigation of proposals formore nuanced
modelling. State-organized religion legacies are historical products, containingmul-
tiple strands of reasoning that can be evoked at different times, regarding different
issues, and even regarding different minorities. Public framing also played a role in
these more heterogeneous conceptions.
The case of the mayor of Montreuil is such an example: In his discourse, he is
intent on seeing the question of cemeteries as a pragmatic matter. Do not evoke
laïcité, he says, as that will only get the attention of the extreme right. Furthermore,
he reinterprets the 1905 law (or more precisely the associational script) as capable
of meeting modern challenges.
We could explain his actions by noting, first of all, that he attacks the matter as a
practical issue and, second, by relating to the French regime as internally plural. Yet,
as we have gone to great lengths arguing, this risks overinterpreting the outcome as
a proof of the model. Explaining the existence of sections in Montreuil by means of
these discursive factors would mean missing out on other relevant ones: the existing
Jewish sections, the mayor’s flirting with the Muslim community, the logique du
terrain and the pragmatism that comes with this institutional domain.
Some of these scripts in the more nuanced model thus have discursive relevance,
but I remain sober about their full explanatory power. Theoretically, this means that
I confirm claims by a scholar like Maussen (2009), that looking at changes in the
14 The difficulty for humanists is that they operate in an institutional context in which they are treated
on par with religious communities. This is relevant for funding and formal representation. Yet, at
the same time they do not want to be like the other religious groups.
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public framing of an issue can help us to understand differences in policy responses.
Yet, I qualify that argument by saying that that the framing issues (institutional
regimes, among which the state-organized religious legacies) better explain the
discursive policy responses15 than they do the material policy responses. They
matter more for their understanding of how agents talk than what they do. For
policy studies looking at shifts in public discourse, this book is thus a reminder
that actual (material) policy outcomes might differ.
III. Reification by Fixating One’s Analysis on One Concept Only. Lastly, our discursive
investigation into the usage of secularism revealed a final example of possible
scholarly reification. The contribution is here twofold.
On the one hand, this entailed an argument about a specific concept concerning
‘secularism’ or some of its cognates ‘postsecularism.’ Terminologically, I judged
secularism to be too normatively charged to serve as a generic concept for compar-
ison. And to borrow Bader’s wording, evoking secularism means “going meta.”16
Methodologically, a scholarly framing in terms of comparative secularism or sec-
ularities would suggest some communality between national contexts, whereas
‘secularism’ had discursive relevance as an element of difference.
This first finding touches on a debate over the suitability of secularism as a
scholarly term of analysis. In line with proposals in sociology to “drop the term
secularization from all theoretical discourse” (Stark/Iannaconne: 1994, 231) and
questions about religion as a universal category within religious studies, there is
also a debate in a range of disciplines about whether to abandon the scholarly
terminology of secularism altogether.17 Bader makes this argument most forcefully
for the purpose of political theory (see Bader: 2009b and Bhargava: 2009b) and the
social sciences.
I lean toward Bader’s argument that the terminology of ‘secularism’ makes schol-
ars focus on the wrong Leitdifferenz. My contribution has been to engage this
meta-analytic discussion from within the analysis of concrete everyday worlds and
to extend it to descriptive and genealogical ways of working with secularism. Yet,
15 How they understand the solutions provided for and the possible social tension (or lack thereof)
involved.
16 Rather than cloud our scholarly (or public) discourse with abstract metaterms, scholars should
economize their language. If you use ‘secularism’ to denote a state attitude for preventing religious
oppression, why not call it something like ‘state prevention of religious discrimination’? (2009b,
567). Substantively, Bader connects this to a claim about the priority of democracy. Rather than ask
how ‘secular’ states are, ask whether they are compatible with and conducive to minimal morality or
minimal liberal democratic morality (cf. Bader: 2007a, 93).
17 In postcolonial studies, scholars remark on the “need to go beyond the conceptual and practical
vocabulary provided by the language of secularism and religion” (Cady/Hurd: 2010, 23).
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I also depart from Bader, by taking more seriously than he does (or needs to do)
that the term can have real meaning for agents in the field. I think this insight is
valid in the work of Asad and Casanova. In sum, I take an interdisciplinary and
pragmatic position on the question of abandonment.18
However, and this constitutes the second contribution and more general method-
ological point, if a genealogical approach to secularism (or any other category for
that matter) is to be used as the basis for comparative field analysis, it requires
answering the question: Who is doing the deployment? And who is not arguing
about secularism? What are they arguing about instead? Emic understandings of a
given praxis or solution might stand in tension with scholarly terminology. Here, I
have attempted to carry the debate forward by employing the strategy of ‘actual’ or
‘perceived deployment.’
8.5.2 Engaging the Discursive Turn and Proposing an Additional Material
Turn
At the utmost general level, then, this book has engaged the project questions: How
do states respond to the new diversity? And what scholarly frameworks or concepts
are best suitable for international comparisons of these responses?
By way of the shortest answers: they respond legally and discursively very dif-
ferently yet act similarly. Best suitable for the international comparison of these
responses are generic analytic frameworks, the concepts of which allow for the
meaning-giving process of the people whose social world is under study; and
frameworks that complement discourse analysis with an analysis of the material
dimensions of governance.
The dynamics of accommodation observed resulted from (a) negotiations be-
tween minorities themselves and public/private burial actors; (b) a set of institu-
tional regimes among which burial and state-church legacies as well as ‘integration’;
(c) the level of praxis.19 Professional public discourse played a role insofar as the
decision-makers make sense of the burial demand in light of these factors through
their discourse (d). Because public discourse is amenable to change, other public
framings might lead to other regulations. And agents can reinterpret a given insti-
tutional script through their discursive foreground abilities, resulting in different
actions.
18 I suggest evaluating secularism terminology internal to the discipline, i.e., investigating “how al-
ternative meanings are connected with the specific goals and context of research” (Collier/Adock:
1999, 540). Pragmatically, I concur that “how scholars understand and operationalize a concept can
and should depend in part on what they are going to do with it.”
19 These encompass professional codes, cultural narratives/sensibilities, and a logic of the terrain.
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The book thus engaged a discursive turn in the scholarship for answering the
question of institutional accommodation. It has concluded that this shift toward
discourse in the social sciences and comparative institutional literature represents an
improvement. It provides the insight that institutions are not only internally plural,
but also multi-interpretable. Institutional outcomes that contradict the expectations
of the institutional model can, in a revised version, nevertheless be seen to be in
line with the model.
When applied to the literature on state-church legacies, this allows for richer and
more descriptively accurate20 models. These are one part in the puzzle of why states
treat Muslims or humanists this way over another.
The focus on public framing furthermore brought to light that governments
regulate ‘religions’ not just via their religious and immigration policies (cf. Bader:
2003a). Rather, other domains, like hygiene or in theDutch case urban planning and
commercial regulations provide numerous possibilities and constraints. Depending
on how the issue is seen and framed, other regulations – or different elements of
the state-church regime – can come into play.
Integrating insights from the Asadian scholars showed how the definition of
what is and what is not ‘Islam’ entailed another aspect of discursive governance.
And this had concrete consequences, for example, in how Islamic sections were
given form (the Hague case study) or to whom burial agencies chose to cater their
services (Al-Khidmat, an Islamic undertaker in Oslo, Norway).
But this discursive turn and scholarly focus on framing also revealed some limi-
tations. As mentioned, scholars should not take public discourse too seriously, since
focusing analytically only on discourse may overemphasize national differences.
It poses the challenge of overinterpretation (reification) and the risk that every
institutional outcome is interpreted as proof of the institutional model.
First, focusing onmaterial analysis and investigating a range of factors can redress
this problem. Second, it helps to be conscious throughout (or at least as much as
possible) of the role ofmodels and normative categories. Do they fulfill a descriptive,
discursive (normative), or explanatory function? How do the respondents justify
their normative commitments? Where do they see the issue? This requires moving
back and forth between scholarly models and categories on the one hand and an
empirical reality on the other.
Needless to say, Asadian scholars are vulnerable to this critique aswell. In this type
of scholarship, the analytic line between description, prescription, and explanation
is not very clear to begin with.21 But even if we take them to task on the level of
20 They describe more accurately the variety of possibly contradicting strands of reasoning.
21 Asad shifts register between merely showing the discursive structure of a narrative of modernity,
providing for a normative critique of secularism, or describing ways of life in the West, Section 2.3.4.
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analysis at which they are best – discursive mapping – the risk of overinterpretation
in their analysis is large. Exactly because the deployment of categories like religion
and secularism is always normatively charged, serving one purpose or another, they
are hard pressed to apply that insight to their own scholarly interventions.
Yet, there is no critical reflection of the presuppositions of their own scholarly
heuristics. By fixating their analysis on the deployment of one concept (e.g., religion,
secularism) internal to a set of practices (law, politics), they prevent their analysis
from being open to the meaning-giving process of the everyday world and its emic
terminology (that might not recognize it as religion or secularism to begin with).
This works in the cases of ‘actual deployment’ but demands explicit consideration
in situations of conflict between emic and etic terminology.
Both arguments (being conscious of the role of models/concepts and comple-
menting discourse analysis with material dimensions) ultimately have ramifications
for an interdisciplinary discussion about Islam – and humanists – in Europe. They
contain methodological suggestions for future comparative research, as they re-
late meta-analytical concerns regarding appropriate scholarly concepts to concrete
everyday worlds and vernacular understandings.
This book’s two-pronged strategy productively showed that the discursive real-
ity of the societal accommodation of minorities is one important aspect of what
“happens to Muslims in Europe” – or humanists – in Norway. Yet, the outcomes
of this study are a sober reminder that material reality might differ. Furthermore,
scholars intending to study the ‘lived experience’ of minorities and public agents in
the West are advised to work with concepts that have a boundary (even if only a
vague one); and to work within an analytic framework that is generic enough to
allow for the meaning-giving process of the people living that life.
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Appendix I: Research Questions at Different Levels
Level A: Metalevel Project Questions
How do states respond to the new religious and cultural diversity?What scholarly
frameworks or concepts are best suited for international comparisons of these
responses?
Level B: General Research Questions
1) What are the institutional and discursive policy responses to Muslim and hu-
manist burial needs and related processes when compared between countries
and over time? What (national) similarities and differences do we observe?
2) What role does a state-organized religion legacy or national repertoire play in
determining burial outcomes?
3) How is secularism used and argued for?
Level C: Patterns of Policy Outcomes
At this level we compare outcomes at three levels of governance across national
contexts.
1) Institutional: What types of legal and material solutions do we see across em-
bedded cases across countries? What pattern of similarities and differences
arises?
2) Discursive: What pattern of similarities and differences arises when comparing
discursive national and municipal responses?
3) What was the role of Muslims/humanists themselves in the process? This shows
the more general process of institutionalization of ‘religion,’ see Scheme 6.2:
actor constellation chart.
4) What is the relevance of a state-church legacy and ‘secularism’?
Level D: Questions Operationalized within Each National Context and Embedded
Case Study
This level provides basic information for formulating the legal, national policy
level and municipal patterns of level C and as discussed in Chapter 6 and 7.
1) What is the formal legal framework regarding religious diversity in the cemetery?
What are the institutional characteristics of this domain (who owns, pays for,
who administratively governs cemeteries)?What is the implicit social imaginary
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of the cemetery in the legislation? What is the historical context of state church
relations for these burial regulations? (Chapter 3)
2) What policy guidelines and changes occurred in this domain over time in
response to the demands ofminorities?What are the institutional and discursive
political responses and related processes in responding to Muslim and humanist
burial needs? (Chapter 4)
3) For each embedded case study: What are the relevant processes that produce
burial outcomes and related actors/decision-makers? Second, what material
solutions do the institutional decision-makers provide for, or avoid? Third, how
do they (or the minorities in question) give meaning to these solutions chosen
and how do they justify the solution? Fourth, how do they talk about and frame
the issue at hand? (Chapter 5)
Level E: Questions Posed to the Individual Respondents. See Appendix II.
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Appendix II: General Interview Guide
Introduction
– Welcome and thank you for participating in this interview.
– What is your function in the organization?
I. Political situation and its historical context: burial challenges and solutions
– Can you tell me a little bit about controversial issues in the cemetery in your
daily work?
– What is the position of your organization herein? What do you think matters?
– Could you give me some historical background? How has this issue evolved?
– In the Norwegian context, what do you think are the main reasons for the 1996
legal change?
– Should Norway maintain this regulation in the future? Why (not)?
Muslim or humanist representatives:
– Could you tell me about the needs of your community in matters burial?
– Have these needs always been relevant?
II. Process
– Can you explain to me how this everyday burial process works? If a Muslim
family expresses the wish for special accommodations, what do you do?
– Could you explain to me how this confessional section/Islamic cemetery/hu-
manist provision came into being?
– What were/are the parties involved?
– Who took the initiative?
Muslim or humanist representatives:
– What is the role of your own Islamic/humanist organization in obtaining special
burial provisions?
– Do you feel your groups’ burial needs are met with understanding?
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– Do you cooperate with other (confessional) groups?
– What is needed to improve the situation?
III. What are the main (normative) considerations at stake?
– What, in your opinion, are some of the main reasons for providing a special
part of the cemetery for Muslims or other religious communities (or not)?
– What solutions do you think are most appropriate? What should be avoided?
For all respondents but especially policy-makers, legal experts:
– What (normative) considerations do you think the lawmaker had in mind when
stipulating these regulations?
– What do you think should be the main considerations?
– Do you think different groups are treated equally in the cemetery?
Muslim or humanist representatives:
– Why, and how, should the state or respective cemetery owner accommodate
your wishes?
IV. Conceptual: How do actors talk about the issue?
If no reference to secularism is made, ask toward the end of the conversation:
– How does secularism affect your daily work in the cemetery?
Muslim or humanist representatives:
– How does secularism have a bearing on your claims toward the state/the
cemetery-owners?
Ending
– Is there anything you would like to further add or ask?
– Thank you so much for your time and information!
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Appendix III: Overview of Interviews Conducted
Interviews held in France
Professional occupation, organization, and place of interview Date(s) of interview(s)
1. Advisor of the Major and City Council Bobigny, La municipalité de
Bobigny, Bobigny
2 February 2009
2. Functionary in Les Amis du Musée Funéraire National d’AMFN,
Paris
3 February 2009
3. Sociologist, l’Université Paris V – René-Descartes, Paris 4 February 2009
4. Muslim burial undertaker Pompes funèbres Musulmane el Badre,
Paris
4 February 2009
5. Former advisor to the Minister of Interior and Professor Imam
Teaching at the Catholic Seminar, Paris
5 February 2009
6. Former President of the CRCM Rhône d’Alpes, Lyon 10 February 2009
7. Member of the commission carrés musulmanes, Lyon 11 February 2009
8. Muslim burial undertaker, Lyon 12 February 2009
9. Conservator, Le cimetière Parisien de Thiais, Paris 2 October 2012
10. Conservator, Le cimetière Parisien de Pantin, Paris 3 October 2012
11. Administrative Director of the Cemetery Services, Le service des
cimetières de Paris, Paris
9 October 2012
12. Administrative leader of the Civil Services and Cemetery Services
(Service État civil/Cimetière)
Assistant to the Office of Conservation (Bureaux des conservations)
Group interview with both in Montreuil
4 October 2012
13. Former Mayor, La municipalité de Montreuil, Montreuil 10 October 2012
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Interviews held in Norway
Professional occupation, organization, and place of interview Date(s) of interview(s)
1. Senior advisor in Matters Burial, Human –Etisk Forbund
(HEF), Oslo
22 October 2008
4 November 2018 (phone)
2. General Secretary for the Council of Free Churches,
Frikirkelig Råd, Oslo
24 November 2008
3. Department Head Church Employer and Interest Organization,
Kirkelig arbeidsgiver og interesseorganisasjon (KA), Oslo
23 October 2008




5. Secretary General, Islamic Council of Norway
Islamsk Råd Norge (IRN), Oslo
27 July 2009
6. Church Minister (sogneprest) in Elverum and Dean of Church
(prost) in Sør Østerdal, Elverum
17 November 2008
23 July 2009
7. Former Director General of the Department of Ecclesiastical
Affairs, Oslo
1 November 2012
8. Senior Adviser Norwegian Ministry of Government
Administration, Reform, and Church Affairs, Oslo
7 December 2012
9. Dean of Church (prost) in Gaudal, Trondheim. 17 October 2013
10. Burial representative and ceremonial leader in HEF,
Trondheim
17 October 2013
11. Church Warden Støren, Støren 18 October 2013
12. Advisor Cemetery Affairs of Church of Norway,
Gravplasrådgiver i Den norske kirke, Oslo
14 October 2013
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Interviews held in The Netherlands
Professional occupation, organization, and place of interview Date(s) of interview(s)
1. Consultant for the National Organization of Cemeteries,
Landelijke Organisatie van Begraafplaatsen (LOB), Amsterdam
3 December 2008
20 August 2012
2. Director of the Department of Municipal Cemeteries in The
Hague, Afdeling Begraafplaatsen Gemeente Den Haag;
Director Catholic Cemetery (Stichting Rooms Katholieke
Begraafplaatsen te ‘s- Gravenhage); Legal expert,
unaffiliated (Jurist)
Group interview with all three in The Hague
4 December 2008
3. Director of the Department of Municipal Cemeteries in The
Hague, Afdeling Begraafplaatsen Gemeente Den Haag, The
Hague
21 April 2009
4. Representative Humanistic Organization Humanistisch
Archief, Amsterdam
4 December 2008
5. President of the Association for Islamic Burial, Stichting
Islamitisch Begrafeniswezen (IBW), Eindhoven
9 December 2008
6. Director of the Cemetery and Crematorium Essenhof,
Begraafplaats en Crematorium Essenhof
19 March 2009 (phone)
7. Board member of the Islamic Foundation Al Raza, Stichting
van Almeerse Moslims Al Raza, Almere
18 March 2009 (phone)
17 June 2009
8. Historian burial history, unaffiliated, Arnhem 14 August 2012
9. Funeral expert, unaffiliated, Funerair deskundige 25 March 2009 (phone)
10. Juridical advisor in matters burial, Juridisch Adviesbureau,
Velp
10 August 2012
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